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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to examine how transformation is defining feminist bioethics and to 
determine the nature of this transformation. Behind the quest for transformation is core feminism and its 
political implications, namely, that women and other marginalized groups have been given unequal 
consideration in society and the sciences and that this situation is unacceptable and should be remedied. 
The goal of the dissertation is to determine how feminist bioethicists integrate the transformation into their 
respective fields and how they apply the potential of feminism to bioethical theories and practice.  
On a theoretical level, feminist bioethicists wish to reveal how current ways of knowing are 
based on inequality. Feminists pay special attention especially to communal and political contexts and to 
the power relations endorsed by each community. In addition, feminist bioethicists endorse relational 
ethics, a relational account of the self in which the interconnectedness of persons is important. On the 
conceptual level, feminist bioethicists work with beliefs, concepts, and practices that give us our world. As 
an example, I examine how feminist bioethicists have criticized and redefined the concept of autonomy. 
Feminist bioethicists emphasize relational autonomy, which is based on the conviction that social 
relationships shape moral identities and values. On the practical level, I discuss stem cell research as a 
test case for feminist bioethics and its ability to employ its methodologies. Analyzing these perspectives 
allowed me first, to compare non-feminist and feminist accounts of stem cell ethics and, second, to 
analyze feminist perspectives on the novel biotechnology. Along with offering a critical evaluation of the 
stem cell debate, the study shows that sustainable stem cell policies should be grounded on empirical 
knowledge about how donors perceive stem cell research and the donation process.  
The study indicates that feminist bioethics should develop the use of empirical bioethics, 
which takes the nature of ethics seriously: ethical decisions are provisional and open for further 
consideration. In addition, the study shows that there is another area of development in feminist 
bioethics: the understanding of (moral) agency. I argue that agency should be understood to mean that 
actions create desires. 
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1 Introduction  
Every day, individuals, families, and medical professionals are faced with difficult medical decisions. Most 
of these cases involve some form of medical intervention or medical technology, whether it be a question 
of administering drugs, using a ventilator, or some other medical technology. Some of these interventions 
are familiar and have been in use for a long time, such as drugs or surgery. Some are novel, such as 
organ transplants. What is common to all these interventions is that they have changed profoundly in the 
past few decades. When antibiotics or bone marrow transplants were once a novel invention, they are 
now a routinely used “technique”. What we now consider to be novel biotechnology may well become 
standard procedure within a few decades. 
The rise of novel biosciences and their applications has an enormous impact on society as 
whole in shaping our understanding of concepts such as life, and death, sickness and health. Moreover, 
the novel bio-based applications affect a growing number of people as the technologies become 
standard, more easily acquired, and more affordable. The life-altering capacity of these technologies 
requires the examination of the ethical and social consequences of the new biosciences and 
biotechnologies.  
  
 
1.1 Feminist Bioethics  
Bioethics is an academic field concerned with ethical questions related to biosciences and their 
applications. Bioethics began as a movement in the late 1960s during an era of social upheaval in North 
America. The movement targeted abuses of medical authority, such as the experiments by Nazi doctors 
and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, in which poor and mostly illiterate African-American men were denied 
treatment for syphilis while being studied for long-term effects of the disease. After the 1960s, the 
bioethics movement took the form of an academic discipline and has since become a philosophical study 
of the ethical controversies in biosciences and medicine.1  
At the same time as the bioethics movement arose, so-called second-wave feminism took 
hold.2 Among other issues, second-wave feminism was interested in topics related to women’s health. 
Activists campaigned for less expensive and more convenient contraceptive methods, research on the 
physiology of menopause, and inclusion of women in clinical trials. During the 1970s, feminist scholars 
                                                        
1 Donchin 2004a, 1/12. “[B]ioethics has grown into a highly professionalized interdisciplinary field that borrows from a cluster of 
interrelated areas of scholarship, including philosophy, law, medicine, and the social and biological sciences.” Donchin 2004a, 
1/12. 
2 Second-wave feminism refers to a period of feminist activity that lasted from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. It addressed a 
wide-range of issues related to social and legal injustices, family, sexuality, work and reproductive rights. 
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began to discuss and implement the issues for which feminist activists were campaigning. They 
examined the abortion debate, the reproductive inventions, and other “women-centered” questions in 
medical ethics.3 
Despite the proximity in time, the two discourses, bioethics and feminism, did not at first 
join forces. The situation has changed since the late 1980s and the early 1990s when feminist scholars of 
philosophy and social theory began using the resources of their fields to evaluate and extend the 
prevailing bioethical framework. In 1989, Hypatia, a journal of feminist philosophy, published two volumes 
on feminism and medical ethics.4 Steadily, different feminist perspectives on bioethics have begun to 
emerge as a distinctive academic sub-field. Since the 1990s the situation has changed, and feminist 
bioethics has become an academic discourse of its own.5 The publication of Susan Sherwin’s No Longer 
Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care in 1992 marked the beginning of a steady stream of academic 
publications on feminist bioethics. Since that time, several monographs, anthologies, and essays on 
feminist bioethics have been published.  
An important landmark in the history of feminist bioethics was the establishment of the 
International Network on Feminist Approaches to Bioethics (FAB) in 1992 at the Inaugural Congress of 
the International Association of Bioethics.6 FAB has emphasized the diversity of themes in feminist 
bioethics. Since 1996, FAB has organized biannual international conferences, which have resulted in 
published proceedings.7 According to FAB, its aim is 
to develop a more inclusive theory of bioethics, taking seriously the standpoints and experiences 
of women and other marginalized social groups; to examine assumptions of bioethical discourse 
that privilege those already in power; and to create new methodologies and strategies responsive 
to the disparate conditions of women’s lives across the globe.8  
FAB emphasizes theoretical aspects in descriptions of its task of developing the theory of bioethics. In 
addition, an applied perspective on bioethics is important. Anne Donchin, a feminist bioethicist and a 
board member of FAB, articulates the aims of the network as being to 
internationalize bioethics: to rectify the sweeping disregard of women’s health care issues within 
mainstream bioethics literature and to build a nonhierarchical, nonelitist, geographically diverse 
                                                        
3 Donchin 2004a, 1-3/12; Lindemann Nelson 2003, 888-889. “The protest movements of the 1960s and increasing 
medicalization and commodification of women’s bodily functions rekindled concern about the sexist bias in medical research 
and practice and fed a fledgling women’s health movement.” Donchin 2004a, 3/12. 
4 Lindemann Nelson 2003, 888-889. 
5 Lindemann Nelson 2003, 888-889. 
6 FAB. www.fabnet.org/what_is_fab.php. Accessed July 2, 2007. 
7 Embodying Bioethics: Recent Feminist Advances was published in 1999 as a result of the 1996 conference; the 1998 
conference in Japan led to the publication of Globalizing Feminist Bioethics: Crosscultural Perspectives in 2001; and the 2002 
conference in Brazil resulted in Linking Visions: Feminist Bioethics, Human Rights, and the Developing World in 2004. In 2006 
FAB held its sixth conference in Beijing, China. The resulting anthology, Feminist Bioethics: At the Centre, On the Margins was 
published in 2010. 
8 FAB 2007. 
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grassroots movement with a collaborative structure that is open to all – academics and 
professionals, health care activists, and concerned groups in all fields.9 
These accounts indicate that both theoretical approaches and practical points of view are an integral part 
of FAB’s work, which is done from “feminist viewpoints.”   
FAB does not explain which feminist viewpoints it means, but states that it seeks “equity 
for women in all of their roles” and that its members “promote diversity and oppose all forms of 
oppression.” In this FAB joins those feminists in favor of “core feminism.”10 Although not all feminists 
share the same definitions of feminist viewpoints, those committed to feminist viewpoints largely rely on 
two positions: women and men have been treated differently in most societies, and women have 
systematically been unable to participate fully in all social arenas and institutions. Those committed to 
core feminism desire to change these situations.11 Feminist bioethicists fight oppression based not only 
on gender or sex, but also on race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, economic class, and other differences 
associated with unequal power relations.  
Non-feminist bioethics has been accused of being indifferent to these issues. Feminist 
bioethicists criticize standard bioethics for ignoring oppression in medical settings and focusing only on 
generic human beings instead of real persons who come from different backgrounds and who are 
affected by different social relationships. Mainstream bioethical theories are said to be blind to the 
contextual and relational details of human life. The subjects of bioethics are abstracted from differences 
in attributes and physical properties. The adoption of a general perspective leads to the omission of 
important experiences and masks power structures.12 Feminist bioethicists therefore, propose that 
bioethicists should learn from other experiences in order to gain a wider perspective on contextual details 
and power relations.13  
By questioning the structure of both bioethical theory and health care practices, it is 
possible to analyze oppression and injustice. For that reason, the function of feminist bioethics is to seek 
                                                        
9 Donchin 2001a, 1. 
10 Donchin & Purdy 1999, 3; Purdy 1996, 146. 
11 “First, women are, as a group, worse off than men because their interests routinely fail to be given equal consideration. 
Second, that state of affairs is unjust and should be remedied.” Purdy 1996, 146. 
12 Donchin & Purdy 1999, 2-4; Lindemann Nelson 2003, 889; Purdy 1996, 144; Sherwin 1996a, 56-57; Tong 1997, 75; Tong 
2001a, 28; Warren 1992, 33; Wolf 1999, 65-66. “[A]lthough some moral agents may adopt a common denominator moral 
perspective without feeling that anything of value is lost, others may feel the loss intensely. The reason for this loss is that 
persons whose unique experiences have been largely omitted from the dominant culture – e.g., women, Blacks, gay males 
and lesbians – may find the stripping away of particularity from the moral observer to be anathema to self. By subtracting 
those features that shed light on their experience and life, such individuals may become, at least in part, invisible to 
themselves.” Warren 1992, 33. 
13 Little 1996, 2/10; Sherwin 2001, 12-18; Wolf 1996, 18. Feminist bioethicists point out that the lack of interest in contextual 
details is due to the centrality of theories in established bioethics. These theories do not take into account the impact of power 
relations to health care, medicine, and biosciences. Feminists point out that science – and thus medicine and also bioethics – 
is always situated and contextual. Sherwin 2001; Wolf 1996, 5, 14-15. “[T]raditional moral theories obscure the ways in which 
power relations structure health care practices.” Sherwin 2001, 13. 
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and expose traces of sexism and oppression within bioethical theories as well as in health care 
practices.14  
A number of feminist bioethicists are alarmed by the impact that bioethics seems to have 
on the existing power relations. In their view, the problem is that, instead of fighting oppression, 
established bioethics has both in theory and in practice sustained oppression.15 Feminists should thus 
examine how bioethics legitimizes existing power relations and especially gender oppression.16  
Feminist bioethicists maintain that since mainstream bioethics has been linked to those in 
positions of power, it has not taken seriously enough the (feminist) call for change in hierarchies, power 
relations, and attitudes to the less well-off.17 Within mainstream bioethics, existing medical practices are 
not being questioned, but rather defended and rationalized. Often the focus is on power: who should be 
the primary decision-maker in a given situation? Feminist bioethicists claim that this question leads 
bioethicists to focus on the competition for power and status. Instead of paying attention to patient 
experience, bioethics emphasizes, endorses, and reproduces the importance of medical expertise. At the 
same time, bioethicists have themselves acquired the role of experts. While medical expertise is in the 
hands of doctors, ethical expertise is in the hands of bioethicists, resulting in a mutual reinforcement of 
power.18 Feminist bioethicists maintain that the structure of bioethics should be more adaptive to lay 
perspectives, that is, the perspectives of patients, families, communities, and research subjects.19 This 
shift would  
render lay accounts and social science analyses at least as important as the professional medical 
and scientific accounts. It would force bioethics to take a close look at caregiving and research 
options outside of traditional medicine and science.20 
Seemingly, feminist bioethicists hope for a change in medicine, both as a science and as a practice.  
                                                        
14 For example, Susan Sherwin claims that feminist bioethics has a dual-task: “Feminist critiques of both the methodology and 
tools of ethics that suggest that an underlying gender bias is implicit in the existing ethical theories. … A principal characteristic 
of feminist bioethics is the critical interest it takes in the oppressive aspects of medical organization and practice.” Sherwin 
1996a, 54. “[W]hen feminists approach the field of bioethics they have reason to consider carefully what role this newly defined 
discipline plays in the existing structures of oppression.” Sherwin 1996a, 49, 50-52, 57. See also Donching & Purdy 1999, 2-3; 
Tong 1997, 75. “In general, feminist bioethicists have been especially dissatisfied with the centrality of traditional moral 
theories in bioethics. They note that the theories ignore rather than highlight and critique the ways in which oppression is 
woven into the various medical practices under review.” Sherwin 2001,13. Emphasis added. “There is a mutual reinforcement 
between bioethics and medicine.” Overall 1996, 172. Emphasis added. 
15 Overall 1996, 178-179; Rawlinson 2001, 414; Sherwin 1996a, 49, 54 ; Sherwin 2001, 12-18. 
16 Sherwin 1992a, 4. 
17 Holmes 1999, 53-56. “When bioethics enters into partnership with those experts and authorities, it is allying itself with those 
least interested in feminist challenges to traditional hierarchies. Thus, when bioethics focuses on hospitals, professional 
societies, and physician-patient relations and ignores feminist clinics, the Black Women’s Health Project, and nurse-practioner-
patient relations, bioethics is ensuring its isolation from feminist thought.” Wolf 1996, 20. 
18 Lindemann Nelson 2000, 499-500; Overall 1996, 170-173. 
19 Wolf 1996, 26. 
20 Wolf 1996, 26. 
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The feminist bioethical literature is marked by an emphasis on the importance of 
identifying and analyzing the background suppositions and main characteristics of established 
bioethics.21 Feminists working in this field try to discern “underlying assumptions, and patterns of thinking 
and practices, of which people may be quite unaware.”22 Feminists are interested in biases in the 
theoretical structure of bioethics. They note that mainstream bioethics has been said to be relatively “free 
of explicit misogynist remarks.”23 Many authors use gender-inclusive language, swap traditional gender 
roles in their examples, defend women’s rights, and show interest in matters that are especially relevant 
to women. This does not, however, satisfy the feminist bioethicists. The problem is not so much in the 
issues discussed as in the philosophical background of the discussion.24 “Adding women” into traditional 
analysis does not sufficiently correspond to feminist aspirations.25 Feminists maintain that traditional 
philosophical concepts, theories, and methods are often biased and gendered in nature.26  
[T]he assumptions about gender have shaped not only the ways in which we think about men and 
women, but also the contours of certain fundamental concepts – from “motherhood” to “rationality” 
– that constitute the working tools of theoretical analyses.27 
For this reason, “feminist challenges to some of the key concepts of traditional ethics”28 needs to be 
carried over into bioethics. 
                                                        
21 “Eradicating unjust gender discrepancies in bioethics will certainly entail some fundamental rethinking. We shall pay close 
attention both to what problems we address and to the ways we deal with them: we shall certainly have to reanalyze basic 
concepts and principles, even if some will not emerge intact.” Purdy 1996, 158. Sherwin 1996a, 50-52. 
22 Crosthwaite 1998, 35. 
23 Sherwin 1992a, 3. 
24 Sherwin 1992a, 3. 
25 Harding 1987, 4. See also Harding & Hintikka 1983, ix. 
26 “The marginalisation of women is not confined simply to the material organisation of socio-political structures, like medicine 
and the law, but is evident in the very foundation of the Western logos, in the process of reasoning and articulation through 
which meaning is produced.” Shildrick 1997, 2. Harding 1987, 7; Sherwin 1992a, 2-3; Shildrick 1997, 2-5. Some feminist 
bioethicists, refer to androcentrism as the basis of power inequality in bioethics and medical practice. According to 
androcentrism, the male is the supposedly generic representative of humanity. Feminist literature indicates that apparently 
neutral uses of male and man are not in fact neutral. Margaret Olivia Little (1996, 2/10) gives an illustrative example of the 
falseness of the generic man: “They [the supposedly neutral uses of man] are false generics as revealed … by our difficulty in 
imagining the logic professor saying, ‘All men are mortal, Sally is a man (woman?), therefore Sally is mortal.” According to 
Little, androcentrism has at least three unwanted results, which show how conceptual understanding has practical outcomes in 
bioethics. First, certain features of men have become regarded as constituting the human norm. This is shown for example in 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision (429 U.S. 125, 1976), which provided grounds for businesses to exclude pregnancy 
disabilities from general insurance coverage, although medical procedures unique to men were on the list of traditionally 
protected benefits. Second, androcentrism affects our concept of women. “Under androcentrism … we tend to anchor man as 
the reference point and view woman’s nature as a departure from his.” (Little 1996, 3/10). Furthermore, women are often 
perceived through their sex – the characteristic most visibly differentiating them from men. Women are thought to be poor 
candidates for clinical trials because of their particular hormonal and reproductive functions. Even though men have hormonal 
and reproductive functions this is not considered to be an inhibiting factor for clinical trials. In societies in which fetal protection 
is seen as paramount, women are treated differently from men in such medical interventions as treatment for substance 
addiction, clinical trials, and organ or blood donation. Third, “under androcentrism, woman is more easily viewed in 
instrumental terms – in terms, that is, of her relation to others and the functions she can serve them.” (Little 1996, 3/10). 
Assumptions about gender have an effect on the interpretation of bioethical issues and their treatment. 
27 Little 1996, 1/10. 
28 Sherwin 1996a, 52. 
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Feminist bioethicists pinpoint the problem to the fact that, although conceptual and 
practical questions have traditionally been explored separately in bioethics, the questions are in fact 
inextricably linked. We need to know at least something about conceptual matters if we are to address 
practical concerns, and philosophers must consider the practical implications of conceptual and 
theoretical matters in order to be precise in their analyses. Feminists note, however, that even if many 
bioethicists are ready to admit this link between conceptual and practical matters, they are unable to 
define the precise nature of the relationship.29 The feminists maintain further that established bioethics 
treats conceptual questions as “philosophical”, whereas questions about people’s everyday attempts to 
live as moral agents are labelled practical. According to feminist bioethicists, the reluctance to treat 
conceptual and practical matters together affects “which questions are studied, how they are formulated, 
and what conceptual tools are brought to bear on them.”30  
The feminist bioethical literature indicates that practical and conceptual issues are 
inseparable and that feminist bioethics is always “political”, for example, Susan Sherwin criticizes 
traditional bioethicists for implicitly suggesting that their “conceptual work is being done in abstraction 
from any political concerns.”31 She maintains that preferred practical outcomes are in fact built into the 
concepts although the concepts are presented as if they were developed independently. Political values 
and convictions shape conceptual arguments. The “political” should not be valued solely negatively. Even 
though the political can be defined in terms of the biased and the partisan, more importantly the “political” 
overlaps with the “ethical” and the “moral” and is also about civil affairs and broader structures in 
society.32 
In sum, feminist bioethicists claim that the inadequacy of standard bioethics is due to the 
following points: Mainstream bioethics is too theoretically inclined; it uses an abstract idea of the 
individual as a fundamental social and moral unit; its structures support and add to the oppression of 
women and other marginalized groups; and it has been indifferent to new ethical perspectives. If these 
premises are not changed, then bioethics will remain biased. Thus, feminism must go beyond expanding 
the scope of morality and consider women in practical ethical contexts and become involved with 
epistemological change.33  
                                                        
29 Sherwin 1996b, 187-190. 
30 Sherwin 1996b, 191. See also Overall 1996, 164; Purdy 1996, 158. 
31 Sherwin 1996b, 195. 
32 Sherwin 1996b, 194-197. “What is generally wrong with the debates about abortion and justice in the provision of health 
services is not that political implications are usually operating in the background of each position, but that denying their 
legitimacy relegates them to the background and keeps us from evaluating those political concerns appropriately.” 
33 Sherwin 1996a, 54; Shildrick 1997, 2; Wolf 1996, 25-26. “Four reasons in particular seem responsible: a historical 
preference for abstract rules and principles that disregard individual differences and context; an embrace of liberal 
individualism that obscured the importance of groups; the structure of bioethics as a field frequently serving government, 
medical schools, hospitals, and health professionals in a way that may have discouraged attention to the views of people 
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1.2 The Transformation of Bioethics 
Feminist bioethics is defined vis-à-vis mainstream bioethical accounts and theories, which are described 
as deficient and power-biased. The task of feminist bioethics is to bring new perspectives to the ongoing 
bioethical discussions. Feminist perspectives criticize as well as enrich the prevailing bioethical 
frameworks. For instance, feminists maintain that practical bioethical issues and health care should be 
analyzed from feminist perspectives, focusing on why certain issues are defined as bioethical problems 
while others are not, what issues should be covered in bioethics, and furthermore how bioethical issues 
are covered and should be covered. Feminist bioethics makes descriptive and normative evaluations of 
standard bioethics. Additionally, feminist bioethics is constructive because it presents alternatives to 
standard bioethics.  
 Despite its criticism, feminism is considered more than just a tool for pointing out injustices 
and wrongdoings. The task of feminist bioethics is not solely to criticize mainstream bioethics, but also to 
revise or transform it, to change existing power relations at institutional and cultural levels and rectify 
systemic injustices. Feminists want also to offer “a counsel of action” to global ethics.34 The strength of 
feminist ethics is the opportunity to change existing hierarchical structures in health care and the ability to 
foster less oppressive agency for marginalized groups.35 Behind the quest for transformation is core 
feminism and its political implications, namely, that women and other marginalized groups have been 
given unequal consideration in society and the sciences and, that this situation is unacceptable and 
should be remedied. The objective of feminist bioethics is to change existing power relations and rectify 
systemic injustices in bioethics, health care, and medicine, by revealing viewpoints that have traditionally 
been neglected and by questioning presuppositions that have remained hidden due to their self-evident 
nature. Feminist analysis is focused on reexamining formally gender-neutral rules and principles in 
bioethics.  
Despite the general commitment to transformation, its depth and form are contested by 
feminist bioethics. Feminist approaches to transformation can be roughly categorized into three strategies 
based on their understanding of the reasons and remedies for the unequal power-relations. These 
                                                                                                                                                                               
lacking power inside and outside those institutions; and the frequent isolation of bioethics from major trends within the 
academy, including feminism, Critical Race Theory, and postmodernism.” Wolf 1996, 14. 
34 Donchin 2004a, 9/12. According to Anne Donchin (2004a, 9/12) and Susan Wolf (1996, 27), this happens best by abiding by 
the following general agenda: to open dialogue with mainstream bioethics in order to define norms of medical research and 
health care, to introduce feminist standpoints into policymaking, to extend justice to marginalized people globally, and to 
persuade donors to put their influence on rectifying human rights violations. Furthermore, “rich empiricism and attention to 
lived experience” (Wolf 1996, 27) should be highlighted because they are important for the feminist outlook on bioethics. 
35 Sherwin 1992a, 92-94; Warren 1992, 38-39; Wolf 1996, 20; 1999, 75-76. 
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strategies and their assessment of the remedies for inequality are influenced by their positions about 
human nature or their understanding of difference.36  
In the first strategy, men and women are basically alike. What unites all genders is their 
shared humanity. The choice of theoretical background affects feminist bioethicists’ commitment to the 
understanding of sexual difference and the form of the transformation. Because of their theoretical 
inclination, for example, liberal feminists support the first strategy. They assert the likeness and the 
equality of men and women and promote equal possibilities of both to participate in society and culture.37 
The second strategy acknowledges the differences between women and men, but argues 
that the sexist traditions fail to value those differences properly. Although women should be perceived 
differently from men, the difference should not lead to devaluing women’s characteristics, but rather to 
appreciating them. For example, care-focused feminists propose that women and men approach moral 
questions from different perspectives which should be equally acknowledged.  
Even though the views of liberal and care-focused feminists seem dissimilar, they may 
also be seen as different sides of the same coin: in the rationale of these theoretical approaches, the 
male serves as the standard for human nature, and the feminist task is to question the understanding of 
human nature as purely male. Feminist bioethicists seem to be aware of the simplicity of this argument 
and the variety of different feminist perspectives on human nature. For example, Rosemarie Tong, citing 
Martha Nussbaum, points out: “Just because some philosophers have conflated human nature with male 
nature, thus wrongly defining the quintessential human being as a male human being, does not mean 
that feminists cannot appropriate the concept of human nature effectively and use it to prove that women 
are no less fully human than men.”38  
The first two strategies emphasize the importance of proving that women are no less 
human than men. The difference between these strategies – and between liberal and care-focused 
feminists – can be seen in their attitude to how women are to be positioned in relation to men. Whereas 
the first strategy emphasizes the aspects of how women are like men, the second emphasizes the 
difference between the genders. Despite their distinct features, both strategies suggest similar remedies 
for inequality by highlighting women and women’s activity and the significance for making women visible 
where they have been invisible. They emphasize women’s issues and questions concerning especially 
                                                        
36 Differences between individuals and groups can be identified behind inequality and distorted power relations. For this 
reason feminists are interested in defining, analyzing and reinterpreting differences. Understanding differences in a new way is 
thought to provide counter-arguments to inequality and oppression.  
37 “[A] conception of the human being and human functioning is the best basis for evaluating women’s position vis à vis men’s 
position around the world.” Tong 2001b, 239. 
38 Tong 2001b, 239.  
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women as objects of knowledge. Existing knowledge is to be extended to include women. Their task is to 
re-evaluate the prevailing views of women. 39 
Unlike the first two strategies, the third strategy adopts an altogether distinct approach to 
the question of difference and hence, to the transformation of feminist bioethics. Adherents to the third 
strategy criticize the first two strategies for having a dual understanding of sexual difference in which 
male and female sexualities form two classes. The first two strategies interpret differences between men 
and women as monolithic and hierarchical. Within this system of dualities, “women do not set their own 
standards of reference, but act and react according to the masculine ideal”40. Consequently, to be a 
subject is to take on the ontological status of a man. Women are left with two choices. They can claim to 
be like men. Sexual difference is irrelevant since both men and women share the same humanity. Or they 
can claim to be just what they have been said to be all along: different from men, while denying the 
implicit assumption that different means inferior.41 Both options are considered insufficient because they 
rely on the male gender as the point of comparison. In the same way, to assume that the female gender 
is superior creates equally difficult problems.42 Feminists in favor of the third strategy maintain that the 
question of difference between men and women should be understood as a question of plural 
differences, that is, differences both between and among men and women. Within this framework, sex 
and gender are not binary, but multiple and not easily categorized.43  
Because of their understanding of differences, advocates of the third strategy propose a 
distinctive tactic for transformation. They emphasize women as subjects of knowledge instead of objects 
of knowledge. They call attention to the transformation of the ideologies on which the standard 
epistemological stances are grounded. The transformation is based on epistemological analysis, which is 
committed to the following criteria. First, the object of knowledge is not solely women, but the prevailing 
ways of knowing. Knowledge is partial and affected by historical and philosophical ideologies. The 
second criterion is to challenge and rebuild current epistemological theories.44 Third, a definition of the 
subject that is based on differences demands a new conception of agency that does not presuppose 
universal human essence, but that, nevertheless defines the subject without losing coherence. Therefore, 
the transformation applies to profound theoretical questions: the task is to re-examine the basic problems 
and key concepts in the field.45  
                                                        
39 See, for example, Niiniluoto 1996. 
40 Shildrick 1997, 147. 
41 Shildrick 1997, 107-111; Shildrick 2005, 6. 
42 Hekman 1999, 17: Shildrick 1997, 107-111; Shildrick 2005, 6. 
43 This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.2. 
44 Grosz 1993, 206-209; Hekman 1999, 23-26. 
45 “[C]ore feminism requires willingness to adjust one’s world view so that metaphysical, ontological or moral beliefs do not 
lead to inequality.” Purdy 2001, 124. See also Niiniluoto 1996. 
20 
 
Some feminist bioethicists maintain that attention to postmodern approaches could be 
helpful in the transformation of bioethics suggested by the third strategy.46 Feminist bioethicists in favor of 
the third transformation strategy use deconstruction to question the mainstream understanding of ethical 
categories.47 The task of deconstruction is not simply to destroy or tear down existing categories. Nor is it 
to replace categories with new ones. Rather, the task is to show that existing categories are not 
generalized, unchangeable truths.48 
To deconstruct the view from nowhere is not to supersede it by the view from everywhere, emptied 
of all moral meaning, but to open up a series of self-reflectively situated perspectives in which the 
focus is on putting into play the most appropriate, though provisional moral responses.49 
The postmodern approach stems from two critical perspectives on modern Western systems of thought. 
One is that postconventional thinking concerns the “point where a system ends.”50 The other is to 
examine “what lies beyond the limits of system.”51 The critique of modernity is based on the question of 
“why and how a particular discourse has been successfully positioned as the ‘right’ or ‘true’ one, and who 
its agents must necessarily be,”52 and this critique is to be done through a “radical problematization of the 
known.”53 Notions of normality, health, and correct anatomy are questioned within postmodern biomedical 
ethics. Clinical approaches should be sensitive to peoples’ experiences, since people may live outside 
the normative categories of sex, gender, and so on.54 Postmodern approaches especially provide tools to 
analyze power through a radically different view of ontological and epistemological questions, such as 
                                                        
46 For example, Susan Wolf (1996, 20) and Margrit Shildrick (1997, 62) point out that bioethics has been untouched by recent 
developments in postmodern – and postconventional – scholarship. Postconventional thinking is thought to bring the 
transformation needed in bioethics. The primary task of postconventional bioethics is to challenge conventional bioethics and 
its outdated premises. 
47 See, for example, Dickenson 2004, Potter 2005 and Shildrick 1997, 2005. 
48 The roots of feminist deconstruction are in Jaques Derrida’s deconstructive reading and the analysis of differences. 
Deconstructive reading aims at finding hidden meanings and contradictions within a text and its margins. Categorical 
distinctions are questioned and analyzed. Deconstruction functions first and foremost in language and discourses. Shildrick 
2005, 6, 13. Derrida (1972, 7) describes mechanism of language by the name of différance which is not a word nor a concept: 
“Je dirais donc d’abord que la différance, qui n’est ni un mot ni un concept…”  According to a feminist reading of Derrida, no 
“simple terms” exist. Each term is understandable only in relation to other terms. Terms are related to each other by difference 
and suppression. Signified and signifier together form a sign. Derrida bases his idea on Saussure: A could not have any 
meaning without non-A. Unless we know night, we cannot know day. Saussure claims that all concepts are linked to each 
other, even if each is also clear-cut and distinct. Derrida, in contrast, goes in his own direction and claims that concepts are not 
clear-cut, but that in one concept, there are always traces of the other. A always carries within it traces of non-A. For instance, 
the difference between day and night is not clear; the Sun and the Moon are in the sky at the same time. According to Derrida, 
the traces of non-A are being suppressed in order to maintain the sovereignty of A. Différance could be defined as the 
relationship between A and non-A.  It is used to describe the relationship of the center and the margin. People desire fixed 
meanings and stability of categories. Stability cannot be reached and it remains a fantasy. Terms have no independent 
meaning or value without other terms. See Shildrick 1997, 103-105; Shildrick 2005, 6. “Because making meaning requires that 
we treat signs as stable yet cannot stabilize them, we experience an irresolvable shift or alteration between perspectives – an 
alteration that Derrida calls différance.” Potter 2005, 114-115. 
49 Shildrick 1997, 139. 
50 O’Connell 2005, 222. 
51 O’Connell 2005, 223.  
52 Shildrick 1997, 90. 
53 Shildrick 2005, 6. 
54 Roen 2005, 259-260. 
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moral agency and differences. Furthermore, the feminists believe that postmodern approaches take 
seriously other elements that are important in feminist bioethics, such as embodiment, contextuality, and 
interconnectedness.55  
Despite their merits, postmodern approaches are a contested partner for the feminists. For 
one thing, postmodernism refers to an array of different approaches and can be defined as a diverse 
phenomenon. It is unclear which particular approach of the many could be used in feminist bioethics. For 
another, postmodernism does not necessarily provide a new epistemology, because many postmodern 
writers reject the whole notion of epistemology. For these reasons, postmodernism alone does not 
provide a stable ground for the transformation of feminist bioethics.56  
Regardless of the problems related to the above-mentioned theoretical feminist 
approaches – liberal feminism, care-focused feminism, and postmodernism – they can all be used for the 
transformation of bioethics to an extent. For example, Rosemarie Tong has argued that eclectic feminism 
provides a political framework for feminist bioethics. An eclectic approach allows feminist bioethicists to 
use two or more feminist approaches simultaneously.57 Different feminist approaches correct each other. 
At the same time they share a common methodology, the “methodology of feminist thought,”58 which can 
provide a philosophical framework for future feminist bioethicists.59 What keeps positions based on 
different theoretical approaches feminist is their commitment to core feminism, that is, to the imperative to 
reduce inequality in bioethical theory, health care practices, and medicine. 
The commitment to core feminism provides the basis for the transformation of bioethics. It 
does not, however, provide a substantive or in-depth answer to the question of how applying core 
feminism to bioethics will transform the discipline and its contents. Feminist bioethicists are informed by 
all three strategies for transformation presented above. However, a paradigm shift can be seen from the 
                                                        
55 Shildrick (2005, 7) maintains that conventional bioethics is unable to accommodate the ethical relevance of corporeality. In 
fact, conventional bioethics disregards corporeality altogether. Postconventional bioethicists maintain that conventional 
bioethics considers real bodies and the “messiness of corporeality” as secondary to ethics. According to Shildrick, the 
disregard of corporeality is paradoxical, given the subject of bioethics. Bioethics is, after all, about health care and medicine, 
which are closely linked to real bodies of real individuals. “The implications for a conventional understanding of the body … are 
far-reaching. The ideal configurations around which western thought is organized are exposed as precisely that – simply 
flawless templates that the bodies of everyday life more or less approximate, and are more or less valued as a consequence. 
All evidence of actual instabilities, imperfections, break-downs, and sheer messiness of corporeality – the very thing that might 
be the subject of bioethics – is seen as a failure of form, a lack of wholeness and integrity, that is pushed to the margins as 
different or is even disavowed.” Shildrick 2005, 7. 
56 See Hekman (1999, 21, 25) on the relationship between postmodernism and feminist methodology and epistemology. 
57 Tong refers to feminist “politics” instead of approaches. For the definition of different feminist politics, see e.g. Tong 1997, 
37-52. 
58 Tong 1997, 93. 
59 Tong 1997, 93-98. Tong does not use the term core feminism, but her understanding of a common “methodology of feminist 
thought” (p. 93) can be identified with core feminism. 
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first two strategies to the third. My analysis of what feminist bioethics is will be informed mainly by the 
criteria presented in the third strategy.60   
 
 
1.3 Research Questions  
It is against this background that I formulate my research questions. My study examines the central 
feminist ways of thinking in relation to the transformation of standard bioethics. The goal is to identify how 
transformation is defining feminist bioethics and to determine the nature of the feminist transformation.61 
How do feminist bioethicists integrate the transformation suggested by feminist theories into their 
respective fields and apply the potential of feminism to bioethical theories and practice? I will answer 
these questions by describing how feminist bioethicists propose that the transformation of bioethics be 
used in certain theoretical themes and applied bioethics.  
The following questions guide my analysis of the theoretical basis of feminist bioethics. 
First, how do feminist bioethicists challenge and rebuild current epistemological theories? For example, 
how do they discuss the question of relativism: does the transformation they suggest entail relativism? 
Second, what kind of moral agency do feminist bioethicists suggest for the transformed bioethics if 
subjects are based on differences instead of stable essences? This point is related to how the analysis of 
power inequalities should be integrated into feminist bioethics. 
In order to deepen the understanding of the feminist transformation of bioethics, I will 
consider how the transformation of theoretical approaches influences concept formation in bioethics. 
Feminists maintain that traditional philosophical and bioethical concepts, theories, and methods are often 
biased. Questioning the nature of these concepts enables an analysis of the oppression and injustice.62 
Feminist bioethicists use the theoretical potential of feminist analysis to reexamine formally gender-
neutral rules and principles in bioethics and uncover the underlying assumptions. The strength of the 
feminist approaches in ethics is their capacity to reveal points of view that traditionally have been 
neglected and to question presuppositions that have remained hidden, owing to their alleged self-evident 
                                                        
60 Despite the fact that the criteria can be linked to postmodern theories, I emphasize that my perspective is not solely 
postmodern. Rather I want to describe and analyze how feminist bioethicists from different philosophical backgrounds discuss 
and define central concepts in relation to their respective field. Critical discussion among scholars is rare within feminist 
bioethics. However, because critical discussion is essential for an academic field to evolve, it is justifiable to present differing 
feminist perspectives side by side and use them to comment on each other. 
61 The issue of transformation strategies is relevant not only to feminist bioethics, but also to all feminist theories. Because 
feminist bioethics derives its theoretical background from feminist theories, it is only natural that feminist bioethics follows the 
development of feminist theories in general. 
62 Sherwin 1996a, 49, 57. See also Donching & Purdy 1999, 2-3; Tong 1997, 75. “The marginalisation of women is not 
confined simply to the material organisation of socio-political structures, like medicine and the law, but is evident in the very 
foundation of the Western logos, in the process of reasoning and articulation through which meaning is produced.” Shildrick 
1997, 2. Harding 1987, 7; Sherwin 1992a, 2-3; Shildrick 1997, 2-5. 
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nature.63 I will use autonomy as an example of the enterprise by feminist bioethicists to transform the 
central concepts in bioethics. 
In addition, I will discuss how feminist bioethicists have been able to apply the feminist 
critique and transformative perspectives to the most recent developments in biotechnologies. Feminist 
bioethicists are steering the bioethical discussion along new paths and in particular are analyzing recent 
biotechnological advances. In two decades of feminist bioethics, topics have varied from abortion to 
human rights, from reproduction to dying, and from practical matters to theoretical issues. Despite the 
variety of subjects discussed, several writers have noted an over-emphasis on reproduction issues and 
show concern that feminist bioethics is too involved in reproduction while omitting other important issues. 
Moreover, feminist bioethicists are worried about the stereotypes that existed, especially in the early days 
of feminist bioethics. The stereotypes indicated that “feminist approaches were often mistakenly assumed 
to address ‘women’s concerns’.”64 Despite the criticism, many feminist bioethicists still focus on 
reproduction and issues related to reproduction.65 Some authors, however, note that other “more 
pervasive bioethical concerns,”66 have been neglected. There is a concern that feminist bioethics does 
not expand its critique beyond reproduction effectively enough. Feminist bioethicists challenge their 
colleagues to undertake the “cutting-edge”67 issues mainstream bioethics and expand the feminist 
perspectives on these issues.68 I will take this challenge as my starting point in the fourth chapter of my 
work, which deals more closely with this last aspect, namely, cutting-edge biotechnologies and their use. 
I will use human embryonic stem cell research as a “test case” for feminist bioethics and its ability to use 
feminist methodologies to analyze ethical questions related to novel biotechnologies. 
The evaluation of theoretical, conceptual, and practical issues related to feminist bioethics 
leads to the question of how to assess feminist bioethics. This evaluative aspect will be taken up in the 
                                                        
63 Holmes 1999, 49; Sherwin 1996a, 49. According to Donchin (2004a, 2/12), the starting point of analysis is to “take sex, 
gender, and other marginalizing characteristics as categories of analysis that are bound up with power relations across both 
public and private life.” 
64 Donchin 2004a, 4/12. See also Little (1996, 1/10): “Some individuals seem to understand feminist bioethics to be talk about 
women’s issues in bioethics or, again, to be women’s talking about bioethics. But while the subject bears some relation to 
each, it is equivalent to neither.” 
65 Donchin & Purdy 1999, 3. 
66 Donchin 2004a, 4/12. See also Lindemann Nelson 2000, 495. 
67 Lindemann Nelson 2000, 505. 
68 Lindemann Nelson 2000, 497; Sherwin 1996a, 56-62; Tong 2001a, 28. For example, Hilde Lindemann Nelson (2000, 497) 
proposes that feminist bioethicists should broaden their scope from reproductive issues to ethical questions caused by new 
biotechnologies: “take the same cutting-edge topics that are now being addressed by nonfeminist bioethicists, but to use our 
own methodology, paying careful attention to how gender is installed and reinforced by power as it circulates through our 
practices of responsibility within the healthcare system.” Embryonic stem cell research is among the cutting-edge topics 
proposed by Lindemann Nelson (2000, 497-498). Other such topics are organizational ethics and genetic ethics. Feminist 
analysis of these issues is needed as it could steer standard bioethics to new paths. “Another cutting-edge topic in bioethics 
that might be enriched by feminist analysis is embryonic stem cell research. … Organizational ethics, genetic ethics, and 
embryonic stem cell ethics, then, are just three examples of the kinds of issues that point mainstream bioethics in new 
direction and that also point feminist bioethics in the same direction.” Lindemann Nelson 2000, 497-498. 
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chapter 5 in which I will consider new directions for feminist bioethics. In this section I discuss how 
feminists could develop a bioethics that includes both theoretical insights and practical applications. 
Feminist bioethicists maintain that mainstream bioethics does not adequately include the considerations 
of contextual and relational details of human lives. In this view, mainstream bioethics does not consider 
lay accounts and social science analyses to be as important as medical and scientific accounts. How 
could this situation be remedied? Could, for example, the use of empirical bioethics help in determining 
how to incorporate different experiences into bioethics? Another aspect is to consider how feminist 
bioethicists could understand agency. In core feminism, women’s agency is seemingly about the 
resistance to those social and cultural norms described as masculinist in feminist thinking. What happens 
to the agency of women whose experiences are in accordance with these norms? Could feminist 
bioethicists develop an understanding of agency that is possible under oppressive conditions?   
Even though my goal is a systematic articulation of feminist perspectives in the academic 
field of bioethics, two things are worthy of note: One is that my focus is primarily on feminist bioethics; the 
second is that I do not set out to provide an inclusive picture of feminist bioethics. Regarding the first 
point, I will not compare feminist and mainstream bioethics in depth. It should be noted, however, that 
while criticizing non-feminist bioethicists and bioethics, feminist bioethicists speak of “mainstream 
bioethics,”69 “contemporary bioethics,” “established bioethics,” or to “standard bioethics”70. Yet no one 
clearly defines what mainstream, contemporary, or standard bioethics are. It is also unclear whether 
there is even a single category of bioethics that could be defined as standard or mainstream. Moreover, 
feminist writers tend to generalize non-feminist bioethics and overemphasize the similarity of different 
non-feminist bioethical approaches. The point of reference and the meaning of the categories of 
mainstream, contemporary, and standard bioethics thus depend on the author. However, feminists seem 
to use these terms to indicate a group of different theorists and theories that ignore oppression. Nor do 
feminist bioethicists offer a more transparent definition. I point out this deficiency in feminist bioethics 
here, but I will not discuss it in more detail. In this text, the “standard,” “contemporary,” “established,” and 
“mainstream” bioethics will be used to refer to the object of feminist bioethicists’ criticism.  
It is not within the scope of this study to contest the feminist bioethicists’ accounts of 
standard bioethics for three reasons. One is that, before detailed comparative work can be done, it is 
essential to analyze feminist bioethics in more detail than has been done so far in the feminist or in the 
standard bioethical literature. Another is that in order for feminist bioethics to develop as a field or a sub-
field it is important to focus on its transformative nature: what do feminist bioethicists bring to bioethics 
                                                        
69 FAB 2007. [www.fabnet.org/what_is_fab.php] Accessed on July 2, 2007. 
70 Overall 1996. None of the terms is precise. But it should be noted that the concept of bioethics is also rather imprecise. 
There are several ways to define bioethics, and there are different definitions of bioethics within moral philosophy and medical 
ethics. Therefore, different uses of non-feminist bioethics can be found and used. 
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that they claim to be new and original? The third reason is that the accuracy of the feminist interpretation 
of standard bioethics is best evaluated in a dialogue between standard and feminist bioethics. This 
dialogue has already begun and can be demonstrated, for example, in the discussions of autonomy and 
stem cell research.71  
For now, it suffices to observe that the feminist representation of standard bioethics is a 
“construction,” by which I mean that it is homogeneous and unvarying, even though mainstream bioethics 
is an ensemble of different approaches with common features and characteristics that have been 
criticized by feminists. However, the feminist presentation of mainstream bioethics does not necessarily 
take into account the differences within the field.  
As for the picture of feminist bioethics as a whole, there is no single way to determine 
what constitutes “feminist bioethics” or who could be identified as a “feminist bioethicist.” Although to an 
extent a commitment to core feminism defines feminist bioethics and feminist bioethicists, the principles 
by which a scholar can be identified as being committed to core feminism are vague at best. Many 
women, for example, contribute to the discipline of bioethics without using explicitly feminist arguments or 
concepts. Should they be counted as feminist bioethicists? Conversely, many scholars – both male and 
female – use arguments, categories, and concepts familiar to feminist theories without identifying 
themselves as feminists. Does the lack of explicit identification mean that these writers are not feminists? 
 I maintain that merely being of female gender does not make a writer a feminist. 
However, the need for an explicit identification as a feminist is another matter. I am inclined to include 
scholars who use arguments that are commonly used in feminist literature in the category of feminist 
bioethicists.  
In this study, I have chosen a technical solution for identifying the criteria with which I 
classify bioethicists as feminists or non-feminists. At a minimum, a feminist bioethicist is a scholar who 
identifies herself or himself as a feminist. In the chapter on central feminist theoretical themes in 
bioethics, I refer to bioethicists who meet this criterion. This is because only explicitly feminist scholars 
can set the minimum boundaries for feminist bioethics as a sub-field. In the following chapters on 
autonomy and stem cell research, the criteria for a feminist bioethicist are more flexible. Even if a writer 
does not identify herself as a feminist, his or her work can be evaluated against the basic theoretical 
themes in feminist bioethics: Does the writer use arguments and concepts familiar to feminist bioethics? 
Both bioethics and feminism are located at the intersection of different theoretical backgrounds. 
Bioethical and feminist scholars use different methods, arguments, and concepts, depending on the issue 
at hand. Their work therefore is not easily categorized.  
                                                        
71 See chapters 3.1 and 4. 
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With this interpretation of the diversity of bioethics and feminism, I wish to relate my 
analysis to the history of feminist philosophy and ethics. Throughout this history the importance of 
different perspectives is emphasized, and in that light, the present study is only one perspective among 
many. Furthermore, the status and position of bioethics are currently being contested. Scholars working 
in the field have not been able to agree even on a definition for bioethics. There are both advantages and 
disadvantages to this comparative lack of definition. If there are no clear boundaries for bioethics, then 
there can hardly be clear structures for feminist bioethics either. Yet by trying to map the place of 
feminism in an area which itself has no firm contours, we gain insight into how the discipline could be 
developed and also defined. Here the contribution of feminist philosophy is not only about challenging 
theoretical assumptions and medical practices, but also about developing a range of strategies through 
which the discipline might become more self-reflective. 
 
 
1.4 Methods and Materials 
The methods used here are typical of philosophical research: concept and argument analysis and critical 
interpretation of the texts. The aim of conceptual analysis is not first and foremost normative, but rather 
descriptive and clarifying. I will describe and clarify concepts that are central to feminist bioethics. I will 
also elucidate how feminist bioethicists use certain concepts in certain contexts. In addition, I will identify, 
analyze, and evaluate arguments that are used in feminist bioethics. In relation to stem cell research, I 
will study and evaluate arguments that are used not only in feminist bioethics, but also in standard 
bioethics. With this analytical reading I will clarify the arguments and concepts used in feminist bioethics 
and thereby elucidate their philosophical premises. In particular I will consider how certain principles and 
practices are formulated and how they affect the understanding of feminist bioethics as a sub-field. My 
method is also constructive as I offer proposals for new directions in feminist bioethics.  
The research literature contains the following principal types of material: feminist bioethical 
literature, stem cell reports, and bioethical literature on stem cell research and use, both feminist and 
standard bioethical. In addition, I use feminist philosophical literature, in order to comment on feminist 
bioethical theories, and standard bioethical literature to reflect feminist bioethicists’ understanding of 
more standard bioethics.  
The feminist bioethical literature used in this study includes monographs, anthologies, and 
individual articles. The following feminist bioethicists are among the most published authors in their field: 
Anne Donchin, Helen Bequaert Holmes, Laura Purdy, Susan Sherwin, Rosemarie Tong, and Susan M. 
Wolf. Of their works, I use the following: Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics; No Longer Patient: 
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Feminist Ethics and Heath Care; Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Theoretical Reflections and Practical 
Applications; Feminism and Bioethics: Beyond Reproduction. Many of the articles I used here have been 
published by FAB in its conference proceedings.  
Margrit Shildrick’s Leaky Bodies and Boundaries: Feminism, Postmodernism and 
(Bio)ethics (1997) can be situated between the feminist bioethical literature and the feminist philosophical 
literature. Shildrick discusses feminist philosophy and its relation to postmodern thinking, especially 
keeping bioethical issues in mind. Similarly, Ethics of the Body: Postconventional Challenges (2005) can 
be situated between disciplines. On the one hand, the volume is a theoretical account of 
postconventional thinking, that is, postmodern and poststructuralist theories. As such, it discusses the 
relationship between feminism and postconventional theories. On the other hand, the book is a collection 
of articles about specific bioethical issues written from perspectives other than that of standard bioethics.  
In the analysis of the concept of autonomy, I rely especially on Relational Autonomy: 
Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (2000) edited by Catriona Mackenzie 
and Natalie Stoljar. I also use Sarah Lucia Hoagland’s Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (1988). 
For the discussion of stem cell research and use I use the following types of literature: 
official stem cell reports written by international, national, and scientific institutions, feminist bioethical 
articles about stem cell research and use, and the more standard bioethical literature on stem cell ethics. 
Biological knowledge about stem cells and their use in research is based on articles in different scientific 
journals, including Science, and from Human Embryonic Stem Cells: An Introduction to the Science and 
Therapeutic Potential (2003). 
Several national and international boards and organizations along with scientific 
organizations have discussed stem cell research, its prospects, and its shortcomings. I will examine stem 
cell reports written in the European Union, Finland, and the United States, as well as two reports drawn 
up by scientific organizations, NordForsk and the European Science Foundation. The ground for the 
selection is straight forward. The roots of feminist bioethics are in Western philosophical traditions and 
societies. The evaluation of bioethics should thus be done first from a Western perspective. Because it is 
important to analyze the weaknesses and strengths of feminist bioethics in its original context, my 
analysis is restricted to this framework. Hopefully, further studies will examine non-Western contexts.  
The E.U. and U.S. stem cell reports are relevant for evaluating Western context. They also 
provide different accounts of the issue within that context. The Finnish reports offer a point of 
comparison. In contrast to the E.U. report, the Finnish point of view reveals a single specific perspective 
on stem cell ethics within the E.U. In comparison to the U.S. reports, the Finnish viewpoint reveals the 
diversity of Western thinking in regard to stem cell research.  
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I will refer to three international reports written within the E.U.: Adoption of an Opinion on 
Ethical Aspects of Human Stem Cell Research and Use, EGE Opinion No 15 (2000); Commission Staff 
Working Paper: Report on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (2003); and Recommendations on the 
Ethical Review of hESC FP7 Research Projects, EGE Opinion no 22 (2003). I call these reports simply 
the E.U. reports. In Finland, the Parliament discussed stem cell research and use in The Committee for 
the Future’s Statement on the Technology Assessment Project “Social and Legal Challenges of Human 
Genome and Stem Cell Research.”72 The statement is a result of an assessment project initiated by the 
Finnish Parliament and the Committee for the Future. Another Finnish stem cell report, Ihmisen 
kantasolut, kloonaus ja tutkimus [Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research] was published in 2003 by 
the Finnish Ethical Advisory Boards. The report was published in English under the name Human Stem 
Cells, Cloning and Research in 2005. Among the U.S. reports I have chosen the following published by 
national authorities: Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research: Executive Summary by the National Bioethics 
Advisory Council (1999) and Monitoring Stem Cell Research by the President’s Council on Bioethics 
(2008). These reports show how ethical issues related to stem cell research have been discussed during 
the presidencies of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In addition, I briefly discuss how President Barack 
Obama’s presidency has affected the research environment in the U.S. Two reports from the British 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) are of interest with regard to egg donation: SEED 
Report: A Report on the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority’s Review of Sperm and Embryo 
Donation in the United Kingdom (2005); and Donating Eggs for Research: Safeguarding Donors. Should 
Egg Donation for Research Take Place and, if So, How Can Donors be Best Protected? (2006). 
In contrast to the international and national stem cell reports, I analyze two reports written 
by scientific organizations, which provide interesting points of comparison because their aims are 
different. While national and supranational reports are written from the legislators’ point of view or for the 
legislators, scientific organizations enter the debate from the perspective of scientists, the scientific 
community, or the funder. In Europe, the European Science Foundation (ESF) and NordForsk have 
published policy briefings on human stem cell research: European Science Foundation Policy Briefing, 
Human Stem Cell Research: Scientific Uncertainties and Ethical Dilemmas (2001) and NordForsk’s Stem 
Cell Research in the Nordic Countries: Science, Ethics, Public Debate and Law (2007). 
In addition to the stem cell reports, I use bioethical literature to examine the stem cell 
debate. This literature is both feminist and more standard in nature. Women’s Health Issues and The 
Journal of Bioethical Inquiry have each devoted a special issue to stem cell research with both feminist 
                                                        
72 Committee for the Future’s Statement on Technology Assessment Project “Social and legal challenges of human genome 
and stem cell research” 2003. 
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and non-feminist articles.73 The following anthologies provide different perspectives on the ethical issues 
related to stem cell research: The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science, Ethics, and Public 
Policy (2001) includes articles about stem cell research, the ethical issues related to the use of human 
embryos, and broader ethical questions related to stem cell research, such as social justice and donor 
protection. The Human Embryo Research Debates: Bioethics in the Vortex of Controversy (2001) by 
Ronald M. Green gives an inside account of the author’s membership on the Human Embryo Research 
Panel in the U.S. Although Green’s view is not limited to stem cell ethics, he expands his account of 
embryo research in general to stem cell research. The Stem Cell Controversy: Debating the Issues 
(2006) is a collection of articles published first elsewhere and collected by the editors Michael Ruse and 
Christopher A. Pynes; it documents the vast array of issues related to the stem cell debate.  
 
 
1.5 Order of Presentation 
The study is organized as follows: in the second chapter, I will describe and analyze feminist bioethics 
and its theoretical premises. I discuss the aims feminist bioethicists have set for their academic enterprise 
and explore the grounds for feminist bioethics: what kind of epistemology do feminist bioethicists refer to? 
Who are the subjects or moral agents in their writings? Furthermore, I examine the central themes in this 
particular academic discipline, which emphasizes the importance of embodiment, contexts, relationships, 
and sexual difference in the analysis of bioethical questions.  
In the third chapter, I will discuss the feminist criticism of the concept of autonomy and the 
feminist alternatives to it. The autonomy debate represents an evolved discussion between non-feminist 
and feminist bioethicists. The chapter provides an overview of the autonomy discussion, but it is not 
within the scope of this dissertation to present the debate in full; an entire dissertation could be devoted 
to this single subject. Nevertheless, an overview helps to understand feminist bioethics and provides a 
basis for further development.  
In the fourth chapter, I will address stem cell research. I discuss the ethical questions that 
generally arise in connection with stem cell research and use, both in non-feminist and feminist bioethics. 
These questions include the moral status of the human embryo, the just use of resources, the protection 
of donors and the commercialization of stem cells. I describe and analyze both non-feminist and feminist 
arguments for each question and show how the questions are covered, first in stem cell reports and also 
in the bioethical literature.  
                                                        
73 Women’s Health Issues, 10, No. 3 (2000); Journal of Bioethical Inquiry, 3, No. 1-2 (2006). 
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In the fifth chapter, I will make a case for one direction in which feminist bioethics could be 
developed based on the analyses in chapters two through four. I include the remarks about feminist 
bioethics in relation to the concept of autonomy and stem cell research. I emphasize two areas in 
particular which call for further investigation: the use of empirical methods in bioethics and the 
development of the concept of agency.  
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2 Central Theoretical Themes in Feminist Bioethics  
Some feminist bioethicists are critical about of having a feminist bioethical theory and even of the need 
for one. They maintain that feminism is simply a perspective on bioethics.74 For example, Susan Sherwin 
uses the metaphor of lenses as a tool for understanding the cooperation of feminism with other moral 
approaches. Lenses are an effective metaphor for the different standpoints that can be used either 
individually or simultaneously. None of the lenses alone provides a true or accurate view of bioethics.75 
Other feminists claim that bioethics will be left untouched unless a new theory of bioethics is formulated. 
For that reason, they call for a feminist bioethical theory.76 These feminist bioethicists claim that a new 
bioethical theory might be needed in order for the transformation to be compatible with feminist values.77 
They maintain that the goal is not to promote a new group to power, but rather to change the whole 
practice of bioethics and medical practice.  
Sherwin maintains that the problem with mainstream bioethics’ inability to deal with 
practical and conceptual perspectives together is due to the “foundational view of theories” in mainstream 
bioethics78. In this view, “the most common way to think of moral theories in bioethics is to credit them 
with providing foundations for the more specific moral judgments of practical moral life.”79 As  a  result,  
mainstream bioethics perceives theories as holding an absolute status. The foundational view represents 
theories as if they could build a concrete, ultimate base for ethics. Since theories have a prominent place 
in bioethics, mainstream bioethicists are tempted to extend the local, theory-based moral systems to 
global contexts. Sherwin points out that no theory provides reliable grounds for solving all ethical 
problems. Accordingly, the foundational view of theories should not be absolute, but perceived as a 
metaphor.80 Sherwin argues that “the governing architectural metaphor suggests that there is a well-
ordered structural relation among different types of ethical claims.”81 Admittedly, theories provide helpful 
insights into bioethics. The insights should not, however, be called theories, but perspectives. Different 
                                                        
74 Purdy 1996, 145; Sherwin 2001, 24.  
75 Sherwin 2001, 23-24. “I recommend that we think of the ‘competing’ theoretical options as a set of lenses available for 
helping us understand the complex moral dimensions of bioethics. Lenses are readily switched when we want a different ‘view’ 
of something; they may even be layered on top of one another. … Some lenses will provide clearer perceptions of particular 
problems than others, but we may still gain understanding by trying on different options.” Sherwin 2001, 23. 
76 Lindemann Nelson 2003, 889; Tong 1997, 1-5, 245; Wolf 1996, 4-5. “Many feminists argue that their task is to construct new 
theory rather than to refine theories that leave everything exactly as it was.” Lindemann Nelson 2003, 889. 
77 “Our task is to come up with new theory, not to refine theories that leave everything exactly as it was.” Lindemann Nelson 
2000, 492, 496. See also Holmes 1999, 57; Lindemann Nelson 2003, 889; Overall 1996, 174, 178-179; Rawlinson 2001, 414; 
Wolf 1996, 5-7, 32-34. 
78 Sherwin 2001, 15. 
79 Sherwin 2001, 14. 
80 Sherwin 2001, 12-18. 
81 Sherwin 2001, 17. 
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perspectives and different metaphors are needed in order for bioethics to be a comprehensive field. 
Feminist bioethicists claim that feminism is one of those perspectives.82 
Even though feminist bioethicists are divided in their attitude on the need for a new theory, 
they are united in their conviction that bioethical theories need to be reformed.83 Regardless of the form 
of the transformation, the future of bioethics should not be “satellite bioethics”84 in which ethical problems 
related to different groups are discussed separately and the core of bioethics remains unaltered. Rather, 
the goal of bioethics is to explore how identities are construed and what meaning different groups are 
given in this construction.85 Although they desire the transformation of bioethical theory, feminist 
bioethicists seem to focus especially on the following issues: the nature of moral knowledge, moral 
agency, and sexual difference, body and embodiment, contextuality, relationality and power. In the 
following sections, I will explore these themes more closely and show how they define the goal of 
transformation. It should be noted that these themes are not single issues but are closely related. My 
interest is to examine whether there are certain elements that unite these themes and whether these 
elements could clarify the idea of transformation. 
 
 
2.1 Knowledge about Morality: Contextual Transformation  
Although feminist bioethicists seek the transformation of bioethics, they are faced with epistemological 
questions. It is unclear whether bioethics involves a distinctive epistemology, yet feminist bioethicists 
maintain that the transformation of bioethics entails modifying the ways knowledge is produced in 
bioethics.86 To achieve this modification, they are identifying, challenging, and rebuilding traditional ways 
of knowing.87 Here I will examine how feminist bioethicists contest and reconstruct the current ways of 
knowledge production in bioethics and consider whether the transformation suggested by feminists 
entails moral relativism, that is, the idea that no single objective standard exists by which one can assess 
the truth of a moral proposition.  
                                                        
82 Sherwin 2001, 24. 
83 Overall 1996, 172;  
84 Wolf 1999, 75. 
85 Wolf 1999, 75-76. 
86 It should be noted that “knowledge” is not necessarily defined in feminist bioethics. It seems, however, that in feminist 
bioethics knowledge is understood as the expertise and skills acquired by a person through experience or education or the 
theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. Moral knowledge can be defined as justified moral belief. Bioethical 
knowledge may refer both to knowledge about bioethical theories (the theoretical understanding of a subject) or the right 
conduct in the face of a bioethical problem (skills or practical understanding of a situation). Feminist bioethicists cannot be 
criticized heavily for their lack of definition of knowledge, for the issue is debated in philosophy in general. However, a clearer 
definition of knowledge could help feminist bioethicists to articulate their aims.  
87 Wolf 1996, 24-25. 
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Feminists maintain that social arrangements and political organizations affect the 
production of knowledge. Therefore, the arrangements through which knowledge and dominance are 
implemented must be brought to light. This can be done by examining the importance of social and 
cultural standards in the production of knowledge, because social and epistemological issues are 
intertwined.88 Feminists argue that the relationship between knowledge and dominance has affected and 
still affects how and why women have been left out as both objects and subjects of knowledge. As 
objects of knowledge, women are left out because they “fail to be known.”89 Examples from the arts and 
sciences are legion: women are excluded when historians chronicle kings, dates, wars and so on, and 
they are omitted when the symptoms of heart-diseases are defined on the basis of male patients.90 The 
history of science and the arts has shown that women remain largely in the background as objects of 
knowledge in culture, society, and academia. One reason is the traditional focus on the justification 
process of knowledge instead of on the selection process of research topics in sciences and the arts. 
This predisposition leads to neglecting the methods of discovery or heuristics and also limits the variety of 
research topics. Heuristic biases especially influence the formulation of hypotheses and the selection of 
research themes such as those related to women and other marginalized groups.91 According to the first 
two transformation strategies presented in the Introduction, feminists have endeavored to make women 
visible in different fields of science and the arts as well as in society at large. Recently, a growing number 
of scholarly works has focused on women as the objects of those studies.  
Women have not been left out simply because they have not been recognized as the 
objects of knowledge. Most importantly, they have not been regarded as knowers, as the subjects of 
knowledge.92 Feminists who advocate the third transformation strategy maintain that women’s exclusion 
is not accidental, but systematic. The point where feminist criticism should be most radical they maintain, 
is where women are excluded as knowing subjects because “there is something wrong with traditional 
conceptions, or traditional ideals, of knowledge.”93 Feminists wish to correct the partiality of existing 
                                                        
88 “For any adequate epistemology, social organization must be shown to be crucial to knowledge.” Addelson 1993, 267. Alcoff 
& Potter 1993, 1-3; Crosthwaite 1998, 35-38; Langton 2000, 129; Wolf 1996, 25. Feminist bioethicists, such as Rosemarie 
Tong (1997, 95-96) and Susan Wolf (1996, 26), maintain that despite the variety in different feminist epistemologies, bioethics 
would change if feminist perspectives were included in the production of bioethical knowledge. On different kinds of feminist 
epistemologies see Tong 1997, 86-89. 
89 Langton 2000, 130. Emphasis in the original. 
90 Langton 2000, 130. 
91 Longino 1993, 101-104. “There can be no doubt that research is – often imperceptibly – shaped by presuppositions and 
interests external to the inquiry itself, which cannot be filtered out by standard, objective, disinterested epistemological 
techniques.” Code 1993, 31. According to Longino (1993, 101-104) androcentrism, sexism, and gender ideology limit the 
nature and number of hypotheses in scientific realm.  
92 According to Langton (2000, 130), women may not be counted as knowers because they “are deprived of the knowledge 
men have.” “[W]omen may be left out as subjects not by failing to be knowers, but by failing to be counted as knowers, even 
when they do know.” Langton 2000, 132.  
93 Langton 2000, 133. 
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knowledge and include women’s perspectives.94 Feminist bioethicists maintain, for example, that the 
ideals of neutrality and objectivity are untenable if they are described as in the traditional philosophy of 
knowledge, which does not give consideration to power relations that affect the way knowledge is 
justified.95 In order to avoid power-biased bioethics, feminist bioethicists recommend two approaches: 
bioethical knowledge should be produced “democratically,”96 and bioethical theory should be constructed 
from the lived experiences of different groups and people.97  
The democratic production of knowledge can be understood in relation to the larger aims 
of feminist epistemologies, which resonate with feminist bioethics. According to feminist epistemologists, 
the democratic production of knowledge differs from the traditional Western epistemologies by taking 
seriously the contexts and relationships of the subject. Feminists criticize traditional Western 
epistemologies for highlighting the knowing subject’s ability to exceed the limitations established by social 
relations and cultural practices. In feminist criticism, subjects are interchangeable, and the identities, 
backgrounds, life contexts, and relationships of the knowing subjects are irrelevant in traditional 
epistemologies. Feminists maintain that traditional accounts of knowledge falsely suppose that the 
subject generates knowledge in an objective and value-neutral manner.98 Hidden subjectivities are 
always in play when knowledge is produced. Although subjectivities might not be recognizable, they are 
not non-existent. Subjectivities are often indistinguishable and seemingly neutral.99 In the traditional 
epistemological view “a certain range of contexts is … presupposed,”100 albeit implicitly. According to 
feminist criticism, the misleading impartiality of traditional epistemologies is the result of considering 
knowledge to be individual matter, rather than a community activity. Such criticism is valid. However, it 
should be noted that not all contemporary mainstream epistemologies argue for knowledge as an 
                                                        
94 Langton 2000, 133. 
95 Lindemann Nelson 2003, 885. 
96 Wolf 1996, 26. 
97 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 17; Mahowald 1996, 100, 103-104; Roberts 1996, 122; Sherwin 1992a, 49; Tong 1996, 
88; Warren 1992, 35, 42; Wolf 1996, 22-23, 27. For example Virginia L. Warren (1992, 35, 42) proposes that women’s 
perspectives open up new questions for bioethics. Furthermore, she proposes that “theory should be constructed from one’s 
life experience”. 
98 Code 1993, 16; Longino 1993, 104-105. Lorraine Code (1993, 16) maintains that especially “positivist-empiricist 
orientations” of “the mainstream” epistemologies privilege “ideal, universal and homogenous human nature that allows 
knowers to be substitutable for one another.” In other words, traditional accounts of knowledge promote “a view from 
nowhere.” The positivist-empiricist account does not seem to have room for circumstantial issues and the personal interests of 
the knowers. According to feminist epistemology, the idea of objective knowledge leads to a devaluation of relationships and 
contexts. Furthermore, it misses the connections between emotion and reason, knowledge and power. “The legislated (not 
‘found’) context-independence … generates the conclusion that knowledge worthy of the name must transcend the 
particularities of experience to achieve objective purity and value neutrality. This is a model within which the issue of taking 
subjectivity does not simply arise.” Code 1993, 19. 
99 Code 1993, 19. “[K]nowledge is not ‘in the head’ of solitary reasoners, but rather is produced and imparted in communities 
of knowers.” Lindemann Nelson 2003, 885. 
100 Code 1993, 19. 
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individual activity. For example, Ilkka Niiniluoto maintains that the community alone guarantees the 
objectivity of knowledge.101 
The criticisms of individual-based standards of inquiry are especially relevant in science 
because individually-centered modes of analysis are disadvantageous in discovering the facts. However, 
the feminist criticism is also partly moral, since it emphasizes the need for democratic values in the 
context of scientific inquiry. Feminist bioethicists maintain that the primary tool for democratic decision-
making is conversation within the community. For example, Susan Wolf suggests that, in bioethics, the 
democratic production of knowledge means that relevant knowledge is produced not only by experts, but 
also by lay-people affected by bioethical questions: “This kind of bioethics would require us to learn from 
patients, subjects, families, and communities.”102  
Wolf draws on the ideas introduced by Helen Longino (1993) whose original context is the 
philosophy of science and thus Wolf’s account is not altogether clear on the differences between moral 
knowledge and scientific knowledge. In science, not everyone can be an expert, whereas moral 
knowledge is more like practical knowledge in which anyone can gain expertise. Or to put it differently, 
the difference between an expert and an amateur is not necessarily relevant in the realm of morals. 
Despite this ambiguity, Wolf’s point seems to be that within moral knowledge anyone can be an expert. 
Wolf maintains that physicians, philosophers, and bioethical consultants are given the status of experts in 
traditional bioethics, even though it is questionable whether moral expertise can be acquired through 
academic training.103 This should be embraced more willingly in decision making and in the structuring of 
public standards for agreement in bioethics, for example. 
Another way to avoid power-biased bioethics is to use experiences in bioethical analysis. 
Experiences are important when “the creation of moral consensus through conversation and 
collaboration”104 is sought. According to feminist bioethicists, attention to lived experiences can be a tool 
for identifying bioethical problems in need of analysis. This is to say that bioethical problems cannot be 
treated in separation from the individuals experiencing the problems.105 On the one hand, feminists are 
convinced that mainstream ethics has focused on areas that men dominate, while, on the other hand, 
ethics reflects men’s experiences. Therefore, feminists claim that it is doubtful whether traditional ethics 
can serve women and their interests.106 Feminist ethicists have tried to overcome this problem by 
                                                        
101 Niiniluoto 2003, 189. 
102 Wolf 1996, 26.  
103 “While surely training in bioethics confers some kind of expertise, few would argue that only bioethicists, medical and 
scientific experts, and governmental authorities should deliberate over questions such as whether a patient receives further 
life-sustaining treatment, who receives an organ transplant, whether physician-assisted suicide should be allowed, or how 
scarce medical resources should be allocated.” Wolf 1996, 25.  
104 Tong 1996, 70. 
105 Tong 1996, 88; Wolf 1996, 27. 
106 Brennan 1999, 860-861. 
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promoting “ethics of lived, concrete experiences which takes most seriously women’s experiences of 
morality.”107 
The attention to lived experience can be equated with “rich empiricism.”108 Rich empiricism 
refers to taking seriously specific cases and experiences in moral analysis while focusing attention on 
power and disadvantages in bioethics.109 According to feminist bioethicists, women’s experiences are 
shaped by “our system of beliefs.”110 Mary B. Mahowald suggests that feminist standpoint theory provides 
a corrective to mainstream bioethics in this respect.111 Feminist standpoint theory is based on the idea 
that “knowledge derives from situated perspectives.”112 Women’s experiences and perspectives can be 
the starting point for the critique of social injustice, exploitation and domination.113 In this view, women 
and other marginalized groups should be encouraged to question both traditional cultural explanations 
and the authority of experts and trust their own judgment as their experiences can provide liberating 
possibilities for those dominated.114  
Paying attention to lived experiences would move bioethical problems into a larger context 
and have relevance not only for the case in question, but also for the larger bioethical community. Ethical 
transgressions are not single events, but have social roots and meanings, which can be shown through 
the experiences of different people. The meanings of otherwise inexplicable situations can be discovered 
by listening to the moral contents of people’s individual experiences. For example, Rosemarie Tong 
refers to “conversationalists” who maintain that “if people listen to each other attentively, over time they 
will conclude their unique stories satisfactorily, that is, in a way that provides significance to otherwise 
incomprehensible situations.”115 Rich empiricism understood as attentiveness to experiences can help to 
understand the effects of domination.116  
The feminist understanding of the importance of experience is not without its problems. 
The first problem is that the relevance of experiences is at best vague, given the examples provided by 
feminist bioethicists. Susan Wolf’s example of distorted power relations shows that experiences as the 
basis for moral analysis can have multiple meanings and lead to odd conclusions. According to Wolf, 
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108 Wolf 1996, 27. 
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111 “Because feminism is committed to equality and the moral significance of women’s experience, both collectively and 
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“women’s experience of health care and science would give one set of problems a new prominence.”117 
She uses father-daughter incest as an example and maintains that feminist bioethicists should not 
consider incest an isolated happening within a family unit, but part of the larger abuse of power relations 
in a society. Similarly, sexual relationships between a physician and a patient should not be considered 
single incidents, but something that reveals significant problems in patient-physician relationships in 
general. Larger cultural and societal contextual details are important in the analysis.118 Although Wolf 
may be right that abuses of power in close relations reflect distorted power-relations on a more general 
level, her remedy is disturbing. She proposes that the prevention of incest “lies in part in restructuring 
familial relationships so that fathers share with mothers a real parenting role.”119 The  leap  from  the  
importance of women’s experience to healing incest by restructuring parenting roles is problematic. 
Although Wolf’s perspective on incest may reveal something about power structures in certain societies it 
may not be compatible with women’s experiences. Would women who have been molested by their 
fathers be willing to say that the crime of incest could have been prevented if their fathers had had active 
roles as parents? It is uncertain whether Wolf’s conclusion reflects women’s experiences.  
The second problem is that feminist bioethicists seem to have various explanations of how 
women’s experiences are influenced and by whom. Susan Sherwin describes women’s experiences of 
symptoms related to the menstrual cycle, such as premenstrual syndrome, menstrual pain and 
menopause. Many women seek medical help to relieve the pain and discomfort. These symptoms should 
not, however, be perceived solely as illness, nor should they be treated exclusively medically, because 
cultural attitudes affect how one experiences and interprets one’s body.120 Sherwin suggests that women 
should have the opportunity to experience their bodies differently than the way proposed by the 
mainstream culture, which describes menstruation and its related symptoms as medical conditions. 
Although Sherwin’s argument is directed against uncritical acceptance of the cultural view of 
menstruation and to not women’s experiences per se, her account is problematic because she implies 
that if women comply with the mainstream culture, their experiences may be criticized from a feminist 
perspective.121 One must ask if Sherwin indicates that there are right kinds of experiences. Sherwin 
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120 Sherwin 1992a, 179-187; 198-199. Sherwin (1992a, 198) proposes that “[p]erhaps many more women could accept 
premenstrual changes and even come to welcome them if society allowed them the space to experience them differently [from 
mainstream cultural attitudes].” 
121 “These warnings are not meant to imply that there are no such things as problematic premenstrual changes or to suggest 
that no women suffer from severe premenstrual or menstrual changes that might properly be relieved by medical means. It is 
not an argument against women seeking medical assistance in the pursuit of such relief. It does constitute, however, an 
argument against accepting the view that premenstrual and menstrual changes are necessarily undesirable and that medicine 
is the best place for women to turn if they do judge these changes negatively.” Sherwin 1992a, 199. 
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seems to have an implicit assumption of what women’s experiences should be like – at least for them to 
reflect feminist values.  
Virginia Warren suggests that when women learn to identify their experiences they can 
learn to challenge the authority of experts and trust their own judgment and “other ordinary folk.”122 
Warren’s point seems to be to encourage women to question professional expertise and trust 
themselves. What remains unclear is Warren’s reference to “ordinary folk.” Who are they? The question 
is even more interesting when Warren’s proposal is compared with Sherwin’s. While Sherwin questions 
the mainstream cultural accounts, Warren promotes the experiences of ordinary folk. What is the 
distinction?  
Despite this difference, Sherwin and Warren’s main points are similar; both encourage 
women to challenge authorities and cultural explanations. What is problematic is that the writers do not 
observe that authorities, experts, and mainstream culture may not be opposed to women’s experiences. 
The issue can be linked to the larger question of when women’s experiences are authentic. Are they 
authentic if the motivational structure is not self-imposed, but rather affected by the social order? The 
question of authenticity is important for feminist bioethicists who wish to use experiences as the starting 
point for analysis. Must one conclude, for example, that in order to serve feminist bioethical analysis, 
women’s experiences must be authentic and not influenced by the social order? In my opinion, what is 
needed is a multifaceted analysis of the influence of social order, an issue I will discuss in detail in 
chapter 3.3. Here it suffices to say that, even though women cannot escape the social order, they are 
nevertheless among those who build, maintain, and contest that order. As such, authenticity is not 
necessarily found only in experiences that are in opposition to mainstream cultural explanations. 
The third problem with invoking the moral significance of women’s experiences is that 
there is no collective women’s experience.123 Consequently, how could different experiences of different 
women affect the nature of knowledge? Feminist bioethicists maintain that individual women’s 
experiences should be taken into account, but they also recognize the experiences that women as a 
dominated group have. Those who have historically been “least served and most harmed”124 should be 
the focus of the analysis.125 However, according to Mary B. Mahowald, there will always be tension 
between group and individual experiences. On the one hand, feminist bioethicists are encouraged to 
consider the experiences individuals have. On the other hand, they are directed to look for systemic 
oppression and injustices in different groups. The tension occurs when the “standpoint of an individual is 
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124 Wolf 1996, 23. 
125 Mahowald 1996, 103; Wolf 1996, 23. 
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at odds with that of a group with which she is identified.”126 Mahowald maintains that this is a tension 
feminists must learn to live with.127 How this should be done, however, remains unstated. 
The examples above show that the importance of experiences signifies different things to 
different feminist bioethicists. The importance of experience is thus unclear and should not be invoked 
without due consideration.128 At the same time the examples indicate that the issue of the moral meaning 
of experience may be interpreted in relation to other feminist themes. Although the feminist bioethical 
analysis of the importance of experiences and women’s perspectives is cursory, the analysis 
nevertheless shows that experiences are linked to other issues that are central to feminist thinking, 
namely, contexts, relationships, and perspectives. Social relations and cultural contexts shape women’s 
experiences, and their individual perspectives affect those experiences. Therefore, one must look more 
closely at the issues of contexts and relationships in order to understand the importance of experiences 
in feminist bioethics.  
Both of the above-mentioned aspects of feminist bioethics – the democratic production of 
knowledge and the use of experiences in analysis – lead to the problem of how to take communal and 
individual differences into account while striving for objectivity, which should be the basis for universal 
standards in bioethics. The question of objectivity is related to relativism. Feminist bioethicists maintain 
that multiple perspectives should guide the production of moral knowledge. This leads to the problem of 
knowing how to build a bioethics that is relativistic enough to accommodate diversities between 
individuals and societies – that is, we want to avoid being insensitive and insulting – yet universal 
enough to serve as a common base from which we can launch collaborative moral action.129 
It appears that feminist bioethicists have proposed two related approaches as an answer 
to the problem of relativism. In the first approach, some form of relativism is inevitable and even desirable 
in feminist bioethics.130 In the second, the discussion of relativism in contrast to universalism should be 
re-examined in order to determine whether it is even possible to talk about objectivity only after the 
situational elements of the knower are demonstrated. I will discuss these in the following. 
First, as for the idea that some form of relativism is inevitable and desirable in feminist 
bioethics, several scholars have referred to “feminist relativism” introduced to bioethics by Susan Sherwin 
in 1992. Sherwin maintains that absolutist principles are oppressive and must be criticized. At the same 
time, however, relativist principles are challenging for feminist bioethics because they “undermine the 
                                                        
126 Mahowald 1996, 103. 
127 Mahowald 1996, 103. 
128 “One may well ask just what it means for a moral theory to take experience into account. Or, what difference it makes if a 
moral theory were to take moral experiences into account. Or, further, what is involved in paying special attention to women’s 
moral experience.” Brennan 1999, 864. 
129 Quinn 2004, 110.  
130 Dickenson 2004, 18; Diniz & Gonzáles Vélez 2001, 65; Nicholas 1999, 245; Sherwin 1992a, 66-75; Shildrick 1997, 137; 
Tong 1997, 84; Tong 2001, 28. 
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strength of moral arguments against oppression.”131 Feminists maintain that there are many different 
realities, and thus there is no single truth in moral discourse. This does not, however, mean that there is 
no moral objectivity at all.132  
Sherwin maintains that there is nothing more primary or central in ethics than the 
community standards. Therefore, feminists are to pay attention to the communal and political contexts 
and to the “role of existing dominance relations in the moral standards that a community endorses.”133 
Power structures have an effect on moral values in a given community. The evaluation of a community’s 
moral standards must be based on an assessment of how the community reaches moral decisions. The 
central element of feminist relativism is the analysis of the power used in decision-making. Practices 
based on the oppressive use of power should be called to account. It is important to safeguard moral 
decisions against further oppression and to discuss decisions in the context of the community.134 
[F]eminists should accept only those cultural traditions, including religiously based ones, that are 
the products of a long history of conversations and negotiations in which all social groups have  
reflectively participated with ample opportunities to freely voice their interests and concerns.135 
One must question, however, whether such cultural traditions exist. The idea that all 
groups have similar opportunities to express their opinions is highly idealized. For this reason, feminist 
relativism represents feminist values, such as core feminism, but not necessarily a standard state of 
affairs, and thus is a limited kind of relativism.136  
The following points should be made. First, feminist relativism could be identified with 
value pluralism defined as the view that there are several values that may be equally correct and 
fundamental, yet in conflict with each other. Limits to pluralism are accepted if vital human needs are 
violated. According to the feminist bioethicists, the conviction that oppression is always wrong should 
guide moral evaluation and decision-making in feminist bioethics. Those in favor of feminist relativism 
acknowledge the contextual and provisional nature of moral judgments and maintain that there is no 
absolute right or wrong. However, social and cultural practices can be evaluated according to their 
origins. It is essential to assess whether these practices reinforce subordination and inequality.  
Second, feminist bioethicists seem to mean moral relativism when they discuss relativism 
in this context. This is not radical moral relativism, meaning that there are different moral or value 
systems that cannot be evaluated or compared to each other. All value systems are equally bad or 
                                                        
131 Sherwin 1992a, 59. 
132 Sherwin 1992a, 65. 
133 Sherwin 1992a, 67. 
134 Sherwin 1992a, 67-68, 75. “Individuals gain understanding about ethics through discussion within a community; we cannot 
work out moral principles apart from the context of their application.” Sherwin 1992a, 68.  
135 Tong (2004, 93) cites Sherwin 1992a.  
136 Mahowald 1996, 99; Nicholas 1999, 245-246; Tong 1996, 84; Tong 2001, 65. 
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equally good. Instead, feminist relativism can be called modest moral relativism which claims that value 
systems can be evaluated and compared and that based upon this evaluation, morality can evolve and 
value systems change. Those in favor of modest moral relativism, such as the Finnish philosopher Ilkka 
Niiniluoto, maintain that the task of philosophy is to seek principles by which moral or value systems can 
be evaluated. These principles can be coherence or compatibility with moral intuitions, for example.137 
Additionally, core feminism could provide a basis for evaluating a value system. A value system could be 
criticized for its oppressive elements.138  
As for the second approach to the problem of relativism, feminist bioethicists maintain that 
universalism – the view that facts can be discovered objectively and thus they apply universally in all 
situations, times, and places – should be understood from the perspective of objectivity. According to the 
feminists, objectivity is attained only through acknowledging that particular subjects discover facts and 
thus produce knowledge. The problem is not with objectivity per se: “What has hurt women is not 
knowledge but ignorance masked as knowledge. What has hurt women is not objectivity after all, but 
pretended objectivity.”139 Ethical evaluations are provisional and always made within a context.140 Core 
feminism and its imperative to reduce inequality can help reveal forms of partiality that have distorted the 
truth and show how partiality can increase our chances of knowing the truth.141 
In this second view, contexts and subjectivities affect the production of moral knowledge. 
Through normalization, the value judgments of Western ethics are given a primary position in contrast to 
other value judgments that stem from other contexts.142 Understanding normality offers an example. 
What constitutes “normal” has many meanings in medicine and bioethics. “Normal” refers both to the 
ideal organic state and to the usual state of an individual. More importantly, “normal” is based on 
judgments about proper and improper bodies and conduct. Normative statements define what is normal 
in medicine.143 
                                                        
137 Niiniluoto 2003, 257-258. 
138 Feminist relativism can be compared to Jürgen Habermas’ consensus theory of truth. See Niiniluoto 2003, 256 for an 
analysis of Habermas. 
139 Langton 2000, 143. 
140 Shildrick 1997, 139. 
141 Campbell 2007, 28/36. 
142 It should be noted that “Western ethics” is not a monolithic whole. Feminist bioethicists do not seem to consider to the 
various forms of Western ethics. 
143 Keane 2005, 98-99. For example, a medical model of drug addiction describes the addict as someone who fails to achieve 
maturity based on self-discipline and autonomy. This model of addiction reinforces norms of independence and self-control. 
Helen Keane (2005, 108-109) criticizes the model and suggests that the interaction of the body with drugs can be either a bad 
or a good encounter, depending on the specific body and the specific drug – and the situation. The task of healthcare workers 
is to decrease the number of bad encounters and increase the number of good encounters. In practice, this means political 
and social responsibility for drug users instead of categorizing the users as abnormal. The responsibility should lie not only in 
guiding individual drug users to what is considered to be normal but also in “harm reduction” which could be handing out clean 
needles. 
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Feminist bioethicists in favor of the third transformation strategy use deconstruction to 
question the mainstream understanding of ethical categories.144 Feminist deconstructionism suggests 
that ethical systems and ethical universals can still exist, but they must be truly universals. An integrated 
view of global ethics is needed in order to combine universalism and difference.145 Instead of assimilating 
differences into one interpretation, the differences should be revealed. Only then can injustices be laid 
bare. However, to recognize differences does not mean to relativize injustices. The proposed approach is 
based on the difference between universality and a general point of view. Whereas universality can be 
promoted and differences appreciated, a general point of view presents problems. Feminist bioethics 
should focus on a universality based on including everyone in moral life, not a false generality that 
assimilates differences into one interpretation.146 
The following points should be made in reference to the feminists’ second answer to 
relativism. First, the feminists do not seem to advocate unrestrained relativism. For example, they point 
out that relativism does not mean “anything goes.” Ethical evaluations are still important, and some things 
are indeed better than others. However, this does not mean that judgments are fixed.147 Feminist 
bioethicists claim that their task is not to deny the relevance of all value judgments, but rather evaluate all 
of them critically.148  
Second, the question of relativism is related to “the bias paradox”: feminists reject 
impartiality as “a general epistemic and moral ideal, but at the same time they want also to reject gender 
bias because it obviously fails to measure up to the ideal of impartiality.”149 In order to overcome the 
paradox, feminists must find a way of separating good biases from bad ones. Furthermore, in order to 
separate good and bad biases, feminists must be able to decide how to define good and bad.150 As 
suggested above, core feminism provides a tool for this definition: when biases are oppressive, they can 
be categorized as bad.  
Third, if feminists accept that biases can be evaluated then they can accept the possibility 
of knowing the truth.151 Although feminist bioethicists do not say so explicitly, they seem to endorse moral 
                                                        
144 See for example Dickenson 2004, Potter 2005 and Shildrick 1997, 2005. 
145 “[F]ar from being sensitive to the ethical pluralism of modernity, particularists are largely blind to it, since they see ethical 
life as encapsulated in distinct domains by rigid grids of categories and sensibilities.” Dickenson 2004, 18. 
146 Dickenson 2004, 23-24. ”Universality in the sense of participation and inclusion of everyone in moral and social life does 
not imply universality in the sense of the adoption of a general point of view that leaves behind particular affiliations, feelings, 
commitments and desires. Indeed … universality as generality has often operated precisely to inhibit inclusion and 
participation.” Dickenson 2004, 23. Direct citation from Young (1990, 105). 
147 “The multiplication of the sites, sources and constructions of value does not … indicate an unrestrained relativism in which 
anything goes. The demand is not that we should refrain from saying that some things are indeed better than others, but that 
we should acknowledge always the impossibility of fixing that judgment in either time or space.” Shildrick 1997, 138. 
148 Shildrick 1997, 137-138. 
149 Campbell 2007, 29/36. 
150 Campbell 2007, 29/36-30/36. 
151 See, for example, Campbell 2007.  
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realism, in which moral facts are understood in the realistic sense of a fact. Value statements are either 
true or not true irrespective of situational elements or what can be agreed upon.152  
It is not within the scope of this study to examine moral realism and the arguments against 
it in detail. Two things, however, should be noted. First, moral realism is not without problems. Some 
forms of moral realism refer to idealistic metaphysics. It could be argued that instead of being moral 
realist, the feminist bioethicists are constructivists: they seem to maintain that values are products of 
human activity. According to Ilkka Niiniluoto, value constructionism can be linked to modest moral 
relativism.153 Niiniluoto’s idea that subjectivist, cultural, and social forms of cognitive and moral relativism 
do not deny the existence of knowledge and values, but rather claim that their truth or rightness is always 
relativized to some individual, point of view, cultural, or social interest is in accordance with the feminist 
bioethicists’ account of moral knowledge.  
Furthermore, although feminists who endorse the third transformation strategy may 
question the possibility of moral truth, the most plausible reading of the feminist transformation of 
bioethics is that this possibility is not questioned, but the ways of finding the truth are. For example, 
Susan Hekman argues that “feminism must provide a grounding for truth claims that does not rely on a 
universal metanarrative but nevertheless provides a stable basis for meaning.”154  
In order to provide this the feminist bioethicists draw on different theoretical backgrounds. 
Below, I present Rosemarie Tong’s and Mary B. Mahowald’s accounts of the nature of moral knowledge. 
These accounts can be described as contextual. Although Tong uses the term “positionality” instead of 
“contextuality” there is a decided similarity between the terms. Moreover, although positionality is not 
synonymous with contextuality, both terms describe the importance of situations and particularities.155 In 
Tong’s interpretation, positionalists claim that knowledge of truth is situated and partial: “although there is 
truth to be known, knowledge of this truth is always situational and partial, even if one possesses a 
feminist consciousness.”156 At the same time, however, Tong claims that in addition to knowledge, truth is 
situated and partial too: “on the one hand, truth is situated in that it emerges from the roles and 
relationships individuals have. … On the other hand, truth is partial in that no one individual or group 
possesses it in entirety.”157 Truth is situated because it stems from the social contexts, relationships, and 
roles that individuals have; it is partial because it cannot be possessed entirely. Individual opportunities to 
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155 However, position refers to the location, place, or situation of the knowing subject, whereas context describes the 
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acquire and possess knowledge are limited. No one can possess the whole truth or universal knowledge. 
Thus, Tong claims that both knowledge and truth are situated and partial.158  
The claim about the situated nature of knowledge and truth has been discussed especially 
in relation to standpoint feminism.159 According to Mahowald, who endorses standpoint theory, 
knowledge is located and thus, it is partial. Individuals cannot acquire a view from a universal or a 
general perspective. The contexts of individuals’ lives affect their production of knowledge. Objectivity is 
possible only through many partial perspectives that form webs of connections. Feminist standpoint 
theorists not only claim that knowledge is partial, but also contend that some perspectives have been 
privileged, while others are disadvantaged. The perspectives of those who are well-offs in society are 
advantaged, while the perspectives of the marginalized are devalued and dominated. The feminist 
standpoint theorists claim that the advantaged view is not complete and thus has to be corrected through 
the perspective or standpoint of those who are dominated. The perspective of the latter is thought to 
reveal a view that is important in developing of a more just and equal society because it exposes 
something that would not otherwise be revealed. According to standpoint feminism, the view of the 
oppressed makes coercion and inequality known.160   
Mahowald maintains that feminist standpoint theory is important for feminist bioethics 
because the theory takes context into account. It is imperative to consider the unique relationships and 
roles women have in their distinctive life contexts and how their roles and relationships contribute to the 
subordination of individuals. It is also essential to be critical of the larger relationships and roles that 
support traditional gender stereotypes and women’s subordination in general in society.161 Feminist 
                                                        
158 “Knowledge comes from facts and experiences, but since our facts and experiences are inevitably limited, our truths are 
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159 Mahowald 1996, 95; Tong 1996, 86. According to Mahowald (1996, 99), standpoint is a “particular position” from which 
things are perceived and viewed. Situations and particulars are at the center of standpoint theory. As such, standpoint theory 
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is, the situatedness on which feminist standpoint theory relies.” Mahowald 1996, 104. 
160 Mahowald 1996, 99-100. 
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103-104), the analysis of the reasons for women’s subordination is central especially in health care contexts. Feminist 
standpoint theory can be helpful in the bioethical analysis of the doctor-patient system, because it takes into account that this 
relationship is embedded in other relationships and that it reflects larger social contexts. Feminist standpoint theory also takes 
into account not only the power relations in the relationship, but also the mutuality of the doctor and the patient. Both the 
doctor and the patient have responsibilities and rights. Mahowald (1996, 103) claims that “health care reflects a patriarchal 
system.” However, the claim is not supported by any evidence in her text. What does the claim mean? Does it refer to the 
hierarchical structure of hospitals? Or to the small number of men in the less well-paid positions in the health care 
professions? Or does it refer to the tendency to assign women the roles of nurses or patients and men the roles of doctors? 
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standpoint theory takes gender differences into consideration. In bioethics, this means studying the 
supposed gender-neutrality of medicine and bioethics. If attention is not given to gender, then power 
structures are not studied and equality cannot be promoted.162  
Despite the fact that Tong employs feminist standpoint theory,163 she points out that the 
theory has two major flaws. First, it seems to presuppose the essentialist nature of all women. After all, 
the theory does not take into account the particularities of individual women. Second, feminist standpoint 
theory seems to duplicate women’s oppression. The world is divided into those with power and those 
without. According to Tong, feminist standpoint theory represents a world in which there are female 
victims and male victimizers. As a result, the theory questions the subjectivity of women.164  
Mahowald defends feminist standpoint theory.165 In her view, women’s privileged 
standpoint is associated with the category of otherness. Otherness is not just accepting a subordinate 
status, but is an alternative way of being.   
The condition of otherness enables women to stand back and criticize the norms, values, and 
practices that dominant culture (patriarchy) seeks to impose on everyone, including those who live 
on its periphery – in this case women. Thus, Otherness, for all the associations with oppression 
and inferiority, is much more than an oppressed, inferior condition. Rather, it is a way of being, 
thinking, and speaking that allows for openness, plurality, diversity, and difference.166  
It is rather easy to accept that knowledge is partial. No one can know everything, not even 
about a single topic. However, it is another matter to claim that truth is partial or contextual. Yet that is 
exactly what some feminist scholars argue. For instance, Susan Hekman maintains that there are 
multiple paths to moral truth, but that the multiplicity does not lead to moral chaos. This is because 
different “moral voices” are developed socially and are thus the “product of the community of values that 
constitutes and legitimizes moral voices.”167 The community of values protects its members from the 
practical outcomes of moral chaos, as seen, for example, in the functioning of common law decisions. 
This is a sign of the operation of moral language games, which are established in a society. Feminists 
may want to oppose some moral voices and highlight others. The process of resistance to certain moral 
practices and the acceptance or legitimatizing of others should be done carefully.168 “[W]e cannot step 
                                                                                                                                                                               
Either way, it is ungrounded – or undefined at a minimum – to claim that health care in general reflects a patriarchal system. A 
hospital structure, the occupational choices of men and women, or some other distinct parts of health care may reflect the 
patriarchal system. But to claim that health care in general reflects a patriarchal system is another thing. 
162 Mahowald 1996, 109, 111. 
163 “[M]y kind of feminist standpoint theorists …” Tong 1997, 86. 
164 Tong 1997, 89. 
165 It should be noted that Mahowald was writing before Tong. Therefore, she does not reply directly to Tong’s criticism. 
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outside [the fundamental beliefs of our world] and create a new world out of nothing. What we can do is 
to work with those beliefs, shifting them in a direction more to our liking.”169 
 What seems to distinguish feminist bioethicists from standard bioethicists is their analysis 
of oppression in relation to moral knowledge. Feminist bioethicists maintain that social relations and 
cultural contexts shape women’s experiences and their individual perspectives. Moreover, contexts guide 
the democratic production of knowledge. When contexts are oppressive, they also have an oppressive 
effect on moral knowledge. The issue of contexts in the production of moral knowledge must therefore be 
examined carefully.  
Feminist bioethicists analyze moral knowledge and agency through contexts, which are 
thus an important element of feminist bioethics.170 Most feminist bioethicists bring up the importance of 
contexts in their analysis of medicine, medical practice, and mainstream bioethics.171 They argue both 
that contextual details should be taken into account in bioethical discussion and that contextual details 
affect how issues are selected for analysis and how they are actually analyzed. The task for feminist 
bioethicists is to be aware and critical of the tendency toward abstractness in mainstream ethics and to 
determine what kinds of contextual details are relevant to ethical analysis. They maintain that concrete 
details are important to the scope and analysis of ethics because people cannot escape the effect of 
contextual details of their lives.172  
Now I will turn to the question of contextuality in relation to moral knowledge, but first I will 
briefly discuss the feminist bioethical interpretation of contexts in general.173 Feminist bioethicists criticize 
the general tendency of standard bioethics toward acontextuality. However, they note that some forms of 
mainstream bioethics, such as casuistry, emphasize the importance of contexts.174 When casuistry is 
applied, the particularities of a given situation are taken into account. Decision-making in healthcare is 
thus optimized for a particular situation and a particular patient.175 Contextual details appear on a 
personal level. At this level, when the moral nature of an action, such as abortion, is analyzed, it is 
                                                                                                                                                                               
”[A]ny appeal to the moral practices of our society must be significantly qualified in a feminist context.” Hekman 1999, 117. 
169 Hekman 1999, 146. 
170  “Amongst the things important in feminist bioethics is context.” Martin 2001, 433. 
171 Donchin 2001b, 367, 370; Donchin & Purdy 1999, 9; Ells 2001, 427; Martin 2001, 433; Rorty 1999, 163; Sherwin 1992a, 
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172 Sherwin 1992b, 19; Wolf 1996 15; Wolf 1999, 70. 
173 It should be noted that, in their treatment of contextuality, some feminist bioethicists fail to appreciate the distinction of 
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want to avoid generalizations, such as “all women are alike.” Nevetheless, there is a certain importance in generalizations. 
Anne Donchin (2001b, 382) proposes that “we need a generalized perspective that acknowledges the kinds of morally 
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174 Mahowald 1996, 104; Wolf 1996, 21, 23. 
175 According to Mary B. Mahowald (1996, 104) “casuistry as a method by which case-based analyses may be applied to 
bioethics.”  
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important to take into account the contextual details that affect the life of the woman in question. How, for 
example, does pregnancy, having a child, or having an abortion affect a woman’s social relations and 
overall life situation? The life contexts and relationships of the woman are affected by her decision.176  
At the same time, however, feminist bioethicists point out that casuistry alone is too 
narrow an approach. Although important, the consideration of contexts should not take the form of case-
based analysis only. The feminist bioethicists maintain that feminists should pay particular attention to 
broad social contexts.177 A context is not merely about local values or the moral situation of an individual; 
it is about structures, cultural values, and philosophical premises. The bioethicists’ task is to identify 
oppressive structures and systemic injustices.178 If the whole health care system is flawed, then it is 
useless to consider contextual issues on an individual level. In the feminist bioethical literature, authors 
urge resolution of the problems at the macro-level, such as the power inequality between lay persons and 
medical professionals in health care delivery and allocation of resources.179 A contextual approach could 
help identify the reasons for oppression and subordination. Therefore, in feminist bioethics, contexts refer 
to larger political and social situations.180  
These larger contextual issues, such as power relations and general policies, should 
inform feminist bioethical analysis. For example, Susan Sherwin discusses the relationship of universal 
and contextual ethics and maintains that specific details and other contextual factors help to solve moral 
questions because they are used to apply general principles. Take, for example, the principle of justice, 
considered central in eliminating oppression.181 However, justice cannot be understood without 
contextual analysis. The appeal to justice “makes sense when the relevant contextual details are spelled 
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Feminist bioethicists such as Roberts (1996, 119) and Silvers (1999, 182) are worried that the voice of the less powerful is 
marginalized. They urge that bioethicists need to take into account the contexts which affect the less well-off in society. 
180 “In the case of feminist thought, the analysis links women’s freedom from coercion over pregnancy to other aspects of 
women’s relative power in society. Hence, feminist ethics still addresses questions of context, but does so in terms of a 
general policy within a society afflicted with patriarchal dominance relations.” Sherwin 1992b, 26. 
181 Sherwin 1992a, 55, 82. Sherwin (1992a, 55) refers to justice as both the “conception” of justice and the “principle” of 
justice. She does not explicate the use of the terms.  
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out.”182 Transgressions of justice cannot be explored in the abstract or without the consideration of actual 
forces that undermine justice. Oppression and women’s subordinate status is the context that should 
inform feminist bioethics. If bioethical questions of biotechnologies or medical practices are analyzed only 
in relation to case-specific details, then the implications of the technologies and the practices of existing 
and potential patterns of oppression are not perceived.183 A feminist bioethical approach to contexts is 
thus in line with core feminism: the task of feminism is to identify oppression and contest it.  
Feminists use contexts in their philosophical criticism, and they use analysis in varying 
ways.184 On the one hand, they refer to case-specific details; on the other hand, they refer to political and 
social circumstances. The difference can be understood if the term “context” is differentiated from the 
term “particularity”. Feminist bioethicists refer to the importance of both particulars and contexts or 
particularizing and contextualizing.185 However, the feminist bioethical literature suggests that 
particularizing focuses on “individual autonomy and informed consent,”186 whereas contextualization 
refers to “network of unequal power relations within which individual decisions are made.”187 Individuals 
need to understand the larger contexts and structures that construct and constrict their lives in order to 
act rationally and make sense of their lives and surroundings. Individual freedom is linked to the social 
and political reality.188  
Feminist bioethicists maintain that the contextual approach informs the epistemology in 
their field. For that reason, they equate the importance of contexts with methodological questions. 
Contexts direct the way bioethical issues are and should be analyzed and discussed. For example, Wolf 
associates attention to contexts with inductivism, a traditional method in bioethics. Feminist bioethicists 
do not propose that there are particular feminist bioethical methods. Rather they maintain that feminist 
bioethicists may use different methods eclectically:  
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There is a shift away from the deductivism and acontextual universals of principlism. Instead, the 
field [bioethics] is moving toward a greater inductivism, whether as an alternative or supplement to 
principlism. Bioethicists variously champion casuistry, narrative ethics, ethnography-driven 
bioethics and other approaches. It is all part of a greater attention to context and cases as the 
wellspring of bioethics analysis.189  
In addition, there are two suggestions for developing particularly feminist bioethical 
methods: Susan Sherwin’s feminist reflective equilibrium and Rosemarie Tong’s practical dialogue. Both 
methods rely heavily on contextual analysis. Feminist reflective equilibrium is distantly based on the 
notion of reflective equilibrium introduced by John Rawls and described by Sherwin as follows:190 
In his [Rawls’s] conception, ethical theory is to be developed by engaging in an ongoing practice of 
shifting our focus back and forth between the level of abstract, theoretical concepts and principles 
and that of our considered moral judgments. Each level is envisioned as correcting and informing 
the other until our intuitions at both levels can be brought into line with one another.191 
Sherwin claims that Rawls’s reflective equilibrium is in need of refinement because of its abstractness.192 
Instead of describing the process with only abstract ideals and terms, we should take into account 
considerations and observations from real life. Special attention should be paid to the patterns of 
oppression.193 In feminist reflective equilibrium, “we make a conscious effort to consider questions of 
domination and power as morally relevant concerns when we explore the conceptual and practical 
dimensions of issues in bioethics.”194 Feminist reflective equilibrium does not provide eternal or timeless 
moral truths, but moral ideals tied to a certain time and place. Sherwin’s idea is based on the feminist 
conviction that no single subject can acquire a general moral perspective. It takes into account each 
subject’s limited vision and perspective.195 Sherwin’s feminist reflective equilibrium is designed to 
consider how certain principles and practices are formulated and how they affect existing patterns of 
oppression. A change in perspective would mean that arguments for universal health care “should be 
reformulated to include not only medical services but all of the controllable conditions that contribute to 
good health.”196 Sherwin calls for a broader conception of health in which preventive and protective 
health measures are given high priority.  
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later developments in Rawls’s reflective equilibrium. For example, Norman Daniels has developed reflective equilibrium to 
become more adaptive to contextual considerations. Furthermore, Daniels has studied the way reflective equilibrium could be 
used in health care settings and in the realm of bioethics. Daniels (1996, 350) maintains, for example, that “ethical problem-
solving … must be multifaceted and responsive to the demands of both context and theory.” Therefore, feminist bioethicists 
would benefit from engaging in dialogue with Daniels, and from further developing the feminist reflective equilibrium. 
193 Sherwin 1996b, 191-193. 
194 Sherwin 1996b, 193. 
195 Sherwin 1996b, 193. 
196 Sherwin 1996b, 201. 
50 
 
Tong, on the other hand, maintains that the feminist bioethical literature indicates that 
feminists wish to engage in the method of “feminist practical dialogue”197 and seek consensus through 
it.198 Feminist practical dialogue differs from the dialogue between different perspectives within 
mainstream bioethics because it is not bound to theories and principles: 
[F]eminist practical dialogue typically begins not with the articulation of general moral rules or 
principles but with the creation of opportunities for participants to speak about their own moral 
experiences. These bits of personal narrative are then molded together through a process of 
collective reflection, the goal of which is to transform the tendency of individual women to think 
about their past situations and actions merely “personal”.199 
Feminist dialogue is not easy, and it may not result in the consensus originally sought. However, the 
dialogue helps to see both the importance of the contexts that make women different from one another 
and also situations that are the same for women around the globe. The dialogue would help feminists 
develop “health care and medical practices that contribute not only to gender liberation but also to race, 
class, and human liberation.”200  
Neither feminist reflective equilibrium nor practical dialogue is well-defined in relation to 
bioethics. Nor do feminist bioethicists explicitly state that they use these methods. The methods are, 
however, important for feminist bioethics in the sense that they describe the importance of context in 
bioethical practice. The methods show that contextuality refers both to the particularities of a given 
situation and to the large patterns of oppression. Attention to both will guide feminist bioethicists toward 
an expanded concept of equality. 
Laura Purdy suggests how to employ context in bioethics. Context, she writes, is a 
principle in feminist bioethics.201 Or at least feminists use context in a principle-like manner:  
There seems to be something of an emerging consensus about characteristics of distinctively 
feminist moral thinking. Among them are attention to particular cases, to relationships, to 
responsibility, to context. These may not be traditional moral principles, but they are principles 
nonetheless: they guide our thinking and provide consistency.202 
Purdy maintains that principles are needed in order to justify reliably the basic claims behind moral 
theories.203 The task of moral philosophers is to formulate a “justifiable formal and material principle.”204 
Without principles, feminist bioethics is in danger of becoming a “special interest ethics” which can easily 
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be bypassed.205 Purdy’s suggestion is both surprising and extraordinary, since most feminist bioethicists 
oppose the use of principles in general. Furthermore, the feminists have pointed out that applying 
principles is difficult if one wants to take contextual details seriously in bioethical analysis.  
From this perspective it is true that statements about contexts such as “all people are in a 
context” or “all people are situated” are empty in meaning and not descriptive. They are axiomatic and of 
little value in informing bioethical theorizing and decision-making. They become important, however, in 
relation to other readings of context. Contexts are important in the production of bioethical knowledge 
when they are linked to power-relations and patterns of oppression as proposed above. Therefore, 
Purdy’s claim that context is a principle in feminist bioethics is relevant. First, the claim is well grounded 
in the feminist bioethical literature, although Purdy herself does not define the principle clearly. Most 
feminists do indeed agree that attention should be paid to contexts, even if they might not call “attention 
to context” a principle. Second, context as a principle guides thinking and provides a basis for feminist 
bioethical arguments. It is thus linked to methodological and epistemological questions. Purdy does not 
formulate the principle directly. It appears, however, that she and other feminist bioethicists might agree 
on the following exhortation: “Always examine the contexts of moral dilemma when making moral 
decisions.” This exhortation can be called a principle insofar it guides our thinking and provide 
consistency.  
In conclusion, feminist bioethicists maintain that contexts construct and facilitate the 
choices made by individuals. These contexts include particular elements and relationships in particular 
cases, but also larger social networks of power relations. Feminist bioethicists emphasize the importance 
of contexts especially in relation to moral knowledge. They maintain that, both moral knowledge and truth 
are partial and contextual. People as knowers are bound by their life contexts. Therefore, knowledge is 
produced in particular situations and circumstances which in turn affect the nature of that knowledge. For 
that reason, the methods that feminist bioethicists propose, namely, reflective equilibrium and practical 
dialogue, are based on contextuality. Both methods suggest moral ideals that are not eternal, but tied to a 
certain time and place. This approach directs the transformation of bioethics. In order to understand fully 
the concept of context we must look at two issues to which contextuality is linked, namely, relationships 
and power. What effect do relationships have on the social contexts that contribute to the construction of 
moral agency and knowledge? How do feminist bioethicists define and analyze the power relations that 
are said to form the larger context for moral analysis in feminist bioethics? When these questions are 
answered, the transformation recommended by feminist bioethicists can be elaborated.   
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field. 
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2.2  Possibilities for Moral Agency: Relational Transformation 
Like other feminist ethicists, feminist bioethicists are interested in determining what a human being is like 
to be capable of moral deliberation and actions that include the evaluation and elimination of 
discrimination. Feminists maintain that those belonging to marginalized groups have limited roles in 
making moral rules and principles. For example, women find themselves negotiating details and 
relationships within the contexts of principles that have been dictated to them.206 For this reason, feminist 
bioethicists maintain that their task is to analyze the opportunities for moral agency under oppressive 
conditions.207 In this chapter I will focus on how feminist bioethicists want to transform traditional 
accounts of agency. What kind of moral agency do feminist bioethicists suggest for a transformed 
bioethics? 
 Some feminist bioethicists, such as Margrit Shildrick, maintain that, in Western philosophy 
autonomy is the determining feature of moral agency. Moral agency in standard bioethics is assigned to 
all people who “have the capacity for autonomy, who understand themselves to be bound by rights and 
duties, and who know themselves to be individuated subjective beings.”208 However, Shildrick maintains 
that a distinction must be made between the concepts of agency and autonomy. According to her, 
agency is the capacity to choose from a limited range of options and act accordingly, whereas autonomy 
is the ability to shape and create those options. Although autonomy is often defined in the bioethical 
context as an ability to make decisions about one’s body and health care, it also entails a comprehensive 
notion of freedom from coercion.209  
The notion of freedom is central to a feminist analysis of agency. Notions of negative and 
positive freedom help us to understand the different aspects of agency. Negative freedom refers to the 
absence of external obstacles to self-guided action. Positive freedom, on the other hand, is the capacity 
to realize an autonomous will or the capacity of self-government. In order for an agent to be autonomous, 
his or her choices and actions must be self-chosen, at least to a degree, not wholly influenced by a social 
order. Philosophers have not been able to conclude what conditions must be satisfied to ensure that an 
agent governs himself or herself when he or she acts.210  In connection with this question, feminist 
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philosophers and bioethicists are especially interested in determining how power-relations affect 
agency.211   
 If feminists question stable subjectivity as the basis for moral agency, then they have to 
answer the question of what becomes of moral agency. What kind of moral agency can be based on 
differences instead of stable essences? In answer, these feminist scholars distinguish stable and unitary 
subjects from diverse and multiple subject positions.212 Subject positions are “possibilities in and out of 
which individual is both constructed and may construct her life.”213 This new perspective on subjectivity 
demands the dissolution of the unified, self-present, and pre-given subject. It also demands the 
dissolution of the subject/object dichotomy. Feminist deconstructionists in particular have given 
consideration to the agency of women and the real-life possibilities that women have for acting. The 
scholars have tried to formulate a subjectivity that women could call their own. Deconstruction is said to 
challenge the binary opposition of male and female sexuality by displacing the whole binary model.214  
The operation of différance … radically deconstructs all reliance on essentialism, both in terms of 
universal sameness or absolutely defined difference. It insists that no meaning is ever fixed but 
always deferred, always as it were sliding away in an infinite chain of signifiers.215 
According to a feminist interpretation, deconstruction entails ethical responsibility because you and I are 
not separate, but intertwined. This connection leads to taking responsibility for the other. 216 However, 
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real bodies rather than the abstract bodies of psychoanalytic theory makes clear the potential pain caused by defining bodies 
as abject others, and by rejecting the qualities that they display.” 
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deconstruction might solve one problem, but raise another. While deconstruction breaks down binary 
opposition, it also breaks down any stable subject positions. 
 Adopting the above-mentioned understanding of subject positions suggests a new way of 
understanding agency, which is not based on understanding individuality as stable and self-governing, 
but rather as more fluid and changing. This understanding does not, however, lead to endless 
fragmentation, because subjects are re-figured locally and temporally. “[F]ar from destroying the notion of 
agency, the deconstruction of the subject forces us to recognize the plurality of its possibilities.”217 
Nevertheless, while questioning the definition of agency as opposing norms, feminist scholars have to 
ask how their understanding of agency should be related to core feminism and its insistence on 
overturning oppression. If there are no stable subjects, but only subject positions, then there is no stable 
category of women or men. If female and male essence is questioned, then does sexual difference 
become meaningless? If so, what happens to the subject of feminism? If the stable category of women 
vanishes must the subject of feminism vanish too?  
 Judith Butler observes that the stable category of women is problematic because the 
subject of feminism, that is, women, is constructed “by the very political system that is supposed to 
facilitate its emancipation:”218 woman is the one who is subordinate to men. However, if there is no 
category of woman and no category of subject, then there can be no impetus for criticizing and 
overturning women’s oppression and promoting women subjects. It is simplistic to assume that the 
solution is to state that because the category of women is problematic, one should not look at the 
differences but instead grant women equal access to the benefits and positions that society makes 
available to men. The differences between men and women lie deeper, and thus more profound changes 
are needed in order to change the situation.219 Feminists in favor of the third transformation strategy 
maintain that the modernist understanding of sexual difference is based on a dual understanding of 
sexuality: male and female sexualities form two classes. Within this system, “women do not set their own 
standards of reference, but act and react according to the masculine ideal.”220 Therefore, their moral 
agency is being questioned. How then, can feminists claim female identity and its empowerment? 
It is dangerous to conclude that the category of women is based on the common “high-
level property of suffering in any one of many forms of oppression and doing so based on their observed 
or presumed gender.”221 The idea that a woman is someone who is oppressed is problematic because if 
women are oppressed by definition, then there is no room for empowerment. If a woman challenges her 
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status as oppressed, then she is challenging her status as a woman.222  In order to provide a different 
interpretation, some feminist argue that “what women have in common is that they fulfill special norms 
which other people and institutions apply to them because they are or are taken to be female.”223 The 
norms for femininity or the standards of being a woman are not solely biological, but relational and 
contextual. The norms of femininity and masculinity are defined within various social institutions and 
relationships. The norms are intertwined with different sets of power relations through these social 
institutions and relationships.  
Although women as a group experience oppression, individuals experience oppression 
differently. The point of feminism is to locate various differences – between women and men and among 
women – “without falling into hierarchical or oppositional ways of thinking.”224 Margrit Shildrick uses two 
different terms to explicate sexual dissimilarity: difference and diversity.  
If … the real material differences between people are to be acknowledged, difference must be 
reconstructed as diverse, plural and in practical terms irreducible. It is not enough simply to avoid 
the false homogeneity of sameness, for simple difference (black/white, young/old, 
heterosexual/homosexual) is conceptually organised in equally homogenous and oppressive 
binary opposites. The notion of diversity, by contrast, embraces heterogeneity, sidesteps the 
devices of dualistic hierarchy, and allows differences and sameness to coexist and mingle.225 
Shildrick refers to Luce Irigaray discussing sexual difference. According to Shildrick, Irigaray does not 
displace sexual difference, but recovers/discovers it, meaning that the feminine is given a voice of its own 
with no reference to the male. Sexual difference in question is a difference “that has never yet existed 
between the sexes”226 and that makes separation and alliance between the sexes possible. Radical 
sexual difference is a project that ends the dualistic approach. As such, the project is an ethical one.227   
 Radical sexual difference is not based on a dualist understanding of biological sex. Nor is 
it necessary to build the category of women on the idea of biological sex difference.228 Despite a general 
understanding that biological sex is easily categorized, it should be noted that all biological and medical 
attributes – chromosomal, hormonal, and physical – are constructed as belonging to one or the other sex. 
Thus, the categorization of men and women involves interpretation. Different models of sex reflect 
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cultural values and thereby cultural expectations of the genders.229 It can be said that women are those 
who are assumed to have certain biological properties that are assumed to define any woman in a certain 
socio-cultural environment. The norms of femininity can vary according to race, class, or other culture-
specific characteristics. Nevertheless, the norms define one single feminine gender. These norms do not 
follow a certain pattern nor are they easily defined. However, they tell something about the expectations 
of the feminine gender.230 Therefore, “diverse norms of femininity and masculinity contribute to defining 
two genders rather than defining a multiplicity of feminine and masculine genders.”231 In this view, the 
category of women should not be discarded, but used critically. Women’s oppression can be 
acknowledged without supporting it.232 According to a definition, feminists are those who oppose the 
subordination of women, and a part of being a feminist is then to recognize that the very category of 
women has oppressive effects.233 Gender and sex categories are fluid, and their existence can be 
questioned biologically. These categories, however, are socially real and even rigid. Social gender and 
sex categories and boundaries create power relations that affect individuals who are assumed to belong 
to these categories.  
Therefore, the task of feminists is to examine the operations of power and the ways power 
is subverted and given new significance. Analyzing the interplay of power and resistance is central to the 
formation of subject positions, which are the only way to attain moral agency for women as women.234 
The questions of transformation and the possibility of female agency are then about how norms and 
power are represented.235 
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According to the feminist bioethicists, the question of norms and power is relevant when 
moral agency is studied in relation to interpretations of the body.236 The bioethicists maintain that the way 
the body and corporeality are interpreted affects the way moral agency is understood. Feminist 
bioethicists’ understanding of the human body demonstrates that cultural interpretations and social 
values alter not only people’s experiences of their own bodies, but also scientific explanations of the 
body. Through normalization some of these explanations become standard. The process of normalization 
reinforces pre-existing social disadvantages experienced by women. Therefore, philosophical and 
biomedical explanations of the body support discriminating descriptions of both female and male 
bodies.237 
 Some feminist bioethicists maintain that the biomedical model of the human body relies on 
a dualistic reading of Cartesian thinking. For example, Margrit Shildrick claims that it is especially “basic 
Cartesian dualism”238 of the mind and body that has affected medical, philosophical, and popular 
discourses and their descriptions of the human body. Within the dualistic conception, the mind is 
described trough the powers of spirituality and intelligence. The body is reduced to a machine, which can 
be evaluated by its functioning.  The mechanistic conception of the corporeal body supported the 
development of modern medicine in the West. Since the body was viewed as a machine, no moral issues 
were raised, and the body was assigned a place outside the moral realm.239 The medical model has 
affected women especially because they “are stereotypically constructed in terms of their biological and 
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example, Rothfield (2005, 38) maintains that “bodily experience is a specific sociocultural event that cannot be extracted from 
the setting of the experience and ascribed to some universal body.” For this reason, there is no real human body; rather the 
human body is “a fabrication” (Shildrick 1997, 13). 
238 Shildrick 1997, 15. Shildrick refers to Descartes’ A Discourse on Method as she explains the dualist conception of mind and 
body. She admits that there are different interpretations of Cartesian thinking. 
239 Shildrick 1997, 16-18. “[A] dualist construction of bodily being served well the development of a mechanistic medical 
science in which the corporeal body could be mapped, measured and experimented on without moral impediment.” Shildrick 
1997, 17. 
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more particularly reproductive bodies, at the same time those bodies express little real sense of personal 
presence.”240 Women are corporeal, yet at the same time absent as active selves.241  
 In order to correct this view, the feminist bioethicists argue that moral agents should be 
viewed as embodied. They maintain that embodiment should be understood as a comprehensive 
description of the unity of mind and the body, the self and the other, revealing the social construction of 
the self.242 We cannot form relationships as disembodied beings, because it is through our bodies that we 
interact and form relationships. Embodiment and relational connections affect our self-understanding. 
The experience of embodiment is intrinsic and essential, not accidental.243  
Embodiment affects how people perceive themselves as subjects. Social, cultural, and 
economic issues affect our bodies through medicine. Medical inventions and social and cultural 
phenomena are concretely located in the body. They show in scars and other physical irregularities.244 
For example, Karen Lebacqz states that the somatization of cultural and social phenomena is an 
example of embodiment. Socially constructed issues, such as economic status, are embodied in 
diseases. Social, political, and economic factors shape people’s health status, access to health care, and 
ability to make use of health care. Lebacqz points out that, for some people, the body represents social, 
cultural, and familial difficulties that cannot be expressed verbally. Physical illness reveals social 
distress.245 Embodiment may be used as a theoretical tool to illustrate that some people carry social 
injustice in their bodies and the illness of a whole society.246 “The somatic embodiment of illness mirrors 
and symbolizes social oppression.”247 An analysis of oppression calls for an analysis of women’s 
experiences and thoughts, which are “mediated through their female bodies.”248 Because the medical 
practice is about embodied selves who meet each other, it is crucial to offer a bioethical account that can 
communicate the corporeal connectedness.249    
                                                        
240 Shildrick 1997, 25. 
241 Shildrick 1997, 25. Shildrick (1997, 26) maintains that new reproductive technologies have “fragmented the female body.” A 
woman’s reproductive organs are described as entirely controllable, yet different from the woman herself. Moreover, the status 
of the embryo is individual and separate from the woman. Shildrick dates the paradox of the corporeality of the female body 
and the absence of female subjectivity to the European Enlightenment. In her view, the Cartesian cogito expressed the 
privileging of mind over body. The subject became self-present and self-authorizing. The subject was expected to transcend 
his own body and trust only his rationality, not the untrustworthy senses. Shildrick points out that the subject is male. 
242 Boetzkes 1999, 121-123; Campbell 1995, 169-170, 172-173. Lisa Sowle Cahill (1995, 199) claims that embodiment is used 
to “counteract a dualism about body and mind in which the body tends to come off as the inferior partner in an uneasy 
relationship.” 
243 Campbell 1995, 169-170, 172-173. “The so-called medical model, which has dominated the traditional biosciences, speaks 
to a powerful split between mind and body where the knowing subject is disembodied, detached from corporeal raw material.” 
Shildrick 1997, 13-14. 
244 Hartsock 2006, 181; Lebacqz 1995, 165. 
245 Lebacqz (1995, 159-160, 165) refers to anthropologist Karen Pliskin. 
246 Hartsock 2006, 3/5; Lebacqz 1995, 160. 
247 Lebacqz 1995, 160. 
248 Tong 1996, 88. 
249 Tong 1996, 88. 
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The feminist bioethicists emphasize the social and relational relevance of embodiment. 
People are connected to other people and to their social surroundings through their bodies.250  The 
importance of embodiment is that it shows persons’ interconnectedness as physical, psychological and 
social beings. The perspective of contemporary bioethics on embodiment is considered inadequate by 
the feminists because the integration of the agents into their social and cultural contexts is not 
highlighted. An embodied moral agent is in a relation with other embodied agents. For this reason, social 
contexts are important in understanding embodiment. The body reflects social meanings and 
relationships.251 For example, Lisa Sowle Cahill wants to develop the thesis that “a positive, integral view 
of the self as embodied and as intrinsically social does not require the rejection of control of the body in 
relation to the values of an encompassing social order.”252 The importance of embodiment in bioethics is 
about treating the body as a key concern in analysis, both medical and ethical.253  Embodiment refers to 
a description of the world, to a concept that defines women’s bodily experiences and the experienced 
body, and to a theoretical tool with which to define ethics.  
Embodiment as a “complex structure of physical, social, and symbolic elements”254 has 
ethical relevance because it demonstrates the integration of body and mind with the self and the other. 
As a symbol of connectedness, embodiment partly explains the nature of moral agency in feminist 
bioethics and philosophy. However, embodiment is not only about what people are like as individuals, but 
also about how relationships are construed. For this reason, embodiment seems to be closely linked to 
relationality. Embodiment is also important for feminist bioethics because it reveals the social, cultural, 
and economic contexts that affect people’s bodies. Bodies reveal hidden inequalities and power 
structures. Embodiment shows concretely the different positions and possibilities people have in society. 
Within the embodied framework, agency is shaped by power relations, which give meaning to the power 
that creates and recreates agency. Within this framework, agency is not expressed in the capacity to 
resist social norms or state one’s authentic self. In order to understand the rationale behind this kind of 
analysis of agency and moral agency, we must once again look closely at how relationships mold agency 
and how they are related to power. 
                                                        
250 “The body enters into the subjectivity of the person, mediates that subjectivity to the world, and is a medium through which 
the world and other persons interact with the subject as embodied self.” Cahill 1995, 204. According to Rothfield (2005, 41-43), 
the realization of culturally-specific corporeality refers not only to objects of knowledge, but also to the knowing subject. The 
subject interacts with others through her or his culturally – and socially – informed body. In the patient-physician relationship, 
the physician understands his or her patient “according to an act of corporeal spectatorship.” If the physician is from a different 
cultural setting, she or he needs to understand not only the medical, but also the cultural and social facts about the patient. 
“The doctor’s ability to perceive the patient is formed according to a number of factors relating to his or her cultural milieu.” 
251 Cahill 1995, 199; Campbell 1995, 169. 
252 Cahill 1995, 199. 
253 Cahill 1995, 199. 
254 Lebacqz 1995, 165. 
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In sum, feminist bioethicists view persons as connected. This connectedness molds what 
people become. However, people are not reducible to their connections and relationships. A critical 
stance vis-à-vis relationships gives people the chance to define themselves. Their identities are not 
preordained according to their roles in their community. This understanding of self as relational directs 
the feminist bioethicists’ account of moral agency. Because moral agents are connected to one another, 
their actions are situated in a web of different relations. Thus individualism and separateness do not 
define moral agency. Moreover, relational understanding directs the transformation of bioethics in issues 
other than moral agency. For example, rights can be understood as relational, and an integral part of 
relational ethics. Relational rights have “the dual purpose of protecting vulnerable individuals and 
encouraging relationships.”255 
The feminist bioethicists’ account of embodiment implies a transformation in bioethics, 
both theoretically and on the applied level. On the theoretical level, bioethics should be based on the 
relational account of the embodied self. On the applied level, bioethics needs to take into account the 
social injustices and oppression that are present in people’s bodies. When medical professionals meet 
patients and clients, they need to recognize the traces of injustices in bodies of patients. To understand 
the rationale behind this kind of analysis of agency and moral agency, we must once again look closely at 
how relationships mold agency and how they are related to power. The realization that relationships have 
a deep influence on human life should inform bioethics, not only on the practical level of decision-making, 
but also on a conceptual level. How have relationship issues affected traditional bioethics and how has 
traditional bioethics incorporated relationship issues into its agenda? How should the relational approach 
transform bioethics? In the following chapter I will discuss the moral importance of relationships in the 
transformation of bioethics. 
 
 
2.3 Relational Bioethics 
The commitment of feminist bioethicists to take relationships into account in bioethical decision-making is 
based on the conviction that relationships shape personhood and individuality.256 The influence of 
relational bonds to people’s individuality needs to be taken into account especially in the analysis of 
autonomy. Feminist bioethicists advocate a relational model of autonomy based on a relational account 
                                                        
255 Brennan 1999, 871. 
256 Donchin 2001b, 369-371; 2004a, 2/12, 6/12. See also Sherwin 1992b, 21. 
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of personhood and on the idea that social environments and relationships can either impair or empower 
autonomy.257 
 The relational self and the relevance of relationships in feminist bioethics are often 
discussed in relation to care ethics.258 Care ethics challenges traditional ethics, which is based on 
abstraction, and explores moral questions within certain contexts and social situations. It takes into 
account particulars and individuals and the moral responsibility to understand the needs of others. 
Accordingly, people’s relationships to others are the basis of moral responsibility.259 Care ethicists 
consider trust, vulnerability, and interdependency the central elements in human relationships. Likewise, 
ethics of care has also been described as the “ethics of love and responsibility based on trust.”260 Even 
though trust is the basis of functional relationships, it involves risks. Not everyone with whom we have a 
relationship is trustworthy. People have to ask themselves whether they should trust others and then take 
the risk of becoming vulnerable. Care ethicists have pointed out that trust is essential because people are 
not self-sufficient, but need each other.261 Vulnerability and human interdependency are recognized as 
morally fundamental in care ethics. It is thus important to analyze the nature of interpersonal 
relationships.262 The nature of the relationship between the “one caring” and the “cared-for” is especially 
important and needs to be defined. What does it mean to be the one, who is caring or the one being 
cared for? How does one make sure that the relationship is moral, non-discriminatory, non-exploitative, 
and empowering?263  
Feminist bioethicists who promote the ethics of care emphasize that both the one caring 
and the one cared for are vulnerable. There is a danger that the one caring will be exploited and the one 
cared for will be oppressed. The idea is that paternalism264 should be avoided and the integrity of the 
                                                        
257 Donchin 2001b, 369; 2004a, 8/12. “[S]elfhood is constituted and maintained within overlapping relationships and 
communities.” Donchin 2004a, 8/12. According to Donchin (2004a, 8/12), autonomous selfhood can be endangered by 
medical conditions. For example, disability and long-term illnesses shape people’s interconnections because they alter the 
bonds people have with each other. Rape or other trauma presents a serious threat to autonomous selfhood because the loss 
of connection experienced diminishes the feeling of autonomy. 
258 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 17-32; Donchin 2004a, 6-7/12; Tong 1999, 33-44. 
259 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 18; Wolf 1996, 50. “An ethics of care is directly concerned neither with doing duty for 
duty’s sake nor with maximizing the good of the aggregate; rather, it is focused on attending to the specific needs of particular 
individuals and on weaving thick webs of human relationships and responsibilities.” Tong 1999, 33. 
260 Tong 1997, 41. Tong refers to Annette Baier.  
261 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 25-26; Tong 1997, 42-43. 
262 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 21. 
263 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 18-21; Tong 1999, 39-41. 
264 It should be noted that feminist bioethicists use ‘paternalism’ which refers to a system reminiscent to the hierarchical family 
structures based on patriarchy. In patriarchy father holds power over women and children. Patriarchy and paternalism indicate 
a male rule and female subordination. When discussing paternalism feminist bioethicists do not discuss the masculinist power 
inherent in the concept of paternalism. However, it would be beneficial for the feminist transformation of bioethics to discuss 
the nuances of the term and whether paternalism best describes different kinds of power relations. Both men and women use 
power, although differently. Does paternalism, then, best describe the multiplicity of power relations? Therefore, feminist 
bioethicists should discuss how the concept of paternalism is used in bioethics and what effects it has for bioethical theories 
and practices. I note the deficient analysis of paternalism here, but do not discuss the problematic nature of the term further.  
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cared-for be respected. Feminist bioethicists point out that in order to avoid exploitation and power 
abuses, it is important to set limits on care. Special attention should thus be paid to the relationship 
between the one caring and the one cared for. At the same time, feminists warn about adopting too 
narrow a perspective. Care relationships always occur within a context.265 Networks of relations can 
support an appropriate care relationship and enable both the caregiver and the one cared for to maintain 
their integrities.266 According to Rosemarie Tong, feminists who advocate the ethics of care must accept 
that people need and depend on each other. However, feminists must not accept total dependence on 
one another. Good care relationships can be defined as those in which the individual tries to empower 
others and “resist the temptation to make those for whom she cares somehow dependent on her.”267  
There are many critics of care ethics. Christine Overall, for example, maintains that the 
ethics of care is ultimately conservative because it does not challenge the mainstream bioethical 
framework effectively enough.268 Other feminist bioethicists have also addressed the model of 
relationships proposed by the ethics of care. They have suggested that the ethics of care is easily applied 
to intimate relationships, but cannot be used in conflict situations between strangers. The problem arises 
also with institutions and societies. Can the ethics of care resist moral wrong on an institutional level?269 
The critics have challenged the care ethicists to define the scope of care: 
In the absence of principles that can show us toward whom our care ought to be directed, we can 
care only for those with whom we happen to be in relation, and although a care ethic might bid us 
individually to care for those social causes we find most worthwhile, it cannot help us revise the 
institutions and ideological and economic forces that play a large role in such evils as world hunger 
or homelessness.270 
The feminist bioethical literature addresses the challenge by claiming that structural 
problems and social injustices can in fact be discussed and solved through the ethics of care. First, a 
distinction between “caring for” and “caring about” needs to be drawn. “Caring about” refers to values. 
What is worth caring about? Social issues, the well-being of future generations and so on are issues 
worth caring about. “Caring for” refers to moral skills. How do we care for what we care about? Feminist 
bioethicists maintain that injustices are often caused by indifference, which arises because people do not 
care about each other.271 A caring element is needed to achieve justice.272 The moral importance of 
                                                        
265 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 19-20. “[T]he caregiver-recipient dyad rarely exists in isolation from other relationships; 
the caregiver is generally nested in a cluster of relationships from which she in turn can draw care.” Carse & Lindemann 
Nelson 1999, 20. 
266 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 20-23. 
267 Tong 1999, 41. 
268 “The ethic of care focuses on specific social relationships as moral givens; it can thus be applied conservatively, without 
challenging the framework within which bioethical issues are posited.” Overall 1996, 173. 
269 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 26. 
270 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 26. 
271 Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 27. 
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relationships is a central element in a feminist bioethics that relies on care ethics. It appears that 
relationships are important, no matter how close or distant they are. What is relevant is that people are 
cared for.  
The ethics of care is often discussed in relation to justice.273 Theories of the ethics of care 
are based on Carol Gilligan’s distinction between two different ways of making moral decisions. The 
traditional approach is rooted in the ethics of justice for which abstract and universal principles are 
important. The other approach, the ethics of care, emphasizes responsibility and person-specific caring, 
while contextual details are valued as important. According to Susan Sherwin, Gilligan found that men 
accepted the ethics of justice more easily than women. Women, on the other hand, pursue the ethics of 
care more easily. Gilligan’s findings are important: they legitimize different kinds of reasoning in ethics. 
Feminists find it relevant to develop a moral theory that takes context, particulars, and relationships 
seriously. However, valorizing traditional female approaches might promote stereotypical gender traits. 
Sherwin maintains that stereotypical gender traits or patterns develop in sexist societies and reflect 
oppressive social and political situations. It is therefore questionable whether care ethics could serve as 
the basis for feminist ethics or bioethics.274 There are, however, indications that the ethics of care may 
provide important elements for feminist bioethics if discussed critically in relation to other ethical 
perspectives. For example, the gap between the ethics of care and the ethics of justice is beginning to 
close.275  
Some feminists have criticized the ethics of justice for different reasons. For example, 
Anne Donchin identifies five reasons why feminist scholars have criticized rights-based ethics.276 First, 
feminists stress that individual rights should be seen in the context of social relations: “Negative right … 
has little value without resources to facilitate its exercise.”277 These resources are often socially and 
culturally embedded and denied to women and other marginalized groups. Second, feminists have 
criticized “the tendency of rights-based theories to lapse into a rigid individualism that disregards the 
basic human needs of socially excluded groups.”278 Donchin observes that feminists have objected to 
rights-based talk as being male-centered. Some have rejected the idea of personal autonomy because 
they claim it diminishes the importance of embodied particulars and social relations. A third reason is 
feminists have noted that rights are needed when caring relationships cease to exist. Rights account for 
                                                                                                                                                                               
272 “[T]he ethic of care challenges us to become attentive to differences in perspective and need as a demand of justice, to 
resist the human tendency to remain insensitive to and unconcerned about what is unfamiliar or relationally and personally 
distant.” Carse & Lindemann Nelson 1999, 27. 
273 Brennan 1999, 866. Clement 1996. 
274 Sherwin 1996, 50-51. 
275 “[R]ecent work in feminist moral theorists suggests reconciliation between rights and feminist ethics.” Brennan 1999, 867. 
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one dimension of moral norms, but they do not tell about the assaults on personal integrity on a profound 
level. Fourth, the early human rights movement demoted women’s rights to the margins. Fifth, rights 
“introduce a generalized perspective that captures one dimension of morality but does not tell us how to 
respect people individually.”279  
However, this critique has recently been contested. The feminist ethicists and bioethicists 
have formulated rights-based normative rules for caring, noting that rights can be conceptualized in terms 
of relationships.280 As Samantha Brennan observes: 
The … conception of rights proposed by feminist moral theorists sees rights as relational, rather 
than individualistic, moral concepts and as connected to concepts and practices of moral 
responsibility and cooperation.281 
Rights are relational in two ways. First, they form a relationship “between rights bearers and those who 
are obligated to accord the rights of others,”282 and they connect individuals. Relational rights help identify 
oppressive and abusive relationships and thus help to answer the question of “who is wronged?”283 In 
feminist thinking, individuality is situated within particular contexts and social relations, which provide 
nurture, care, and identity. Groups are a source of oppression as well as self-affirmation and dignity for 
individuals. Individuals depend on groups, not only because of physical needs, but also to guarantee self-
affirmation. Social programs that fail to take into account the differing and complex matrices through 
which identities are formed fail to deliver justice.284  
The second way in which rights are relational is that feminists pay attention to rights as 
moral practice. Rights presuppose activities that go on between people who negotiate, claim, and accord 
rights. People also form relations with each other through rights, which connect people not only with each 
other, but also with their community and with society in large. Rights are negotiated and claimed within a 
community.285 For example, the human rights paradigm can be used to define morally acceptable 
practices culturally and globally. Human rights can be perceived either as metaphysical or epistemic 
                                                        
279 Donchin 2004b, 34. Donchin’s analysis of feminist resistance to rights discourse, and especially her fifth point, reveals an 
interesting point in feminist thinking: on the one hand, she criticizes rigid individualism; on the other hand, she criticizes rights 
for not explaining how to respect people individually. Feminist thinkers are not apparently entirely clear on what is meant by 
“individualism,” “generalization,” or “respecting people individually.” Is it that individualism refers to the ontological idea that 
people are not socially interconnected? Is it that feminists especially criticize this ontological statement about human nature? 
Or is it that while sharing a relational approach to personal ontology feminists wish to promote individual rights in practice? 
Feminists appear to be conflicted in their views of individuality. 
280 Brennan 1999, 867; Dodds 2004, 1-12; Donchin 2004b, 31-56; Quinn 2004, 105-107; Tong 2004, 89-104. For example, 
Carol Quinn (2004, 105-108) maintains that people need to learn how to care because caring does not happen “naturally.” She 
states that people have a right to dignity and to flourishing. Quinn uses the Hebrew word kavod to signify the relational notion 
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she maintains, offers a basis for a general account of human dignity. 
281 Brennan 1999, 867. Emphasis added. 
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statements or as a potentially enforceable international standard. The ontological and epistemic 
difficulties can be discussed and criticized at the same time as international norms are upheld. In other 
words, the human rights discourse can be criticized theoretically, yet practical human rights can be 
valued and protected.286  
Despite the differences between the feminist approach and the human rights discourse, 
the promotion of human well-being and the protection of the vulnerable are important to both.287 Without 
a rights-based perspective, attention to global ethical issues may remain marginal. According to Donchin, 
contextual and local issues have taken precedence over world-wide moral problems in feminist 
bioethics.288 However, those who resist the rights discourse in bioethics forget that it can be helpful in 
identifying the needs of those who are globally on the margin. The central issue should not be so much 
about the relationship of human rights and moral discourse, but more about the characterization of 
human rights.289 Rights should be established from the perspective of those who do not possess them or 
to whom rights have been denied, not from the perspective of those who already have them.  
The feminist bioethicists claim that rights-based ethics must be part of bioethics, but that 
this cannot serve as the only basis for global bioethics. Rather a wide range of issues that shape human 
beings and their health should be taken into account.  
Rights-based moral thought alone can tell us nothing about what should be done in the absence of 
claimant procedures. To develop a more adequate global bioethic, we need a moral framework 
that encompasses rights claims within a broad range of moral norms, a framework that is fully 
responsive to conditions that shape human health and well-being across the globe.290 
For that reason, feminist theorists link the relational theory of rights to a larger “theory of self as relational, 
where the focus is on the relationships that form and sustain individuals.”291 Feminists have pointed out 
that the theories of rights do not require an individualistic ontology of personhood. What the theories of 
rights do require is the recognition that people can have differing opinions. This requirement is compatible 
with relational accounts of the self. Complete independence and separation are not needed in order to 
promote rights. People can be significantly connected and yet have different interests. Feminists are 
critical of traditional theories of the self in which people are portrayed in atomistic terms. They emphasize 
connection and the meanings of community and history to one’s identity.292 An important element in the 
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relational account of the self is the recognition of both connection and separation. Relational approaches 
are not the opposite of the individual approach, but can be combined with it. Individuals’ rights claims are 
necessary. If rights are not taken into account, then the vulnerable become even more vulnerable.293  
Health care ethics is grounded in relationships: between providers of care and patients, 
between patients and their families, between theorists and practitioners. Although the context of these 
relationships is varied, the relationship itself supports and informs ethical reflection and decision-making. 
Feminist bioethicists maintain that the assessment of the nature and quality of relationships is important 
because it affects how individuals act as moral agents. According to Carolyn Ellis, relational ethics 
“acknowledge our interpersonal bonds to others, and initiate and maintain conversations.”294 As part of 
relational ethics, it is important to deal with the reality and practice of changing relationships between 
patients, health care professionals, families, and bioethicists. Relational ethics requires agents to take 
responsibility for their actions and their consequences.295 
 According to feminist bioethicists, the relational approach should direct decision-making in 
bioethics. Feminist bioethicists maintain that concrete relationships influence people’s moral decisions, 
and their moral decisions affect their relationships. In bioethical decision-making the fact that people 
consider how existing relationships affect their choices and how their actions affect those around them 
should be taken into account. Medical procedures not only have physical consequences, but also social 
consequences, and these should be analyzed together. The feminist bioethical literature criticizes 
mainstream bioethics as incapable of recognizing social dimensions of medical interventions. Informed 
                                                                                                                                                                               
The embedded account emphasizes that history and tradition define an individual’s identities. Individuals cannot influence their 
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vulnerable party. It has been shown that women get smaller financial settlements through mediation than if the divorce is tried 
in the courts. The example shows that there are limits to encouraging conversation between parties. This is true even when 
mediation is proposed as a relational approach to divorce. 
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consent procedures are one example. Patient consent is needed before medical interventions are carried 
out. Before consent can be acquired, medical professionals should explain the risks of the procedure to 
the patient. Risks are usually understood as medical complications. However, a discussion of the social 
and relational consequences or risks should also be included. The lack of reflection on the social 
dimension of the illness or medical procedure is especially problematic for those faced with a diagnosis of 
chronic illness. Or, for example, women with risk pregnancies, who too often are left with the choice of 
continuing or terminating the pregnancy. The medical risks of both options are fully discussed, but there 
is not necessarily room for a discussion of the social consequences of either alternative.296 
According to feminist bioethicists, the relational approach would question the use of the 
universal moral principles that have dominated the field of bioethics: “adopting a universal perspective 
toward moral situations tends to … reveal generic persons and relationships whose psychological 
subtleties have been washed away.”297 Feminist bioethicists have noted that the representatives of 
mainstream bioethics tend to “interpret harms suffered by oppressed groups as harms solely to the 
generic individuals who have been stripped of their particularity.”298 A relational account of differences 
does not, however, result in rejection of all generalizations. According to Aileen F. Salles, there are two 
kinds of generalizations: those that are not factual but threaten just treatment of people as well as those 
that are factual and politically helpful in pointing to the unjust treatment of people.299 The generalization of 
women belongs in the second category; it is accurate and politically useful. Anthropological evidence 
suggests that across societies, women are disadvantaged, first, by societies division into public and 
private spheres, which results in “women [taking] care of domestic management and men [being] 
dominant in the public domain,”300 and second, by forms of “female subordination to males within the 
context of both impersonal social institutions and personal relationships.”301  
  Salles discusses the problem of difference from a relational approach and asks how 
respect for cultural and ethnic differences can be differentiated from their stereotypes. Salles criticizes 
bioethicists for not taking up the problem of difference on the conceptual level because “respecting 
patients requires acknowledgement of the importance of their worlds and their fundamental relationships 
and values.”302 Bioethicists recommend that health care professionals acknowledge that cultural norms 
might control a patient’s preferences. It is important for the health care professional to listen to the patient 
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and his or her personal preferences while keeping the cultural context in mind. No matter how 
advantageous this recommendation seems to be, it is not enough.303  
Before practitioners can hear patients and negotiate with them to use cultural differences in a 
positive way, they must have a clear conception of what culture and ethnicity represent.304 
The concept of difference should not be accepted uncritically. Unfortunately, differences 
are often understood essentially, and ethnic and cultural diversity is described stereotypically. 
Stereotypical accounts of cultural differences are naïve and inattentive to the unique choices within a 
culture or an ethnic group. Furthermore, uncritical emphasis on culture might harm women within that 
culture.305 Essentialist conceptions of difference “define an ethnic group by a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions and assign people to that group insofar as they meet those requisites.”306 Common 
properties among members of a particular group are assumed, and individuals are assigned to that group 
if they exhibit these properties. Consequently, essential and static assumptions of group identity lead to 
oppression.307 Salles uses Iris Marion Young’s definition of oppression as “disadvantages and social 
inequality suffered by some groups as a result of others’ assumptions in everyday life.”308 For example, in 
Finland all Romany people are expected to share the same values and behaviors because they represent 
a sub-culture.  
Salles questions the conclusion that stereotyping has been explained as a result of human 
cognition: essential assumptions help everyday thinking. According to this explanation, stereotypes do 
not have to have negative or unethical consequences. Essential conceptions of groups per se are not 
unethical. However, an essential account of groups may rest on false premises. “Several theorists have 
pointed out that it is impossible to name a set of enduring characteristics that all members of a group … 
share in common.”309  
 A relational account of group differences is thought to provide the basis for a bioethical 
understanding of differences and for practical recommendations to health care professionals. Individuals 
belong to a group insofar as they are in relation to each other. Social structures, not characteristics or 
stereotypical attributes, define groups. Group members are hindered by the same social barriers, usually 
established by the members of a dominant culture. A web of changing historical relationships provides 
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the unitary base for a group. A relational description of ethnicity and group identity first takes into account 
that the members of a particular ethnic background do not meet the group’s ideal and second, that they 
are still part of a social collective.310 Within this account, certain generalizations are possible.  
Relational ethics fosters insight into the understanding of unequal power relations. In the 
realm of medicine, the physician-patient relationship especially should be studied.311 Both feminist 
ethicists and bioethicists are critical of the idea that “the role of ethics is to clarify the obligations that hold 
among individuals who are viewed as paradigmatically equal, independent, rational, and autonomous.”312 
For example, the traditional account of independent individuals who negotiate with each other and who 
have equal opportunities does not correspond to the reality of the physician-patient relationship. In reality, 
different power structures are in play. Furthermore, relationships do not exist only between two 
individuals, but are linked in a web of different relationships in which patients and physicians are seen as 
unequally situated.313 Feminist bioethics also considers other unequal power relations that are linked to 
bioethical questions, such as reproduction and nurture and the different roles women and men have in 
reproduction and nurturing domestic functions.314 
Virginia L. Warren maintains that, contrary to traditional bioethics, feminist bioethics is 
interested in “relationship issues that do not involve deciding who wins various power struggles.”315 In 
order to “examine how people in academia relate to each other when discussing ethics,”316 she uses 
“Ethics Game”317 as an example. A negative Ethics Game should be opposed as a form of discussion in 
which the participants wish to prove themselves right and others wrong. Different issues are discussed in 
a competitive manner with the result that finding the truth becomes less important than winning the 
argument. Ethics Game is often played when conference papers are written and selected, for example. 
Collaboration could minimize the problems caused by competition. Warren prefers collective authorship 
as a remedy for the problems created by the Ethics Game.318 
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A result of the negative Ethics Game is the fascination with crisis issues instead of so-
called housekeeping issues meaning issues that are ongoing and about which decisions need to be 
made repeatedly. In bioethics, crisis issues receive more attention. Crisis issues are temporary, and 
moral decisions about them are relatively final. According to Warren, crisis issues can be addressed with 
a narrow range of alternative actions, whereas housekeeping issues “require us to reassess large parts 
of our lives: our character traits, how we think about ourselves, and how we relate to others.”319 
Housekeeping issues bring out the importance of relationships that usually are taken for granted, such as 
caring for close relatives.320 Warren suggests that relational questions and housekeeping issues could be 
discussed within “relationship ethics,”321 which would redirect the questions asked by bioethicists in order 
to focus on openness, responsiveness, and caring. For example, sensitivity should be shown to patients 
and co-workers when designing education and working conditions for health care professionals. The role 
of physicians as authorities should be questioned whereas their role as educators should be 
emphasized.322  
To conclude, relational ethics acknowledges our interpersonal bonds and their influence at 
bioethics on different levels. First, feminist bioethicists describe how relationships influence and direct 
bioethics in concrete settings and in decision-making situations. Second, they consider relationships 
important for analyzing power inequalities and oppressive structures in a society. Relationality provides a 
basis for the understanding of agency in feminist bioethics. It helps to understand how agents are 
intertwined and how this affects ethical theorizing and moral decision-making. Relational ethics is based 
on the idea that people are connected. The feminists’ account of relational ethics is based on a relational 
account of the self in which the interconnectedness of persons is important. Anne Donchin concludes 
with the following in relation to autonomy, relationships, and a general moral perspective: 
What is misleading about this view [abstract model of autonomous subject of medical 
interventions] is not its generality alone – a general moral perspective toward others is essential to 
the understanding of many situations – but the exclusion of social relations from the construction 
of the self.323 
 Although feminist bioethicists emphasize that individuals are continually in relationships 
with each other, they do not just concentrate on the individual aspect of moral agency. They also use 
relationships to refer to personal relationships between individuals, and to larger-scale social 
relationships. Relational ethics is based on the idea of responsibility. If people want to adopt an ethical 
stance, then they must realize the interconnectedness of moral agents. The idea of relationality is 
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reflected for example, in the deconstuctionistic view of the boundary of the self and the other. Once the 
boundaries of the self and the other are deconstructed, they become unstable. There are traces of the 
other in the self and vice versa. And if there are traces of the other in the self, then responsibility for the 
self is also responsibility for the other, namely, the other in the self. 
This chapter has provided an outline for the feminist bioethicists’ understanding of 
relational ethics. Relational ethics combines elements from care ethics and ethics of justice both of which 
recognize the interconnectedness of people. In this view, the relational account of group differences can 
help to provide a basis for a non-stereotypical understanding of group differences. Relational ethics could 
foster insight into the understanding of unequal power relations. Therefore, before the feminist 
bioethicists’ idea of relational ethics can be fully understood, we must analyze the effect of power on 
relationships. I will now turn to this question. 
 
 
2.4 Power 
The previous chapters on moral knowledge and agency indicate that the central issues in feminist 
bioethics should be evaluated from the perspective of contextuality, relationality, and power. My analysis 
in chapter 2.1 demonstrated that oppression and women’s subordinate status is the main context for 
feminism and feminist bioethics. Furthermore, the analysis indicated that contexts affect the nature of 
moral knowledge. Likewise, chapter 2.2 suggested that relationships affect moral agency. Both 
contextual moral knowledge and relational moral agency are affected by power. An analysis of power is 
therefore needed to clarify this context. In this chapter I map the feminist bioethicists’ understanding of 
power and its effects on the transformation of bioethics.  
 The concept of power is central to feminism, which evaluates the subordination of women 
and studies the possibilities to resist that subordination. Despite the central status of power in feminist 
thought, power is not easily defined. However, for purposes of this study the following provides a 
working-definition: 
Some theorists define power as getting someone else to do what you want them to do (power-
over) whereas others define it more broadly as an ability or a capacity to act (power-to).324 
Most feminists agree on core feminism: women are in a subordinate position and face 
oppression in society, a situation that should be remedied.325 Women’s subordinate status and 
oppression are linked to power. Therefore, feminists analyze power relations and seek to transform the 
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oppression inherent in these relations. The feminist literature indicates that women’s oppression is partly 
due to blind acceptance of cultural values and stereotypes in which male dominance is seen as the 
natural order of things.326 The strength of feminist bioethics compared to standard bioethics is its 
comprehensive analysis of power in health care and the medical environment in which doctor-patient 
relationships are at the center of bioethical analysis.327 Feminist bioethicists have not given consideration 
to real doctor-patient relationships, but also to the way mainstream bioethics have treated the issue of 
power. Power relations are dealt with from two perspectives within feminist bioethics. The first 
perspective is practical: how does power appear in actual health care and medical settings and 
situations? The second perspective is more analytical or theoretical: how does bioethics, as a 
philosophical discourse, discuss issues of power and how does bioethics react to power inequality? 
Feminist bioethicists maintain that, from the practical point of view, bioethics has failed to 
empower patients regardless of an outward concern for the vulnerable patient. Ethics and especially 
formulating moral theories are ways for the powerful to extend their power and control those with less of 
it.328 Medical practice is seen as disempowering, especially to women and other marginalized groups. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that women are discriminated against both as patients and as 
health care professionals. Feminist bioethicists point to studies showing that women and patients of color 
receive less information from their physicians than do male and white patients. The feminist bioethicists 
maintain that medical practice is built on hierarchical structures that foster subordination and oppressive 
power relations.329 As health care professionals, women are offered roles that are characterized by 
traditional gender-roles. Women are assigned the roles of patients rather than the roles of health care 
professionals or the roles of nurses rather than doctors. Men occupy positions of power, while women are 
assigned the roles of care-takers.330 In addition, feminist bioethicists are alarmed about the way medical 
research is conducted. They maintain that masculine concerns direct research interests and that the male 
body serves as the medical standard.331 Furthermore, medical practice does not encourage women to 
trust themselves or seek ways to maintain their own well-being, but instead directs them to trust male 
doctors and professionals.332  
Feminist bioethicists argue that not only medical practice, but also mainstream bioethics is 
oppressive to women and other marginalized groups. Feminist bioethicists propose that bioethics has 
become part of Western medical practice and medicine, although bioethics does not increase physical 
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health and well-being. Bioethics has become institutionalized, because of which professional associations 
have become increasingly important. Feminist bioethicists have noticed an alarming tendency for 
committees, conferences, and consultations to be for health care professionals only. From the feminist 
point of view, the quantitative growth in bioethics has come to mean growth in power in the field.333 The 
question posed in feminist bioethics is: “Does bioethics’ alliance with institutionalized power keep it 
closed to issues that concern marginal groups?”334 Since mainstream bioethics has allied itself with those 
in positions of power, it has neglected the (feminist) call for change in hierarchies, power relations, and 
attitudes to the less well-off.335  
Feminist bioethicists maintain that power inequality is situated in the theoretical structures 
of bioethics. They identify two main theoretical reasons behind the ignorance: individualism and 
abstraction. First, bioethics’ appeal to individual rights has erased the meaning of community contexts 
and cultural affiliations.336 Standard bioethicists perceive their field as being about ethical problems that 
arise on the individual level. Although mainstream bioethics condemns discrimination and calls for equal 
treatment of all human beings, it has not succeeded in achieving its own goal of equality. As individual 
rights are fostered, group-rights are overshadowed. Consequently, problems related to group 
marginalization are beyond the scope of bioethics.337 Feminist bioethicists strive to bring about a change 
that would ensure sensitivity to both particularities and group identities.338 They urge bioethics to pay 
attention to the marginalized who are often ignored by the powerful. Feminist bioethicists maintain that 
their goal is not to promote a new group to power, but rather to change the whole practice of bioethics 
and medical practice:  
The goal is to fundamentally change the ways in which an institution and culture function, to 
systematically transform privilege and status so that it will benefit those on the margins more than 
those at the center.339 
Power struggles might be eliminated if “people [were] helped to develop a sense of self and of self-worth 
(identity) that is not based on putting down or controlling someone else (power over others).”340 
Feminist bioethicists do not analyze the roots of gender oppression or women’s 
subordinate status thoroughly. For them it is axiomatic that oppression and unequal power relations 
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among women and men, among patients and health care professionals, and among different groups exist 
in medicine, medical practice, and mainstream bioethics. There is no attempt to formulate an 
independent explanation for the evil. For example, Susan Wolf argues that power is best discussed 
through analysis of gender. 
We agree that a feminist bioethics would recognize that moral analysis requires attention to 
gender; there is too long a history of harm, inequality, and disadvantage based on gender to 
ignore the category. Indeed, ignoring it merely helps to keep such oppression invisible and alive.341  
However, the gender perspective alone does not explain how power should be seen in feminist bioethics. 
Instead, it is useful to look at different socio-cultural and philosophical descriptions. Below, I will discuss 
different socio-cultural perspectives on power in relation to feminist bioethics: the functionalist, the 
political economy, and the Foucaultian. I will use Deborah Lupton’s analysis of power in her 
anthropological study of patient-physician relationship.342 Lupton’s analysis is especially interesting for 
bioethics because of the wealth of examples from health care settings. 
 In functionalist perspective on power, power is “based on legitimate authority.”343 Power is 
not coercive, but is a positive social resource that helps members of society to achieve common goals. 
Power differences are not denied, but are viewed as constructive and necessary to keep society 
functioning. Those with power are those with the most skills, whose role is to benefit the entire society, 
including those with no power. In this view, physician-patient relationship, for instance, is not the location 
of conflict or power struggle. Rather it is a relationship in which the professionals serve the patients and 
the whole of society with altruism and expertise. Consequently, the professionals should be rewarded 
with higher power and more status. Status is thought to maintain social distance between the 
professional and the patient, allowing “the doctor to take control and perform the healing function 
successfully, and thus ultimately serving the best interest of the patient.”344 From the functionalist 
perspective, the unequal power of patient and physician is well grounded and has a function. However, 
this does not mean that the physician can act arbitrarily, but should instead encourage the patient by 
“supporting the sick person, affirming his or her worth and maintaining a considerate attitude.”345 To act 
according to the physician’s role is to help the patient maintain trust in medical practice. This eventually 
improves the outcome of medical procedures. From the functionalist perspective, patients often wish to 
defer to the physician’s recommendations. Distress, pain, discomfort, and psychological stress may add 
to the patient’s psychological need not to take responsibility for managing of their own illness and healing. 
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Patients have a need to rely on doctors. This is easier to do if the physician has the power. In other 
words, a powerful status helps doctors perform their work better.  
One problem with the functionalist perspective is that it focuses on individual patient-
physician relationships and does not analyze larger social patterns in which individual relationships take 
place. The dominance of medicine and medical practice is not analyzed on a structural level, and 
negative aspects of medical power are not taken into consideration. Nor is the influence that wider 
discourses, ideologies, and practices have on power differentials analyzed.346 The functionalist 
perspective is thus problematic for feminist bioethics. 
The political economy perspective on power is based on the idea that the patient-
physician relationship is defined by a power struggle and conflicts of interest. Occupational control, not 
professional skills or expertise, is the basis for power. Medical practitioners have power because their 
status gives it to them. Power is maintained by controlling medical knowledge. Societies promote the 
power of physicians by granting them a monopoly on medical practice. Medicine helps produce and 
legitimize social class structure and promote dominant interests. In addition to social status, physicians 
have the power to define health and classify people according to their health status.  
The professionalization of medicine has resulted in physicians’ control over medical 
knowledge and in an “asymmetry of information between the doctor and patient.”347 It has also resulted in 
physicians having a powerful status in society with patients dependent on them. In the political economy 
perspective, there is a “social class schism” between patients and physicians. The language, practice, 
and manner of medical practice are often middle-class. Middle-class patients may find medical 
encounters more comfortable than patients from lower classes, for whom taking an active role as a 
patient is difficult. The critics of the political economy perspective point out that the model is simplistic and 
considers only the visible elements of medical power. The political economy perspective is not 
nuanced.348 Although the model incorporated a study of the visible elements of power in a medical 
setting, it is unable to create more comprehensive account of power in relation to the production of moral 
knowledge and agency. It does not, for example, state how those oppressed could reclaim their agency. 
In the Foucaultian perspective, power does not just repress, but also produces knowledge 
and agency.349 It is thus a social organization or a relation of force. Subjects do not precede power, but 
are created and enabled through the power relations.350 Power is a “strategic relation which is diffuse and 
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invisible.”351 Patients are subjected to the exercise of power in medical examination. They are the target 
of a watchful eye and clinical techniques. A patient becomes “a case,” which indicates that the patient is 
both the subject and the object of knowledge. Medical practice is part of this social organization, and both 
physicians and patients surrender to it, believing in its importance. Physicians remain authoritarian, 
detached, and responsible for the patient’s well-being. The Foucaultian perspective comes close to the 
functionalist perspective. Medical power is not about domination, and explicit coercion does not 
necessarily accompany the power. The patient voluntarily surrenders to the gaze of the physician and the 
nurse. In the Foucaultian perspective, power is everywhere, pervasive. However, power is not about one-
way domination, and patients are not obliged to submit.352  
The modes of patient resistance to medical power are numerous. First and foremost, a 
patient seeks a physician’s consultation. Although the power is weighted towards the physician, it is the 
patient who initiates the relationship. It is also the patient who decides whether to keep seeing the same 
doctor and whether to comply with the treatment or find another physician. Patients with enough money 
can go to private clinics instead of public ones and can choose what services to buy. Patients might be 
able to seek information on their own rather than comply with the information provided by medical 
professionals. Patients who do not have this opportunity (because of illiteracy, lack of resources, and lack 
of money) might seek other ways of resisting medical power by becoming uncooperative or helpless. 
Thus, a passive patient role can be seen as a point of resistance. Foucaultian theorists maintain that the 
medical profession does not expect patients to be passive, but to have internalized the ideology of patient 
participation. Knowing the patient is essential, because patients can remain silent or lie.353 In sum, power 
cannot be understood as a singular model of domination and subordination, but as a relation of force.  
The Foucaultian perspective on power can help clarify feminist bioethicists’ understanding 
of theoretical issues related to their field.354 Most importantly, power is built into all relationships 
throughout society. It is not imposed from “above,” but permeates social institutions and relationships 
from “below.” The following perspectives can be introduced in relation how power affects agency and 
knowledge.  
 In relation to agency, if power is understood from the functionalist or political economy 
perspective, the opportunities for agency are limited for those who are oppressed. However, within the 
Foucaultian model, agency is possible. This notion locates agency outside the political and moral 
autonomy of the subject and questions agency as the capacity to realize one’s own interests against the 
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weight of custom, tradition, or other obstacles. Those who are subjugated do not completely lack agency. 
They are also able to resist the power relationships in which they are located.355 
 The last point raises the questions of how women contribute to their own domination and 
how do they resist or subvert it? Curiously, feminist scholars provide different answers to this question 
from a seemingly similar Foucaultian point of view. Saba Mahmood maintains that it is important to move 
beyond the simple resistance/subordination framework and perceive agency as expressed in various 
ways, not only in moments of resistance.356 Her study is about women’s agency in the Muslim mosque 
movement. She discusses the possibility of transformation in this connection and maintains that “the 
question of how the hierarchical system of gender relations that the mosque movement upholds should 
be practically transformed is, on the one hand, impossible to answer and, on the other hand, not ours to 
ask.”357 She contends that the question of resistance is always linked to the particular modes of 
subjectivation. For that reason, any attempts at transformation are violent if they come from outside that 
particular setting. Mahmood acknowledges that there are theoretical possibilities for transformation, 
although she nevertheless feels uneasy in complying with feminism’s political ends.358   
 Alison Stone provides another answer to the same question. She observes that masculine 
power can persist only as long as women participate in producing it, because resistance is always 
possible. There is no single reason why women have been subordinated. Different forms of masculine 
power emerged strengthening one another and forming “an overall social pattern of masculine power.”359 
The different modes of power create disciplinary power that produces self-regulating feminine individuals. 
Women themselves reproduce masculine power by complying with feminine expectations. Stone 
encourages women to engage in “’local’ struggles against specific sites of masculine power.”360 
 I maintain that Mahmood is correct in a sense: the aspiration for political transformation 
may result in violent acts. However, she is also mistaken in a sense: feminist political aspiration is not 
necessarily violent. Transformation is not transformation if it does not stem from within oppressive 
structures. Resistance or aspiration for transformation can be seen in small-scale and local struggles, as 
suggested by Stone. As a matter of fact, throughout her study Mahmood herself explores the ways 
women in the mosque movement engage in such resistance. What feminists could learn from this reading 
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of power and agency is that they may want to hold onto core feminism but also be clear about the scale 
of the political transformation, which should never be violent or imposed from the outside. If feminists 
want to respect women’s agency in full, then they have to learn to live with the uneasy feeling that women 
may comply with masculine power. At the same time, however, it is clear that, in a Foucaultian sense, 
men no more than women are not outside power. Power affects, restricts, and enables all people.  
  In relation to knowledge, it should be noted that power gives rise to knowledge, is based 
on knowledge, and makes use of knowledge. On the other hand, power reproduces knowledge. Because 
power and knowledge are relational, one must look closely at the effects of that relationality. The claim 
that power necessitates and creates power implies that power permeates everything. However, the 
Foucaultian understanding of power and knowledge does not describe the nature of knowledge. Power 
relations do not dictate whether knowledge is realistic, but rather portrays who has the authority to control 
certain discourses.361  
 Feminism informed by a Foucaultian understanding of power and knowledge is linked to 
“social constructionism.” In social constructionism, truth statements are grounded in social meanings (or 
language games, or discourses). Most feminist bioethicists seem to comply with this interpretation. 
However, the acceptance of social constructionism raises the question of how feminists can effect 
transformation. In the absence of absolute truth, feminists are faced with the problem that social 
meanings tend to reinforce the inferior status of women. The question feminist social constructionists 
have to answer then is: “How does power maintain the status quo and how countervailing power might 
facilitate change?”362 Susan Hekman maintains that accepting the social basis for truth statements does 
not imply “rote obedience to hard and fast rules but, rather, loosely circumscribed actions that allow for a 
good deal of latitude and slippage.”363 Differences within a culture are possible, even though cultural 
forces have a determining role. In order to change the status quo women and other marginalized groups 
can engage in what Stone calls “local struggles.” The task of feminists is to locate and identify the sites of 
power inequalities and challenge them. I have argued that within bioethics, these sites can be identified 
as the theoretical basis of bioethics and the concepts employed in bioethics and medical practice.  
In relation to change two issues should be noted. First, change is possible, but it cannot 
be done radically: the current words and practices should be redefined. 
Change is thus effected by connection, not radical relocation. I interpret this to mean that social 
and linguistic change is a function of the redeployment and redefinition of words and practices that 
already exist in social life. Social reformers take linguistic tools that are already at their disposal 
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and reemploy them in new areas; they take the familiar and turn it into unfamiliar purposes. The 
result is new social/linguistic practices.364 
Second, the world is comprehensible through concepts. Therefore, changing the concepts means 
changing the world. According to Hekman, concepts are flexible and can be used in new and different 
ways to construct new social understanding:  
The point is that changing these concepts on the margins can and does profoundly change our 
world; it shifts the riverbed onto new rock and sand. But, far from inviting nihilism and chaos, this 
understanding of social/linguistic change builds the possibility of change into the bedrock of social 
intelligibility.365  
In reference to Hekman, I conclude that the third transformation strategy for feminist 
bioethics presented in chapter 1.2 is both logical and possible. The question is not about finding a “true” 
grounding for feminist bioethics, for all meanings are “true” only in a social sense. Instead, feminist 
bioethicists must work with beliefs, concepts, and practices that give us our world and hence, effect 
change towards feminist values. What is clear from this chapter is that feminist values can vary. 
However, at their core they are linked to contextuality and relationality. It is therefore possible to claim 
that contextual and relational analysis should guide the work of feminist bioethicists with central bioethical 
beliefs, concepts, and practices. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion on the Central Theoretical Themes in Feminist Bioethics 
Feminist bioethics began as a criticism of mainstream bioethics. It focused on two issues from descriptive 
and normative perspectives: what ethical problems receive attention in standard bioethics and what 
problems should receive attention; and how these issues are covered in bioethics and how they should 
be covered. Behind this analysis are questions about the structures, background values, and 
philosophical perspectives in mainstream bioethics: why is attention paid to certain issues and not to 
others? And more importantly, how does the makeup of mainstream bioethics support or hinder overall 
equality?  
The goal of feminism is to identify, analyze, and overturn oppression at the practical and 
theoretical levels. Feminist bioethicists present different ways to rectify systemic injustices in medicine 
and bioethics. They maintain that contemporary bioethics is ill-equipped to discuss problems related to 
oppression and injustices, the prime reason being that most bioethical problems are regarded as 
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problems between individuals. As such bioethics’ view is limited and the field is unable to identify 
problems that are based on systemic injustices.  
Feminist bioethicists propose that in order to transform bioethics, attention should be 
devoted to the theoretical, conceptual, and practical levels of bioethics. How should the understanding of 
moral knowledge, moral agency, and embodiment be transformed? In this chapter I have covered 
feminist bioethicists’ accounts of the following themes: the nature of bioethical knowledge and how it is 
produced; the kind of moral agency feminist bioethicists suggest for transformed bioethics if subjects are 
based on differences instead of stable essences; whether sexual difference become meaningless, if 
female and male essence is being questioned; and if female and male essence is questioned, how does 
this affect the understanding of embodiment and corporeality in bioethics.   
Feminist bioethicists maintain that moral knowledge is produced socially. Feminists 
contend that bioethics is biased if it does not acknowledge the social and cultural influences on the 
production of knowledge. Feminist bioethicists also emphasize the social basis of moral agency. They 
maintain that it is important to construct accounts of moral agency that are in accordance with women’s 
experiences, and therefore, they emphasize the relational nature of moral agency. Additionally, feminist 
bioethicists maintain that embodied experience should inform the production of bioethical knowledge. 
Moral agents are embodied beings who interact with one another. Embodiment highlights the physical, 
social, and symbolic elements of human life. Fourth, feminist bioethicists maintain that the category of 
women is problematic because women are different from one another and because there is no 
exhaustive list of characteristics that must be fulfilled in order to be a woman. The category of women can 
be evoked in the sense that women as a group are oppressed. Oppression does not need to be total or 
permanent. A Foucaultian perspective helps to show that resistance is included in being oppressed.  
Throughout the analysis of these themes, two issues are emphasized, namely, the 
contextual and the relational approaches to bioethical problems. By contextuality, feminist bioethicists 
mean the approach that involves evaluating ethical questions by taking into account both personal 
frameworks of an individual and the social, cultural and societal circumstances to which the questions are 
related.  
Relational ethics, on the other hand, is based on the idea that people are connected. 
Individuals are continually in relationships with each other. In fact, according to feminists, the self is built 
relationally. People become who they are through relationships. Feminist bioethicists use relationships to 
refer not only to personal relationships between individuals, but also to larger-scale, social relationships. 
Relational ethics is based on the idea of responsibility. If people want to adopt an ethical stance, then 
they must realize the interconnectedness of moral agents. The idea of relationality is reflected, for 
example, in the deconstuctionistic view of the boundary of the self and the other. Once the boundaries of 
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the self and the other are deconstructed, they become unstable. There are traces of the other in the self 
and vice versa. Furthermore, if there are traces of the other in the self, then responsibility for the self also 
means responsibility for the other, namely, the other in the self.  
Analyzing of these theoretical themes in feminist bioethics reveals that power is used as a 
tool when feminist bioethics is evaluated. The Foucaultian perspective on power indicates that agency is 
possible, regardless of and because of power. Agency should be understood as a capacity that both 
resists and inhabits norms. Therefore, oppression and subjugation do not eliminate women’s agency. In 
addition, the analysis of power reveals that power gives rise to knowledge. Knowledge is socially 
constructed and truth is socially embedded. However, this does not mean that the feminist transformation 
has been in vain. Feminist bioethicists must work with the beliefs, concepts, and practices that construct 
our world and through these, make changes toward feminist values. In the following chapters I discuss 
how feminist bioethicists have questioned bioethical concepts and practices.  
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3 The Concept of Autonomy in Feminist Bioethics 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that the transformation of feminist bioethics involves analyzing 
central bioethical concepts. Recognizing strange elements in familiar concepts can illuminate the overall 
feminist analysis of bioethics. By strange elements I mean aspects that do not reflect feminist values or 
aspects with perplexing implications when studied closely. Once these elements are identified, it is crucial 
to provide new interpretations of the old concepts. In this chapter I will discuss how feminist bioethicists 
have analyzed a central concept in bioethics, namely, autonomy. First, I will explain the feminist criticism 
of standard understanding of the concept of autonomy. Then, I will present feminist alternatives to the old 
concept of autonomy. These alternatives rest on the idea of relationality. Third, I will discuss a 
consequence of the feminist understanding of autonomy as relational, namely, socialization. How can 
individuals be autonomous if they are affected by oppressive socialization? Fourth, I will discuss how 
autonomy can be applied in practical bioethics. Here I will focus on the issue of respect for autonomy.   
The importance of autonomy is widely recognized in contemporary moral and political 
theory. However, there is no consensus about what autonomy means or how it should be employed. 
Autonomy stands for different ideas in different fields of moral and political theory. Autonomy can be 
classified as either moral or personal autonomy. Moral autonomy refers to the ability to impose the moral 
law on oneself. It is about identity constrained by what one regards as morally permissible. Personal 
autonomy is about living according to one’s own choices and values in any aspect of one’s life, not only in 
relation to questions of moral obligation.366  
In Western bioethics, autonomy is often equated with informed consent and treated as a 
practical tool in health care settings. It has not only been interpreted as informed consent, but also as 
both a right and as a capacity. Bioethicists refer to autonomy from both the practical and theoretical 
perspectives and assess it from different point of views, designed to help both philosophical theorizing 
and practical decision making in the medical arena.367 Autonomy is thus widely held to be the 
cornerstone of the discipline of bioethics.  
Much of modern Western bioethical theorizing relies on the characterization of four 
bioethical principles introduced in Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress (first published in 1983). One of these principles is respect for autonomy. The others are 
benevolence, nonmaleficence, and justice.368 Although Beauchamp and Childress were not the first to 
formulate the principle of respect for autonomy, it is fair to say that their understanding reigns in the field 
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of bioethics today.369 Their account can be considered to belong to the practical discourse, because it is 
designed to solve “concrete dilemmas that arise within the practice of medicine.”370 Beauchamp and 
Childress maintain that their account of the respect for autonomy does not involve an ideal of autonomy, 
but is within the reach of a normal human being. Within this context respect for autonomy is defined as 
follows: 
[O]ur analysis will be closely tied to nonideal moral requirements of “respect for autonomy.” We 
analyze autonomous action in terms of normal choosers who act (1) intentionally, (2) with 
understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that determine their action.371 
The principle of respect for autonomy implies that an individual should be free from coercion in deciding 
to act, and that others are obligated not to interfere with the individual’s choices.  
Feminist bioethicists have offered critiques of autonomy and presented different 
alternatives, both to a more general account of autonomy and Beauchamp and Childress’ specific 
principle of respect for autonomy.372 Below, I will describe the debate over the status and meaning of 
autonomy in feminist bioethics. 
 
 
3.1 Feminist Criticism of the Concept of Autonomy 
Feminist bioethicists maintain that the concept of autonomy as presented in the standard literature on 
bioethics is not a reliable cornerstone, because standard bioethical ideologies of moral life are contrary to 
feminist beliefs about human existence and moral agency.373 Carolyn Ells, for instance, claims that the 
concept of autonomy carries ideological dimensions – “ideologies of moral life”374 – which must be 
analyzed because they have an effect on moral reasoning as well as on political and social systems. 
Marilyn Friedman, on the other hand, maintains that feminists are partly wrong to blame mainstream 
philosophical accounts of autonomy for fostering ideologies contrary to feminist values. Feminists should 
aim their critique at the popular cultures of Western societies, which highlight and endorse a false ideal of 
                                                        
369 Kukla 2005, 35. 
370 Kukla 2005, 35. 
371 Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 59. 
372 Cook 1994, 197-198; Donchin 2001b, 366; Ells 2001, 417-418; Kukla 2005, 35. It should be noted that feminist writers do 
not always indicate whether they are referring to the principle of respect for autonomy as presented by Beauchamp and 
Childress or to a more general idea of autonomy. Some feminists refer directly to Beauchamp and Childress’ principle, 
whereas others discuss the general meaning of autonomy within bioethical theorizing. I will make a clear distinction between 
Beauchamp and Childress’ principle and a broader account of autonomy when this is done in the feminist literature. 
373 Ells 2001, 419. 
374 Ells 2001, 419. 
85 
 
masculine autonomy. Men are idealized as independent and self-sufficient, devoid of any dependency. 
Mainstream philosophies are ill equipped to criticize these cultural ideals.375 
 Feminist bioethicists distinguish two “uses” of autonomy: theoretical and practical.376 
Theoretically, autonomy refers to metaphysical accounts of agency, morality, and personhood.377 An 
abstract and metaphysical account of autonomy alone is not sufficient in the bioethical context, because 
the task of bioethicists is to solve practical problems and not formulate ontological accounts. Thus, 
bioethicists need a more practical notion of autonomy.378  The main question then is: what are “the ethical 
obligations of health professionals to patients?”379 Thus, the second “use” of autonomy is about 
respecting and promoting patient autonomy in practice. It is contrasted with the first more general 
account of autonomy and demands “autonomous action on everyone’s part”380. 
Some feminist bioethicists think that it is not the concept of autonomy itself that is 
problematic, but rather its applications in practical circumstances. The problem lies in paternalistic health 
care practices. There is evidence to suggest that female patients are often perceived as less autonomous 
than male patients and that women experience more paternalism than men.381 Feminist bioethicists 
maintain that this is evident, for example, in how research involving women has been regulated in the 
United States. From the early 1970s until the beginning of the 1990s, researchers, investigators, and 
medical ethicists excluded women from medical and pharmaceutical research, even though women were 
willing to participate.382 The protectionist attitude was an effect of a number of “health-care scandals,” 
such as the birth of so-called thalidomide babies, in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, which resulted in 
significant harm to female patients and their unborn children.383 Because of these scandals, researchers 
were fearful of including women who were pregnant or who might become pregnant during clinical trials, 
since the studies might cause fetal damage. This meant that pharmaceutical products were approved that 
were never tested on adult women. Such exclusion was especially harmful, since medical products were 
prescribed for women more frequently than for men.384 However, in the 1980s, “a growing opposition 
movement began to point out and protest the dearth of information about women’s health that resulted 
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from their research exclusion.”385 Eventually, in 1994, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) mandated 
the inclusion of women in research.386 
Despite the change from protectionist legislation to the inclusion of women in clinical trials, 
research involving women is still a widely discussed topic in bioethics. Often the discussion of the risks of 
including women as research subjects is related to the potential harm to gestating fetuses. This potential 
harm has led some bioethicists to argue that pregnant women should be excluded from clinical trials and 
that all women as “potentially pregnant” persons should be excluded from clinical trials unless they 
consent to the use of contraception during the research. In addition, some bioethicists maintain that 
caution should be used when women are recruited as research subjects, not only because of their 
reproductive capacities, but also because of their oppressed position in society. According to this 
argument, women are more vulnerable than men to exploitation because women as a group have been 
relatively powerless in most societies. Both reasons for excluding women from research carry the risk of 
negatively influencing the quality of women’s medical care. Moreover, they demonstrate the paternalistic 
tendency in research study designs.387  
Some feminist bioethicists maintain that these problems related to women’s inclusion in 
clinical trials would not arise if women were treated as autonomous persons capable of making informed 
choices.388 The answer to the problem would be to amend autonomy to women in practice, not to reject 
or redefine the whole concept. For example, Rebecca Cook maintains that Beauchamp and Childress’ 
principle of respect for autonomy is more coherent than many feminist critics have realized.389 The well-
known concept can help feminists to communicate their views to a wider audience unfamiliar with feminist 
terminology, yet fluent in mainstream bioethical phrasing.390 The theory may be used as “a universal 
ethical language in which to ‘ask the woman question.’”391  
A closer reading, however, reveals that the feminist bioethicists who criticize the practical 
flaws of autonomy criticize not only the practical implementation of the principle, but also the theoretical 
concept of autonomy. For example, Cook states that the principle of autonomy as such is not 
problematic, even though it does not apply to women in practice. At the same time she finds the principle 
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theoretically problematic when she refers to the traditional understanding of women’s personhood and 
capacities.392  
Too often, women have been considered to be less than full persons, and to lack the capacity of 
persons because they make decisions conditioned by their own experiences and perceptions, 
which differ from those of persons who are accustomed to the role of authoritative decision-maker, 
particularly in hospitals and medical clinical settings.393  
The problem with autonomy is not solely about how the principle is applied in practice, but also about 
how it is used to describe women. Carolyn Ells, for example, maintains that Beauchamp and Childress’ 
theory is constructed in such a way that it cannot even be changed to accommodate better feminists’ 
concerns.394 Therefore, Beauchamp and Childress’ principle of respect for autonomy is based on a 
distorted perspective of moral life; this perspective is such an integral part of the theory that it cannot be 
changed without the whole theory collapsing.395  
The feminist critique of the principle of respect for autonomy is linked to the overall critique 
of the concept of autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress’ theory is thought to mirror issues that are 
embodied in these critiques. The feminist critiques can be divided into five broad categories: symbolic, 
metaphysical, care, postmodern, and diversity.396 The symbolic critique is directed the abstraction of the 
“autonomous man” who is self-sufficient, isolated, and independent. According to the critique, the 
autonomous man is an ideal, inherent in Western philosophy, which influences modern Western 
epistemology and moral theory, descriptively and prescriptively promoting a concept of human nature and 
moral agency. Human beings are described as capable of resisting the influence of others and leading 
independent lives. Although mainstream theories of autonomy recognize that the abstraction can never 
be achieved, feminists nevertheless maintain that in practice the abstraction leads to prescriptive views of 
human life that are problematic. The prescriptive conclusion is that individual autonomy is presented as 
an ideal or a symbol for what it is to be a human being. However, as stated in the previous chapter, 
feminist bioethicists maintain that human life should be understood relationally. For this reason, individual 
autonomy is deficient as a symbol for human life.397 
 The metaphysical critiques are based on two premises. First, agents are at least partially 
constituted by social relations. Second, the traditional concept of autonomy presupposes atomism or 
individualism. Because the first premise is indispensable for feminists, it follows that the concept of 
autonomy should be abandoned. It should be noted, however, that there are feminists who think that the 
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second premise is false, and thus the metaphysical critique is invalid. They maintain that the concept of 
autonomy need not be interpreted in individualistic terms, but can exist as anti-individualistic.398  
 In the care critiques, the traditional ideals of autonomy do not acknowledge the values of 
dependency and interconnection, which historically have been central to women’s lives. Moreover, 
because these relations have been associated symbolically with femininity, women’s experiences and 
femininity are devalued. The care critics emphasize that autonomy need not be replaced altogether, but 
rather modified to better fit both femininity and dependence and connection. Hence, the care critics take 
into account relational aspects of autonomy.399  
 The postmodern critics of autonomy focus on a critique of the subject. Although 
postmodern critiques are manifold, there is an underlying uniformity: “the notion of autonomy is a kind of 
conceit or illusion of the Enlightenment conception of the subject.”400 Autonomy is said to be based on the 
Cartesian idea of clear self-awareness or on the Kantian conception of individuals as rational and free 
agents. These ideas of agency are thought to be complicit in the subordination of the other, that is, those 
who are not deemed capable of rationality and self-mastery.401  
 According to the diversity critiques, persons do not have single identities, but rather 
internal identities that combine the different group affiliations the individual may have. Among other 
things, group affiliations can be based on race, ethnicity, gender, and class. Consequently, the diversity 
critiques challenge the assumption that agents are cohesive or unified as expected in traditional theories 
of autonomy.402 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, feminist bioethicists combine different methods of 
criticism and are not necessarily tied to a certain perspective. Therefore, the above-mentioned critiques 
of the concept of autonomy can be used simultaneously to analyze the standard understanding and to 
transform the concept. However, it is useful to categorize the central elements of the critiques. What 
unites these five types of criticism is dissatisfaction with the ideal of individual autonomy.403 The feminist 
criticism is based on the contention that autonomy fosters ideologies of rationality, freedom, and 
individualism and that these ideologies are not only unrealistic, but also dangerous to marginalized 
groups.404  
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 The first criticism is that feminist bioethicists contend that moral autonomy is traditionally 
attached to persons who are essentially rational. According to mainstream bioethics, only rational 
persons who can conceptualize, handle information and knowledge, and consider the nature and 
consequences of their actions are autonomous. A rational agent must be able to perceive significant 
differences between various options and reason logically.405 Feminist bioethicists think that such an 
argument is problematic because autonomy based on rationality does not include those with mental 
disorders, handicaps, or in various stages of immaturity. Even Beauchamp and Childress maintain that 
certain physical and mental conditions compromise autonomy.406 Consequently, people affected by such 
conditions are not always deemed capable of taking part in medical decision-making.407 Those who once 
fit the traditional model of autonomy, but no longer do so are a good example of how vulnerable is the 
concept of autonomy. Healthy, competent, and thus autonomous individuals find it hard to fit into the 
autonomous model in the event of long-term or debilitating illness such as Alzheimer’s disease, because 
they must rely on other people.408 Medical conditions that alter rationality compromise people’s capacity 
for autonomy. However, people with Alzheimer’s disease have lucid periods during which they can and 
should be considered autonomous.  
 According to some feminist bioethicists, the second problem with the traditional concept of 
autonomy is the supposition that people are free of external influences.409 One must be able to make 
one’s own decisions in order to be considered autonomous. Freedom refers both to the negative freedom 
from interference and the positive freedom to do something. The individual must also be able to 
conceptualize and act on the appropriate choice. According to feminist bioethicists, mainstream 
bioethicists do not take into account the fact that people’s autonomy may be constricted by external 
factors. Some individuals are certainly capable of rational thinking and logical reasoning, but factors such 
as political forces, upbringing, or social status restrict their options. External factors may create a 
situation in which certain modes of thought are not “available” to everyone.410 Feminist bioethicists have 
pointed out that external factors often have an effect on women’s autonomy especially. The influence 
may not always be direct, but occurs indirectly by social and cultural values, which shape the way people 
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think and perceive things. According to the feminists, in Western societies these values have been largely 
patriarchal and the autonomy of women has been jeopardized in the social context.411 
 The capacity for moral autonomy seems to rest on the idea that an individual is mentally 
capable of considering the choices and making decisions for herself. The ability to think rationally is 
crucial, whereas freedom to act does not seem to be crucial in the traditional definition of an autonomous 
moral agent. One can be an autonomous moral agent even if one’s actions are restricted from the 
outside. External interferences are considered offences against autonomy, but not factors that 
compromise moral agency. One is an autonomous moral agent as long as one has the potential for 
autonomy. This line of argument however, is somewhat problematic from a feminist viewpoint. First, it is 
presented as if the capacity to choose were natural or a given as part of the human condition and as if 
social and cultural values did not influence ways of thinking. People may not be as free as they are 
expected to be in the traditional account of autonomy.412 Second, the ability to act autonomously should 
be taken into account. In the feminist bioethical literature, one author has observed that “although the 
‘mental’ autonomy described may satisfy a necessary condition, it can no longer be posited as a sufficient 
condition of moral agency.”413  
 The third reason why autonomy is problematic for feminists is that it is closely connected 
to individualism in the modern Western philosophical tradition.414 Feminists have given special attention 
to the “abstract universalist”415 nature of autonomy. In their view the concept of autonomy dependents on 
an asocial and individualistic conception of a person embedded in modern moral theories.416 In the 
traditional account, autonomous persons are independent and self-reliant.417 For example, Anne Donchin 
maintains that the traditional principle of autonomy is attached to individuals who are rational and self-
sufficient, yet have no social contexts.418 Accordingly, the problem with the concept of autonomy is that it 
has traditionally focused on individuals, and for this reason, it is hard to build communal responsibility into 
the bioethical concept of autonomy.419 The principle of autonomy as such does not include obligations to 
others:  
                                                        
411 Shildrick 1997, 87. It is unclear whether Shildrick refers to practical autonomy or to the concept of autonomy when she 
claims that women’s autonomy has been jeopardized.  
412 Friedman 2000b, 213-213; Shildrick 1997, 87. 
413 Shildrick 1997, 87. 
414 Donchin 2001b, 374; Sherwin 1996, 53. 
415 Donchin 2001b, 367. 
416 Donchin 2001b, 366-367. 
417 Donchin 2001b, 374; Sherwin 1996a, 53. 
418 Donchin 2001b, 366. 
419 Sherwin 1996a, 52. 
91 
 
The principle of autonomy is assigned the task of holding this moral world together by requiring 
everyone to refrain from unauthorized actions involving others. It is exclusively negative and 
imposes no substantive duties to anyone.420 
The feminist bioethical literature suggests that the traditional concept of autonomy is based on an idea of 
society in which everyone takes care of themselves and human relationships have lost their meaning.421 
This becomes apparent when one sees how difficult it is to apply the principle to those who cannot claim 
autonomy on their own behalf. According to the feminists, the treatment of, for example, children, the 
mentally handicapped, the very sick, and the incompetent is a special problem in the traditional bioethical 
literature.422 
 Feminist bioethicists warn that individual autonomy frequently works to favor the privileged 
and dismiss the interests of the less well-off.423 Feminists fear that the traditional account serves as a 
reason to dismiss the claims of equality. They perceive that it justifies existing conditions, whereby 
communal responsibility is undervalued and social mores are frequently subjugated to personal interests. 
Social duties are less valuable than individual interests.424 Anne Donchin, for example, is concerned that 
autonomy is identified with non-interference and individuation as well as with the false impression that 
individuation can be fully accomplished. This might result in underrating interdependencies and accepting 
the misapprehension that one could be wholly independent. This in turn may lead to unmasking the 
common psychological phenomenon of people denying their own dependency and frailty. In the case of 
disabling illness and deteriorating health, people may try to maintain an impression of self-sufficiency and 
find the need to deny their inner desire for connectedness.425  
  Some feminist bioethicists link the above-mentioned problems especially with Beauchamp 
and Childress’s principle of respect for autonomy, accusing Beauchamp and Childress of including 
rationality and impartiality in the principle of respect for autonomy.426 Feminist bioethicists have 
concluded that these ideologies have a profound impact on how moral subjects and problems are 
perceived. The ideologies of rationality and impartiality confirm the traditional ways of tackling ethical 
questions and solving moral problems. They further reinforce the notions of objectivity and voluntariness 
by emphasizing the picture of an objective world in which actions can be explained causally and moral 
                                                        
420 Donchin 2001b, 369. 
421 “[A] society populated by such autonomous decision-makers, each negotiating the terms of care in isolation from everyone 
else, summons up images of bleak dystopian scenarios, all social ties having come undone.” Donchin 2001b, 375. 
422 Donchin 2001b, 374-375. 
423 “[M]any feminists perceive that the concept of autonomy, rather than working to empower the oppressed and exploited 
among us, in practice often serves to protect the privileges of the most powerful.” Sherwin 1996a, 53. 
424 “In asserting the primacy of the individual, autonomy-based theories characterize social and moral obligations as 
essentially secondary to considerations of self-interest. … It is taken as analytic truth among political theorists that individual 
autonomy cannot be fully reconciled with the needs of the community. Sherwin 1996a, 53.  
425 “[F]ormal abstract conception of autonomy fosters a moral indifference to the needs of others for whom one is not directly 
dependent.” Donchin 2001b, 375. 
426 Ells 2001, 418-420-422; Cook 1994, 197-198. 
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judgments are based on facts. For example, Carolyn Ells maintains that the ideological background does 
not match the reality of moral life.427 “Feminist commitments about the nature of people and moral 
problems more accurately reflect people’s lived moral experience than do the ideological commitments 
that B&C [Beauchamp and Childress] rely on.”428 Beauchamp and Childress’s theory thus does not match 
feminist values and orientations.429 According to feminist bioethics, there is the danger of considering 
autonomy to be the primary tool for treating moral problems and becoming blind to other approaches and 
solutions.430 When we come to believe that (most) bioethical problems can be solved by invoking 
autonomy, we also come to believe that moral subjects are just as the theory describes.431  
Beauchamp and Childress discuss the feminist critique of autonomy in a brief section in 
the fifth edition of their Principles of Biomedical Ethics.432  They especially take into account the points 
that feminists have raised about the social nature of morality and autonomy. They defend the feminist 
quest for “relational autonomy”433 that is crystallized around the idea that persons are socially rooted and 
that relationships affect individual autonomy.434 Moreover, Beauchamp and Childress explicitly maintain 
the importance to invalidate oppression: “We support calls for overturning oppressive socialization and 
relationships, and note that they promote relational autonomy and do not reject autonomy altogether.”435 
Beauchamp and Childress thus deny that the feminist critique threatens the basis of autonomy. Rather 
they affirm that the critique supports a certain kind of autonomy, namely, relational autonomy.436  
                                                        
427 Ells 2001, 419. 
428 Ells 2001, 419. 
429 Cook 1994, 197-198. 
430 Ells 2001, 424. 
431 “Even if B&C’s theory were such that it could accommodate more comprehensive understanding of moral problems and the 
moral nature of people, B&C’s silence on the full range of human characteristics and the full range of moral problems, along 
with the silence on these matters of the whole dominating moral tradition, is sufficient to create and sustain ideologies of the 
moral life. … By relying on a limited understanding of people and moral problems, B&C’s conception of autonomy produces 
such ideologies.” Ells 2001, 425.  
432 “Some critics of the prominent role of autonomy in biomedical ethics charge that it focuses too narrowly on the self as 
independent and rationally controlling. They question the model of an independent, rational will that is inattentive to emotions, 
communal life, reciprocity, and the development of persons over time. For instance, some feminist critics view moral theories 
that focus on autonomous agents and actions as unrealistic and even pernicious, particularly if they place a supreme and 
overriding value on autonomy and interpret it in masculine ways.” Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 58. 
433 Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 59. 
434 “[S]ome feminists have sought both to affirm autonomy and to revise individualistic or atomistic conceptions of autonomy 
through ideas of ‘relational autonomy’ that center on the conviction that ‘persons are socially embedded and that agents’ 
identities are formed within the context of social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, 
such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.’ These accounts maintain that ‘oppressive socialization and social relationships’ 
can impair autonomy, for instance, through forming an agent’s desires, beliefs, emotions, and attitudes, through thwarting the 
development of the capacities and competencies essential for autonomy, and through various restrictions and limitations on 
the range of options for action.”  Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 59. It should be noted that Beauchamp and Childress do not 
clearly indicate the source of their citations. 
435 Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 59. 
436 Beauchamp & Childress 2001, 59. Anne Donchin credits Beauchamp and Childress for taking into account the relational 
aspects of human life. According to Donchin (2000, 238), Beauchamp and Childress “do not deny that communal life and 
human relationships provide the matrix for the development of self.” 
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Beauchamp and Childress seem to have more in common with feminists than is generally 
acknowledged. In fact, some feminist bioethicists have noted that autonomy is also a helpful tool in 
feminist bioethics and feminist values can be seen as logically consistent with the traditional principle of 
autonomy.437 The feminist seek to advance women’s self-determination, and in this pursuit autonomy can 
be useful.438 After all, Beauchamp and Childress express the idea that “personal autonomy is, at a 
minimum, self-rule that is free from … controlling interference by others.”439  The feminists highlight 
women’s right to physical integrity, and the principle of autonomy helps to maintain this right.440 According 
to the feminist bioethical literature, Beauchamp and Childress interpret the principle of autonomy to mean 
“the respect due to an autonomous agent rather than an ideal image of a fully autonomous self.”441 This 
interpretation is in line with Beauchamp and Childress’s understanding of the principle of autonomy. They 
maintain that “being autonomous and choosing autonomously are not the same as being respected as an 
autonomous agent,”442 an argument that is in line with some feminists’ accounts of the need for respect 
for autonomy. I will discuss the feminist understanding of this respect in the last section of this chapter. 
According to the feminist interpretation then, traditional bioethical theories define 
autonomous individuals as self-sufficient, unconnected, and separate. Autonomy suggests that 
individuals can act without influencing, encountering or touching each other. It secures individual 
boundaries and assures that bodily integrity is not invaded. Autonomy refers to self-control and thus 
suggests that individuals can both restrain and surpass themselves. According to the feminist 
interpretation of the mainstream account of autonomy, both the power of the will to control personal 
desires and the power to protect oneself vehemently are central elements in the moral behavior of 
autonomous individuals.443 Contrary to the mainstream account, the feminist bioethicists insist on the 
importance of relationality. Autonomy-based theories ignore the very core of feminist bioethicists’ claims, 
namely, that people are products of their social history and current circumstances.444 An individual 
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441 Donchin 2001b, 366. Emphasis added. 
442 Beauchamp and Childress 1983, 62. For some feminists, however, this defense is not an acceptable form of cooperation. 
For example, Carolyn Ells (2001, 418-419) has criticized Beauchamp and Childress’s attempt to accommodate feminist 
concerns.  The feminist literature indicates that the problem is bypassed if only respect for autonomy is emphasized. To apply 
the principle one would have to know what autonomy is about. Only then can one respect autonomy. “B&C [Beauchamp and 
Childress] believe that these feminists have misunderstood their theory and that, moreover, their theory is immune to feminist 
critique. This dismissive response is unsatisfactory. It fails fully to appreciate the nature of the criticism.” Ells 2001, 418. Even if 
Beauchamp and Childress do not refer to an ideal picture of fully autonomous individuals, they need somehow to define what 
an autonomous agent is. Otherwise, the autonomous agent cannot be respected. Beauchamp and Childress (2001, 59) define 
respecting autonomy in terms of “normal chooser who acts intentionally, with understanding and without controlling 
influences.” They go further to explain that autonomy does not entail an ideal picture of moral agents but a normal human 
being making moral choices. From a feminist point of view, the existence of “a normal chooser” is questionable. 
443 Friedman 2000b, 216; Hoagland 1988, 144. 
444 Ells 2001, 427-428; Sherwin 1996a, 53. 
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becomes a moral subject only within a social, cultural, and communal context. Morality is seen as a social 
construct and is always inter-personal. It is located within relationships and communities. There is no 
abstract moral sphere detached from an empirical social sphere. It is questionable whether actions could 
be defined as moral, should they take place outside the inter-personal background.445 Thus, autonomy 
too is a social construct.446 “[T]he concept of a universally applicable autonomy is untenable in both social 
and moral sense.”447 However, feminists note that the traditional concept of autonomy is built on sets of 
beliefs or ideologies that are not absolute but “arise because of the way a discourse is practiced.”448 
Therefore, these beliefs can be transformed. In the next section I will discuss attempts by feminist 
bioethicists to redefine the concept of autonomy.  
 
 
3.2 Feminist Alternatives to the Concept of Autonomy 
In chapter 2.4 I argued that feminist bioethicists in favor of the third transformation strategy emphasize 
the interpretation and redefinition of the bioethical concept. In the previous chapter I presented the 
feminist criticism of the concept of autonomy. This criticism is the basis of redefining the concept. Below, I 
describe two alternatives to the concept of autonomy: first, Susan Sherwin’s and Rosemarie Tong’s 
bioethical interpretation of Sarah Lucia Hoagland’s “autokoenony” and second, Rebecca Kukla’s 
“conscientious autonomy.”449 These models differ in that the first is introduced within mainstream 
bioethics, and the second is introduced in an explicitly feminist context.450 At the end of this section, I will 
present an overview of the feminist redefinition of autonomy as relational.  
Not all feminist bioethicists are satisfied with the different definitions given to “autonomy.”  
Some have proposed substituting a different term for autonomy, one of which is “autokoenony.” The term 
was introduced in 1989 by Sarah Lucia Hoagland in her Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value.451 Susan 
Sherwin was the first to employ the term in a bioethical context.452 Rosemarie Tong has also used 
                                                        
445 Shildrick 1997, 88-90. See also Friedman 2000b, 217-218. 
446 “[O]ur more usual understanding [of morality] demands at the very least that our moral behaviour is directed towards other 
sentient beings, and I shall insist that it is primarily in the context where those beings may themselves be agents, that we are 
fully morally engaged. In any other context the exercise of autonomy is stripped of meaning and value, and consequently one 
can claim that it is only the socially situated individual who may be fully self-determined in any important sense.” Shildrick 
1997, 89.  
447 Shildrick 1997, 86. 
448 Ells 2001, 427. 
449 Kukla 2005, 39. 
450 It should be noted that Kukla does not call herself a feminist, and conscientious autonomy is not an explicitly feminist 
interpretation of the principle of autonomy. However, Kukla’s way of discussing autonomy reflects issues emphasized by 
feminists, such as relationships and contextuality. It is also in clear opposition to the traditional concept of autonomy. 
451 Hoagland 1988. 
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autokoenony to describe the future of feminist bioethical thinking.453 Autokoenony explicates the paradox 
of feminist thought in which subjectivity is built by close connections to others. An autokoenonous 
individual is a “self inextricably related to other selves.”454 Individuals are seen as subjects who are 
closely connected with other subjects and need them, but are by no means solely dependent on them.455 
The comparison of autonomy and autokoenony helps to explain the paradox of being both closely 
connected to others and yet a separate individual. Regardless of (or because of) this relatedness, 
autokoenonous individuals are subjects in their own right. Autonomy originates from the Greek words 
autos (self) and nomos (law). Conversely, autokoenony originates from autos (self) and koinonia 
(community). It refers to a self within a community.456  
Feminist bioethicists emphasize that autokoenonous individuals are not wholly self-
contained, yet they are not wholly dependent either. Relationships mold individuals and their 
personalities. The autokoenonous individual understands that she or he is closely connected with other 
individuals, and this realization directs her or his morality and actions. According to the feminist bioethical 
literature, “the abstract conditions for the interaction of pre-given, unified and rational subjects”457 has 
been the main interest of mainstream bioethics. Principles of rights, freedom, justice, and rationality have 
become central in the traditional bioethical discussion. Feminists are afraid that biotechnology and health 
care have become arenas in which individual interests clash and bioethics the place in which these 
conflicts are resolved and individual interests safeguarded against violation.458 Autonomy understood 
under such conditions does not correspond to feminist values. 
Conversely, the actions of an autokoenonous individual are self-directed as well as other-
directed. Feminists have pointed out that individual life is always situated. Autokoenonous individuals live 
in a certain context, but they try not violently to control or mold the environment according to their own 
selfish wishes. On the contrary, they try to work within and in accordance with the context.459 This does 
not mean rendering oneself helpless, for example, in oppressive social situations. Autokoenonous 
persons are free to say no and to guard their integrity. They respect themselves and others to struggle 
against inequitable states of affairs. They interact and touch each other. An autokoenonous view would 
alter the bioethical scheme in which rigid individuality has become the lynchpin. In the future, conflict 
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resolution might include not only discussing the abstract conditions of right conduct, but also interaction 
and understanding life as embodied, situated, and connected.  
The humanist moral self who acts, and towards whom we have responsibilities is given as 
individual, clear-sighted, autonomous and unitary, both affirmed and threatened by the gaze of the 
other; in contrast, feminists might privilege a notion of contiguous bodies/selves touching and 
speaking together.460  
 
Another alternative to the traditional understanding of autonomy is suggested by Rebecca 
Kukla. She presents an alternative reading of what she calls “conscientious autonomy,”461 which  is  
designed to take into account human interdependencies and the larger patterns of relationships between 
the patient, health care professionals, and those close to the patient. Kukla bases her idea on the critique 
of the principle of autonomy as something that is easily reduced to informed consent.462 For that reason, 
she refers to the traditional concept of autonomy as “self-determination.”463 Bioethicists agree on the 
central place of self-determination in health care contexts. Although there may be broader definitions of 
autonomy, the role of these definitions in health care settings is not as relevant as the role of self-
determination.464 Two broad conditions define autonomy as self-determined: 
(1) An autonomous agent is the center location of her own decision and actions; that is, they 
originate freely from her rather than being imposed upon her from the outside. (2) An autonomous 
agent more or less understands the facts about her situation and can engage in practical reason 
on the basis of this understanding.465 
These conditions lead bioethicists and health care professionals to tackle problems in health care and 
medical settings as if the problems could be solved simply by protecting the patient’s ability to act in a 
free and uninfluenced manner in situations that require decision-making.466 Autonomy as self-
determination is linked to a “punctate decision,”467 by which Kukla means “a decision made in response to 
a discrete choice that can be understood in isolation from the rest of a patient’s health care.”468 Autonomy 
as self-determination and the punctate decision is a concrete act or choice not connected to larger issues 
of the patient’s life, relationships, or the patient’s or health care worker’s commitment to principles 
throughout their lives. Autonomy as such is missing an aspect of perpetuity. This leads to the illusion that 
respect for autonomy is relevant only in times of crisis or in situations that demand exacting decisions.  
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However, autonomy is also relevant in long-term health care practices, such as prenatal 
care and pregnancy, although it is usually linked to pregnancy and prenatal health care only when 
punctate decisions are needed. For example, prenatal tests, pregnancy termination, and treatment 
interventions require patient decisions. In contrast, informed consent is rarely asked for or punctate 
decisions are rarely needed during “normal” pregnancy and prenatal care. Kukla maintains, however, that 
issues of autonomy also arise in the context of normal pregnancy and prenatal care. 469 In prenatal care, 
pregnant women are typically integrated into a screening system in which they take part in “routine, 
ongoing activities.”470 They are expected to follow a diet, exercise, take vitamins, and abstain from 
alcohol, drugs, and tobacco. Self-monitoring is expected, and pregnant women are asked to watch their 
weight and monitor the number of fetal kicks. Health care professionals check the women’s blood 
pressure, take ultrasound and blood tests, and administer other forms of surveillance, which are often 
thought of as routine measures during a normal healthy pregnancy. Women’s consent is rarely asked 
before these routine check-ups. Rather, they are expected to agree “automatically.” It is not often pointed 
out that women need to make decisions about these health care activities too.471 Decision-making is not 
only about deciding to agree to given health care practice, but it is also about constantly making the 
decision to commit oneself to the recurring practices over a longer period of time.  
In fact, women are responsible for their prenatal care. Consequently, much of the care is 
located outside the health care institutions and clinics. Prenatal care is regulated not only by a set of 
practices, but also by social standards. Women may not actively choose certain health care practices 
while pregnant. Instead they find themselves within a certain system of monitoring. Medical practices are 
socially and culturally normative and presented as authoritative. Women are responsible for being 
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Pregnancy serves as an example of the nature of health care in which most activities are best described as ongoing or 
continuing instead of punctate. “What we see here is a complex set of interdependencies among personal choice, personal 
responsibility, external accountability, subjection to authority, self-discipline, the collection of information, and deference to the 
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compliant with the system.472 What is interesting, though, is that in addition to being compliant, women 
are also expected to internalize the standards of prenatal care.473  
Kukla’s point is twofold. First, health care decisions are made in a long-term manner. 
Decision-making is not always punctate. Second, autonomy is an important element of decision-making 
in ongoing health care practices, and not only in punctate decisions. If Kukla is correct, understanding 
autonomy as consent is problematic. Health care practices are not solely about crisis situations in which 
punctate decisions are needed. Rather most health care practices are about long-term activities, which 
require commitment on the part of the patients.474 A major role of health care professionals is to ensure 
that “the establishment and inculcation of proper ethic of self-management and accountability … is 
accomplished appropriately.”475 The understanding of autonomy as capacity is not helpful in this kind of 
situation because more is required than patient agreement to bodily invasion. According to Kukla, 
patients are required not just to surrender their bodily integrity but also to take an active role in the 
process of health care activities. Professionals are required not just to inform their patients about medical 
facts, but also to promote patients’ attitudes and ongoing activities appropriately.476  
In her reformulation of the concept of autonomy as conscientious, Kukla attempts to show 
that patients can be both autonomous and rely on medical professionals.477 To be conscientious means 
to be responsible and to act out of commitment. Conscientious autonomy differs from the traditional 
understanding of autonomy in that it is not about self-determination and single decisions. It is about 
fidelity to processes or long-term commitments, which can be internal or external and still result in the 
same kind of conscientious actions. For instance, pregnant women usually take good care of their health, 
attend regular check-ups, and watch their diet. Kukla maintains that women do not necessarily do these 
things because they have chosen them or because they are coerced into doing them. Rather they are 
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committed to act upon the norms they have found to be right.478 As a result, Kukla defines 
conscientiousness as “a virtue displayed over time.”479 
This does not indicate simple compliance or obedience, but a capacity for critical 
reflection. Autonomous patients understand that advice given by medical professionals is authoritative, 
but not absolute. Conscientious autonomy involves patients trusting themselves. Self-trust and 
conscientiousness can be shown to be present even when patients do not make their own choices, but 
allow the health care professionals to decide for them. This is the core that distinguishes mainstream 
understanding of autonomy from conscientious autonomy. As for conscientious autonomy, patients can 
be autonomous even when they are not self-determining and cannot make their own choices. Sometimes 
patients act responsibly and conscientiously when they defer to the judgment of medical professionals. 
Patients can act responsibly and show self-trust if they consider medical professionals to be in a better 
position to make medical decisions. Deferral is an act of conscientious autonomy if the patient trusts her 
own judgment.  
According to Kukla, health care is best acquired when patients assess and criticize health 
care practices conscientiously and when they take responsibility for their actions, even if their action 
means giving up the power of decision-making. Professionals’ task is to help foster and maintain patient 
conscientiousness. This involves respecting patients’ capacity to take responsibility for their health care 
decisions both inside and outside the hospital and the doctor’s office.480 In the mainstream notion of 
autonomy, the source of the principles must be the autonomous agents themselves. As shown above, 
Kukla believes that this is an unrealistic demand in a health care setting. Commitments to values and 
norms can stem from other sources as well. Conscientious actions can be guided by several factors such 
as other people and cultural positions. The issue is rather that the agent accepts the guidance.481 While 
the mainstream bioethicists maintain that patient autonomy is limited or diminished, Kukla views the issue 
through conscientious autonomy. Even if patients cannot be self-determining, their autonomy may not be 
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diminished. More accurately, they may take responsibility for their own health by choosing to trust 
medical authorities.482 
 What distinguish Kukla’s redefinition of autonomy from the traditional is that both self-
determination and coercion are lacking. Kukla discusses them but does not give them the same central 
place in the idea of conscientious autonomy as they traditionally have. Kukla uses relationships instead of 
self-determination and coercion. Interaction between health care professionals and patients are more 
important. In Kukla’s opinion, patients may feel in control if they have a trusting patient-doctor 
relationship, even if they then defer to the doctor’s opinion. If health care professionals see autonomy 
only through informed consent, then they can avoid taking real responsibility in fostering patients’ 
conscientious autonomy.483 Kukla calls uncritical reliance on informed consent the “rituals of informed 
consent.”484 She maintains that it is uncertain whether these rituals foster patient autonomy, which may in 
turn require that decisions be placed in the hands of health care professionals instead of patients. The 
outcome depends on a respectful patient-doctor relationship.485  
Both conscientious autonomy and autokoenony are attempts to overcome the feminist 
uneasiness with autonomy. They are attempts to address the paradoxical situation in which the feminist 
bioethicists find themselves: they realize both the need for autonomy and the inadequacy of the 
traditional account.486 Both conscientious autonomy and autokoenony are relational in nature since both 
emphasize human relationships, the social nature of moral knowledge, and the importance of contexts in 
value formation. Conscientious autonomy and autokoenony can be interpreted as belonging to the 
category of relational autonomy. 
Recent feminist discussion of autonomy is defined by the idea of relational autonomy, an 
“umbrella term”487 accommodating different perspectives and accounts.488 These perspectives are based 
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take into account the networks of relationships that affect the personal autonomy of individuals. Their interpretations differ from 
one another on the importance given to the specific content of the autonomous preferences of the agents. The interpretations 
of feminist bioethicists are situated differently on the division between procedural and substantive theories of autonomy. 
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on the conviction that social relationships shape moral identities and values.489 Relational autonomy is 
based on the idea that 
persons are socially embedded and … agents’ identities are formed within the context of social 
relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, 
gender, and ethnicity. Thus the focus of relational approaches is to analyze the implications of the 
intersubjective and social dimensions of selfhood and identity for conceptions of individual 
autonomy and moral and political agency.490 
Relational autonomy reflects feminist bioethicists’ understanding of moral agency: it takes into account 
the influence that social situations have on the development and expression of autonomy. First, moral 
agents cannot become autonomous in a social vacuum, but only through relationships and social 
contexts. Second, autonomy is pursued only in social contexts, because relationships and social contexts 
affect the ways people can express their autonomy.491 Structural inequalities must be integrated into an 
adequate account of autonomy.  
[U]nless that account is responsive to structural inequalities in the position of differently situated 
women, it risks reinstituting some of the most reprehensible features of the masculine ideal, 
overvaluing individual self-determination so grossly that power imbalances among the more and 
less advantageously situated are disregarded. Thus as adequate relational account needs to 
connect personal self-development with more inclusive social aims, emphasizing women’s 
particular vulnerabilities to unjust treatment, namely their reproductive capacities and social 
positioning within families.492 
 In relational autonomy, socialization affects autonomy. However, as seen in the chapter on 
relational bioethics, the relational perspective is not without problems. It raises the question of how 
(oppressive) societies influence and direct a person and her or his decisions, actions and choices. 
Oppression may compromise a person’s autonomy. Relational autonomy thus directs bioethicists to be 
aware that autonomy is not solely an achievement of individuals. One must analyze both the society and 
the individual to determine the “degree to which an individual is able to act autonomously.”493  
 
 
3.3 Relational Autonomy and Socialization 
The relationship between autonomy and oppression is especially relevant the feminists’ quest to overturn 
oppression. In the relational approach, personhood is formed in human relationships, which may endorse 
or inhibit autonomy. Oppressive socialization impairs personal autonomy because it affects the formation 
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of beliefs and values, and self-conceptions: “oppressive socialization can lead to the acceptance of 
norms, which once internalized, block agents’ capacities for detecting whether the norms are correct.”494 
The systematic denial of the self-worth of an individual is characteristic of oppression or oppressive social 
relations.495 Because social imagery has a powerful role in the process of agents’ self-worth, it is likely 
that agents “identify with those cultural representations of their identities that seem to afford greater social 
recognition and to incorporate these representations into their self-conceptions and their imaginative 
projections.”496 These social and cultural representations may be oppressive even if they help agents 
achieve social recognition. Feminine standards of beauty are an example of this type of cultural 
representation. The idea that oppressive socialization inhibits autonomy has troubling consequences: 
how is autonomy possible for those oppressed in comparison to those who are relatively liberated? What 
consequences will this have on the understanding of autonomy in feminist bioethics?  
The problems related to socialization and autonomy could be solved by abandoning the 
importance of autonomy altogether as some feminists suggest.497 However, this would be undesirable 
from the feminist bioethical perspective because autonomy can also serve as an “emancipatory ideal in 
the feminist, antiracist, and postcolonial analyses of oppression, subjection, subjectivity, and agency.”498 
Therefore, feminist bioethicists committed to core feminism cannot abandon autonomy. For that reason, 
they have to address how to take seriously the influence of the social order on autonomy.  
Diana Tietjens Meyers’ intersectional identity presents a possible answer for the issue of 
oppressive socialization and autonomy. She denies that oppressive socialization affects autonomy 
negatively. Contrary to the belief that oppressed peoples’ capacities to make autonomous decisions is 
compromised, Meyers claims that “multiply oppressed individuals are in some respects better positioned 
to make autonomous judgments concerning issues of social justice and policy, and hence are better 
positioned to exercise autonomous moral and political agency, than multiply privileged individuals are.”499 
In her analysis of autonomy for the oppressed, Meyers invokes the concept of intersectional identity, 
which is an identity influenced by social systems of subordination and oppression. Race, ethnicity, class, 
gender, and sexual orientation constitute complex identities. The idea of intersectional identity is closely 
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tied to intersecting group memberships, which in turn propose that an individual belongs simultaneously 
to different groups. Group memberships overlap. Intersectional identity and intersecting group 
membership are paradoxical. Group-based identity emphasizes that the ties to a group can be both 
voluntary and imposed, both integral to one’s sense of self and hurtful.500  
Although intersectionality is an important element of identity formation it is also dangerous 
because it threatens autonomy. Western culture emphasizes the importance of membership in some 
groups, while downplaying the importance of others. All individuals are members of several groups 
whose membership constitutes the identity of these individuals, even if they do not recognize it. For 
example, the racial or ethnic identity of white Finns is rarely emphasized, while the ethnicity of Finns who 
have Romany background often is. Similarly, maleness and a heterosexual orientation go unmentioned 
more often than womanhood, homosexuality, or bisexuality. Meyers maintains that to have autonomy is 
to have self-knowledge. To have self-knowledge one has to recognize the groups to which one belongs. 
Because people do not necessarily recognize their own group associations, they lack full autonomy.501  
Additionally, cultural stereotypes, oppression, and subordination shape the representation 
of different groups. Individuals face specific advantages and disadvantages according to their group 
identities. Meyers emphasizes that the individual experiences of the members of the same group can 
vary significantly. However, she also maintains that “individuals who belong to different groups have 
different social experience, and this targeted and lifelong socialization shapes individualized identities.”502 
Those who have group ties to oppressed groups more often experience their ties as constraining than do 
those in privileged categories. Furthermore, because group-targeted cultural norms influence individuals’ 
self-definition and self-direction, they may put autonomy at risk because self-direction and self-definition 
are necessary for autonomy.503 Similarly, intersectional identities may result in tension between the 
demands of different categories and conflicting self-understanding and inconsistent social and political 
loyalties. These conflicts may have a negative influence on the chances for autonomous actions.504  As 
an example, for a Romany man, the norms of gender impose authority, whereas the norms of ethnicity 
stipulate lack of respect.  
Although intersectional identities may put autonomy at risk, Meyers emphasizes that they 
are important for constituting autonomy.505 The opposition between the dominant and the oppressed 
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positions is not unconditional or absolute. Most people belong to different groups with different social 
values.506  
Thus, the trope of intersectional identity dismantles the stark opposition between dominant and 
subordinate positions. Very few people have wholly privileged identities. Very few people have 
wholly subordinated identities. Most people’s identities blend socially disvalued and socially valued 
group-identity determinants.507 
Because of the different social values given to different group affiliations and because individuals belong 
to different groups, membership in an oppressed group does not cause individuals to become victims. 
People seldom belong only to a subjugated group, but are also members of privileged groups. Meyers 
maintains that intersectional identity can broaden one’s moral and political perspectives and motivate 
individuals to overcome the unjust treatment confronted by members of different, less-valued groups.508   
Unawareness of one’s intersectional identity can also lead to the opposite result: 
ignorance of injustice to others. People can either become so deeply absorbed in their own suffering that 
they are unable to see the suffering of others, or they can acknowledge their membership only in socially 
valued groups and disregard their membership in less valued groups. Meyers warns against identifying 
only with dominant groups: 
For people who are identified primarily with dominant social groups, moral integrity may become a 
casualty when intersectional identity is suppressed and discreditable political views are displaced 
onto universalistic moral principles. Failing to make connections between one’s socially valued 
group membership and one’s political views leads to self-deception, rationalization, and corruption 
of principles – in short, to moral heteronomy.509  
Meyers’ account of intersectional identity explains why it is wrong to assume that women 
are less autonomous than men. Both men and women have different group affiliations some of which are 
dominant and some of which are oppressed. Even if oppression hinders the development of skills 
required for autonomy competency, it may also provide autonomy-constituting elements. To be unaware 
of one’s intersectional identity means to be unable to be fully autonomous.510 Intersectional identity 
affects the degree of autonomy that both men and women can achieve.   
 The problem with intersectional identity is that, although only a few “people have wholly 
subordinated identities,” some nevertheless do. It is not impossible at least to conceptualize such a 
person. Intersectional identity does not help to understand how such people could be autonomous. 
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Therefore, intersectional identity does not solve the central problem of the concept of autonomy. Instead, 
feminists need other theoretical tools to answer the question of how autonomy could be possible for 
those oppressed. 
 There are two theories of autonomy, namely, the procedural and the substantial, which 
feminist bioethicist use to answer the question of oppressive socialization and autonomy. The effects of 
oppressive socialization are analyzed differently within the frameworks of these theories. The procedural 
theories of autonomy hold that an agent must critically reflect her beliefs, desires and values in order to 
act autonomously. These beliefs, desires, and values must be acquired and endorsed autonomously. 
Procedural theories are “content-neutral” because they enable agents to choose between different ways 
of living, diverse conceptions of good, and varying political perspectives. The procedural theories of 
autonomy foster feminist insights about diversity and multiplicity of agents. The theories acknowledge 
that agents have different life-plans in different social contexts. Furthermore, procedural theories can 
accommodate feminist perspectives on relationality because they do not presuppose strong 
independence or self-sufficiency, but rather take into account the fact that dependence and connection 
can be autonomous choices. Additionally, procedural theories provide opportunities for a critical 
evaluation of relationships and socialization. Agents are encouraged to criticize, contest and abandon 
oppressive relationships.511 Consequently, an agent must have certain types of “autonomy skills.” The 
exercise of autonomy skills, such as self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction, is important in the 
process of achieving autonomy. Even if the capacity to make rational choices is important, it does not by 
itself equate to autonomy: 
A person who is fully autonomous will make rational choices that reflect their authentic desires or 
values. However, being able to make a rational choice does not necessarily reflect full autonomy; 
rational choosers can make rational choices if they have developed their capacity for rational 
deliberation in light of rational principles, even if they lack skills in self-direction.512 
Autonomy skills are part of the larger notion of autonomy competency, the development of 
which depends on the development of necessary skills. Self-knowledge and self-definition are needed to 
exercise personal autonomy. In order to attain self-knowledge and self-definition an agent must use the 
following skills: introspection, imagination, memory, communication, and analytical, volitional, and 
interpersonal skills. Introspective skills help individuals to interpret and judge their own experiences and 
feelings. Imaginative skills enable individuals to adopt different self-concepts. Memory skills allow 
individuals to recall their past experiences, not only from their own lives, but also from literature or other 
forms of art. Communication skills permit individuals to learn from the experiences of others. Analytical 
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and reasoning skills enable individuals to assess the information they have gained about themselves and 
their self-concepts. Volitional skills help individuals to resist pressure from others and to maintain their 
commitment to a self-portrait they consider authentic. Interpersonal skills allow an individual to challenge 
the status quo together with other individuals.513 Autonomy competency is achieved through exercise in 
the social environment and in relation to other individuals.  
Some feminist theorists claim that the theory of autonomy competency does not, however, 
satisfactorily answer the question of whether “warped desires, or desires that arise as a result of 
oppressive socialization, [could] ever be autonomous?”514 They maintain that the substantive theories of 
autonomy are better designed to answer this question. Whereas an agent’s motivation, actions, and 
critical reflection on these actions are central to the procedural theories of autonomy, the substantive 
theories involve some non-neutral content of autonomy.515 Procedural conditions are seen as a 
necessary, but not sufficient condition for autonomy. In general, the substantive theories put restrictions 
on a person’s desires, preferences, and values, and these must be of certain content.516  
For example, Natalie Stoljar is cautious about adopting an entirely procedural account of 
autonomy, because, in her view, only strong substantive theories of autonomy can satisfy “feminist 
intuition”517 i.e., an insight “that preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity cannot be 
autonomous.”518 Only substantive theories can explain why, according to feminist intuition, certain 
restrictions should be made on the contents of agents’ preferences.519 Using material collected by Kristin 
Luker in the 1970s, Stoljar analyzes the autonomy of women who take contraceptive risks. In Luker’s 
original study, contraceptive risk was defined as sexual behavior that led to unwanted pregnancies. The 
study was intended to answer the question, “Why do women who can presumably use freely available 
methods of contraception end up having unwanted pregnancies which result in induced abortions?”520  
The women in the study considered whether it was inappropriate for women in general to have active 
(premarital) sex lives or to initiate sex and whether women should use their pregnancies to bargain for 
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marriage. These were the reasons that prevented women from using proper contraception during 
intercourse. The question then is did the women take contraceptive risks autonomously?  
According to the procedural theories, the women could be considered autonomous 
because their reasoning fulfilled certain standards for critical reasoning. For example, the subjects 
showed the capacity for critical reflection, even though they had internalized feminine norms that 
motivated them to take the risks. Yet Stoljar maintains that feminist intuition suggests that the women 
were indeed non-autonomous, because their reasoning was motivated by feminine socialization and 
norms. Because the women had internalized oppressive norms and were motivated by them, their 
autonomy had been compromised.521  
According to Stoljar, strong substantive theories of autonomy provide evidence for this 
kind of feminist intuition. The strong substantive theories require that agents have an ability both to 
criticize their actions competently and to identify the correct norms that apply to their actions. If an agent 
derives motivation and reasons from false norms that have been internalized, then the agent can be 
judged as not to be autonomous. Some norms are false, and their internalization restricts the capacity to 
criticize the norms in question: 
Women who accept the norm that pregnancy and motherhood increase their worthiness accept 
something false. And because of their internalization of the norm, they do not have the capacity to 
perceive it as false.522  
Feminists who promote substantial theories of autonomy maintain that the internalization of false norms 
impairs autonomy. Feminist intuition provides a tool for analyzing false norms.  
 The idea of feminist intuition is, however, problematic. It may provide a description of a 
situation, but it is unsuitable as a prescriptive tool in feminist bioethics. First, it is vague. Feminism is a 
diverse political phenomenon and theoretical perspective. There is no single feminist intuition, but rather 
there are intuitions. Although the feminists could refer to core feminism as the basis for feminist intuition, 
they cannot derive detailed norms from it. Second, women’s explanations of their own experiences are 
considered to be influenced by oppressive socialization instead of arising out of autonomous deliberation. 
It is possible then that the strong substantive theories lead to a situation in which “women cannot even 
know the truth of their own experiences.”523 Both alternatives are unsatisfactory in feminist bioethics.524 
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Although the importance of women’s experiences for moral knowledge is equivocal, experiences can still 
be seen to guide feminist bioethics when interpreted in a given context. Moreover, the decisive aspect of 
the autonomy debate cannot be that an autonomous person resists oppression and acts according to 
certain norms which are set from the outside. 
Substantive autonomy is problematic, not only because of the difficulties related to 
feminist intuition, but also because such autonomy lacks any claim to value neutrality. The central idea of 
substantive autonomy is that the “concept [of autonomy] is reserved to only those lifestyles and value 
pursuits that are seen as acceptable from some political or theoretical point of view.”525 Although 
feminists could deny the possibility of value neutrality altogether and say that all theories of autonomy are 
value-laden, the idea that only limited types of lifestyles and value pursuits are satisfactory conditions for 
autonomy disturbs feminists for several other reasons. For one thing, as noted above, the content of the 
right kinds of values is difficult to determine. Moreover, feminist bioethicists in favor of the third 
transformation strategy wish to endorse agency that is multiple and preserves diversity among agents’ 
actions and life-choices. Oppression and coercion are not first and foremost evident in the content of a 
person’s values, but in the fact that the number of optional values is limited. While stating that only certain 
values are commendable, the substantive theories of autonomy might, for their part, restrict the options 
available to agents and, therefore, restrict the possibilities for the diversity of agency. 
Most disturbingly, the substantive theories of autonomy would open up the possibility for 
ungrounded paternalism. According to substantive theories of autonomy, people who have internalized 
oppressive norms are not able to determine what their own good is and are thus more susceptible to 
paternalistic intervention. What is more, the strong substantive theories render most people non-
autonomous, because the theories put such heavy emphasis on the right kind of content for internalized 
norms. In order for a person to be autonomous, his or her internalized norms cannot be affected by 
oppressive socialization. However, as suggested by Meyer’s account of intersectional identity, for 
example, most people are in fact affected by socialization one way or another.  
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It is also problematic that the substantive theories of autonomy require people to be fully 
aware of all of their values, goals, desires, and the effect of socialization on those values, desires, and 
goals. However, it is questionable whether one can ever become entirely aware of one’s socially 
determined values, desires and goals. If this awareness were held to be central to autonomy, then no one 
could be autonomous. However, I am inclined to maintain that no such awareness should be the basis of 
autonomy. The claim could further be elaborated by redefining the relationship between authenticity and 
autonomy. Traditionally, authenticity has been considered the basis for autonomy. Agents must reflect 
their authentic desires in order to be autonomous. Accordingly, autonomous agents are those whose 
preferences, goals, and life plans are authentically their own. Therefore, a person who is authentic in her 
own desires is not influenced by the social order.  
Yet this assumption can be criticized on two counts. First, it is wrong to assume a 
transparent or unitary self as a presupposition for authenticity because authenticity does not refer to the 
“hidden inner self, which is finally revealed after the effects of socialization have been stripped away.”526 
Second, authenticity develops or is constructed when autonomy skills are exercised. Because individuals 
develop these skills in relation to other individuals, their authenticity is also produced relationally. One 
does not have to acquire personal integration or authenticity to be autonomous. On the contrary, the 
exercise of autonomy competence is a precondition for authenticity. The development of an authentic self 
is a life-long project in which the use of autonomy competency plays a substantial role.527  
As with other competencies, one learns through practice, and practice augments proficiency. … As 
one gains proficiency [in autonomy competency], one’s authentic self develops, and one’s self-
portrait becomes more and more nuanced and rich.528 
Although I can see the appeal in substantive theories of autonomy for feminists, for the 
above-mentioned reasons I am inclined to maintain that these theories do not correspond to the third 
transformation strategy I am proposing for feminist bioethics. In my view procedural theories of autonomy 
are better equipped to recognize the processes by which desires, preferences, and values are 
internalized.  Procedural theories account for autonomy in terms of the structural and historical 
components of a person’s capacity for critical self-reflection. Obviously, oppressive socialization can also 
affect these capacities negatively. How, then, can an understanding of relational autonomy suitable for 
feminist bioethics be developed? 
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Some feminist bioethicists maintain that the key is to note that socialization never 
completely impedes autonomy. Although “feminine socialization typically hampers the development of the 
skills of critical reflection that are essential for an agent to have a degree of autonomy,”529 such 
socialization does not inhibit autonomy altogether, because there are degrees of capacities for autonomy. 
Women who have internalized feminine socialization may – and often do – have the capacity for critical 
reflection and autonomy.530 For example, Susan Dodds maintains that oppressive socialization does not 
just affect those who are in worse-off positions in a given society. Most individuals do not possess full 
autonomy; such possession would require them to have a wide array of autonomy skills and independent 
competencies.531 Rather people are usually either minimally or medially autonomous. A minimally 
autonomous person possesses only a few autonomy skills and independent competencies, whereas a 
medially autonomous person is located between full and minimal autonomy. Autonomy competency can 
be developed and person’s environment has a great influence on the development processes. The 
degree of autonomy varies according to contexts and situations. It is wrong to assume that individuals are 
either fully autonomous or not autonomous at all.532  
Feminist bioethicists need to be careful when they refer to autonomy as a degree. The 
idea of full, medial, or minimal autonomy raises the question of the relationship between different degrees 
of autonomy and especially of the nature of full autonomy. There is a danger that minimal and medial 
autonomy are seen as basic autonomy, meaning “the minimal status of being responsible, independent 
and able to speak for oneself,”533 whereas full autonomy is regarded as ideal autonomy, “an achievement 
that serves as a goal to which we might aspire and according to which a person is maximally authentic 
and free of manipulative, self-distorting influences.”534 The separation of basic and ideal autonomy 
misses the critical point of feminism. Feminist criticism of autonomy is directed mainly against ideal 
autonomy. Autonomy as an ideal fosters ideologies that are unrealistic. Feminist bioethicists need to 
make sure that autonomy as a matter of degree does not become understood as ideal autonomy. The 
idea that autonomy is a matter of degree is nevertheless important for feminist bioethics, because it 
shows that autonomy does not require avoiding the influence of socialization altogether or critically 
analyzing all socially determined values, goals, and life plans.  
This solution to the question of socialization is not completely satisfactory. It demonstrates 
that the intention to transform the central bioethical concepts is not without peril. The transformation may 
introduce new problems. Nevertheless, this reformation of concepts redirects the discussion of autonomy. 
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Moreover, it provides another productive aspect that is too often overlooked by theoretically-inclined 
scholars, both in standard bioethics and in feminist philosophy. Although the theoretical uneasiness with 
the transformation of autonomy remains, the discussion of autonomy provides some suggestions for 
concrete actions in health care. The realization of the negative consequences of oppressive socialization 
leads to concrete actions, which are aimed at improving the autonomy of the oppressed. The limitations 
of autonomy direct bioethics and establish requirements for health care professionals because patient 
autonomy can be respected only when oppressive socialization is taken into account. Health care 
professionals are to respect the agency of every human being, including those who are oppressed. This 
includes also fostering the development of autonomy or the autonomy competency of the oppressed.  
Although some individuals are affected by (oppressive) socialization, others are obligated to respect them 
as relationally autonomous individuals. This is so even when external pressures are oppressive and limit 
the abilities individuals have to govern their own lives and make independent choices. The value of 
interpersonal respect should be regarded as paramount for feminist bioethics, even to the extent that we 
allow others to choose something that, in our view, may not be in their own best interests.535  
If interpersonal respect is essential to feminist bioethics, then how should it be 
understood? Furthermore, how should the feminist understanding of socialization and relational 
autonomy guide the transformation of bioethics in practice? In the following chapter, I will discuss how the 
feminist transformation of autonomy can be understood from the perspective of respect for autonomy. 
  
 
3.4 Respect for Autonomy in Feminist Bioethics 
Given that autonomy is interpreted relationally, some feminist bioethicists believe that autonomy is an 
integral part of bioethics, despite its weaknesses. Relational autonomy would be helpful for both patients 
and professionals in health care settings. It would strengthen the patients’ sense of their own agency and 
help build equal patient-provider relationships.536 The feminist bioethical literature indicates that the 
importance of relational autonomy should be understood both as a description of human beings and as a 
prescription of respect for autonomy. I have discussed the weaknesses and strengths of relational 
autonomy as a description of human beings. In this chapter, I focus on the perspectives of feminist 
bioethicists on respect for autonomy.  
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 The feminist bioethical discussion arises from Beauchamp and Childress’s account, which 
some feminists contend is compatible with the relational perspective. For example, Anne Donchin credits 
Beauchamp and Childress for considering the relational aspects of human life and not denying that 
“communal life and human relationships provide the matrix for the development of self.”537 Feminist 
bioethicists, however, maintain that the model is insufficient for other reasons. First, Beauchamp and 
Childress base their concept of respect for autonomy on a “contract model of the physician-patient 
relationship.”538 Both the physician and the patient are regarded as independent negotiators or 
contractors. Therefore, the physician acts responsibly as long as the requirement of informed consent is 
fulfilled. The physician does not have to enter into a relationship with the patient in order to act 
responsibly. This model thus overlooks the patient’s vulnerability and dependency. Furthermore, it does 
not require attention to be given to the patient’s surroundings, life experiences, or social situation.539 If the 
physician is to respect patient autonomy, she or he needs to recognize the “patient’s struggles to break 
free of oppressive authoritative influences and assisting them to sustain relationships essential to their 
self-identity and well-being.”540 Understanding the consequences of oppressive socialization influences 
the feminist concept of respect for patient autonomy in the health care context. Bioethicists have a 
responsibility to inform professionals about oppression in health care and the ways it can be fought.  
The feminist bioethicists claim that because of the oppression of self-trust, bioethicists and 
health care workers must pay particular attention to the effects of this influence.541 An agent must trust 
her capacities and skills in order to act on her decisions. Self-trust can be expressed in three different 
ways. First, an agent must trust both her capacity to make good decisions and her competency skills in 
order to be motivated to act according to her own choices. In addition, the agent must trust the 
information he or she has received about the choice at hand. Second, the agent must trust her ability to 
act upon her decision. Third, the agent must trust her own judgments regarding the choice. Oppression 
can undermine all three types of self-trust. An agent may distrust herself because an oppressive 
environment has deprived her of the chance to develop or exercise autonomy skills. Or an oppressive 
environment can result in the agent’s trust in her opportunities to fight the oppression. Oppression can 
also shape an agent’s values, which may result in the agent distrusting herself if the values encourage 
her to undermine her own moral worth.542 Only when this is acknowledged can health care professionals 
support patient autonomy:  
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If health-care providers are to respond effectively to these problems [the effects of oppression], 
however, they must understand the impact of oppression on relational autonomy and make efforts 
they can to increase the autonomy of their patients and clients.543 
Health care institutions need to recognize social oppression and injustice in personal relationships.544 The 
feminist bioethical literature indicates that power is too often unjustly distributed in health care institutions. 
Because oppression can put autonomy at risk, health care professionals should identify the patterns and 
the effects of oppression in their work.545  
Bioethicists should identify not only the conditions of a choice, but also the conditions for 
the development of the skills required to express autonomy.546 For example, Susan Dodds emphasizes 
the importance of analyzing how the capacity for autonomy is developed.547 Respect for autonomy is not 
solely about choice in certain situations, but also about reinforcing the development of skills required for 
autonomy competency: “respect for autonomy is not restricted to respect for choices of a certain kind but 
also requires promotion of the development of autonomous selves.”548  
The development of autonomy competency can be supported, for example, by the 
following measures. First, accessible health care systems ensure respect for autonomy better than 
systems that do not provide equitable access.549 A society has responsibility for the promotion of 
personal autonomy, since society is responsible for providing access to what is needed to develop 
autonomy competency. As part of a society, a health care system is also part of this development, since 
good health and access to health care are preconditions for the pursuit of autonomous projects. The 
suggestion that access to health care is a precondition for the pursuit of autonomous projects is 
interesting from a Finnish point of view. According to this view, the Finnish health care system promotes 
respect for autonomy, because it provides “equitable access for all members of the community.”550 
However, the universal access to health care does not guarantee alone that the system promotes the 
development of autonomy competency. 
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Second, health care systems can also promote autonomy by paying special attention to 
those who require long-term institutional care.551 “Health-care settings are social environments that can 
play a socializing role in the development of autonomy competency.”552 For example, children with severe 
disabilities or chronic illnesses and adolescents with psychiatric illnesses face the socializing power of 
health care institutions. It is important that health care professionals provide an environment that 
promotes the autonomy of the patients in long-term care. The skills required for autonomy competency 
can be taught. Children and adolescents with chronic illnesses can be encouraged to participate in 
decision-making about their own treatment and express their feelings and needs. In order for this to be 
efficient, health care professionals cannot treat such children and adolescents as needing total care. The 
parents and guardians can also be active in promoting autonomy competency.553  
Third, health care professionals can foster autonomy in health crises if they do not focus 
solely on the provision of information and respect for informed consent. Sudden and severe illnesses are 
crises and hence, threaten autonomy. Crises require reassessment of one’s self-understanding, which 
affects one’s autonomy competency.554 Health care professionals can help patients by “providing support 
for people in coming to terms with their altered circumstances as a part of the protection and respect for 
autonomy.”555 In a crisis situation, respect for autonomy is not necessarily guaranteed by giving vast 
amounts of information to a patient. Health care professionals do not necessarily respect patient 
autonomy by the patient giving opportunities to take full control of his or her health care. Rather health 
care professionals are expected to support and assist the patients to reexamine their values, desires, and 
preferences. This may signal respect for autonomy better than simply giving information.556 
Feminist bioethicists indicate that in medical decision-making situations, autonomous 
patients are often expected to understand medical interventions and technicalities and give or deny 
informed consent based on the facts. In these situations both patients and medical interventions are 
isolated from any social context.557 There is a danger that physician-patient relationships are abstracted 
from their social, political, and cultural contexts if too much weight is put on the traditional model of 
autonomy. The traditional model protects free and rational individuals from unwanted intervention 
committed by other free and rational individuals. The model does not include the idea that individual 
choices are largely molded by social contexts and cultural values. Many of the most significant moral 
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dimensions of physician-patient relationships are situated exactly in the social, political, and cultural 
aspects of the encounters and the contexts in which they are located.558 
For example, Anne Donchin maintains that respect for autonomy means that health care 
professionals take into account the meaning illness has for patients, and how they as professionals can 
help support “patients’ struggles to create new personal meanings out of the experience of disease, 
disorder, or disability.”559 Respecting autonomy does not mean just paying attention to the information 
given, but also to the manner in which the information is communicated. Information that is imparted in a 
seemingly neutral manner may paralyze a patient and promise a neutrality that health care professionals 
cannot necessarily guarantee. For example, prenatal genetic testing is often followed, not by treatment, 
but by a decision on whether to terminate the pregnancy. Donchin maintains that in such a situation, 
illusory neutrality and detachment do not foster patient autonomy, which would in fact require taking 
seriously the emotional support that the patient needs in the face of an illness, trauma, or test result that 
can disrupt familial relationships.560 
Donchin’s account of autonomy shows that a feminist understanding of the respect for 
autonomy requires redefining informed consent. If informed consent is understood merely as a disclosure 
of information by those who seek the consent (medical professionals or researchers) and decision-
making by those whose consent is sought (patients or research subjects), then an important 
communicative element of the process is overlooked. In order to give informed consent, the patient must 
not only have relevant information, but also understand this information. Therefore, adequate informed 
consent requires effective communication between the health care professionals and the patients. 
Making information available or disclosing information is not a sufficient condition for informed consent. 
Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill have proposed that, instead of being obliged to disclose information to 
patients and research subjects, medical professionals and researchers should be obliged to 
communicate with those whose consent they seek. Without communication informed consent procedures 
fail.  
Disclosure [of information] by itself may not reach its intended audience, so may fail to 
communicate what is proposed, or which commitments are offered; decision-making by itself may 
fail to communicate whether consent is given or refused or which commitments are assumed in 
consenting.561 
Although Manson and O’Neill write from a mainstream perspective, their account of 
informed consent as communication is based on two aspects that have significant relevance  for feminist 
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ethics, namely, relationality and contextuality. Communication is relational in that it is based on a 
reciprocal process in which the agency, both of the person requesting consent and the person whose 
consent is requested, is important. Without this relational element informed consent fails. The model of 
informed consent as communication emphasizes the agency both of health care professionals and of 
patients.562  
[A]n agency model of communication locates informed consent in communicative transactions 
between agents. It provides a framework for a transactional model of informed consent, which 
emphasises what is said and what is done both by those who request consent, and those who 
respond by giving or refusing their consent.563  
In addition, informed consent processes are always contextual. Manson and O’Neill 
describe informed consent as a communicative transaction that takes place in a certain time and place, in 
other words, in a context. In order to be adequate for all parties involved, the communication transaction 
must take into account the contextual details that affect the communication. Otherwise, the 
communication process becomes irrelevant.564 
Communicative transactions ought to be sensitive to others’ practical commitments, including their 
practical commitments to acquire relevant knowledge. Good communication takes account of what 
others already know, and of what they want and need to know at that time, in the context. 
Epistemically adequate communication is relevant communication, and has to be limited to what is 
appropriate to the actual context.565 
Context-based communication requires that the communicating parties are at least implicitly aware of one 
another’s interests, competences, and commitments. The requirement of implicit awareness is 
demanding. However, it also shows that “all communication is partial, is rooted in background knowledge 
and inferential competences.”566 
Manson and O’Neill acknowledge that communication includes different kinds of actions 
and that communication can go wrong for several reasons.567 However, they maintain that certain norms 
can be established for proper communication in bioethics. Communicative transactions should be based 
on intelligibility, relevance, accuracy, and honesty. Those whose consent is sought should thus 
understand the information communicated and comprehend its meaning in a particular context. 
Consenting fails if patients do not understand for what the consent is requested or that it is requested. 
Also, the medical professionals must respond appropriately to the patient’s consent or refusal to give 
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consent.568 In practice, this entails medical professionals and patients having a sense of one another’s 
background knowledge. “There is little point in communicating things that the other party already knows, 
or has no need to know in a particular context.”569 Furthermore, informed consent processes succeed 
only if they are based in truth-claims. The patients must be able to assume that information 
communicated by medical professionals is true and that the communication is truthful.570 This requires 
interpersonal trust between the medical professionals and the patients.  
As stated earlier, feminist bioethicists maintain that the aspect of self-trust is crucial for 
informed consent. An agent must trust the information he or she receives about the choice at hand. The 
content of the information alone does not guarantee that the agent trusts the information given. Rather 
the communicative relationship in which the information is imparted provides the basis for trust. As seen 
in chapter 3.2 on feminist alternatives to autonomy, Rebecca Kukla’s conscientious autonomy provides a 
model in which the trusting relationship of medical professionals and the patients is emphasized. Patients 
feel “in control” if they have a trusting patient-doctor relationship. Autonomy is demonstrated as being 
relational in nature.571  
Bioethics in general and feminist bioethics in particular could benefit from a model of 
relational autonomy and informed consent in which the ideas of conscientious autonomy and informed 
consent as communication are connected. Rebecca Kukla is critical of traditional models of informed 
consent. In her view, traditional accounts equate autonomy with informed consent. In the traditional 
model, informed consent is seen as a punctate decision, an idea that Kukla opposes.572 Kukla’s account 
could be elaborated on by redefining informed consent as suggested by Manson and O’Neill, who agree 
that informed consent is not about punctate decisions. However, they maintain that informed consent is 
an important concept for bioethics. Therefore, it should be reformulated as a communicative process.573 
For their part, Manson and O’Neill are critical of traditional accounts of autonomy. They maintain that 
individual autonomy is neither a sufficient nor a necessary justification for informed consent for two 
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reasons. First, if individual autonomy is seen as merely a choice, then it can be seen as a condition for 
informed consent, but it cannot be fundamental to ethics.574  
If individual autonomy is seen as fundamental to ethics, but merely as a matter of choice, then the 
only permissible restriction on choice would will be those required to protect others’ individual 
autonomy. All choices that leave others’ autonomy intact – however bizarre, however self-
destructive, however, offensive, however degrading – will be permissible, and restrictions on them 
will be unacceptable.575   
However, many ethicists have pointed out that individual autonomy can legitimately be limited when 
other, equally important “other-regarding” principles are evoked. But then, according to Manson and 
O’Neill, individual autonomy cannot be fundamental to ethics.576 Second, if autonomy is seen as a form of 
rational or reflective choosing, it may be fundamental to ethics, but it cannot be an operational basis for 
informed consent:  
[R]ational autonomy… is more cognitively demanding than a minimal conception of individual 
autonomy as mere, sheer choice. If appeals to rational autonomy are used to justify informed 
consent requirements, this will set a higher hurdle for cognitively adequate consent, so shrink the 
range of cases in medical and research practice for which informed consent could be required.577 
Even if informed consent could not be based on individual autonomy, it would be fruitful to 
examine whether it could be based on relational autonomy, such as conscientious autonomy. In this 
model, autonomy would not be understood as a pure choice, but as a relational concept. Autonomy 
would be pursued in social contexts and expressed not only in punctate decisions, but also in processes 
and conscientious actions. In a medical setting, respect for autonomy could be shown in patient-doctor 
relationships, which are based on trust and communication. In this model, both parties are active and 
their agencies are restated in a way that is not possible within the framework of individual autonomy. A 
decision-making capacity does not require individual autonomy, but can be based on relational autonomy 
and agency. This understanding of agency could be formulated by using the ideas of autokoenony. Social 
relationships shape moral identities and values. Autokoenonous agents are inextricably connected to 
each other. Individual autonomy is not the prerequisite for agency, which is construed relationally and 
through the networks of subordination and power.  
The proposed model of relational autonomy and informed consent presents a new picture 
of both patients and health care professionals. However, it poses theoretical and practical challenges for 
bioethicists and health care practitioners.  On the theoretical level, the model demands a more nuanced 
analysis of autonomy and agency in both mainstream and feminist philosophy and ethics. It also requires 
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a comprehensive examination of how informed consent and autonomy have been formulated in relation 
to one another throughout the history of bioethics. It necessitates imagination in order to rethink the 
issue. This task would help to develop feminist bioethics further.  
On practical level, the discussion above reveals that health care professionals can foster 
autonomy competency and thereby show respect for autonomy. However, the examples also indicate 
that individual health care professionals are faced with an enormous challenge which requires more time 
and resources than are currently available. Bioethicists are challenged to seek practical ways to endorse 
state and institutional responsibility for the promotion of autonomy. This is not easily done. However, 
unless health care professionals and institutions recognize autonomy in all its complexity and take its 
practical implications seriously, they cannot react to the threats to autonomy:  
At the practical level, the specification of the kinds of practices and policies in health care that 
need reexamination in light of the demands of autonomy must be elaborated in the context of 
existing health-care systems and an articulation of the likely autonomy-affecting features of 
different treatments and conditions.578 
In sum, feminist bioethicists maintain that health care institutions and professionals cannot 
ignore the issue of oppression if they are to protect patient autonomy. Health care that turns its back on 
oppression does not respect autonomy.579 It thus appears that feminist bioethicists are genuinely 
committed to the idea of core feminism. The aim of feminism is to fight oppression in its different forms. In 
relation to autonomy, this means finding appropriate ways to define respect for autonomy. 580 This would, 
for example, mean that feminist bioethicists need to find ways to redefine informed consent processes as 
being based on relational understanding of autonomy and agency. Relational autonomy involves 
individuals as self-determining moral agents who are positioned relationally to their families and health 
care professionals. For their part, health care professionals need to identify oppression and work for its 
elimination, as well as foster the development of autonomy competency in patients and clients.  
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3.5 Conclusion on the Concept of Autonomy in Feminist Bioethics 
Feminist bioethicists and philosophers have criticized the concept of autonomy and developed alternative 
ways of understanding it. They argue that the traditional understanding defines persons as being self-
sufficient, unconnected, and individualistic. Nor do traditional accounts of autonomy take into account the 
importance of relationality. According to the feminists, the accounts ignore the fact that people are first 
and foremost products of their social history and current circumstances. Morality is a social construct and 
always inter-personal. Within this view it is insufficient to claim that autonomy as power to control 
personal desires and the power to protect oneself from others should be given a central place in 
bioethics.  
 The feminists maintain that the concept of autonomy can and should be transformed, and 
they present alternatives to the traditional concept of autonomy. Autokoenony and conscientious 
autonomy are examples of the feminist reformulations. These alternative approaches belong under the 
category of relational autonomy, which is said to “embody a dimension of social awareness and 
commentary that is lacking in most mainstream philosophical approaches.”581 Relational autonomy 
reflects the feminist understanding of moral agency as being social. People become autonomous only 
through relationships and social contexts, which in turn affect how people can express their autonomy 
skills.  
 However, as this has shown, the feminist approaches to autonomy are not without 
problems. In particular, the question of oppressive socialization and its effects on autonomy should be 
studied. Are individuals who are affected by oppressive socialization autonomous if their motivational 
structure is not self-imposed, but affected by a social order? I have argued that if a purely self-imposed 
motivational structure is a prerequisite for autonomy, then no one is autonomous. We all are affected by a 
social order from which we cannot escape. Obviously, some social and cultural explanations are more 
oppressive than others, and as such they should be criticized. However, the conclusion cannot be drawn 
that autonomy as a concept should be discarded because oppressive socialization cannot be supported. 
In this connection, three issues are worthy of note. 
First, relationships are both barriers to and advantages for autonomy. The challenge is to 
make these two sides of relational autonomy cohere. Second, even if personhood is inherently social, 
autonomy requires a certain degree of separate personhood. Therefore, a self must be to a degree a 
coherent unity. This is not to say that selves must be absolutely unified, coherent, or transparent. Minimal 
coherence, transparency, and unity suffice. Yet feminist philosophers are challenged to articulate “the 
nature of the minimally distinct and coherent self – and to determine the complex ways in which social 
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relationships bear on its prospects for autonomy.”582 Third, respect for autonomy can still be important to 
feminist bioethics. The aim of feminism is to fight oppression in its different forms. In relation to 
autonomy, this means finding appropriate ways to define respect for autonomy. Feminist bioethics 
suggests that this can be done by redefining informed consent as a communicative transaction that 
emphasizes the agency both of those who seek consent and those whose consent is sought. The 
elements of contextuality and relationality are important in this model. Consent is given in a particular 
context based on inter-personal relationships. Respecting autonomy means paying attention not only to 
the information given, but also to the manner in which the information is communicated.  
I propose that Neil Manson’s and Onora O’Neill’s account of informed consent sheds light 
on how feminist bioethicists could redefine informed consent. Although Manson and O’Neill write explicitly 
from a standard bioethical perspective, their account of informed consent definitely has relevance for 
feminist bioethics. Like the feminist bioethicists, Manson and O’Neill are critical of individual autonomy, 
which they maintain is problematic for bioethics in general and for the justification of informed consent in 
particular.583 I further suggest that feminist bioethics could benefit from combining relational models of 
autonomy, such as conscientious autonomy and autokoenony, with informed consent as communication. 
Together with a feminist understanding of autonomy as relational, the agency-based model of informed 
consent as communication shows that instead of individual autonomy, relational autonomy and agency 
should become central to bioethics. 
The proposed model of informed consent as communicative transaction indicates a shift of 
focus from individual autonomy to relational autonomy and especially to the notion of agency. These 
realizations challenge feminists to determine more clearly how autonomy and agency should be 
understood and what their relationship is. I will discuss agency in more detail in chapter 5. For now it 
suffices to say that in feminist bioethics, agency may be a better concept with which to describe the 
relational nature of being than is individual autonomy. Agency includes the idea that, even though 
individuals (agents) may not be fully autonomous, they are nevertheless autonomous to a degree (having 
minimal or medial autonomy) and are thus capable of consenting.  
What is important for the development of feminist bioethics as a sub-field is the realization 
that the transformation of bioethics is possible. Mainstream and feminist bioethics could improve and 
develop one another. The discussion of autonomy and informed consent as communication is an 
example of how the transformation could work in practice. From the evidence presented in this chapter, it 
is clear that the third transformation strategy for feminist bioethics results in a change to feminist values. 
As shown in chapter 2.4, change is possible, but it cannot be done radically. Instead, the current 
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concepts and practices should be redefined. Concepts, such as autonomy, and practices, such as 
informed consent procedures, are flexible and can be used in new and different ways to construct new 
social understanding that is in accordance with feminist ideas of relationality and contextuality.  
The discussion of autonomy should guide feminist bioethics in its theoretical perspectives 
and practical applications. How can autonomy, then, be respected in concrete situations that require 
bioethical reflection? In the next chapter I discuss stem cell research and its use as a test case for 
feminist bioethics and the ability to employ the theoretical and conceptual tools that feminist bioethicists 
propose.   
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4 Stem Cell Research and Use as a Test Case for Feminist Bioethics 
In the Introduction, I defined the task of feminist bioethics as bringing new perspectives to the ongoing 
bioethical discussions. In the present chapter I take up this task and discuss how feminist bioethicists 
have been able to apply feminist critique and transformative perspectives to the most recent 
developments in biotechnology. I have chosen stem cell research as a test case for feminist bioethics 
and the ability of feminist bioethics to employ its methodologies in order to analyze ethical questions 
related to novel biotechnologies.  
Stem cell research presents an interesting example. In view of the claim that feminist 
bioethics is unable to expand beyond questions of reproduction, stem cell research is linked to such 
reproductive issues as how donated eggs, embryos, and aborted fetuses are used in research. Clearly, 
such research affects women and infertile couples who donate eggs, embryos, and fetuses for research. 
Yet reproduction is not the only ethical questions evoked by stem cell research. Other issues, such as the 
therapeutic potential of stem cells, the just use of resources, and the commercialization of human tissue, 
are relevant. Thus, stem cell research broadens the traditional perspective of feminist bioethics and offers 
an interesting case for feminist bioethics.584  
It should be noted that as yet, there is no sustained feminist consideration of stem cell 
research, which is a rather new subject matter in bioethics. I will review how the subject has been treated, 
both by non-feminists and feminist bioethicists, and discuss the following ethical aspects: the moral status 
of human embryos, the therapeutic potential and just use of resources in relation to stem cell research, 
and the rights and protection of stem cell donors and recipients. Each section below gives the both non-
feminist and feminist responses to these questions. Before turning to the bioethical discussion of stem 
cells, I will briefly discuss their characteristics and potential applications. I will also review official reports 
on stem cell research and use.  
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4.1 Introduction to Stem Cells and Stem Cell Ethics 
Stem cells are cells that are capable of self-renewal and reconstitution of one or several types of tissue. 
Human stem cells can be found in adults, fetuses, and embryos. During the embryonic and fetal stages of 
human development, all tissues and organs are formed of these cells. In an adult body, stem cells 
replenish tissues and cells. The absence of stem cells would lead human tissue to deteriorate, and 
eventually die. Human stem cells are divided into different categories according to their origins and their 
ability to differentiate. The categories are human embryonic stem cells (ES cells), human embryonic germ 
cells (EG cells), adult or somatic stem cells, and induced pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells).585  
The main sources of ES cells for research are supernumerary embryos created by means 
of assisted reproduction techniques (ART), such as in vitro fertilization (IVF), but subsequently not used 
for reproductive purposes. Current medical practice recommends creating several embryos in one IVF 
cycle in order to maximize the chance for pregnancy and reduce the number of cycles needed.586 In order 
to create as many embryos as possible, several eggs are needed. Hence, women are encouraged to go 
through hormonal treatment in order to produce several eggs at the same time. Women go through the 
treatment before egg retrieval. As the result of the treatment, a woman’s body starts to act as it does in 
menopause. Right after this, the medication is changed to induce superovulation, that is, several ovarian 
follicles mature at the same time and the woman produces multiple eggs. Ova are then retrieved, either 
through laparoscopy or trans-abdominal ultrasonically directed oocyte recovery (TUDOR) under light 
sedation, and the retrieved eggs are fertilized with sperm on a petri dish.587 The current practice of 
creating several embryos during one IVF cycle results in embryos that are no longer needed for 
reproduction and thus remain in ART clinics. Couples or women who have undergone ART are given the 
choice to discard the supernumerary embryos or donate them, either for research purposes or to other 
women or couples for assisted reproduction.588  
ES cells can be obtained from other sources as well, such as embryos created for 
research purposes by IVF or somatic cell nuclear transfer (SCNT). In SCNT a nucleus from an adult 
somatic cell is transferred to an enucleated ovum. The egg is then activated to develop without 
fertilization, and it can be induced to differentiate to the blastocyst stage in which pluripotent stem cells 
are isolated. Embryos can sometimes also be created for research purposes by dividing an embryo in 
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two or by parthenogenesis (stimulation in vitro of an oocyte to initiate the duplication of the cell’s genetic 
information and then the division of the cell).589  
ES cells are present immediately after fertilization. The fertilized egg begins to divide, and 
all the cells in a two-to three-day old embryo are similar. These cells are called totipotent stem cells for 
their unlimited capacity to form any human cells. Totipotent stem cells can also form a new embryo 
altogether as well as the placenta and other membranes around the embryo. At the age of four to five 
days, the fertilized egg reaches what is called the morula stage. At approximately the age of five to seven 
days, a hollow appears in the center of the morula, and the cells begin to differentiate into inner and outer 
cells. The embryo then reaches the blastocyst stage. The outer cells give rise to the tissues around the 
fetus, including the placenta. The inner cells constitute the fetus itself as well as some of the surrounding 
tissues. Pluripotent stem cells are created when the inner cell mass is isolated from the outer cell mass. 
The isolated inner cells are called pluripotent stem cells. It is important to note that pluripotent stem cells 
as such do not occur in vivo and they cannot alone develop into an embryo if they are placed in a 
woman’s uterus.590 
EG cells can be derived from the primordial germ cells of a five-to ten-week-old fetus. A 
germ cell is a general term for the sperm, egg, and their precursor cells. Primordial germ cells can be 
isolated from the gonadal ridge of aborted fetuses. During normal fetal development, the gonadal ridge 
develops into a testis or an ovary.591 Both ES cells and EG cells are pluripotent, but they are not identical 
in properties or character.  
Somatic stem cells reside among differentiated cells in fetal and adult tissues and organs 
and regenerate the tissue in which they are located. They can give rise to a single cell type or to 
terminally differentiated cell types constituting a specific tissue or organ. Somatic stem cells are either 
progenitor or multipotent stem cells. Progenitor stem cells differentiate into only one cell type. For 
instance, spermatogonial stem cells can differentiate only into spermatozoa. Multipotent stem cells give 
rise to several cell types constituting a specific tissue or organ. For instance, haematopoïetic stem cells 
can differentiate into all the diverse blood cells. No adult stem cells that are pluripotent in capacity have 
yet been identified in a human body outside the womb. Somatic stem cells have been identified in tissues 
and organs of born human beings, including the brain, bone marrow, peripheral blood, blood vessels, 
skeletal muscle, the epithelia of the skin and the digestive system, the cornea, the dental pulp of the 
tooth, the retina, the liver, and the pancreas. Somatic stem cells are also found in the organs and tissues 
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of aborted fetuses and can be obtained following an autopsy, for example from post-mortem brain tissue. 
Haematopoïetic stem cells can be retrieved from the blood of umbilical cord at birth.592 
Although adult stem cells are not pluripotent in capacity, some adult cells may be 
“genetically reprogrammed to an embryo-like state by being forced to express genes and factors 
important for maintaining the defining properties of embryonic stem cells.”593 These are called induced 
pluripotent stem cells (iPS cells). It is still unknown whether or how iPS cells and ES cells differ in 
clinically significant ways. IPS cells are thought to provide efficient tools for drug development and the 
modeling of diseases. Moreover, they may create novel possibilities, especially for regenerative medicine 
(see below).594 
The main interests in stem cell research lie, on the one hand, in basic science and, on the 
other hand, in the possible therapeutic and clinical applications of stem cell technology. Research on 
stem cells opens up a new view of basic developmental biology and on the basic mechanisms of cell 
differentiation and proliferation. Stem cell research may provide information about normal and abnormal 
human development and yield a deeper understanding of the causes of birth defects, infertility, and 
pregnancy loss. Stem cell lines can be used to discover the effects of chromosomal abnormalities in early 
human development. A better understanding of cell division and differentiation may provide information 
about such diseases as cancer. This kind of research may also provide knowledge about early childhood 
tumors, many of which are embryonic in origin. Eventually, stem cell research may suggest new 
strategies for therapies.595 
Stem cell lines can be used for pharmacology studies and toxicology testing. Culturing 
specific, differentiated cell lines would make it possible to test a large number of chemicals on human 
tissue. Information about how differentiated cells respond to different potential drugs would help to 
distinguish useful from harmful medicinal products. In the opinion of some, pharmacology and toxicology 
testing are the most likely biomedical applications of stem cell research in the immediate future.596  
In time, stem cells could be used in gene therapy. They could substitute for other means, 
such as viruses, as vehicles or bearers of genetic information for the therapeutic delivery of genes. This 
kind of therapeutic delivery system is being designed especially for the treatment of cancer. Stem cells 
could be cultured and directed to differentiate into specified cell types, which would then target specific 
cancerous cells and deliver direct treatments that will destroy or modify the problem cells. 
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Stem cells are being investigated for novel therapeutic applications, often called 
regenerative medicine or cell-based therapies.597 Cell-based therapies can be divided into three groups: 
transplantation of differentiated cells derived from stem cells, direct administration of stem cells, and 
stimulation of endogenous stem cells. The production of differentiated stem cell lines for therapeutic 
transplantation is one of the potential future applications of stem cell research. Serious illnesses and 
injuries can cause permanent cell and tissue damage. Stem cells could be cultured to produce a 
particular cell type, which could then be used for the repair of diseased or damaged tissue. The source 
for the differentiated stem cells could be ES or somatic cells, including the patient’s own stem cells. Such 
treatment could be used for diabetes, Parkinson’s disease, and muscle diseases. The direct 
administration of stem cells may be possible or needed in some cases. Stem cells would colonize in 
designated site in the body and differentiate into the desired cell type. The patient’s own stem cells could 
be stimulated to induce or augment self-repair of the damaged tissue. Stimulation of endogenous stem 
cells requires the use of growth factors.598 
Bone marrow transplant is a routinely used form of stem cell therapy. Haematopoïetic 
stem cells can be retrieved from human bone marrow and then transplanted to a patient affected by 
leukemia or aplastic anemia after chemotherapy. Haematopoïetic stem cells can also be obtained from 
umbilical cord blood at birth. National cord blood banks facilitate the haematopoïetic stem cell 
transplantation.599 In Finland, the Red Cross coordinates the collection of umbilical cord blood. 
Despite the routine use of stem cells in bone marrow transplants, most novel stem cell 
based therapies are at an early stage of development. Several obstacles must be overcome before these 
therapies can be realized, beginning with a strong need to gain a better understanding of cell 
differentiation, dedifferentiation, and transdifferentiation. There is a risk that stem cells will differentiate 
inappropriately after transplantation. The risk is serious, because stem cells may develop tumors, such as 
teratoma. Furthermore, methods for ensuring the viability and functioning of differentiated cells need to 
be clarified. Isolation and purification methods need to be developed in order to avoid the transplantation 
of inappropriate cells. Germ-free culture conditions need to be ensured by developing good 
manufacturing practices (GMP).600  
Immune rejection is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of stem cell-based therapies in 
cases when a patient’s own cells cannot be used. Several approaches have been envisioned: the 
creation of stem cell banks, immuno-suppressive drugs, generation of immunotolerance, and the use of 
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SCNT or therapeutic cloning. SCNT would help overcome the problem of tissue rejection in cell 
transplants.601 Yet it is unlikely that this kind of therapeutic use of stem cells or SCNT technique will be 
used at any time in the near future.602 Rather, using of iPS cells could greatly diminish the risk of immune 
rejection. Cells and tissues used in clinical transplantations could be derived from iPS cells generated 
from a patient’s own cells and would be a “nearly identical match to the cell donor and thus avoid 
rejection by the immune system.”603 
ES and EG cell research seems increasingly promising from the point of view of 
regenerative medicine. At the same time, it presents serious ethical dilemmas: Is the promise of 
regenerative medicine an important enough reason to proceed with embryonic and fetal research? 
Humanitarian hopes are juxtaposed with moral dilemmas. Several national and supranational boards and 
organizations along with scientific organizations have discussed stem cell research, its prospects, and its 
shortcomings. In the following section, I will introduce stem cell reports written in the European Union, 
Finland, and the United States as well as two reports drawn up by scientific organizations in the Nordic 
region and the E.U. 
The European Union has been active in reflecting ethical questions in stem cell research 
and therapies.  Although the E.U. mandate does not include the regulation of ethical matters such as 
human stem cell research, the E.U. has nevertheless taken a stand on the issue, for example in 
evaluating the funding of ES cell research through the framework programs of research and 
development. Furthermore, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (hereafter 
EGE) has registered its opinions on embryonic stem cell research.604  
Three supranational reports written within the E.U. will be considered here: Adoption of an 
Opinion on Ethical Aspects of Human Stem Cell Research and Use, EGE Opinion no. 15 (2000); 
Commission Staff Working Paper: Report on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research (2003); and 
Recommendations on the Ethical Review of hESC FP7 Research Projects, EGE Opinion no. 22 (2007). I 
call these reports the E.U. reports.  
EGE Opinion no. 15 was published in 2000 and remains the most extensive official 
opinion within the E.U. The two other E.U. reports refer to EGE Opinion no. 15. The 2003 and 2007 
reports do not revise the general principles of Opinion no. 15, but base their guidelines on its principles, 
namely,  
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the principle of respect for human dignity 
the principle of individual autonomy (entailing the giving of informed consent, and the respect for 
privacy and confidentiality of personal data) 
the principle of justice and beneficence (namely with regard to the improvement and protection of 
health) 
the principle of freedom of research (which is to be balanced against other fundamental 
principles);  
the principle of proportionality (including that research methods are necessary to the aims pursued 
and that no alternative more acceptable methods are available).605 
In addition to these principles, EGE stresses the following aspects of stem cell research and use: the 
moral status of the embryos; the long-term consequences of stem cell research and use for individuals 
and society; the public control of stem cell research; the appropriate application procedures for E.U. 
funded stem cell research; and safe and anonymous donor procedures (including informed consent 
procedures). In addition the EGE regards as highly suspect the creation of embryos for the sole purpose 
of research and commerce.606  
It should be noted that EGE explicitly expresses concern for women’s rights and health in 
the context of stem cell research and use. It states clearly the necessity of avoiding the violation of these 
rights: “The demand for spare embryos and oocyte donation [should]… not increase the burden on 
women.”607 Furthermore, the group is aware of the risk of instrumentalization and coercive pressure that 
women as donors may experience. EGE emphasizes the need to prevent commercialization and the 
urgency of obtaining informed consent from women and couples as donors.608  
The Commission Staff Working Paper “aims to provide a description of the state of play of 
the scientific, ethical, legal, social and economic issues related to human stem cell research and human 
embryonic stem cell research.”609 The Working Paper was used as a basis for discussion in an inter-
institutional seminar on bioethics in 2002. It cites EGE Opinion no. 15 and Decision no. 1513/2002/EC of 
the European Parliament and the Council concerning the sixth framework program of the European 
Community for research, technological development, and demonstration activities, thereby contributing to 
the creation of the European research area and to innovation (2002-2006). According to the Working 
Paper the fundamental ethical principles articulated in EGE must be respected. Furthermore, the Paper 
states that the ethical acceptability of research proposals must be secured and that particular 
consideration should be given to the socio-economic aspects of stem cell research and use. Special 
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attention is devoted to social aspects of stem cell research and use: “The ethical and social debate 
should be a natural part of the research and development process, involving society as much as 
possible.”610 This is said to be best secured by open discussions and dialogue between the public and 
the scientific community.  
EGE Opinion no. 22 “indicates the measures (guidelines) to use during the ethics review 
of FP7 [Framework Program 7] research projects on human embryonic stem cells (hESC).”611 The ethical 
criteria for research projects under FP7 include four criteria set forth by FP6 and two additional criteria for 
FP7. The criteria defined under FP6 require that applicants must first prove that the regulatory criteria are 
met and indicate their national regulatory requirements; second, the applicants must provide information 
that the ES cells used result from non-implanted IVF embryos; third, the privacy of the embryo donors 
must be secured; and fourth, information on the conditions of donation must be provided. EGE is 
intended to ensure the freedom of donation by banning any financial incentives. The two criteria defined 
under FP7 concern the alternatives to human ES cells and donors’ rights. EGE is strict in protecting 
donors’ rights and stresses that the following criteria must be met by FP7 research projects: 
no pressure has been put on the donors at any stage; 
the donor’s health has not been put at risk by excessive ovarian stimulation; 
informed consent to the donation for research of an embryo, originally planned for reproduction, is 
given in knowledge of the kind of research intended …; 
information was given that consent could be withdrawn up to the stage of the creation of stem 
cells; 
infertility treatment and research was appropriately separated; 
no financial incentives have been offered to donate embryos for research at any stage. … 
However, some members of the EGE hold the view that the reduction of IVF costs is 
acceptable.612 
EGE Opinion no 22 takes a stand on the moral status of the embryo: It states that human embryos are 
not “neutral objects,”613 and thus “informed consent should address explicitly this moral dilemma, leaving 
the decision to the donors.”614 In addition to these guidelines, EGE Opinion no. 22 emphasizes the need 
for continuous promotion of public governance and dialogue between science and society.  
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In sum, the E.U. reports are thorough and designed to establish guidelines for E.U.-funded 
research projects. Moreover, the E.U. reports are sensitive to women as donors. In this respect the 
guidelines in Opinion no. 22 are especially important.  
In comparison to the E.U. reports, the Finnish reports are narrow. Public stem cell debate 
has not been lively in Finland. It is especially noteworthy that the public has not engaged in vigorous 
debate about stem cell ethics even though experts have discussed the topic and tried to promote the 
visibility of stem cell ethics. The active role of experts in the stem cell debate was demonstrated in a 
unique declaration published by embryo and stem cell researchers in 2001.615 The declaration articulates 
the researchers’ opinion of embryo and stem cell research, states the principles by which stem cell and 
embryo research is to be conducted in Finland, and endeavors to broaden the public discussion. The 
guiding principle is the freedom of the research. The researchers wanted to ensure a permissive research 
environment in Finland, one guaranteed by legislation. The researchers expressed their willingness to 
work together with the legislators in order to formulate laws with an appropriate scope for the research. 
The researchers opposed reproductive cloning and expressed their commitment to preventing it by the 
means available to the research community. 
 In addition to the researchers’ own declaration, two governmental bodies have addressed 
stem cell research and ethics. In 2003 Finland’s National Advisory Board on ethics published a report 
Ihmisen kantasolut, kloonaus ja tutkimus [Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research] dealing with the 
scientific, legal, and moral aspects of stem cell research and use. In 2005 the report was published in 
English under the title Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research. The aim of the report is to “stimulate 
discussion on human stem cells, their potential uses, ethical issues and the lack of clarity in their 
regulation.”616 Regarding stem cell ethics, the committees state that the ethical questions related to the 
issue are mostly connected to the “origin and methods of stem cell production”617 from which stem cells 
are derived.  
Other problems are divided among several categories: “Ethical issues connected with the 
use of fetal stem cells,”618 “Ethical issues connected with embryonic stem cells,”619 and “Ethical issues 
connected with therapeutic cloning.”620 The report explains the guidelines for research on fetal tissue in 
Finland: a research project must undergo appropriate evaluation and be approved by an ethics 
committee and the head of the research unit. In addition, donors are to be asked for their consent.  
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In addition to the ethical issues connected with embryonic stem cells and therapeutic 
cloning, other issues were raised by the report, which states that in Finland ES cells are derived from 
supernumerary embryos produced in infertility treatments. The report maintains that the collection and 
fertilization of as many eggs as possible during one IVF cycle is in the best interest of the woman and the 
couple undergoing the treatment: “IVF treatment often yields unwanted frozen embryos.”621 The 
prerequisite for the use of these embryos is the informed consent from gamete donors.  
Although the report mentions the need for women’s consent where aborted fetuses and 
embryos are concerned, it does not emphasize such consent in regard to the use of unfertilized eggs in 
SCNT (the report uses both the abbreviation SCNT and the term “therapeutic cloning”). However, the 
report observes that some people object to SCNT because it is said to exploit “both the embryo and the 
women who donated the ovum.”622 Another reason to oppose SCNT, according to the report, is its 
closeness to reproductive cloning: “the procedure can be used to clone humans, i.e. to produce an 
identical individual to the somatic cell nucleus donor, which is forbidden under many international 
agreements.”623 
In sum, the report by the Finnish Ethical Advisory Board presents the ethical issues and 
then explains the Finnish procedures and guidelines. It does not discuss in depth ethical questions 
related to stem cell research and use. It is interesting to note that the perspective on women as donors is 
inconsistent. On the one hand, the report discusses women as donors and the informed consent 
procedure. On the other hand, it states that the donor of the stem cells is either the fetus or the embryo: 
“The collection of stem cells of both fetal and embryonic origins involves destruction of the ‘donor’ – the 
fetus – or embryo – and this is ethically problematic.”624 It remains unclear how the report would suggest 
that women as donors of fetal and embryonic material would be best protected in a consistent and 
reliable manner. 
The issue of donor protection is discussed in more detail in the report by the Finnish 
Parliament entitled Committee for the Future’s Statement on Technology Assessment Project “Social and 
legal challenges of human genome and stem cell research” (2003). The statement is a result of an 
assessment project that was initiated by the Finnish Parliament and the Committee for the Future. The 
project and the assessment targeted the production of knowledge about the social importance of the 
human genome and stem cell research. Furthermore, the project was designed to assess the 
Parliament’s agency to regulate and guide the development in human genome and stem cell research 
and use. The assessment is based on a report from interviews with experts and feedback forms. The 
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following fields are presented: human genome research, stem cell research, (bio)ethics, and the 
economy. The interviews were conducted and the report written by docent Osmo Kuusi and Professor 
Martti Parviainen.625  
The Committee for the Future gives general recommendations concerning human genome 
and stem cell research in Finland and emphasizes education and appropriate research funding. 
[B]iology tuition in comprehensive and secondary schools should be improved and increased. … 
The interaction between bioscience experts, politicians and citizens on bioscience issues should 
be increased. High quality media debate on relevant issues should be increased.626 
It recommends establishing a network research training institute for stem cell research in cooperation 
with other Nordic countries and funded by the Academy of Finland. In the long term all biocenters should 
be equipped with functional stem cell laboratories, in cooperation with the Central Hospital of the 
University of Helsinki. With the current methods, stem cell processing requires exceptional dexterity. The 
crucial nature of these skills must be recognized in the training of researchers and other employees. In 
addition, the Parliament is to clarify “what kind of provisions should be made in the European biomedicine 
agreement to guarantee basic stem cell research and the possibility to implement them on a sound 
ethical basis.”627 
The statement itself is short and without details. For example, “a sound ethical basis” is 
not defined nor is its aim clarified. The report does, however, explicitly and extensively describe ethical 
questions related to stem cell research and use. The utilization of stem cells is related first and foremost 
to the following question: “To what extent we can use adult stem cell applications and to what extent it is 
more reasonable to use stem cell lines derived from human embryos?”628 The report recognizes the 
difference between the use of ES cells and somatic stem cells, the use of ES cells being laden with more 
ethical questions than the use of somatic stem cells. Yet most experts interviewed for the report held the 
opinion that ES cells are more suitable for therapeutic purposes than somatic stem cells. The report 
states that in the context of stem cell research and use, the basic ethical question is about the “intrinsic 
value given to embryos and fetuses of different age.”629   
The question of the value given to embryos and fetuses is discussed at length in the report 
and from two perspectives: “What is the intrinsic value of the human embryo?”630 and “The intrinsic value 
of the fetus in relation to the health and well-being of the mother and those receiving stem cell 
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therapies.”631 The report merely summarizes expert opinions without giving clear and unambiguous 
recommendations. However, something can be said about the general view it reflects. First, the intrinsic 
value of an embryo is to be tied to the larger contexts: to women and to the health of the women who 
donate embryos and ova for research and also to the larger anthropological question of what it means to 
be a human being. Second, the definition of the intrinsic value of embryo and fetus seems to be a societal 
issue.632 Third, the report emphasizes that ethical questions and technical questions cannot be 
separated. Both technical and ethical choices affect the development of the field of stem cell research.633 
In the United States, there are two stem cell reports published by national authorities that I 
will consider here: Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research: Executive Summary by the National Bioethics 
Advisory Board (1999) and Monitoring Stem Cell Research by The President’s Council on Bioethics 
(2004). The National Bioethics Advisory Board (NBAC) was established by President Bill Clinton in 1995. 
Its mandate expired in 2001. The NBAC was to provide advice and make recommendations to the 
National Science and Technology Council and to other government entities in bioethical matters. The 
NBAC was followed by the President’s Council in Bioethics (PCBE) in 2001, which operated until the end 
of President George W. Bush’s administration and functioned as a consultative governmental body on 
bioethical issues. On March 9, 2009, President Barack Obama issued an executive order revoking an 
earlier presidential statement that limited research on ES cells. The effects of President Obama’s order 
will be presented below in connection with the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) guidelines on stem 
cell research. 
The aim of the NBAC report was to discuss the question of “whether the scientific merit 
and the substantial clinical promise of this research justify federal support, and if so, with what restriction 
and safeguards.”634 Its authors stated that the merit and the promise of stem cell research should be 
weighed against the moral status of embryos and fetuses from which stem cells are derived: “[A]lthough 
the human embryo and fetus deserve respect as forms of human life, the scientific and clinical benefits of 
stem cell research should not be forgone.”635 
The NBAC further stated that the use of EG cells derived from cadaver fetal tissue is more 
acceptable than the use of ES cells. Yet the NBAC also indicated that both EG and ES cells could be 
used in federally funded research projects. EG cells would have to be derived from cadaver fetal tissue 
and ES cells from the embryos remaining after infertility treatment. The NBAC did not recommend federal 
funding for research projects that use the so-called embryos created by IVF or SCNT for the sole purpose 
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of research. NBAC states that cadaver fetal tissue and supernumerary embryos provide a sufficient 
source for stem cells.636 Regarding the conditions for donation of fetal tissue and embryos for research, 
the NBAC maintained that informed consent is required from the donor.637 Furthermore, monetary or 
other inducements must not affect women’s decision to have an abortion or to donate aborted fetuses or 
embryos; hence, “embryos and cadaveric fetal tissue should not be bought or sold.”638   
The NBAC discussed national, local, and private oversight and review protocols. It 
recommended the creation of national and local oversight panels. It also recommends that the 
Department of Health and Human Services establish a National Stem Cell Oversight and Review Panel 
whose membership would be multidisciplinary. The panel should give attention both to the use of stem 
cells and to their derivation. In the NBAC view, the ethical guidelines established by the panel would 
affect those working in the private sector as well. Thus, it recommended to those in the private sector to 
take voluntary action in order to create ethical safeguards and standards consistent with the principles 
presented in the report.  
In comparison to the NBAC, the PCBE took a rather different perspective. NBAC supports 
the use of federal funds for ES and EG cell research, whereas PCBE provided the grounds for restricting 
federal funding. Monitoring Stem Cell Research was based on President George W. Bush’s statement in 
August 2001 that ES cell research projects are eligible for U.S. federal funding only if they use stem cell 
lines created before August 9, 2001. Globally, 64 ES cell lines had been created by that date. Monitoring 
Stem Cell Research defended the President’s decision, evident in chapter three, “Recent Developments 
in the Ethical and Policy Debates”, section III “The Charter of the Policy” in which arguments against the 
current policy were outlined and discussed.  
The PCBE presented three ethical principles for governing stem cell policy: the importance 
of relieving suffering, the freedom to conduct research and the moral standing of the human embryo. The 
moral status of the embryo was discussed in special detail. The authors analyzed the question of 
biological continuity as an argument for or against the use of ES cells. According to the continuity 
argument, the human embryo should be recognized as having full moral status, based on the claim that 
there is no particular point in human development that would warrant a sudden change of moral status. 
By contrast, in the discontinuity or graduality argument, there are such points in human embryonic and 
fetal development. The appearance of the primitive streak and the beginning of the nervous system are 
such stages. The moral status of an embryo develops gradually. Although the graduality argument 
appeals to biological facts, it also appeals to a moral or metaphysical claim about the meaning of 
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humanity. “[G]enetic identity and organismic continuity are not sufficient; what matters is present form 
and function, more than mere potential.”639 
In addition to the continuity and discontinuity arguments, the PCBE recognized an 
alternative approach, which it calls the “special respect” approach. Arguments based on this approach 
rely on questions of the viability and potential of the embryo. The purpose of these arguments was not to 
decide the moral status of human embryos in general, but rather to resolve “questions of the moral 
standing of certain particular embryos.”640 According to the PCBE, these arguments showed that under 
certain conditions, particular embryos could be used for research, while the issue of the moral status of 
embryos per se was left unanswered. For example, some writers argued that it would be better to use 
IVF supernumerary embryos for research than merely to discard them. Furthermore, the PCBE claimed 
that some authors use natural embryo loss as an argument for using embryos in research. Since embryo 
loss in unassisted reproduction is estimated to be as high as 80 percent, using artificially created 
embryos for research would not destroy more embryos than those that are lost in natural unassisted 
reproduction.  
In addition to these arguments, the PCBE discussed a third line of reasoning that non-
viable embryos could be used in research while viable embryos could not. Since IVF procedures yield 
surplus embryos and since “the best” are chosen for implantation, the non-viable embryos could be 
permitted for research and use. Moreover, the creation of non-viable embryo-like artifacts for research 
could circumvent the moral dilemma of using human embryos for research.641  
The PCBE concluded by pointing out that there are powerful and well-argued views for 
both for and against stem cell research, and neither side seems to be persuaded by the other. However, 
the PCBE appeared to be optimistic in evaluating the intensifying ethical debate over stem cell research 
and use:  
But the rich and growing ethical debates do suggest the possibility of progress toward greater 
understanding of the issues, and toward more informed public decisionmaking, as all parties to the 
deliberation appreciate better just what is at stake, not only for them or their opponents, but indeed 
for all of us.642 
Under the administrations of Presidents Clinton, George W. Bush and President Obama, 
the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) has published guidelines for research using human pluripotent 
stem cells. The Clinton administration NIH guidelines, published on August 25, 2000, reflected the 
NBAC’s recommendations. Only research done on ES cells derived from supernumerary embryos and 
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EG cells derived from cadaver fetal tissue were eligible for federal funding. Informed consent, free and 
voluntary donation and oversight are emphasized.643 The Bush administration guidelines, published on 
November 7, 2001, stated that research on stem cell lines created after August 9, 2001 was not eligible 
for federal funding. Furthermore, the research must meet the following criteria:  
The stem cells must have been derived from an embryo that was created for reproductive 
purposes; 
The embryo was no longer needed for these purposes; 
Informed consent must have been obtained for the donation of the embryo; 
No financial inducements were provided for donation of the embryo.644 
The Obama administration guidelines, published on July 7, 2009, reflect the President’s 
executive order given on March 9, 2009, which states that “the Secretary of Health and Human Services, 
through the Director of NIH, may support and conduct responsible, scientifically worthy human stem cell 
research, including human embryonic stem cell research, to the extent permitted by law.”645 The current 
NIH guidelines acknowledge women’s role as oocyte donors and the ethical and health implications of 
that role in relation to SCNT. Because NIH considers the health risks associated with ovum donation too 
high, it denies federal funding for research projects using ES cells derived from research embryos.646 
Therefore, ES cells derived from other sources, such as research embryos created by IVF or SCNT or 
parthenogenesis are not eligible for NIH funding. NIH emphasizes proper, informed consent procedure as 
a prerequisite for research projects to be eligible for funding. The requirements are identified in detail 
under Section II (A). Under Section 509, the Omnibus Appropriations Act 2009 (also known as the Dickey 
Amendment) NIH does not fund the derivation of stem cells from human embryos. In sum, all of the U.S. 
reports focus on the use of federal funds. The task of the reports and NIH guidelines is to find 
justifications for federal support for ES cell research. Thus, the reports do not have a direct influence on 
the research done in the private sector. 
In Europe two scientific organizations, the European Science Foundation (ESF) and 
NordForsk, have published policy briefings on human stem cell research: European Science Foundation 
Policy Briefing, Human Stem Cell Research: Scientific Uncertainties and Ethical Dilemmas (2001) and 
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NordForsk’s Stem Cell Research in the Nordic Countries: Science, Ethics, Public Debate and Law 
(2007).647 
ESF hopes that their statement will “lead to an appropriate framework for research to 
continue in balance with ethical and moral issues.”648 The statement describes the basics of stem cell 
biology and research and the ethical debate. ESF states that research on stem cells derived from adults 
and aborted fetuses creates hardly any ethical problems.649 However, research on ES cells causes 
concern: 
Such ethical concerns relate to two issues, one the instrumentalisation of human embryos, i.e. the 
reduction of life to a commodity, and two, deep concern about the risk of a slide from the cloning 
tissues to the cloning of human beings (reproductive cloning).650 
ESF maintains that research on embryonic, fetal, and adult stem cells should be continued in order to 
determine the characteristics of different types of stem cells and their potential applications. ESF 
recommends that ethical issues be taken seriously by the scientific community, and consequently, 
research on human stem cells should be carefully regulated. 
In comparison to ESF’s short statement, NordForsk’s policy brief is more comprehensive. 
NordForsk discusses the societal, legal, and ethical aspects of this research. According to NordForsk, the 
aim of their report is: 
to strengthen the Nordic stem cell research community and policy makers by providing a joint 
Nordic knowledge base as a support to future, well-informed decision making regarding such 
issues.651 
While the perspective is mainly Nordic, a global aspect is added in the discussion of stem cell research in 
Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Singapore.652 NordForsk lists the following factors 
that are of great importance if Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden are to benefit from stem 
cell research: 
In addition to scientific excellence, these include access to funding, investment in research and 
development, good education systems, international collaboration and student exchange, a 
supportive legislative framework, strong democratic tradition, favourable bioethical climate and the 
public perception and support.653 
NordForsk promotes research both on ES cells and somatic cells, the benefits of which can be realized 
within a clear and open legislation. NordForsk points out, however, that stem cell research is not only a 
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legislative issue, but also a complex ethical issue. The main ethical concerns are the hope of increasing 
biological knowledge and the development of treatments for serious illnesses, balanced by the question 
of what procedures are acceptable to carry out on a human embryo.654  
NordForsk’s brief begins with discussion of different aspects of the therapeutic potential of 
research on human stem cells. It recognizes the potential of human stem cells for therapeutic use. At the 
same time NordForsk acknowledges the uncertainty of stem cell therapies: “Several difficulties need to 
be overcome before stem cell technology can be used for the treatment of patients on a wider scale.”655 
NordForsk is hopeful that these difficulties will be overcome. It recommends that further research on stem 
cell biology and clinical applications be conducted:  
A broad, interactive and collaborative research programme in the Nordic countries that addresses 
both basic and clinical questions in stem cell biology, platform technologies and safety concerns 
may be the crucial ingredient needed to catalyze further progress in this field.656 
NordForsk also discusses the moral status of the human embryo. It recognizes that there are different 
perspectives: “an argument based on continuity, an argument based on graduality and an argument 
based on potentiality.”657 According to the potentiality argument, the focal point in defining the moral 
status of embryos is their potential to become human beings. In short, the potential argument leads to the 
conclusion that a human embryo may have a right to develop in line with its potential (a right-in-trust of a 
human person) even though it is not recognized as having the essential attributes of a human person.  
NordForsk points out that the potentiality argument has been criticized on several 
grounds. First, what does it mean to be a human being? Based on the latest biological knowledge, even 
skin cells have the potential to become a human being. Second, to allow a being to develop according to 
its potential means that the development may be interrupted. However, to allow an embryo to develop 
means more than to just merely withdrawing interference. It requires positive action: a woman in whose 
uterus the embryo would be implanted and who would carry the pregnancy to term.658  
NordForsk does not support or oppose any of the arguments. Rather; it emphasizes the 
need to form a sustainable policy, according to which publicly accepted and regulated research can 
continue.659 NordForsk recognizes the difficulty of finding a policy that is acceptable to all. It holds, 
however, that some consensus has been found in the use of supernumerary embryos. NordForsk claims 
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that it is better to use surplus embryos for stem cell research than to destroy them.660 Simultaneously, 
NordForsk appreciates that its argument is open to criticisms. One is that the method of assisted 
reproduction that creates surplus embryos may be unacceptable. Another is that some assisted 
reproduction clinics may wish to fertilize fewer embryos in order to avoid the creation of surplus embryos. 
There are also other solutions to the use of supernumerary embryos, such as embryo adoption.661  
In addition to the therapeutic potential of stem cells and the moral status of the human 
embryo, NordForsk discusses donor rights, that is, the appropriate treatment of those who donate 
fetuses, embryos, and unfertilized eggs for research. In general, NordForsk emphasizes the importance 
of informed consent procedures. It recommends that donors be informed of the fact that stem cell lines 
created from their embryos might live forever. Since donors’ decisions to withdraw consent after the 
creation of a stem cell line cause “insuperable obstacles”662 for researchers, NordForsk does not 
recommend giving donors the right to revoke their consent after the creation of cell lines. Instead, it 
recommends that donors be informed about “the limits on their possibility to revoke consent.”663 
Furthermore, NordForsk advises that donors are told about possible commercial interests of stem cell 
research and use. A donation should be based on free and willing contribution to science.664 Even though 
commercial benefits for the research institute might seem unfair to donors, there is an “implicit contract 
between the donor, the people doing the research and society: the donor participates freely on the 
understanding that this will be to the advantage of society at large.”665 
In sum, both ESF and NordForsk take a positive stand toward stem cell research and use. 
Both discuss the ethical questions related to the issue, none of which is thought to outweigh the benefits 
of the research. They are, however, considered great enough to result in regulation. The reports show 
that the scientific community is ready to propose self-regulation in regard to stem cell research and use. 
Furthermore, the scientific community advocates national and supranational guidelines for the field.  
This overview of the stem cell reports indicate that those from scientific organizations are 
designed to provide guidance for the scientific community, whereas the national and supranational 
reports seek to propose a common policy for stem cell research within their own sphere of authority. A 
central question in the policymaking in the federal, national, and supranational reports is the use of 
research funds. What criteria must a research project meet to be eligible for federal, national or 
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supranational funding? While the E.U. reports indicate consistency on is question, the U.S. reports reflect 
the changing political climate. Whereas the E.U. reports indicate a state-based governance of all stem 
cell research, the U.S. reports suggest voluntarily accepted ethical guidelines for the private sector. 
However, the Finnish reports indicate that the scientific community in Finland is willing to define the 
ethical ground rules for itself.  
Although the reports have different aims, they share a common feature. All indicate that 
certain ethical issues affect and should affect policies and guidelines. These ethical issues can be divided 
into the following categories: the moral status of the embryo; the therapeutic potential of ES and EG 
research; donor protection and rights; and commercial use of reproductive tissues, stem cells, and stem 
cell products.  
In the following section, I will discuss these issues in relation to the goal of feminist 
bioethicists’ to transform bioethics. The ethical questions raised in the stem cell reports have been 
discussed in the vast bioethical literature and are often referred to as the stem cell debate. Here I will 
discuss and analyze the central ethical issues in the debate. I will not provide a full account of all the 
different positions, but rather point to the principal themes. My focus is on how feminist bioethicists have 
commented on the stem cell debate and amended its arguments. I give special consideration to the 
following: how does stem cell research affect women and how have these effects been dealt with in the 
debate? How do the feminists’ comments change the debate and redirect its focus? How do feminist 
insights reveal the feminist transformation of bioethics in the stem cell debate?  
 
  
4.2 The Moral Status of Human Embryos  
The moral status of human embryos is a central ethical question in connection with stem cell research 
and use. The stem cell reports indicate that the boards, organizations, and councils involved in the 
debate over human embryonic stem cell policies consider the moral standing of human embryos from the 
perspective of how embryos should be regarded morally and how their use should be regulated in 
research?666 
Below, I describe the debate over the moral status of embryos from three perspectives. 
First, I discuss how the question of the moral status of embryos is linked to the further question of 
whether the moral status limits or enables research on embryos. Second, I describe the debate about the 
status of pluripotent stem cells derived from human embryos, sometimes called the derivation-use 
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distinction: Is there a morally relevant difference between deriving pluripotent stem cells from embryos 
and using the already derived pluripotent stem cells? Third, I describe the ethical debate over of the 
creation of research embryos: Is there a morally relevant difference between using supernumerary 
embryos versus research embryos? This can be called the discarded-versus-created distinction.  
The question of the moral status of human embryos is most often discussed in terms of 
the respect owed an embryo.667 In the moral sense, respect is linked to the concept of dignity: “To 
respect something is to regard it as valuable in itself, to cherish it because of what it is.”668 The bioethical 
literature and stem cell reports indicate that the goal of moral discourse is to clarify and define the status 
of embryos in order to determine whether an embryo is an entity deserving respect. Furthermore, if the 
embryo deserves respect, then how should that respect be shown? The discussion is directed at 
establishing the degree of protection that embryos should have.669  
Since respect is usually granted persons, the question of the moral status of an embryo 
could be framed as whether an embryo is a person.670 The stem cell reports do not discuss the 
personhood of human embryos per se. ESF and the NBAC refer to the personhood of human embryos 
only in passing.671 Accordingly, the question of whether a human embryo is a person is not a central 
issue in the stem cell reports. Nevertheless, the reports discuss the respectful use of embryos. For 
example, EGE does not discuss the personhood of a human embryo, yet it refers to “the respect due to 
the human embryo.”672 Furthermore, EGE, NordForsk, and the PCBE discuss whether the origin of the 
embryo affects the respect it is owed. In other words, may embryos of one origin be used for research, 
while embryos of another origin should be treated differently?673 The complexities are evident in EGE’s 
Opinion no. 15, which stresses the principle of proportionality leading to the adoption of a precautionary 
approach: 
Calling for prudence, the Group [EGE] considers that, at present, the creation of embryos by 
somatic cell nuclear transfer for research on stem cell therapy would be premature, since there is 
a wide field of research to be carried out with alternative sources of human stem cells (from spare 
embryos, foetal tissues and adult stem cells).674 
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Some bioethicists have concluded that it is “incoherent to say that we can both respect embryos and 
accept their dismemberment in the research process.”675 However, others have argued that since the 
moral status of the embryo can be conceived differently, it is coherent to respect them differently.676 The 
stem cell reports seem to support this second line of argument.  
The question of moral status is often framed as “when the embryo becomes ‘a human 
being’ or when ‘human life’ in a moral sense is thought to begin.”677 The biological similarities and 
differences between live-born human individuals and embryos are considered morally significant. The 
PCBE points out that nearly all participants in the stem cell debate relate the beginning of human life in a 
moral sense to the biological basis of humanness.678 In addition, biological definitions seem to affect the 
regulation of the use of human embryos for research. Four of the stem cell reports analyzed in this study 
– NordForsk, the PCBE, the Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future report and Human Stem 
Cells, Cloning and Research – refer to the “fourteen-day limit”. The primitive streak – the formation of a 
nervous system – appears after fourteen days of embryonic development. After this, an embryo can no 
longer give rise to two separate embryos. Consequently, the appearance of the primitive streak is thought 
to denote the beginning of individuation. According to the fourteen-day limit, embryos older than fourteen 
days may not be used for research.679 
There are different perspectives on the question of how the moral status or humanness is 
based on biology.680 For example, the Finnish Parliament Committee for the Future’s report discusses 
“what kind of absolute value should be given to embryos or fetuses of different ages.”681 The report 
implicitly presumes that different value is given to embryos of different ages. Interestingly, when the 
question was presented to the experts, it was not elucidated by developmental descriptions of embryos of 
different ages nor accompanied by a listing of different ages. As a matter of fact, the report does not 
discuss age or developmental stage in relation to the question. Rather it states the degree of respect 
embryos should have. The following terms are used for embryos: “early embryos” and “embryos from the 
beginning of their development.”682 Therefore, the report does not clarify what it means by “embryos of 
different ages” nor describe different developmental stages. The experts who were interviewed for the 
report do not answer the original question, namely, what value should be given to embryos of different 
age? Thus, the report does not provide an answer to the very question it poses.  
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The PCBE and NordForsk discuss how moral status may be based on biology and make 
reference to the continuity and the graduality arguments.683 According to the continuity argument, the 
human embryo should be recognized as having a full moral status from the moment of conception. 
According to the graduality argument, several other biological occurrences that have been suggested 
may point to the beginning of human life. For example, the appearance of the unique diploid genome and 
the appearance of the primitive streak have been cited as showing the beginning of human life.684 Both 
the continuity and the graduality arguments endeavor to answer the following question: At which point is 
the embryo entitled to full protection? Both arguments relate the starting point of human life and the point 
of protection to the understanding of biological occurrences and their nature.685 
Both the continuity and the graduality arguments have been opposed on the grounds that 
the recent advances in biological knowledge have made defining the beginning of human life a complex 
issue. In addition, the continuity argument has been opposed by demonstrations that there is no one 
moment of fertilization. Fertilization itself is a long process that takes from twenty-four to forty-eight 
hours.686 Furthermore, critics of the continuity argument claim that there is more to being a human being 
than possessing a human genome. The proponents of the continuity argument have responded first that, 
although an embryo changes in its dimensions, scope, and degree of differentiation, it is nevertheless 
persistently itself throughout the process. All developmental stages are part of the continuous 
development toward birth. Second, the proponents claim that developmental changes should not 
determine moral worth. For example, the PCBE points out that according to the proponents, it is 
“dangerous to begin to assign moral worth on the basis of presence or absence of particular capacities 
and features.”687  
The graduality argument, on the other hand, has been opposed on the following grounds. 
From an ethical perspective, it seems dubious since, according to the graduality argument itself, human 
embryos have some moral value during all developmental stages. Is it right then to destroy an entity that 
has at least some value?688  From a biological perspective, the graduality argument is based on a 
questionable biological understanding. The gradual development process may not be as straightforward 
as it is claimed to be. Embryo splitting and blastomere separation show that chromosomally normal 
embryos that have a diploid genome can be divided after which they continue to develop into separate 
healthy embryos. Blastomere separation can be performed in laboratory settings, but most notably it 
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takes place in nature whenever identical twins or triplets are born.689 Individuation is a complex process 
during which separate and distinct embryos can fuse in the course of early development.690  
The problems of the continuity and the graduality arguments may be avoided by using the 
potentiality argument raised by NordForsk.691 In this argument, the potential of the embryo to become a 
fetus and to be born indicates that human embryos are not just any human tissue.692 The question is then 
framed as follows: Is it morally permissible “to halt the development of an entity that might go on to 
become a sentient being and, then, a conscious human being?”693 Human embryos are thought to have 
symbolic value. Accordingly, human embryos deserve special respect.694 For example, the bioethicist 
John A. Robertson proposes that embryos are “symbols for human life or constitute an arena for 
expressing one’s commitment to human life.”695 It is unclear, though, what Robertson means by “an 
arena for expressing one’s commitment to human life.” Does this rhetorical statement offer Robertson an 
opportunity not to take a stand on the moral status of the human embryo? Nor is the potentiality argument 
without its critics. In addition to the objections raised by NordForsk, the argument may also be criticized 
on the grounds that an embryo does not become a self-conscious being, but produces one. A human 
embryo brings into existence both the fetus and the surrounding and supporting tissues such as the 
placenta. Consequently, the whole embryo does not become an individual human being.696  
  As the PCBE report indicates, some writers have criticized the potentiality argument by 
comparing embryo loss in research to embryo loss in early miscarriages.697 It appears that most people 
are indifferent to a degree about the fate of an early embryo. This is reflected in their relative lack of 
concern about early miscarriages: later miscarriages are mourned more than early ones. The 
permissiveness toward using supernumerary embryos for research is thought to reflect the same attitude: 
the embryos would be lost regardless whether the research took place or not. Most people do not 
condemn creating and discarding surplus embryos in IVF. Why then condemn the use of embryos for 
research? Furthermore, it has also been pointed out that nature is rather wasteful with embryos. Only a 
                                                        
689 Green 2001, 27-29. “If biological humanness starts with the appearance of a unique diploid genome, twins and triplets are living 
evidence that the early embryo is not yet one human being, but a community of possibly different individuals held together by 
gelatinous membrane.” Green 2001, 29. 
690 Green 2001, 29-31. 
691 NordForsk 2007, 31-32. 
692 Marquis 2006, 195; NordForsk 2007, 31-32; Robertson 2006, 141. 
693 Green 2001, 43-44. 
694 Marquis 2006, 195; NordForsk 2007, 31-32; Robertson 2006, 141; Steinbock 2000, 129. 
695 Robertson 2006, 141. 
696 Marquis 2006, 195-196. However, for some bioethicists, such as Marquis (2006, 196), the criticism is not sufficient: “Such an 
argument appears to require the assumption that an entity cannot shed some of its parts and remain self-identical. However, this 
seems false: consider amputees.” Marquis seems to compare blastocysts with amputees. In his comparison, blastocysts and 
amputees’ integrity or moral status is not threatened by the loss of cells or body parts. Certainly Marquis is right: amputees’ 
personhood is not threatened. However, he can be criticized for making a poor comparison. He seems to downplay complex 
contextual details related to amputation and the individual experiences of it. 
697 PCBE 2004, 19/33-20/33. See also Holm 2006, 176 (first published in 2003); Marquis 2006, 193 (first published in 2002-2003). 
146 
 
small number of fertilized eggs are implanted in the natural course of reproduction.698 These arguments 
have led some to argue for embryo and stem cell research: 
These considerations suggest that the early embryo’s interests are not among those we need to 
take into account in establishing boundary points to protect it. Because it is not sentient, it is not 
physically harmed by its use in research, and its loss of opportunity to come into being is not 
something we appear to regard as a significant concern.699 
Objections to this view have been made on the grounds that it misses the fact that an embryo is already a 
being. The point is not about the embryo becoming something that has a right to protection, since it 
already is that something.700 The critics of the “natural embryo loss” view have pointed out that we do not 
condone all things that happen in nature, nor wish them to be done deliberately. Moreover, the absence 
of moral sentiment does not imply an absence of moral obligation.701  
The potentiality and the symbolic value arguments may be extended to the social 
consequences argument. According to the social consequences school, “personhood is a matter of 
definition rather than biological fact, based on socially constructed norms.”702 The Finnish Parliament’s 
Committee for the Future’s report seems to promote a social consequences argument when it states that 
the social definition of the value of the embryo is important.703  
Some writers have argued that regardless of their moral status, human embryos may be 
both respected and used for research. For example, the Geron Ethics Advisory Board comments that 
“early embryonic tissue is respected by ensuring that it is used with care only in research that 
incorporates substantive values such as reduction of human suffering.”704 This argument is further 
supported by the fact that supernumerary embryos would be destroyed regardless of whether research is 
carried out on them. For example, NordForsk proposes that it is better to do research on embryos than to 
destroy them.705 Glenn McGee and Arthur Caplan take this argument further by claiming that human 
embryos are not sacrificed in research, but rather their lives are preserved in stem cell lines: “[t]he life of 
a one hundred-cell embryo is contained in its cells’ nuclear material.”706 The continuity from embryos to 
cell lines is mentioned also in EGE’s report: 
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Human embryonic stem cell research is aimed at creating cell lines with appropriate 
characteristics, in terms of purity and specificity. There is thus continuity from the embryonic cells 
to the therapeutic material obtained by culture.707 
EGE does not clearly discuss whether the life of the embryo continues. It nevertheless observes the 
connection between embryonic cells and therapeutic material which is a result of the goals of the 
research. 
Catherine Waldby and Susan Squier develop the argument further that the embryo does 
not die as a result of the creation of stem cell lines, but rather becomes immortalized: 
[W]hat actually dies in the establishment of a cell line? The embryo’s tissues are not destroyed in 
the process – rather, they are removed from one form of organization, the blastocystic, whose 
order depends on particular patterns of intercell communication and gene-cytoplasm interactions, 
to another form, the cloned cell line, where tissues reproduce but do not differentiate or self-
organize.708 
According to Waldby and Squier, the status of a human embryo is contestable and its relationship to the 
human community ambiguous. This is evident when the stem cell debate is examined: different views of 
the ontological status of the human embryo compete. Biotechnologies that change the “temporal 
trajectory of human life” affect how being human are understood. The “temporal trajectory of human life” 
refers to the journey from birth to death, which is considered straightforward in Western societies. Like 
other biotechnologies, stem cell technologies reroute and change this journey. The reshaped trajectory 
redefines what it is to be human.709 The trajectory’s beginning is not marked by birth, but by earlier 
developments. Since the development of embryology, “the narrative arc that describes identity across 
time has been extended to include the earliest moments of ontogeny.”710 
Even without biotechnological interventions, human embryos do not have a predestined 
biological fate. And even if embryonic development is depicted as a biologically stable, linear, and 
progressive process, it is not linear, but open-ended and contingent. Statistically linear and progressive 
embryo development is rare: 22 percent of fertilized eggs do not develop into embryos; 20 percent of 
clinically recognized pregnancies spontaneously abort; blastogenic abnormalities and other 
developmental abnormalities and congenital diseases may arise during embryonic and fetal stages of 
human development.711 If stem cell research has been opposed on the grounds that it threatens the 
human potential in embryos, then the “human potential” needs to be redefined. Stem cell lines capture 
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the human potential because of their therapeutic potential. Cell-based therapies may help restore and 
rebuild damaged tissues or supplement deficiencies in adult human beings.  
[S]tem cell lines do not “destroy the human potential of the embryo”; rather, it is precisely the 
human potential at that level of embryonic organization that they use. They modify and redirect this 
potential into a viable form of living system that is histologically human, although its morphology 
bears no relationship to the human organism.712 
The argument that stem cell lines immortalize the human development requires us to ask: 
What is the difference between embryos and cell lines derived from embryos? Is it morally acceptable to 
use pluripotent stem cells that are derived from embryos? Is there a moral distinction between using the 
pluripotent stem cells and deriving them from embryos? What is the moral status of pluripotent stem 
cells? These questions make up derivation-versus-use distinction.  
One of the main points in the derivation-versus-use distinction is whether the pluripotent 
cells constitute an organism. By definition, an organism has to carry all life functions within it. Pluripotent 
stem cells do not have this capacity. Hence, they may be denied the status of an organism. It has been 
argued that pluripotent stem cells should not be called embryos either, because the human embryo has 
the capacity to develop into a human being if it develops in a woman’s uterus. Pluripotent stem cells do 
not have this capacity.713 Hence, some writers consider stem cells neither embryos nor organisms: 
Stem cells … are not tiny embryos in the rough, nor can they become embryos. They are not 
‘alive’ in the sense of giving rise to entire living organisms, though they are capable of reproducing 
themselves.714 
The idea that pluripotent stem cells are neither embryos nor organisms is implicitly expressed in the 
report Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research by Finnish Ethical Advisory Board. The report describes 
embryos as the donors of the pluripotent stem cells. The rhetoric indicates that pluripotent stem cells are 
perceived as part of embryos and not as organisms in themselves.715  
A  related  question  is  whether  it  is  wrong  to  use  pluripotent  stem  cells  if  it  is  wrong  to  
destroy embryos and derive stem cells from them. Some scholars argue that it is morally permissible to 
use already derived stem cells, but that the derivation of the cells is morally wrong.716 This view is linked 
to the question of whether one complies with or benefits from evil by using pluripotent stem cells that 
have already been derived.717 One could argue that the use of pluripotent stem cells is not linked with 
embryo destruction in a way that would lead to the prohibition of the use of these cells. Some bioethicists 
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argue that researchers are not encouraging the destruction of the embryos.718 The possible benefits of 
research would probably have no effect on the current practice of embryo destruction. The embryos that 
are no longer needed in assisted reproduction would be destroyed in any case: “Research or no 
research, the embryo will be destroyed.”719 According to the proponents of research, the most decisive 
fact is not how supernumerary embryos will be discarded, but that they will be. Embryos cannot feel pain 
at the developmental stage during which they would be discarded. The means by which the embryos are 
discarded is not relevant. Some bioethicists argue that researchers are not indirectly promoting the 
destruction of the embryos, even though the possible benefits of research would lead to a wider 
acceptance of embryo use.720  However, the possible benefits of research would probably have no effect 
on the current practice of embryo destruction since “most progenitors who currently choose to discard 
spare embryos do so for reasons having nothing to do with the prospect of research.”721 Consequently, it 
is argued that the researchers are not directly nor indirectly involved in the destruction of the embryos. 
They do not destroy embryos nor are they encouraging others to do so. Thus, the derivation-versus-use 
distinction is morally valid.722 
There are, however, those who question the validity of the derivation-versus-use 
distinction on the following basis. First, the logic of the argument rests on the current practice of using 
supernumerary embryos. The creation of research embryos would change the situation.723 Second, even 
though infertility clinics discard embryos, it does not follow that it is morally permissible to do so.724 The 
fact that supernumerary embryos will be discarded does not lead to the conclusion that supernumerary 
embryos may be used in research. It is a mistake to infer moral permissibility from a common practice. 
Third, the distinction between stem cells and embryos is considered nominal. Some claim that although 
pluripotent stem cells could not develop into human beings if placed in a uterus, it does not mean that 
they do not have the genetic make-up needed for development. The difference between embryos and 
pluripotent stem cells is claimed to be a technicality that promotes ethical acceptance of the stem cell 
research.725 Accordingly, “it is disrespectful to suggest that those who believe that embryos are human 
persons look the other way when embryos are destroyed to obtain stem cells.”726  
The derivation-versus-use distinction can be seen behind stem cell policies, for example, 
in Germany and in the United States. The current legislation in Germany prohibits the derivation of ES 
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cells, but allows the import of ES cell lines that were created prior to January 1, 2002.727 While the U.S. 
government has no federal legislation on stem cell research, its funding policy defines the research 
projects that are eligible for federal funding. Under President George W. Bush’s administration, federal 
funding could be granted to research projects that use ES cell lines created prior to August 9, 2001. In 
President Obama’s administration, the derivation of ES cells is restricted by the Dickey Amendment. The 
German and U.S. policies have resulted in serious challenges to researchers, with the quality of research 
being put in jeopardy.728 What is more, German and U.S. policies are based on false ethical premises. 
The ban on the creation of new ES cell lines means that the destruction of any further embryos is 
prohibited. On first impression “in a very neat way, past wrongdoing is acknowledged and future 
wrongdoing is prevented”729 by these policies. However, the goal of preventing future wrongdoing will not 
be attained, as long as embryo destruction is accepted as part of IVF programs. Both countries still 
continue to allow embryo destruction in their IVF clinics, but prohibit it in research programs.730 If IVF 
programs, which discard embryos, are supported, so must research on surplus embryos be supported. 
It has been claimed that the argument against embryo destruction on the basis of 
prevention of future wrongdoing is applicable only to research embryos, not supernumerary embryos; 
“the research kills embryos that would not have existed if it were not for this particular research 
program.”731 Supernumerary embryos would be destroyed, regardless of research interests. There is no 
convincing reason not to use supernumerary embryos for research. The German and U.S. regulations fail 
on two accounts: they support neither sustainable ethical nor scientific practices.732 The report of the 
Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future appeals to a similar argument; one of the experts 
interviewed for the report maintains that research cannot be opposed on the basis of the fact that 
research destroys embryos.733 
Some researchers have suggested that there is an important distinction between doing 
research on embryos originally created for infertility treatments and doing research on embryos created 
solely for this purpose.734 This position can be called the discarded-versus-created distinction.735 Those 
who hold the view that embryos have intrinsic value consider the discarded-versus-created distinction to 
                                                        
727 In many respects the NBAC recommendations are more moderate than those put forward during the George W. Bush 
administration. The NBAC recommended a moderate policy, maintaining that federal funds can be used both for the derivation of ES 
cells and the research on ES cells. According to the NBAC, the derivation versus use distinction is not ethically relevant. See NBAC 
1999, 4. 
728 Harris 2000, 148; Towns & Jones 2006, 334-336. 
729 Towns & Jones 2006, 336. 
730 Towns & Jones 2006, 334-336. 
731 Towns & Jones 2006, 337. 
732 Towns & Jones 2006, 336-337. 
733 Kuusi & Parviainen 2003, 198. 
734 Macklin 2000, 114; Parens 2000, 117; Parens 2001, 43. 
735 Parens 2001, 43. 
151 
 
be insignificant. However, those who hold the view that embryos do not have intrinsic value find the 
discarded-versus-created distinction appropriate.736   
Of course, persons who oppose research with spare embryos on the ground that embryos 
themselves have intrinsic moral status also oppose the creation of embryos for research. 
However, persons who approve of research with spare embryos because of their view that 
embryos lack interests nevertheless disagree whether embryos should be created for research 
purposes when there is never any intent to transfer those embryos to the uterus.737 
It should be noted that while these writers invoke the intrinsic value of the human embryo, they do not 
define the value. Can intrinsic moral status be defined by the presence or lack of interest as Robertson 
seems to be doing in the passage quoted above? The use of moral concepts seems inadequate in the 
stem cell debate. 
EGE, NordForsk, and the Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future’s stem cell 
reports encourage research on supernumerary embryos rather than the creation of research embryos.738 
The bioethical literature indicates several reasons for concluding that using supernumerary embryos is 
more acceptable than creating research embryos. First, one’s intuition suggests that creating embryos for 
reproductive purposes is more acceptable ethically than creating them for research.739 This argument is 
questionable because it seems to imply that the origin of the embryo defines the morality of its use. Thus, 
the intention of the creator of the embryos seems to define their moral status. Usually, the intention of the 
agent is regarded as significant in relation to the moral status of the product of the agent’s activity if the 
product is an artifact (think of nuclear power and its use for energy or warfare). However, the intention of 
the agent is insignificant if the “product” has an independent moral status (consider a couple’s intention to 
have children). Can the conclusion be drawn that EGE, NordForsk and the Finnish Parliament’s 
Committee for the Future consider embryos to be artifacts? 
  Second, the discarded-versus-created distinction might reflect the idea that actively 
“helping” nature is morally more acceptable than doing something that does not happen naturally. 
Helping couples to reproduce is “natural,” whereas embryo creation for research has nothing to do with 
helping nature.740 The argument can be questioned by asking what constitutes the notion of the natural. 
Furthermore, does “natural” equal moral?  
Third, there is a fear of instrumentalization behind the discarded-versus-created 
distinction. Some bioethicists claim that the creation of research embryos leads to a situation in which 
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these embryos are regarded merely as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.741 It might 
also be argued that the creation of research embryos is unnecessary, since there are surplus embryos 
that can be used in research.742 EGE and the Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future’s report 
advocate this line of argument. Why create research embryos if supernumerary embryos are 
available?743  
Fourth, in analyzing the discarded-versus-created distinction, the issue of spare ova needs 
to be considered as the discarded-created distinction is analyzed. Creating research embryos is 
impossible without a great number of ova. The use of eggs for the creation of research embryos might 
lead to coercion of women. This problem might not arise if surplus embryos were used.744 The PCBE and 
the Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future’s report also state the concerns for the egg donors in 
relation to SCNT.745 
It should be noted, however, that some bioethicists question the discarded-versus-created 
distinction. Although Paul Lauritzen does not encourage the creation of research embryos, he points out 
that the discarded-versus-created distinction is illogical since IVF procedures are not possible without the 
creation of research embryos in the first place. 
[T]here is something of an irony in the fact that so much attention has been devoted to developing 
and defending the distinctions between embryos created solely for research and embryos left over 
from IVF procedures, because there would be no embryos left over from IVF procedures has there 
not been embryos created solely for research purposes to develop IVF in the first place. Given this 
fact, and given that this fact is no great secret even though it had not been discussed very much it 
appears disingenuous to endorse the distinction between “research” and “spare” embryos as a 
way of demonstrating respect for early embryos while nevertheless encouraging its destruction.746 
The issue of creating research embryos is part of another question, namely, whether 
research embryos should be created by IVF or by SCNT. NordForsk maintains that there is “no 
fundamental difference between embryos created through IVF and embryos created through somatic cell 
nuclear transfer.”747 There may, however, be other reasons to oppose SCNT. According to NordForsk, 
SCNT might induce a move down the slippery slope to reproductive cloning.748 Other stem cell reports 
also indicate that SCNT should be opposed because the technique could be used for reproductive 
cloning. There is a fear that if SCNT becomes a standard practice, then reproductive cloning will be more 
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easily accepted.749 Another reason to oppose the creation of research embryos might be that the use of 
SCNT increases the number of embryos used in research and, consequently, decreases the respect one 
should show for human embryos. Furthermore, embryos created by SCNT might be respected less than 
those created by IVF because the former do not have a unique genetic make-up.750 Erik Parens notes 
that, “genetic uniqueness is one of the valued properties of embryos created by IVF.”751 However, the 
idea that genetic uniqueness constitutes grounds for human dignity, and consequently grounds for 
respect has been questioned.752 There is “no prima facie reason why we cannot … maintain awe before 
SCNT embryos created for research to promote human well-being more generally.”753 
The moral status of the embryo is closely related to the biological basis of humanness. 
The derivation-versus-use and discarded-versus-created distinctions are linked to the debate on the 
moral status of an embryo. Some scholars claim that the moral status of an embryo can be determined 
by focusing on a single biological feature.754  However, determining the starting point of individual human 
life not only involves understanding biological occurrences, but also other issues affect the beginning of 
human life, in moral sense. Closer analysis of the debate over the moral status of an early embryo 
reveals that there are number of implicit and explicit background suppositions affecting the ways the lines 
are drawn.755 The definitions of a human being, a person, and an individual – the terms used in the 
definition of the status of an embryo – are influenced by factors other than biological processes. The 
issue does not seem to be only about the embryo belonging to the biological human race. In point of fact, 
the issue is more about the embryo’s potential to be “one of us” or the symbolic value given human 
embryos.756  
The PCBE acknowledges that, according to current biological knowledge, individuation is 
a process rather than a singular event. Biological knowledge affects how we determine the beginning of 
human life – morally and socially. This determination in turn involves choice and decision-making. What 
features in the continuous process are relevant as we determine the moral status of an entity?757  
A description of early embryonic development is necessary though not sufficient to an 
understanding of the nature and worth of an early embryo. It is not sufficient because any purely 
                                                        
749 ESF 2001, 4; Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research 2005, 10. 
750 Parens 2001, 47. 
751 Parens 2001, 47. 
752 Peters 2003, 168-169. 
753 Parens 2001, 47. 
754 Green 2001, 50. 
755 “[E]fforts to define humanity in terms of a single intrinsic property, such as genetic identity, rationality, or self-awareness, go awry. 
… Working on the assumption that determining humanity in a moral sense is a matter of identifying that property, they then make this 
feature a necessary and sufficient condition for the possession of full moral protectedness. But this approach misses the fact that 
protectedness is established by the choice of a marker event for which a variety of independent, intersecting, and compelling reasons 
exist, some of which have little to do with the properties of the entity itself.” Green 2001, 50. 
756 Green 2001, 40; Robertson 2006, 150. 
757 PCBE 2004, 13/33. See also Green 2001, 26. 
154 
 
biological description requires some interpretation of its anthropological and moral significance 
before it can function as a guide to action.758 
And how are these features chosen in the first place?759  
In selecting a point on the curve of biological change as one that should alter our moral practice, 
we are making a decision. This, in turn, forces us to examine the purposes and values that shape 
the decision.760  
In sum, the debate over the moral status of human embryos is diverse, but yet follows a 
certain pattern: the biological boundaries are thought to help define the moral status of the human 
embryo. Bioethicists think that defining and determining the biological boundaries of human life to be 
important – even fundamental. This idea is based on the belief that the boundaries “govern our bestowal 
of moral respect.”761 However, as shown above, biological boundaries and definitions cannot determine 
the moral status of human embryos. Instead, two competing interests and views direct the ongoing 
debate: the opponents argue against stem cell research on the basis of biological views, while the 
proponents use biological views to defend the research. Biological characteristics and definitions are 
given parallel moral definitions. While biological definitions are uncertain and flexible, too are moral 
definitions. The stem cell reports and most bioethical literature on the subject remain silent about what is 
meant by demands that human embryos should be respected or that they have a right to protection.  
The stem cell debate is based on the idea that biological and moral definitions are used to 
determine whether the embryo is “one of us” or whether it belongs to the moral human community. I 
argue, however, that biological definitions of the human embryo do not solve the question of the moral 
status of the human embryo. Moreover, philosophical concepts should be defined more carefully in the 
stem cell debate. 
The issue of the moral status of human embryos provides an interesting point of view on 
feminist bioethics: not many feminist bioethicists discuss the issue directly. Karen Lebacqz and Bonnie 
Steinbock are among the few who analyze the moral status of human embryos in relation to stem cell 
research.  Both maintain that respect is owed to human embryos, even though the embryos are not 
persons. Furthermore, although human embryos must be respected, they can still be used in stem cell 
research.762   
From a feminist point of view, the issue of respect does not need to be coupled only with 
the personhood of the early embryo. Other entities than persons can be respected and thus protected. 
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Even if embryos were not considered persons, they may be owed respect and protection.763 Respect and 
protection may not, however, mean that embryos cannot be used in research. For example, EGE 
stresses the sensitive nature of the use of human ES cells. Because of the sensitivity attached to the 
issue, EGE calls for public control, but not for a ban on research.764 EGE obviously calls for a respectful 
attitude toward embryos, while allowing research on them. 
According to Karen Lebacqz, respect is related to value. To treat an entity with respect 
and to value it is to grant that the entity has intrinsic moral worth. Respect is both an attitude and a moral 
norm. It involves thinking, feeling, and ways of acting.765 Most often, respect is thought to be owed to 
persons. Western philosophy draws on the Kantian tradition when respect for persons is discussed. From 
a Kantian perspective, “the attitude of respect includes at least these two components: active sympathy 
and readiness to hear the reasons of others and to consider that their rules might be valid.”766 Lebacqz 
maintains that in such a characterization, the personhood of embryos could not be fully endorsed. 
Embryos can be cherished, and they have values. As such, they could be defined as persons. However, 
because embryos are not self-determined or rule-governing beings, they cannot be considered persons. 
Even though Lebacqz appreciates the vast philosophical discussion over Kantian understanding of 
personhood, she maintains that “if we ascribe personhood to the embryo, we draw on an understanding 
of personhood not based on qualities that Kant enunciated.”767 However, there might be some other 
contexts in which respect for embryos is meaningful.768  
Respect can be ascribed to nonpersons, sentient beings, and even plants. Respect is 
owed not only to persons, but also those who are “in danger of being cast outside the system of 
protection that personhood brings.”769 For example, if we ascribe respect to persons because they are 
agents having autonomous choice and valuations, we can respect other living things as “quasi-agents”770 
who have their own centers of organized activity and who pursue their own ends in their unique way.771 
Furthermore, it can be argued that persons’ values must be respected. And because many people value 
nature and sentient beings such as animals, these values must be respected.772 Moreover, since respect 
is not only a moral norm, but also an attitude that require the realization of the concrete reality of others, 
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humility, and perception of the other in the self, the same attitude can be shown to nonpersons, such as 
embryos, along with persons.773   
Lebacqz points out that for some, an attitude of respect means that embryos cannot be 
used in research because research violates their moral value. In this view, research is disrespectful.774 
However, others, such as Lebacqz herself, maintain that respect for embryos does not lead to the 
conclusion that embryos cannot be used in research. Although embryos should never be perceived 
merely as research subjects, they can be used for research if the research is important enough. An 
attitude of respect indicates that the embryo should never be used in a cavalier manner but as something 
with “incredible value.”775 In practice, this means that the harm done to embryos should be minimized.776  
Karen Lebacqz adopts a broad understanding of respect whereby respect is owed not only 
to persons, but also to nonpersons. Moreover, respect is not only a duty of omission as it is for Kant. 
Rather respect is active. “The value of the other is honoured by seeing its life as intrinsically intertwined 
with our own lives.”777 Like Lebacqz, Bonnie Steinbock advocates a symbolic value argument in which 
embryos should be respected as symbols of human life and thus not used in vain. Embryos may be used, 
but not in unimportant ways. In her view, neither research nor assisted reproduction involves the frivolous 
use of embryos. Therefore, neither of the practices threatens the respect owed to human embryos.778 
From a feminist perspective, respect for an embryo can be defined in a meaningful way even if the 
embryo is used for research. Another matter is “whether such respect happens in practice.”779 
In addition to Lebacqz and Steinbock, not many feminist bioethicists have applied the 
theoretical potential of feminist bioethics presented in the previous chapters of this work to the discussion 
of the status of a human embryo in relation to stem cell research. Two possible explanations can be 
given for this state of affairs. First, although feminist bioethicists do not discuss the moral status of human 
embryos in relation to stem cell research, they do discuss this status in relation to abortion. Since the 
beginning of feminist bioethics, abortion and the moral status of human embryos and fetuses have been 
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important topics. For example, Beverly Wildung Harrison’s early work on abortion has influenced feminist 
thinking about the moral status of the embryo and could thus be applicable to stem cell ethics.780  
Second, feminist bioethicists maintain that the discussion of the moral status of the human 
embryo should not have such a central place in the stem cell debate. Instead, other issues demand 
attention. For example, the feminist bioethicists Donna L. Dickenson and Lisa Sowle Cahill maintain that 
because the discussion focuses on the details of embryonic development, important social dimensions of 
stem cell research and use can be overlooked. Solely invoking the moral status of the fetus or embryo 
cannot solve the ethical problems inherent in stem cell research.781 Firstly, the moral status of an embryo 
cannot be defined according to its biological qualities or properties. The interests of the parents and 
surrounding society are also relevant in determining its moral status. Secondly, issues such as the 
society’s concept of reproduction, the value given to the genetic relationship between parents and 
children as well as issues such as the utility of stem cell research and reducing human suffering must 
also be considered.782 Thirdly, what makes both the opponents’ and the proponents’ views of ES cell 
research fruitless are their lack of interest of donors. Women and infertile couples as donors are equally 
invisible to both sides.783  
These readings of feminist bioethics help to explain feminist bioethicists’ apparent lack of 
interest in the moral status of the human embryo in relation to stem cell research. Rather than being 
content with non-feminist appraisals of the status question, feminist bioethicists maintain that the moral 
status of an embryo should be defined relationally. Biological definitions of the human embryo alone 
should not direct the debate over the moral status of the human embryo. Instead, the attitudes of the 
surrounding society and the embryo donors should be taken into account. Furthermore, the discarded-
versus-created distinction cannot be solved by looking at the inner qualities of human embryos. The 
contexts in which embryos are either “discarded” or “created” should be taken into account as ethically 
relevant factors. 
When the observation that focusing on the moral status of the human embryo causes 
other important dimensions of stem cell research to be overlooked is linked to a more general theoretical 
approach in feminist bioethics, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the stem cell debate is inadequate if 
larger issues of social justice are ignored. These include financial issues as well as donor and recipient 
protection. For example, how does the need for research embryos affect women and infertile couples as 
embryo donors as well as those regarded as the possible recipients of stem cell crafts? Second, the 
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socio-economic implications of the research and its possible application should be evaluated. Moreover, 
feminists are addressing the commercialization of stem cell research and how its applications will be 
related to the reproductive labor of the donors. I will discuss these issues in the following sections.  
 
 
4.3 Therapeutic Potential and the Just Use of Resources 
Stem cell reports indicate that the moral status of embryos and an embryo’s right to protection should be 
compared with the benefits of the research. The reports are intented to generate a public policymaking 
process in which the possible benefits of the research are balanced against the moral status of an 
embryo.784 In its Opinion no. 15 EGE maintains that the principles of justice and benefits and the principle 
of freedom of research are at stake when stem cell research is reviewed. Improvement and protection of 
health are the benefits of the research. Also the report considers the principle of proportionality. The 
research methods should be balanced against the aims of research. The most acceptable available 
research methods should be sought. The principle of freedom of research is to be balanced against other 
fundamental principles, such as respect for human dignity and the principle of individual autonomy.785 
EGE does not, however, elaborate on the definition or the scope of the principles.  
The PCBE does not give as high a value to the benefits argument as EGE does. The 
PCBE acknowledges that the benefits argument is used in the stem cell debate: most claims in 
opposition to the funding policy of President George W. Bush’s administration and in support of liberal 
stem cell policy are grounded in the benefits argument.786 However, the report points out that according 
to the proponents of the funding policy, the “duty to find cures for diseases cannot be an unqualified or 
absolute imperative.”787 Rather the proper treatment of human subjects is a guiding duty in stem cell 
research. Rules prohibiting certain procedures on human subjects should be appended to human ES cell 
research. The PCBE concludes that the fundamental issue in question is the moral status of human 
embryos.788 
Although the moral status of human embryos is a central issue in stem cell reports, the 
reports indicate the need to consider wider issues of social justice.789 Most stem cell reports discuss the 
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possible therapeutic use of stem cells and the distribution of its benefits. The bioethical literature 
indicates that not everyone can afford treatments that appear to be rather costly at least in the beginning. 
Distribution of the benefits of the research is one of the problems that stem cell research and use will 
intensify.790 Some bioethicists claim that investors are especially interested in high-tech and expensive 
“rescue medicine.” Money is made in the technological medical area rather than through basic health 
care. The medical interest is directed to cures rather than to the causes of diseases. Furthermore medical 
professionals interpret health-related problems as threatening to the individual and not to the community. 
Diseases are seldom viewed as social problems. Should scarce resources be directed toward inventions 
and cures or better basic heath care?791  
NordForsk acknowledges that stem cell research is relatively expensive, given the small 
number of people who could benefit from it, at least in the beginning. Their report indicates, however, that 
in the long run more people could benefit from the research as treatments for diseases that are “prevalent 
among poor populations”792 are developed. NordForsk and the PCBE raise also the question of whether 
scarce resources are best used on stem cell research. They acknowledge that some of the most lethal 
diseases might be globally cured if proper resources were available.793 NordForsk asks furthermore 
“whether resources are best spent on developing treatments for future generations or on providing 
treatment for the benefit of today’s generation.”794 The Finnish stem cell reports do not discuss issues 
related to scarce resources, but suggest that substantial resources are to be directed to stem cell 
research.795 For example, the Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future states that basic research in 
the field is to be promoted politically and financially.796 The report denotes that not only should the costs 
of stem cell research and therapies be counted, but also improved public health which would result in 
financial benefits.797 The reports from both scientific organizations analyzed in this study, ESF and 
NordForsk, promote the idea of adequate funding for stem cell research.798 The bioethical literature 
indicates, that although the problem of distributing resources is not new or unique to stem cell research, 
the unpredictable nature of such research intensifies the problem.799 NordForsk further states that the 
question related to the distribution of resources is not unique to stem cell research: 
                                                        
790 Cahill 2000, 134-135; McLean 2001, 147; Shannon 2001, 181-182. 
791 Shannon 2001, 181-182. 
792 NordForsk 2007, 38. 
793 NordForsk 2007, 38; PCBE 2004, 23/33. 
794 NordForsk 2007, 38. 
795 Kuusi & Parviainen 2003, 181. 
796 The Finnish Parliament Commission for the Future 2003, XVII. 
797 Kuusi & Parviainen 2003, 195. 
798 ESF 2001, 5; NordForsk 2007. 
799 “The problem of just distribution of medical resources is not new, but the unprecedented promise of stem cell technology raises 
the stakes.” McLean 2001, 203. 
160 
 
[A]lthough we might wish resources were more fairly distributed, it might seem inappropriate to 
single out stem cell research in particular as a case of the unjust use of resources.800 
The Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future’s report points out that one major issue 
in relation to social justice and distribution of benefits is the creation of stem cell banks, which could be 
one strategy for addressing immune rejection. The issue is important, since direct stem cell transplants 
from one donor to another would cause immune rejection in the recipient. A stem cell bank would include 
a wide spectrum of different stem cell lines for providing as compatible a transplant as possible to the 
recipients. EGE describes two conditions for stem cell banks: safety and confidentiality. Stem cell bank 
safety means that donors, recipients, and their medical files could be traced in order to avoid 
unsatisfactory side effects. Confidentiality means that donors’ rights will be protected by keeping all 
personal data confidential.801 The Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future’s report on stem cell 
research and use shows that experts differ in their opinions of how stem cell banks should be started in 
Finland. However, most experts agreed on two issues. The required number of stem cell lines would be 
1,000 to 2,000, and stem cell bank in Finland should be governed by a Genome Information Center, 
should such a facility be organized.802 The experts also maintain that several cell lines are required in 
order to find matching transplants for recipients. According to one estimate, building a stem cell bank 
would take approximately twenty years. The Finnish experts do not discuss the basis on which the cell 
lines would be selected.803 
The just selection of stem cell lines is widely discussed in the U.S. where the biological 
diversity is enormous. Faden, Dawson, Bateman-House et al. suggest three different strategies for 
building a stem cell bank: a coverage maximizing strategy, an equal chances strategy, and an ethnic 
representation strategy. In the maximizing strategy, stem cell banks would be designed to represent the 
greatest percentage of the population, that is, to find the most common haplotypes. This strategy has two 
drawbacks. First, persons with less common haplotypes would never benefit from the bank. Second, the 
strategy favors white Americans. According to the equal chances strategy, the bank would be designed to 
include haplotypes that are neither common nor rare but somewhere in between. The selection process 
could be randomized in order to give all haplotypes an equal chance to be selected. The problem is that 
the results would be the result of luck, not design. The equal chances strategy might thus foster the same 
inequality as the maximizing strategy. Moreover, there is the possibility that all the selected haplotypes 
would be relatively uncommon.804 In the third strategy, the ancestral/ethnic representation strategy, the 
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bank would include “the most common haplotypes from each of the major ancestral/ethnic groups in the 
United States in order to make the bank useful to the same percentages of patients from each ethnic 
category.”805 The ethnic representation strategy is not efficient, because fewer people would benefit from 
a bank designed according to its strategy than from a bank designed according to the maximizing 
strategy. The authors, however, emphasize that it is important that governmental actions – including 
designing stem cell banks –not add to the worse-off position of non-white Americans.806 Suzanne Holland 
maintains that the ethnic representation strategy also corresponds to the aspirations of feminist bioethics: 
The appeal of feminist bioethics includes a similar sort of demand – that the needs and concerns 
of historically oppressed groups perhaps be given a privileged position in terms of health care 
access and allocation. Susan Sherwin has insisted that medical research should be evaluated “in 
terms of its connection with existing patterns of oppression and domination in society.”807 
The stem cell reports do not discuss the design of stem cell banks at length. Instead they 
devote more attention to the public acceptance of stem cell therapies. For example, NordForsk and the 
PCBE emphasize the importance of realistic and open discussion about stem cell research and use.808 
The public should be made aware of gap between the discovery of stem cells’ potentiality for cures and 
their clinical application. Patients with incurable diseases may have high hopes that will not be realized. 
According to NordForsk, transparent discussion and debate “promote public trust in new technologies.”809 
NordForsk maintains that both scientists and bioethicists should explain stem cell science and ethics to 
the public. Information and communication help to avoid exaggerating the potential benefits of research 
and contribute to understanding the funding policy.810 In order to gain public support for stem cell 
research and create an ethically adequate research environment, the research community must engage 
in a dialogue with policymakers and the public. NordForsk’s goal of having public debate and open 
communication is praiseworthy. However, one might well ask how the communication will be carried out? 
Especially in Finland, the public seems uninterested in the stem cell debate. The public trusts scientists 
and medical researchers. NordForsk maintains that wide public acceptance of research is one reason 
that the political climate in the Nordic countries favors stem cell research and use. Furthermore, the 
public trusts institutions and expert systems.811  
Shelley Tremain analyzes the aspects of equality and benefits from a feminist and 
disability study perspective. She argues that the stem cell debate is overly positive about the possible 
benefits of research. Feminist accounts especially should question the benefits discourse inherent in the 
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stem cell debate more effectively. The current discourse on the possible benefits of the research 
contributes to the normalization of human beings.812 “[T]he ontological status of the category of ‘normal 
species-typical functioning’ … [is] inflated, evaluative, and suspect.”813 Therefore, it should not guide what 
is understood to be normal and abnormal. The category of normal species-typical functioning is a result 
of normalizing biopower, which is a power that regulates, administres, manages, and normalizes life. 
Normalcy is defined according to social norms.814 Feminists and other bioethicists should pay attention to 
the normalizing power of stem cell research and therapies.815 
According to Tremain, stem cell technologies – among other biotechnologies – have a 
greater effect than stem cell reports or bioethicists recognize. These technologies not only have 
immediate effects, but also long-term and profound outcomes. Bioethicists are incorrect to concentrate on 
the immediate effects of stem cell technologies such as benefit sharing and the use of resources. Stem 
cell research and use should be evaluated from the perspective of how they affect the definition of 
normalcy and, consequently, the ways medicine and biotechnologies support people’s desires to achieve 
this normalcy. Power structures that influence the creation of the definition of normalcy should be 
examined. Furthermore, how these power structures affect different people should be examined.816  
To summarize, the bioethical literature shows that a move beyond the question of the 
moral status of human embryos is needed if the debate is “to do justice to the moral questions raised by 
technological developments associated with stem cell work.”817 Technological developments are in effect 
on two levels: the practical and the conceptual. On the practical level, one of the main issues to be 
discussed is the sharing of benefits. Because stem cells may provide cures for serious illnesses and 
severe conditions, appropriate conditions for delivering those cures are needed. SCNT-based individual 
therapies could provide histocompatible tissue transplants. Nevertheless, as Karen Lebacqz has pointed 
out, therapies with SCNT are questionable when justice is considered. To create unique cell lines for 
individual patients would be expensive and, therefore, unaffordable for many. For that reason, it is 
important to look for other options, such as stem cell banks. The creation of stem cell banks may be 
based on different perspectives as demonstrated by Faden, Dawson, Bateman-House et al.  
The feminists’ contribution to the discussion of the just use of resource has been limited. 
However, they have pointed out two important issues. First, stem cell research and use cannot be used 
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to strengthen existing or past power inequalities. For example, the creation of stem cell banks may not be 
based on practices that continue to strengthen past unequal power relations, but must be based on an 
ethnic representation model. Instead of the individualized approach to stem cell research and use, 
perspectives that are based on social justice and careful conceptual considerations are needed. Second, 
on the conceptual level, discussion of stem cell technologies shapes the understanding of normalcy and 
people’s desire for it. Power structures that affect the definition of normalcy should be examined. 
Sustainable stem cell ethics and policies are based on an estimation of the effect power-relations have 
both on the practical and the conceptual levels. Feminist bioethicists are most vocal about power 
relations in connection to donors and recipients and their rights and protection. I will discuss this issue in 
the next section.  
 
 
4.4 Donors and Recipients: Rights and Protection 
Stem cell research is done on aborted fetuses, supernumerary embryos, and ova. Women and infertile 
couples818 donate this “material.” The stem cell reports devote special attention to donor rights and 
protection. Some of them, however, do not specify who the donors are. For example, the NBAC, the 
PCBE and the Finnish advisory board’s Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research use mostly gender-
neutral language and refer to “donors” rather than to women or infertile couples. Human Stem Cells, 
Cloning and Research mentions women as ovum donors in discussions of SCNT, but refers to embryos 
as donors in relation to the creation of stem cell lines.819 The Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the 
Future statement does not mention who the donors are. However, a report made on the statement 
discusses women and infertile couples at length.820 Interestingly, the report has not greatly affected the 
formulation  of  the  statement  in  this  respect.  A  similar  inconsistency  can  be  detected  in  the  two  EGE  
reports. In Opinion no. 15, EGE defines women and infertile couples as ovum and embryo donors.821 
EGE “stresses the necessity to ensure that the demand for spare embryos and oocyte donation does not 
increase the burden on women”822. However, in Opinion no. 22 EGE uses gender-neutral language and 
speaks merely of donors.823 Even if EGE regards women as donors in Opinion no. 15, it does not specify 
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what it means by the increased burden on women, nor does it suggest any tangible way to prevent the 
violation of women’s rights.824 However, in Opinion no. 22, EGE begins developing specific instruments 
for preventing violations of  donors, because it clearly identifies the conditions under which research 
projects can be financed.825 NordForsk is the only stem cell report to discuss the donation of aborted 
fetuses, supernumerary embryos, and unfertilized eggs at length, and it clearly identifies the donors.826 
What is common to most stem cell reports is that they emphasize that free and informed consent is 
required from donors of aborted fetuses or supernumerary embryos for research. Furthermore, the 
reports maintain that no financial or other inducements may be used that may affect the prospective 
donors.827  
The identification of donors – or donor groups – is the first requirement for protecting 
donor rights. One needs to know whom to protect if protection is needed. Even though ESF is the only 
stem cell report to remain silent about donor rights or protection most stem cell reports fail to meet the 
requirement of identifying donor and recipient groups. Although the donor issue is not widely discussed in 
mainstream bioethics or the stem cell reports, it is the main focus for feminist bioethicists working in the 
field.  In this section, I will analyze how the stem cell reports, mainstream bioethicists, and feminist 
bioethicists discuss the donation of aborted fetuses, supernumerary embryos, and oocytes for research. I 
will present each case separately and then draw conclusions on the similarity between the different donor 
issues.  
 
Donation of Fetal Tissue – The Abortion Debate Revisited 
Stem cell reports acknowledge a link between stem cell research and abortion.828 They discuss abortion 
from two perspectives. First, abortion is directly linked to stem cell research because research is 
conducted on aborted fetuses.829 Second, the disagreement about the nature, character, and moral 
standing of human embryos is entangled with the abortion debate.830 “Because embryo research hinges 
on the question of the moral status of an unborn human entity, it is tightly coupled to abortion ideology, 
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rhetoric, and politics.”831 In addition to the reports, several bioethicists discuss the stem cell debate in 
relation to abortion.832  
Abortion is discussed especially from the following perspectives within or in relation to the 
stem cell debate. First, what are the proper guidelines for fetus donation? Second, can the public 
acceptability of abortion be used as the basis for accepting research not only on EG cells but also on ES 
cells?833 Third, should the abortion debate be separated from the stem cell debate altogether?834 Finally, 
should the abortion debate and the stem cell debate be connected by investigating them from a new and 
wider perspective in order to gain a better understanding of both issues?835 Before turning to these 
issues, I will briefly describe the main arguments of the abortion debate. 
Bioethical accounts of abortion are often presented from the angle of rights: the fetus’ right 
to life and the woman’s right to bodily integrity. In other words, the abortion debate revolves around two 
questions: what is the moral status of a fetus, and is the fetus’s right to life sometimes or always stronger 
than the right of the woman carrying the fetus? The question of a fetus’s moral status is often discussed 
from the perspective of whether the fetus is a person or not. The question of the personhood of the fetus 
is also related to the second question, namely, when or at what stage of pregnancy or development does 
a fetus become a person who is entitled to protection?836 These questions are similar to the questions 
about the permissibility of using embryos for research: To what extent are human embryos and fetuses 
entitled to protection or on what grounds can they be used in research? As such, the two debates reflect 
each other. As indicated above, the question of the moral status of human embryos and fetuses is widely 
discussed. Different viewpoints, from the continuity argument to the potentiality argument, are put 
forward.837 Regarding abortion, the dominant arguments define the limits to terminate pregnancy or to 
use embryos for research.838 
In addition to the moral status of fetuses, women’s right to bodily integrity is debated. 
Feminists especially have defended a woman’s right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy and have also 
emphasized women’s right to privacy, which in their view, includes the right to abortion.839 Often the right 
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to abortion has been defended on the grounds that no one other than the person pregnant for example 
legislators and medical staff can make the decision to terminate the pregnancy.840  
The stem cell reports discuss abortion in relation to the acceptance of using aborted 
fetuses for research. The reports indicate a fear that public approval of using aborted fetuses will 
increase the number of abortions or justify them. EGE, the NBAC, NordForsk, and the Finnish Advisory 
Board want to ensure that a woman’s decision to go through with abortion is made independently and 
separately from the decision to donate the fetus for research. The use of aborted fetuses in research has 
been defended on the grounds that the decision to terminate a pregnancy is made prior to the research 
and that knowledge of the research does not influence the decision to abort.841 In other words, ulterior 
motives, such as obtaining money or providing fetal tissue for a specific person or a specific purpose, 
may not affect women’s decision to conceive or to terminate a pregnancy. The reports do not, however, 
show any evidence of studies indicating that women in fact behave in these ways. The idea that ulterior 
motives affect women’s decision to terminate a preganacy is not based on evidence but is formed “in 
response to claims made by opponents of abortion.”842 Furthermore, how could abortion and stem cell 
research be wholly separated in the minds of women, at least those women, who are aware of the public 
debate about donating fetuses to research? The idea of separating abortion decisions and donation to 
stem cell research is based on the assumption that women are unaware of recent developments in 
science and it is only at abortion clinics that women are informed of the possibility of donating fetuses to 
research. 
NordForsk also discusses the issue from another perspective. It appreciates the need to 
separate abortion and research and warns health care professionals about influencing the patient “one 
way or the other.”843 At the same time, however, NordForsk recognizes a compassionate aspect: “it might 
be comforting to some people to know that something good can result from the abortion.”844 NordForsk 
acknowledges the difficult situation of a woman who has undergone an abortion. While other stem cell 
reports remain silent about the treatment of women in these situations, NordForsk emphasizes the proper 
conduct of the medical professional: “the doctor asking for consent must be careful not to ask in such a 
way as to make the experience more distressing.”845 NordForsk does not, however, make any 
suggestions about how this is to be carried out in patient-doctor relationship. Human Stem Cells, Cloning 
and Research offers a point of comparison to NordForsk’s sympathetic account as it describes the 
Finnish policy matter-of-factly: “When a woman coming for termination of pregnancy is asked for her 
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consent, she will be told why and how the research is to be carried out. Obtaining consent has not been a 
problem.”846 The statement is not further elaborated, and the question remains: what is meant by a 
problem? And furthermore: a problem for whom – the women or the researchers?  
The Finnish report on which the Committee for the Future’s statement is based implies 
that if abortion is morally permissible, then stem cell research on EG and ES cells should be permissible 
as well. The report states that conclusions about the permissibility of the therapeutic use of ES cells can 
be drawn on the basis of comparison between the value given the well-being of the mother and the value 
given to an embryo’s or a fetus’s life. Based on the opinions of experts, the report concludes that first, the 
mother or the parents should have the ultimate decision about the fate of their embryos or fetuses, and 
second, society may try to influence – but not coerce – the parents’ or mother’s decision. The report 
clearly emphasizes two aspects: a woman has the right to decide about her own body and the moral 
status of embryos or fetuses is shaped socially.847  
Some bioethicists conclude that the public permissibility to terminate a pregnancy provides 
an argument for ES cell research.848 Or at least, they claim that some arguments made against ES cell 
research may be refuted on the grounds that the same arguments would not be accepted as being valid 
against abortion. For example, Holm argues that accepting the continuity argument would rule out 
abortion in most, or perhaps all, cases. If a fetus is a human being from conception, then its life must be 
protected against termination.849 The most stringent arguments against stem cell research would “commit 
us to a much stricter abortion policy than many find acceptable.”850  
Even though the abortion debate might provide arguments for stem cell research, the 
proponents of stem cell research have often disliked making the connection between abortion and stem 
cell research. In their opinion these issues should be kept separate.851 This attitude is present in the 
NBAC report which admits that abortion is a morally debatable issue, but maintains that the ethical 
questions related to abortion are not relevant in relation to stem cell research.852 The proponents of the 
research fear that antiabortion forces will manage to cause a ban on stem cell research in the name of 
embryo protection.853 According to the proponents, such as Kenneth J. Ryan, it is important to separate 
the abortion and the stem cell debates. He states that to link the abortion to stem cell debate is to keep 
both abortion and stem cell research on the public and political agenda. Ryan criticizes the opponents of 
research for connecting the political and often heated abortion debate to stem cell research. Furthermore, 
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he claims that there is an inconsistency in the opponents’ argument: The use of aborted fetuses should 
not be radically different from the use of fetuses that have died spontaneously.854  
Ted Peters also argues that the stem cell debate and the abortion debate should be 
separated. The stem cell debate cannot be “the next chapter in the abortion controversy.”855 According to 
Peters, the abortion debate is too simplified to illustrate the complexities of stem cell research and use. 
[T]he ethical issues involved with this research are far too complex to be reduced to such a simple 
assessment. Portraying the stem cell debate as the abortion controversy is at best intellectually 
misleading, at worst ethically negligent. … The moral poignancy of the stem cell debate lies not in 
its proximity to the abortion controversy, but in the wider question of the potential good promised 
by this research.856 
Peters argues that stem cell research and use may be supported, since stem cells provide a “potential to 
revolutionalize medicine.”857 On the basis of the principle of beneficence, he believes that stem cell 
research should be approved.858  
The beneficence argument is used also by Ruse and Pynes. They claim that stem cell 
research and use benefit people who fall sick through no fault of their own. In other words, embryos may 
be used if the benefits for those in need are great enough. At the same time Ruse and Pynes imply that 
abortion is another matter: Unwanted pregnancies are the results of someone’s negligence. As a result, 
the arguments used in the abortion debate should be different from those used in the stem cell debate: 
Unwanted pregnancies do not occur by chance but through carelessness or the like. Why then 
should a human or a potential human be destroyed just to mop up after someone has failed to 
exercise restraint or caution? But the stem cell issue brings another dimension entirely. If 
individuals fall sick, it is usually not their fault.859 
The statements above indicate that Peters, Ruse, and Pynes consider abortion to be 
either a simple moral question or a morally obscure issue. According to Peters, the abortion debate is a 
“simple assessment,”860 whereas Ruse and Pynes claim that abortion usually takes place “in a haze of 
moral disapproval.”861 Interestingly, Peters, Ruse, and Pynes analyze the abortion debate as if it did not 
have any consequences for women. Peters might be right to conclude that the abortion debate is  too  
simplified to be referred to in relation to stem cell research and use. Nevertheless, the link between 
abortion and stem cell research should be acknowledged and demonstrated.  
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Ruse and Pynes’ account is even more questionable, because it does not explicate why 
women should be responsible for unwanted pregnancy if “someone has failed to exercise restraint or 
caution,” for example, in the case of rape. To whom do Ruse and Pynes refer as this “someone,” and 
moreover, what kind of “restraint” or “caution” should be exercised in order to avoid unwanted 
pregnancies? Their attitude reflects the “idea that women ought to be responsible for their sexual acts 
and should pay the price if they get pregnant [which] is also part of the old repressive puritanical 
response for what is presumed immoral behavior.”862 
The feminist bioethical literature indicates that both the abortion and the stem cell debates 
are shortsighted. The lack of forethought is due to simplified interests in rights. The stem cell and abortion 
debates should be altered such that the two debates might mutually benefit. Both abortion and stem cell 
research need to be reviewed more carefully than has been done so far.863 If stem cell research is 
analyzed from a feminist perspective, then neither abortion nor stem cell research appear to be solely 
about rights or moral status. Rather the feminist perspective means that abortion and stem cell research 
are discussed in a complex set of relationships, obligations, and responsibilities.864 Below I will outline the 
feminist perspective on abortion. It should, however, be noted that feminists are not united in their views 
on this issue.  
Unlimited access to abortion does not necessarily add to women’s reproductive control. 
Some feminists claim that justifying abortion on the grounds of the right to privacy is not a valid argument. 
The question is not about privacy, but about equality. Furthermore, the feminist literature indicates that 
abortion is too often the only option for some women, regardless of what they want. Abortion is the only 
option if the society does not support the pregnancy and the raising of children in challenging 
circumstances. Women who would want to carry the pregnancy to term might not be able to do so 
because of their financial or social situation. Society needs to give sufficient support to women to enable 
them voluntarily to decide whether to terminate or continue a pregnancy. The issue is thus never purely 
about women’s rights to privacy or bodily integrity versus the fetus’s right to life.865  
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Some feminists claim that the moral status of an embryo or a fetus should not be 
undervalued.866 These feminists wish to point out that the relationship between the pregnant woman and 
the fetus is extremely close.867 When the woman and the fetus are treated as closely connected, the 
ethical perspective on abortion is placed in its proper context and broadens beyond a discussion of rights. 
According to the feminist bioethical perspective, the moral value of fetal life depends on the pregnant 
woman: “fetuses are morally significant but their status is relational rather than absolute.”868 Thus, the 
connection between the pregnant woman and the fetus has been emphasized.869 This has led feminists 
to ask whether it is right under any circumstances to force a woman to carry a pregnancy to term.870 
Feminists also maintain that since the fetus is dependent on the woman, the woman has a right to decide 
whether she continues the pregnancy or lets it be terminated.871 Feminists indicate, however, that the 
idea that the moral status of the fetus is wholly derivative from its connection to the woman is 
problematic.872  
Feminists have developed a relational understanding of pregnancy and abortion, denoting 
a reciprocal relatedness, which constitutes being a human. I wish to note that relationality does not 
directly support women’s right to abortion, irrespective of the situation. Although the fetus is dependent 
on the woman, it does not necessarily follow that the woman can terminate the pregnancy if she wants to. 
According to the relational perspective, there is no simple answer to the question of whether abortion is 
always right or always wrong. Abortion is a better option in some cases than in others and must always 
be judged contextually. In the feminists view, contextual analysis of abortion shows that women consider 
pregnancy and the continuation or termination of it in connection to their relationships. Feminists have 
claimed that women try to solve moral dilemmas by taking into account their own interests as well as the 
interests of others. Women are to decide how they will protect and take care of themselves at the same 
time as they consider the well-being of the fetus and other people affected by their decision.873  Hence, 
women must attain a balance between altruism and egoism. Feminists have pointed out that women do 
not choose abortion casually.874  
[M]ost women who choose abortion do so for substantial reasons related to their physical and/or 
mental health, to their ability to rear a child, or to their fetus’s health status. Were abortion 
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suddenly made illegal many of these women would be prompted to seek out illegal, sometime life-
threatening abortions (an action one would not resort to in order to solve a “trivial” problem).875  
Feminists maintain that the abortion debate should not be limited the discussion about the rights of a 
woman versus the rights of a fetus. Contextual considerations remain central to the debate: “The reasons 
that justify one woman’s decision to have an abortion … may not justify another woman’s decision.”876 A 
relational and contextual approach to pregnancy and abortion is not made solely on the evaluation of an 
individual woman’s moral choice. Instead, the evaluation is directed outwards, to the community and the 
social dimensions of abortion: 
[M]oving away from individualistic liberal view of pregnant woman as primarily or exclusively an 
autonomous moral agent might lead us to recognize the obligations that individuals and 
communities have to support her during and after burdensome pregnancy.877 
In addition to relational and contextual deliberations, feminists emphasize the need for a 
political analysis of abortion. From a feminist viewpoint abortion is a political issue. Society’s attitudes, 
norms, and practices in the area of reproduction are highly relevant to the abortion debate.878 Likewise, 
stem cell policy is a political issue. Harris maintains that a new perspective might reveal a position that 
often goes unnoticed in the stem cell debate, namely, that stem cell policy may affect abortion policies.  
Revisiting the ban [on embryo research] … could provide a solid foundation for a federally funded, 
scientifically sound embryo research agenda. Furthermore, doing so potentially strengthens two 
very important feminist claims vis-à-vis abortion: first, that the relationships and contexts of 
procreation are important factors in the ethics of reproductive decision making, and second, that 
one may wish to protect fetal interests, yet agree that sometimes the balance of competing 
interests outweighs that desire. If public policy supports embryo research on these grounds, we 
would be making an important contribution not only to scientific research, but also to abortion 
politics and policy.879 
If interests vis-à-vis the protection of embryos were considered significant in relation to stem cell 
research, then perhaps attitudes toward abortion would become more permissive as well, and interests 
competing with fetal protection would be considered significant in relation to abortion. If relational and 
contextual aspects were considered important in the stem cell debate, then perhaps these aspects would 
be considered equally important in the abortion debate.  
I propose two points that may extend the debate. First, while it is recognized that the 
abortion and the stem cell debates are linked and even bear a resemblance to each other, abortion in the 
context of stem cell research needs to be evaluated. There is hardly any discussion about women 
donating aborted fetuses specifically for stem cell research. Instead of separating the issues, they should 
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be more closely linked when it is a question of fetal stem cell research, because such research is always 
related to abortion. Obviously, the usual understanding of abortion as a debate over rights is not very 
informative. A more nuanced analysis of the relations and contexts related to the issue is needed. 
Second, while feminist bioethicists call for taking women’s experiences into account, they nevertheless 
do not seem to be calling for social science studies on women’s experiences in donating an aborted fetus 
to research. It is important to obtain empirical data on women’s perspectives, attitudes, and experiences 
about donating aborted fetuses to stem cell research.  
One example of such a study is Naomi Pfeffer’s focus group study conducted in the U.K. 
between November 2006 and April 2007 and published in 2008 in Social Science and Medicine880. 
Pfeffer studied 41 women of whom 31 had had an abortion and 10 had not. Her goal was to investigate 
“what matters to British women when they think about donating an aborted fetus to research, and how 
stem cell research and therapies might influence their views”881. There were five main findings.  
First, the women defined “fetus” and “baby” in a contextual manner. “The categories of 
‘fetus’ and baby’ are organised around how a particular fetus is viewed at a particular time.”882 In other 
words, “fetus” was most often identified with an unwanted pregnancy, whereas “baby” was identified with 
a desired pregnancy, regardless of the age of the fetus or baby. Furthermore, the differences between 
participants’ legal and biological views about the significance of the gestational age were acknowledged 
in the discussions, yet they could not develop a continuum between the different accounts.883  
Second, the fetus is not unique to women and not identical to her. The participants felt that 
the fetus was neither wholly separate from them nor totally independent.884 Thus, women’s experiences 
confirmed the feminist understanding of self as relational. Individuals are connected with but not identical 
to each other. This connection is clearly experienced in pregnancy. Stem cell ethics is inadequate without 
proper understanding of the physical and psychological effects of such a connection. 
Third, the “participants’ enthusiasm for medical research … diminished as the discussion 
developed.”885 Although stem cell research was initially welcomed and considered a good thing, the 
discussion revealed that the participants later questioned their donation on the basis of their uncertainty 
about the nature and goals of stem cell research, and because they felt that the aborted fetus might 
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persist in the cell lines, possibly presenting an obstacle to women, who wanted to “get on with their 
lives.”886  
Fourth, the women were uncertain about the nature of stem cell research and what it 
might involve in the future. If stem cell lines are immortal, then they might be used indefinitely. In this 
context women were concerned about the repercussions of stem cell research on society in general.887  
Interestingly, this result reflects Waldby and Squier’s analysis of the continuity of embryonic life in stem 
cell lines. Waldby and Squier maintain that embryos become immortal through stem cell research and the 
creation of stem cell lines. They use the argument to oppose those who resist stem cell research 
because it kills embryos. However, according to Pfeffer’s study, the same argument could be used to 
oppose stem cell research. If donors feel uneasy about the immortality of stem cell lines, then this may be 
used as an argument against the research.  
Fifth, some women were concerned about the treatment of the aborted fetuses as mere 
scientific objects. According to Pfeffer, this indicates that “the duty to care” was invoked in some 
participants. Women feel a duty to care for babies and children.888 According to Pfeffer, the women’s 
concerns indicate that “an invitation to donate an aborted fetus to medical research in general and stem 
cell research in particular places a woman at the juncture of a host of concerns over which she has no 
authority.”889 The study shows that women do not feel empowered in relation to stem cell research.  
To summarize, the abortion debate is bound to the stem cell debate. According to the 
analysis above, the proponents of ES cell research claim that those who oppose the research bind the 
stem cell debate tightly to the abortion debate, especially in the U.S. The proponents claim that the 
opponents manage to keep stem cell research a heated issue by linking it to abortion. The feminist 
bioethical literature shows that the oppositional positions between and within abortion and stem cell 
debates are shortsighted. While abortion and stem cell research are indeed different issues, the 
similarities between the debates should be recognized. However, the recognition should not lead to 
outright acceptance or rejection of stem cell research on the basis of the acceptance or rejection of 
abortion or vice versa. Rather, the recognition should lead to a critical evaluation of both debates. For 
example, both the abortion and the stem cell debates concentrate on the moral status of the fetus and the 
embryo. Biological characteristics are thought to provide information about the moral status of embryos 
and fetuses and, consequently, about their proper treatment. The moral status then is juxtaposed with the 
rights of women or those in need of stem cell therapies.  
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Feminist bioethicists have pointed out that the abortion debate cannot be solved by 
invoking the moral status of the fetus, especially if the status is determined by the appeal to biological 
factors. Neither is it solely about rights. Moral questions are raised in a moral community. They are to be 
viewed from a larger perspective as proposed by feminist bioethicists. Feminist bioethicists suggest that 
the recognition of the similarities and dissimilarities of the two debates might lead to a broader 
understanding of both abortion and stem cell research and use. Feminist bioethicists claim that this 
broader understanding, which takes relational and contextual analysis seriously, might expand both 
abortion and stem cell debates and provide the basis for effective policies on both counts. For example, 
Pfeffer’s study shows that contextual and relational issues matter to women when they consider donating 
aborted fetuses to research. It thus empirically validates the theoretical perspective of feminist 
bioethicists.  
 
Donation of Supernumerary Embryos 
The guidelines of stem cell reports that emphasize the need for free and informed consent take a step 
toward protecting women and their health by requiring documentation of how embryos are acquired for 
research.890 However, most of these guidelines do not regulate the circumstances under which the 
embryos are created in the first place. Unlike other stem cell reports, EGE’s Opinion no. 22 discusses the 
issue from a different perspective. EGE has formulated extensive criteria for FP7 research projects in 
2007. These criteria include special attention to donor rights and the conditions under which embryos are 
both created for assisted reproduction and donated for research.891  EGE acknowledges that allowing the 
use of supernumerary embryos for research might have psychological consequences for women and 
infertile couples.892 NordForsk too emphasizes the emotional effects of the donation:  
The purpose for which they [women or infertile couple] had the embryos created was to have a 
child, and thus they might have made a psychological connection between the embryos and 
possible future children.893 
In relation to the psychological stress related to embryo donation, all stem cell reports overlook that the 
psychological stress might not be so substantial if the creation of research embryos were allowed.  
[A] couple’s open and informed consent to offer gametes expressly for research purposes might 
be preferable to after-the-fact consent by couples donating embryos remaining from their efforts to 
start a pregnancy. These couples … are struggling with infertility and are often psychologically 
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more vulnerable and distressed than gamete donors who knowingly choose to assist 
researcher.894  
In addition to psychological risks, the stem cell reports discuss the physical risks related to 
embryo creation. The current medical guidelines, which recommend the creation of several eggs and 
embryos during one IVF cycle, are analyzed.895 Producing multiple eggs and embryos is thought to 
minimize hyperstimulation, that is, women undergoing egg maturation and retrieval time and again. 
According to Human Stem Cells, Cloning and Research this “saves money, relieves burden on the couple 
involved in the infertility treatment, and spares the women the procedures she has to undergo, together 
with the associated risks.”896 The report does not discuss the possible risks associated with the 
procedure. EGE, on the other hand, takes a different perspective. According to EGE’s Opinion no. 22 and 
the FP7 guidelines, research projects must provide evidence that the donor’s health has not been put at 
risk by excessive ovarian stimulation prior to donation.897 
Contrary to the stem cell reports, feminist bioethicists have shown particular concern 
about the negative effects on donors of using supernumerary embryos for research. The feminist 
bioethicists maintain that careful attention should be paid to the situation and the context prior to embryo 
donation.898 Feminists have pointed out that the current trend might include risks that are seldom 
discussed. First, it is rarely observed that there is in fact no medical agreement on the optimal number of 
ova and embryos to be produced during an IVF cycle.899 Consequently, the production of multiple eggs 
and embryos has been questioned. The use of cryopreserved embryos produces lower birth rates than 
using of fresh embryos. Feminists have raised concerns about whether physicians properly inform their 
clients about these issues.900  It has nevertheless been noted that even if there were limitations on the 
number of embryos created there would also always be “room for creative overestimation of the need for 
embryos for reproduction.”901 The link between infertility treatment and stem cell research should be 
acknowledged in order to avoid any possibilities for misconduct. If the links were made clear, then there 
would be less room for the “creative overestimation” of the number of embryos needed for infertility 
treatments because the motivation to gain research “material” would be under surveillance. 
Second, are women free to say no to the production of as many ova and embryos as 
possible? Feminist question “whether women can be free from pressures inherent in the very dynamics of 
the situation in which they find themselves at infertility clinics to produce as many eggs as possible for 
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fertilization.”902 According to feminist bioethicists, cultural aspects and the social structure of society 
shape how women perceive the meaning of infertility and thus affect their decisions to consent to 
hyperstimulation, egg production, and retrieval.903 What is ignored in the stem cell reports is that the 
issue of socialization also indirectly emerges in relation to stem cell research. 
Feminist bioethicists rely on a relational account of the self, which in turn leads to adopting 
the view that socialization has an impact on people’s desires, hopes, and choices. It can thus be argued 
that in a pronatalist environment,904 women feel pressured to reproduce. The pressure may not be direct 
or active, but childless women and couples are expected to justify their reproductive choices whereas no 
such requirement is put on women and couples with children. This pressure is echoed in infertility 
treatments when involuntarily childless women and couples seek medical assistance.905  
However, as stated in the previous chapters, the issue of socialization is not 
straightforward. Women and infertile couples do not lose their agency when oppressed, but find other 
means of expressing it. The point is to identify the effect of socialization. If this were done, then 
responsible infertility clinics could provide not only medical assistance for overcoming involuntary 
childlessness, but also other means, such as psychological counseling and links to adoption agencies.906  
Feminist bioethicists maintain that bioethical cases should be analyzed within a context. 
However, little attention has been given to the context in which embryos are obtained for research. 
Moreover, barely any attention has been given to embryo donors, that is, the people involved in fertility 
programs. In particular, there is a lack of empirical studies on how the donors feel about the use of 
embryos in stem cell research. One such study was conducted by Sarah Parry in Scotland in 2001, and 
the results were published in Social Science and Medicine in 2006. Parry used focus groups and 
interviews involving fifty participants to investigate “the views of people involved in fertility programmes 
who may be approached to donate their embryos for SCR [stem cell research].”907 Parry paid particular 
attention to the relationships between people and their embryos and how this affects the views the 
participants had about ES cell research.908    
Parry’s main result was that the participants’ understanding of stem cell research was 
context-bound in nature.909 The participants emphasized that not all embryos were “spare” in the sense 
that they could be used for research. The embryos suitable for reproduction were considered unsuitable 
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for research and vice versa. However, the perceived suitability of embryos for either reproduction or 
research was neither fixed nor bound to the clinicians’ opinions about the viability of the embryos. Rather 
the participants felt that technical categories in which the embryos were classified according to their 
viability were inappropriate as they did not capture the physical and emotional aspects of assisted 
reproduction.910 When the participants expressed their views about the embryos suitable for donation to 
research, they also expressed the wish that embryos should be used only in research within the field of 
reproduction. Participants who had agreed to donate embryos for research were perplexed about the 
type of research they had consented to.911 The participants showed a distrust of the scientists and 
expressed the concern that if they had not consented to embryo donation, the scientists would have 
found an alternative source of embryos, that is, i.e., infertile couples in other countries where consent 
procedures were not as strict as in the U.K. According to Parry, the participants viewed scientists as 
“driven by a desire to conduct eSCR [embryonic stem cell research] above ethical concerns.”912 Parry 
concludes that this is an indication of how a stressful situation may affect patients at “important decision-
making juncture.”913 Furthermore, since people may feel morally obliged to donate embryos to research, 
it is important to consider the possibility of coercion inherent in the donation processes.914  
The participants felt that assisted reproduction disrupted the “linear narrative of life: 
gamete-embryo-foetus-child”915 within which they viewed the embryos. Participants appreciated that the 
teleological sequence of their embryos might be affected by several aspects of assisted reproduction. 
However, to donate embryos to research disrupts the narrative the participants had formed. “To introduce 
a view of embryos as sources of stem cells rather than potential children was inconsistent with and 
disruptive of those narratives.”916 In sum, researchers should not assume that infertile couples support 
and participate in stem cell research. Their situation is more complex than scientists and clinicians 
acknowledge.917 
To summarize the discussion of embryo donation, there is concern about the conditions in 
which women and infertile couples create and donate supernumerary embryos for research. Feminist 
bioethicists in particular call for a social and cultural analysis of the assisted reproduction and donation 
processes. Parry’s focus group study reveals the worrying fact that the views of prospective donors and 
researchers’ views about embryo donation are different. In the U.K. context, the prospective donors 
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showed distrust of scientists. This attitude should be taken into account whenever sustainable stem cell 
ethics is sought. I have proposed that the link between infertility treatments and stem cell research should 
be recognized. Transparency would leave less room for misconduct in infertility treatment clinics in the 
production and donation of supernumerary embryos.  
 
Donation of Unfertilized Eggs 
Ova are needed in several stages of stem cell research and its therapeutic application: they are used for 
the creation of research embryos and needed in such research applications as SCNT and its therapeutic 
use. Unfertilized eggs may be received from two donor groups. The first group consists of women 
undergoing IVF treatment for their own reproductive purposes, who can donate some of their eggs for 
research. The second group consists of women undergoing treatment to become egg donors for purpose 
of donation, either to benefit and to help other women to reproduce.   
The stem cell reports discuss egg donation. For example, EGE and NordForsk both 
acknowledge the risks involved.918 The potential health risks associated with ovum retrieval are well 
documented. For one thing, the medication used to induce ovulation presents a risk; it may cause 
nausea, swelling, abdominal pain, and in the most severe cases ovarian cancer. For another thing, 
physical pain and injury can occur during the retrieval process. And not least there is psychological and 
emotional stress.919 NordForsk recommends that only women who undergo IVF treatment (the first 
group) should donate unfertilized eggs also for research. NordForsk acknowledges that this may not be 
possible because of the insufficient number of eggs available.920 EGE stresses that the demand for 
oocyte donation should not increase the burden on women. Additionally, EGE recognizes the possibility 
of women’s instrumentalization as donors of unfertilized eggs.921 Human Stem Cells, Cloning and 
Research also recognizes instrumentalization: “Many people who oppose therapeutic cloning [SCNT] say 
that this procedure exploits both the embryo and the women who donated the ovum.”922  
Most stem cell reports emphasize that ovum donation, like embryo donation, should be 
free of monetary inducements. Eggs for research must be donated, not sold or bought. Proper informed 
consent procedures are required to ensure that women have knowingly and willingly donated unfertilized 
eggs for research.923  In addition, the reports recommend not only should women be excluded from 
having any financial benefits, but also they should be excluded from having any direct or indirect health 
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benefits. According to EGE and the NBAC, women should have no rights to decide how their ova or the 
embryos created from their eggs are used in stem cell research or therapies. They should not have a say 
in how stem cell lines created from their gametes would be used nor should they direct or restrict the 
recipients of derivative tissues or cell lines for research or therapy.924 The stem cell reports maintain that 
the absence of monetary and other inducements would guarantee that pressure will not be put on women 
as donors. 
Interestingly, women may simultaneously be paid for donating eggs for reproduction and 
yet denied any financial compensation for donating ova for research. Currently, the practice of selling and 
buying gametes for research varies globally as well as within the E.U. Some E.U. member states, such 
as Finland, have forbidden commerce on gametes. However, such commerce is not regulated in all E.U. 
member states. The situation would be more consistent if the internal logic of reports such as EGE is 
implemented. EGE strictly rules out commerce on embryos and fetuses and recommends that selling 
human embryos should be illegal, because such commerce would be contrary to the respect due the 
embryo.925 This might well lead to a ban on selling gametes: “if the sale of human embryos is to be illegal, 
then for the sake of consistency, so, too, must be the sale of gametes collected for the sole and express 
purpose of creating research embryos.”926  
Feminist bioethicists have raised concerns that these guidelines might have unintended 
results and ultimately increase the pressure on women to become donors. For example Francoise Baylis 
asks: “If egg retrieval for the creation of research embryos is potentially harmful for women and there are 
no compensating benefits, why would women want to do this?”927 Baylis suggests that women do accept 
the risks involved in ovum donation when the donation is related to assisted reproduction. Women would 
then either be trying to have genetic offspring themselves or helping other women to reproduce. Such 
ends are thought to compensate for the difficulty of egg donation. What benefits, if any, would women 
have for their participation in research? Are they expected to act altruistically?928 According to Baylis, the 
demand for altruism might in fact lead to a situation in which women might be faced with coercion and 
exploitation. I maintain that Baylis has an implicit presupposition, namely, that such women regard 
reproduction as more rewarding than research. The question is not whether the presupposition is right or 
wrong, but rather whether the diversity of women’s views on reproduction and stem cell research has 
been neglected. Altruistic donation may be a viable possibility for some women. While it is important to be 
aware of the danger of exploitation, it is also important to respect women who wish to become donors. 
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The demand for unfertilized eggs is growing as stem cell research and therapies evolve. 
The demand would increase if ova could be used to replace human embryos in research. For example, 
Donna L. Dickenson claims that a major challenge to the growth of the stem cell field is the moral status 
of human embryos. “It is widely assumed that if embryos were not involved, the stem cell technologies 
would be ethically unobjectionable.”929 The ethical debate over the moral status of human embryos has 
led to the invention of “embryo-lite techniques.”930 One such technique “involves genetically manipulating 
a nucleus from an adult cell, inactivating certain genes, before inserting it into an enucleated ovum.”931 
This method is just a technical fix to a moral problem. While scientists invent new techniques to substitute 
embryo-like entities for embryos, the ethical issues involved in using ova go unnoticed. Public policy that 
takes into account the sources and uses of ova is needed, especially because the commodification of 
body parts, including gametes, is increasingly common.932 
It should be noted, though, that women do not donate eggs for research without prior 
thought. Rather eggs are made available for research by those who undergo gynecological procedures, 
such as sterilization, or women undergoing assisted reproduction procedures; an example is follicle 
reduction prior to insemination if too many eggs develop following ovulation induction. Eggs that do not 
fertilize after IVF can also be donated. From a clinical perspective these eggs are “extra.”933 Furthermore, 
while scientists develop different ways of obtaining embryos, they also work on optional methods to 
obtain ova for research and reproduction. These methods could lessen the part women currently play in 
stem cell research. Novel techniques could thus reduce the coercion and exploitation of women and their 
reproductive capacity.  
One of these methods is in vitro maturation (IVM), in which immature egg cells are 
collected from an ovarian follicle during a normal menstrual cycle. Immature ova are then matured in vitro 
for a period of about thirty hours. The procedure is easier than the traditional means of collecting eggs, 
since no hormone treatment is needed for IVM to be successful.934 However, it is still unknown how the 
maturation of ova outside a woman’s body affects the cells.935 IVM could be also used to develop 
immature ova collected from aborted female fetuses. Another option is to create iPS cells and to “re-
programme the nuclei of somatic cells in such a way that the resulting cells differentiate directly into stem 
cells thus avoiding the need for a source of oocytes and the subsequent development of an embryo.”936 A 
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third alternative includes the use of cows’ eggs in research which replace human ova in SCNT.937 
NordForsk discusses the creation of such chimeras (a combination of two animal species or animals and 
humans) and recognizes that the creation of chimeras might go against respect for human nature. 
Moreover, some might have an intuitive reaction against the creation of chimeras, a reaction sometimes 
referred to as the yuk-factor.938 
Despite the alternative ways of obtaining ova, the need for unfertilized eggs is unlikely to 
decrease. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case: the need for unfertilized eggs is growing. In the 
U.K. the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has recognized the need for unfertilized 
eggs for research. In 2006 in order to overcome the unmet need for eggs HFEA introduced a practice 
called “egg sharing”. According to HFEA, in the reproductive context “egg sharing” is “an arrangement 
whereby a woman undergoing treatment agrees to provide a certain portion of the eggs collected during 
her treatment cycle to be used in the treatment of others.”939 In the research context “a woman donates a 
proportion of her eggs [to research] and in return receives reduced treatment costs”940. HFEA also 
introduced a non-patient donor scheme in which a woman who is “not having IVF treatment herself 
undergoes stimulation and donates all the eggs collected.”941 HFEA’s purpose in introducing egg sharing 
and non-patient donation schemes is to increase the number of eggs available, especially for SCNT, but 
also for other research projects.942  
In July 2006 HFEA introduced the schemes and granted permission to the North East 
England Stem Cell Institute to use egg sharing. Only after granting the permission did the HFEA launch a 
public consultation, in September 2006, for the purpose of identifying the ethical issues related to egg 
sharing and to gather the views of the public and interested parties on the issue of egg donation for 
embryo research.943 Egg sharing, non-patient donation, and consultation are discussed by feminist social 
scientists and bioethicists who criticize the consultation process for diminishing the public’s ability to 
evaluate the practices, because the policy decision was made before the HFEA provided the report on 
the consultation.944  
Feminist scholars also criticize the content of the consultation for the following reasons. 
First, the first consultation question, “Do you think that women should be able to donate their eggs to 
research?,” suggests that it is women’s actions that should be restricted, not those of scientists or 
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clinicians asking for egg donations. The question indicates that women have a strong desire to donate 
their eggs for research. “[T]he issue should be framed the other way around in terms of whether 
researchers should be allowed to approach women.”945 Second, critics of HFEA maintain that the context 
in which women donate eggs for research should be more carefully considered. Especially the physically 
and emotionally straining nature of IVF procedures should be acknowledged. Yet instead, the 
consultation highlights the positive outcomes of IVF treatments, although almost 80 percent of IVF cycles 
are unsuccessful. Furthermore, consultation does not consider the situation in which women are asked 
for consent.946 Third, consultation does not explain sufficiently how women can withdraw consent if they 
are not able to pay for IVF treatments without the reduced costs. A woman’s financial situation is crucial 
to her ability to give or withdraw consent. Since the inequities in ability to pay for IVF are not considered, 
the practice of egg sharing puts women with different economic statuses in unequal positions.  
Fourth, the critics are not satisfied with the clarity of the description for the type of 
research for which the eggs would be used.947 As suggested by Parry’s and Pfeffer’s studies, this poses 
a threat to the donors’ ability to criticize the research in a meaningful way. Fifth, the egg sharing scheme 
is embedded in assisted reproduction practices. IVF clinicians are said to be involved in stem cell 
research, although not necessarily directly. The HFEA suggests having a research nurse who is 
positioned between the patient and the clinic. However, it is unclear whether the donors can separate the 
treatment nurses from the research nurses. “It is a complex requirement for highly stressed patients to 
distinguish research and treatment nurses and to understand the former impartial.”948 Sixth, women are 
asked to donate eggs specifically for SCNT. Since some people do not consider entities created by 
SCNT to be embryos and because embryo research is controversial, SCNT might become an ethically 
preferable source for stem cells over supernumerary embryos. This might lead to the “conceptualisation 
of eggs as more acceptable research object than embryos.”949 Seventh, the consultation’s choice of 
words is confusing. Sharing is normally understood as something voluntary. To be paid to share seems 
paradoxical. Furthermore, who are “non-patient” donors? The term suggests that women going through 
IVF for reproductive purposes are patients, whereas women donating eggs for research are not, even 
though they go through the same procedures.950 It thus seems that, according to HFEA, women are 
patients only if they need assisted reproduction.   
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Significantly, the HFEA egg sharing and non-patient donation schemes differ from 
previous policy in the U.K., and thus EGE recommendations, which favor voluntary donations, are 
preferable. For example, Roberts and Thorsby argue that the “donation of eggs from IVF treatment to 
stem cell research … is a challenging new phenomenon that does not have exact parallels with either 
egg sharing for treatment or embryo donation.”951 The authors maintain that egg sharing for research 
purposes requires an innovative ethical and policy consideration.952  
In sum, stem cell reports maintain that egg donation should be altruistic. Women should 
not be permitted any financial benefits, nor should they have any direct or indirect health benefits. This is 
thought to reduce the chance for coercion and exploitation. Feminist bioethicists, such as Baylis, question 
altruistic donation. While some women may consider the donated eggs as “extra”, and thus the ethical 
issues related to the donation as irrelevant, others may experience the situation differently. Although I 
maintain that the opportunity for women to donate their eggs altruistically (especially if they consider the 
eggs to be “extra”) should not be denied, I am concerned about the egg sharing scheme and its 
implications for women undergoing IVF. Egg sharing is a novel way to obtain unfertilized eggs for 
research, and it has no parallels in biotechnology. It is thus unexamined territory. It can, however, be 
evaluated in relation to the more general question of whether reproductive tissue such as ova, embryos 
and fetuses could be bought or sold. I will analyze this question in section 4.5 on commercialization. 
 
Donor Rights and Protection: Conclusion  
An analysis of stem cell reports reveals that informed consent is a key issue in regard to donor rights and 
protection. The reports recommend securing donor autonomy by introducing strict informed consent 
procedures. The reports’ viewpoint is not expanded beyond this. However, as pointed out in chapters 3.3 
and 3.4, strict and detailed informed consent procedures are inadequate for protecting autonomy if they 
are not equipped with two insights. First, the influence of the social order should be taken into account. 
Second, informed consent should be seen as a communicative transaction. 
 As to the point of the effects of social order on informed consent, feminist bioethicists are 
faced with the following question: Are women and infertile couples autonomous and thus free to give 
informed consent if their motivational structure is not self-imposed but affected by a social order? I have 
argued above that both the mainstream understanding of individual autonomy and the feminist criticism of 
embryo and ovum donation miss the point that everyone is “affected by social order”, not just the  
oppressed or women and infertile couples. While analyzing donor issues feminist bioethicists do not note 
that autonomy is a process. Agents do not necessarily possess full autonomy, although they are 
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autonomous to a degree. To suggest that in order to make informed choices a woman has to be fully 
autonomous is to have a naïve understanding of autonomy. Autonomy becomes an ideal that cannot be 
attained.  
The discussion on stem cell research and the role of women as donors clearly shows how 
fragile a concept autonomy is if it is not understood in relational terms. In assessing whether and how the 
donation of embryos, fetuses, and oocytes should be regulated, feminist bioethicists have to weigh the 
risk that permissive legislation might put women as donors in danger as opposed to the risk that women’s 
ability to choose their reproductive destiny would be subject to governmental regulation. The question 
comes down to the difficulty of weighing women’s decision (self-determination) to become donors against 
women’s autonomy skills, such as self-definition and self-knowledge. I maintain that it is exactly women’s 
self-definition and self-knowledge that feminist bioethicists consider to be threatened by stem cell 
research. They argue that stem cell research limits rather than enhances women’s opportunity for self-
definition and self-knowledge through the reinforcement of stereotypical representations.  
While stem cell research is closely connected to assisted reproduction, it is also closely 
connected to the ideal of having genetic offspring. In feminist bioethics, this ideal is considered a 
stereotypical representation, which in turn devalues women and jeopardizes their self-definition. Self-
definition is instrumental to the achievement of agency and autonomy. For this reason unregulated 
donation processes threaten autonomy. This threat is considered greater than the threat to women’s self-
determination. The losses to self-definition outweigh the gains in women’s self-determination. Thus, the 
dangers of donation would outweigh women’s determination to become donors.953 Even so, the analysis 
above does not consider that women have several “social orders” or contexts in which their self-definition 
is constituted. Within this web of contexts stem cell and assisted reproduction might be marginal. 
Therefore, these things alone cannot be a threat to women’s self-definition, and thus autonomy in the 
meaning given above is something that can be expressed in degrees. Autonomy should be understood 
as a capacity, a collection of skills. Autonomy is thus a complex concept. For this reason it is unsuitable 
as the only explanation for why women and infertile couples might feel disempowered by stem cell 
research.954 Furthermore, feminist bioethicists must be careful if they claim that women who choose to 
follow cultural norms (such as having genetic offspring) are being “oppressed” and in need of  “liberation.” 
This claim implicitly assumes that women are non-autonomous, and thus it justifies paternalistic 
interference. However, socialization does not inhibit autonomy altogether and therefore does not justify 
paternalistic interference. 
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The above analysis supports the argument that respect for autonomy cannot be 
understood simply in terms of informed consent as a disclosure of information. Instead, informed consent 
should be regarded as a communicative transaction. According to this understanding, it is essential for 
women and infertile couples to understand the implications of becoming donors. Responsible informed 
consent procedures would mean that, in the context of assisted reproduction and stem cell research, the 
stem cell researchers and health care professionals involved communicate with those whose consent is 
sought. Because informed consent processes succeed only if they are based in truth claims, the 
prospective donors must be able to assume that the information communicated by medical professionals 
is true. The prospective donors must trust the information they receive about stem cell research. 
According to feminist analysis, accurate information about stem cell research involves information about 
the procedures that precede the research, such as assisted reproduction. The content of the information 
does not alone guarantee that the agent trusts the information given. The communicative relationship in 
which the information is given provides the basis of trust. This requires interpersonal trust between the 
medical professionals or researchers and the prospective donors. A sustainable stem cell policy would 
emphasize the importance of these aspects of the consent process.  
In addition to a critical evaluation of the stem cell debate and informed consent processes, 
as suggested by the feminist bioethicists, sustainable stem cell policies should be grounded on empirical 
knowledge about how the actual donors perceive stem cell research and the donation process. What is 
still needed is a survey in which women and infertile couples express if and how they would be 
empowered as donors of aborted fetuses and supernumerary embryos.  
Tissue donation and transfer threaten individual autonomy not only of the donors, but also 
of the recipients. While feminist bioethicists devote attention to the donors of unfertilized eggs as well as 
to donors of fetal and embryonic tissue, they do not consider the possible recipients of stem cell crafts. 
Tissue donation in general and stem cell donation in particular express corporeal relationality – 
intercorporeality. Intercorporeality poses a threat to individual autonomy. People are “mutually 
implicated”955 with one another. Biotechnologies create new forms of intercorporeality and networks of 
relationships. These risk the coherence of autonomous selfhood.956 Human tissue and tissue crafts are 
neither neutral nor impersonal. Instead, they are perceived as retaining “some values of personhood for 
many if not most donors and recipients.”957 Tissue exchange is relational and social. This is especially 
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evident in organ donations when individuals have to adjust psychologically and physically to the new 
organ.958  
The idea of intercorporeality explains the relational and social nature of tissue transfer. 
Intercorporeality means that the “body image is always the effect of embodied social relations.”959 It 
describes how bodies are positioned in relation to other people and objects. Tissue transfer in particular 
affects the body image of the recipient, who must reorient, depending on the organs and tissue 
transferred. Since the transfer is identified with the donor, the recipient often feels as though she is in a 
relationship with the donor. For example, “semen (like whole organs) is a substance that refers back to 
the identity of the donor and carries aspects of this identity with it when it is used by the woman for 
insemination. Hence, to accept someone’s donated semen is to enter into a relationship with them.”960 
Therefore, bioethical attention should be directed to the networks and relationships created through 
tissue transfer in general and stem cell research in particular. Intercorporeality creates new power 
relations that are expressed, for example, through market forces. Market forces dictate the price for 
organs and other tissue and hence, affect the power relations within biotechnologies and therapies.961 I 
will discuss the commercialization of stem cells and their by-products in the next section.  
 
 
4.5 Commercialization of Stem Cells  
Several bioethicists are aware of the problems inherent in the commercialization of gametes and 
embryonic and fetal tissue in the new stem cell technologies.962 According to some, commercialization 
has unwanted effects. For example, Barbara Katz Rothman argues that “such research [on stem cells] is 
not driven by possible cures for existing diseases, but is driven by the market itself.”963 Others have 
questioned the view that market forces dictate the rules of stem cell research and use, because it 
“presumes that scientists will only conduct research for profit.”964 According to these bioethicists, the aims 
of stem cell research are respectable. Bioethicists differ in their views on the acceptability of 
commercialization. However, all are convinced that the issue should be discussed from different 
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perspectives. As bioethicists seek a broader understanding of stem cell research and commercialization, 
the following questions are relevant: Does commercialization lead to the commodification of human 
embryos and egg cells? Is the commodification of human eggs and embryos inherently wrong? What are 
the possible benefits and the harmful consequences of commodification? Does reproduction count as 
labor and does it, thus, have financial value? Who owns the embryonic and fetal tissue, and thus, who is 
entitled to any benefits? Lastly, how should the commercialization of stem cell and embryo research be 
regulated?  
According to NordForsk, in today’s market economy, commercialization is said to be 
necessary for the development and manufacture of stem cell-based therapies. Patenting stem cell-based 
products and therapies are seen as the strongest incentive for investors to engage in stem cell research, 
which consumes financial and human resources and whose prospects are not secure. Patents are 
thought to guarantee investors some profit. Stem cell research is deniably commercialized.965 In contrast 
to NordForsk, ESF stresses that, instead of the commercial sector, public bodies must finance stem cell 
research. According to ESF, public financing will guarantee the work of independent scientists.966 In 
addition to ESF, EGE recommends a strict prohibition on commerce in embryos and fetal tissue. It 
estimates that commercialization has unwanted effects as it might increase coercive pressure.967 The 
European Commission Staff Working Paper also emphasizes the prohibition on human tissue and body 
parts, including embryonic and fetal tissue.968  
Feminist writers in particular have addressed the issue of commercialization and 
commodification as possible results of commercialization.969 They have pointed out that the research on 
embryos, fetuses, and ova and their therapeutic uses signals an indirect commodification and 
instrumentalization of human reproduction. Market forces seem to dictate the practices of stem cell 
research.970 The question of commodification can be framed as follows: 
When we commodify something, we take that which is not already a commodity and make it into, 
or treat it as though it were, a commodity. … [A] commodity is an object of utility.971 
In this definition, reproductive tissues have become commodities.  
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Commodification has been discussed most openly in relation to the commerce on 
gametes, especially eggs. The decisive question is whether the commodification of human eggs is 
inherently wrong. On the one hand, the commodification of human eggs and embryos has been opposed 
on the grounds that it threatens human dignity. It is thought that commodification threatens the respect 
owed to human embryos as discussed above. Furthermore, all human body parts – including human egg 
cells – have a derivative dignity. Accordingly, the commodification of ova is wrong.972 On the other hand, 
the commodification of human eggs has been justified on the grounds that, when well-regulated, it 
protects individual freedom and benefits both donors and recipients.973 Therefore, commodification can 
either be morally permissible or impermissible. The moral nature of commodification depends upon: 
(1) whether the thing commodified has intrinsic value that is incompatible with its being either fully 
or even partly commodified; (2) whether moral constraints exist on the alienability of the thing from 
persons; or (3) whether the consequences of making the thing alienable and of commodifying it 
are, or are not, favorable.974 
The first point is widely discussed; it has been argued that human eggs do not have 
intrinsic value. For example, the bioethicist David Resnik maintains that human eggs do not have an 
inherent value. Consequently, the commodification of human eggs is not inherently wrong.975 The latter 
two points are less often discussed in bioethics. However, Carolyn McLeod and Francoise Baylis discuss 
the commodification of human eggs and embryos in relation to alienability and personhood. They argue 
that commodification is morally permissible if commodities are separable from or, in other words alien to 
us.  
Feminist perspectives on personhood emphasize its relational nature. Persons are 
relational beings, that is, they are embedded in social relations. Consequently, persons would suffer 
intense alienation if they were disconnected from others. Others help persons to understand and give 
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meanings to their experiences. In addition, the political contexts in which persons are rooted are 
important for the development of personhood and autonomy.976 The development of autonomy is further 
affected by embodiment. The body influences who persons become and what they can become. 
Consequently, bodies and body parts are important aspects of personhood.977 Body parts are inalienable 
to persons insofar as they “instantiate the self, facilitate autonomous action, or promote bodily 
integrity.”978 However, not all body parts are constitutive of the self. Therefore, it is not clear that the 
inalienable status is always true for reproductive tissue. Embryos and ova, however, can have an 
inalienable status in relation to some persons and in some cases.979 According to McLeod and Baylis, 
“embryos express what is distinctive about us and allow us to fulfill important ends in terms of 
reproduction and having biological relations with others.”980 This idea is compatible with the feminist 
understanding of persons as relational beings. Accordingly, feminists do not consider embryos and 
fetuses individual entities, but either as part of women’s bodies (in vivo) or originating from women’s 
bodies (ex vivo or in vitro). Feminists emphasize, however, that even if embryos may be inalienable, they 
may not always be persons themselves. Embryos do not have the moral status of a person. The 
inalienability of embryos may explain why some donors retain a connection to their embryos and object to 
the commodification of their embryos. Some donors cannot completely separate themselves from their 
embryos. 981 
It should be emphasized that embryos are not inalienable to all persons or even to all 
women (although to some). Reproductive tissue is not inseparable from all women. Some women do not 
wish to consider ova, embryos, and fetuses as constitutive parts of themselves. The idea that embryos 
are inalienable to all persons is incompatible with the feminist conception of relational personhood and 
also with the feminist political concern for women’s reproductive autonomy.982 For this reason, the 
commodification of human reproductive tissue needs to be evaluated from a perspective other than the 
inalienability of embryos and ova. Special attention should be paid to the consequences of 
commodification. It is important to “constrain and direct this process so that it does not cause social 
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harms, in particular the exploitation and oppression of women.”983 Accordingly,  a  wider  perspective  is  
needed for the ethical evaluation of commercialization of stem cell research and use.984 
Feminist bioethicists have indicated that the commercialization of eggs might lead to the 
exploitation of women especially.985 These feminist bioethicists do not define exploitation. However, they 
provide an example. Certain groups of women are vulnerable and not properly protected as egg donors. 
Feminist bioethicists maintain that there are alarming signs of egg donors’ bodies and bodily products 
being evaluated according to the women’s ethnic background, social class, and status. For example, in 
the U.S. two groups of women donate eggs: those who donate eggs for research and those who donate 
eggs for reproduction. Feminists claim that the women who sell eggs for reproduction are usually white 
and well-educated, while the women who sell eggs for research are most often non-white and less 
affluent. Furthermore, feminists are alarmed by signs of unequal payment, depending on whether women 
donate ova for reproductive or for research purposes. Market forces dictate that the price for eggs used in 
reproduction is higher than the price of eggs used for research. It seems that commercial forces pit two 
groups of women against each other.986  
The eggs of well-educated Caucasians at Ivy League universities are obviously worth considerably 
more on the reproductive-fertility market than eggs of non-Caucasian, less educated, nonaffluent 
women. Might the eggs of these less valued women become a future source of research-only 
oocytes in the private sector? Eggs destined for laboratory research could be viewed as 
disposable and therefore likely to command far less than eggs used for implantation.987  
Since there is no federal oversight of private research laboratories or infertility clinics, market forces 
dictate the price for ova and the rules of commerce.988 Feminist bioethicists suggest that the lack of public 
control over private infertility clinics heightens the possibilities for the exploitation of women and infertile 
couples as embryo donors.  
The question of exploitation is worth a deeper consideration. In order to examine 
exploitation in the context of stem cell research, we must distinguish between exploitation, unfair 
exploitation, and commercial exploitation. Exploitation simply means to take advantage of some 
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resources (mere utilization). Unfair exploitation, on the other hand, means to take advantage of certain 
resources in an inappropriate way. Unfair exploitation involves the idea of a wrongful use.989 It does not, 
however, include commercial or financial transactions. Commercial exploitation, by contrast, involves “the 
idea of some disparity in the value of exchange of goods or services.”990 Sometimes the latter two 
elements of exploitation (unfairness and financial transaction) are simultaneously present.  
Bioethicists have frequently discussed the question of what makes a situation unfairly 
exploitative.991 For present purposes I will focus on two answers that are especially connected to stem 
cell ethics and feminists’ responses to the debate, namely, vulnerability and financial interests. As 
presented in the above chapters on donation, my analysis is that some feminist bioethicists are implicitly 
claiming that women are vulnerable or weak because of certain motivational structures, which explains 
their willingness to donate reproductive tissue. The motivation can either be financial inducements or the 
social pressure to have genetic offspring. In this view, women are easy objects for exploitation. 
Some ethicists, such as Henrik Kjeldgaard Joergensen, maintain that unfair exploitation 
threatens the vulnerable. Although Kjeldgaard Joergensen’s account of exploitation does not explicitly 
recognize the difference between exploitation and unfair exploitation, it valorizes the idea of how 
vulnerability could be linked to unfair exploitation. Kjeldgaard Joergensen defines exploitation as a 
situation in which  
A (the exploiter) takes advantage of a situation involving B (the exploited) in an unfair or 
inappropriate way, which is made possible because A is in some way in a superior position.992  
A has an advantage in the situation and is not entitled to the advantage because of the situation’s 
inappropriateness. An inappropriate situation is one in which B is weak or vulnerable, and B is in need of 
special care or protection.993  
The idea that vulnerability defines exploitation and that the vulnerable should be protected 
against exploitation is appealing. For example, Jacob Dahl Rendtorff and Peter Kemp propose that 
vulnerability should be adopted as one of four basic ethical principles in bioethics and biolaw in Europe. 
The other basic principles should be autonomy, dignity, and integrity.994 Vulnerability is “ontologically prior 
to the other principles”,995 and describes a human being who is mortal and whose integrity can be 
threatened. In other words, vulnerability expresses the “finitude of the human condition”.996 According to 
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Rendtorff and Kemp, vulnerability is both descriptive and normative. In a pluralistic society, vulnerability 
can bind individuals together by bringing about mutual respect between human beings.997  Making 
reference to Jürgen Habermas, Rendtorff and Kemp maintain that 
vulnerability of the other person is extreme, it imposes an appeal for the protection of the human 
person and for justice between all individuals in the cultural and social world. Therefore 
vulnerability is important as the foundation of the notions of care, responsibility and empathy with 
the other, it motivates ethical concern for the fragility of the other. Profound vulnerability is the 
basis of ethics.998  
Rendtorff and Kemp’s principle of vulnerability rightly focuses on the importance of mutual recognition 
and respect. Furthermore, it reminds us of the limitations of human beings and thereby of the limits of 
medicine and biotechnologies. For these reasons, vulnerability is an important theme in bioethics and 
should be integrated into the field.  
However, a closer look reveals the problematic nature of vulnerability, both as an ethical 
principle (Rendtorff and Kemp) and as a condition for exploitation (Kjeldgaard Joergensen). As to the 
criticism of vulnerability as an ethical principle, it should be emphasized that ethical principles should 
guide action. Although Rendtorff and Kemp discuss how each of the four principles, including 
vulnerability, should direct decision making and actions in bioethics and biolaw, they fail to distinguish 
exactly who is vulnerable in their account. Because of this omission, the principle of vulnerability loses 
some of its force as an ethical principle. The general definition given to vulnerability indicates that all 
human beings are vulnerable. Although this may well be true, Rendtorff and Kemp end up in a situation in 
which they eventually have to decide who is the most vulnerable. After all, in a concrete decision-making 
situation, it is unhelpful to maintain that all people are equally vulnerable. The need to decide who is the 
most vulnerable is evident in the closing paragraph on the definition of the principle of vulnerability in 
which the writers indicate that it is important to identify the poorest and the weakest in a society:  
In biomedicine today it is the task of the legal regulation of biomedical issues to protect the 
weakest and the poorest in society against discrimination, manipulation and destruction from other 
social groups. Therefore the principle of vulnerability belongs to the most essential principles in 
bioethics and biolaw.999 
Rendtorff and Kemp try to resolve the question of who is vulnerable or the most vulnerable 
on a case-by-case basis. They present sets of different bioethical problems and discuss how the principle 
of vulnerability should be employed in each.1000 From a feminist perspective a case-by-case – or 
contextual – analysis could be a viable alternative to the identification of the vulnerable. However, a 
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thorough analysis of power should precede or be included in the contextual evaluation of 
vulnerabilities.1001 This analysis is missing in Rendtorff and Kemp’s theory. As seen in chapter 2.4 on 
power, feminist bioethicists are most likely to benefit from a Foucaultian analysis of power in which 
everyone is affected by power. Power is not imposed from above, but cuts through the whole of a society. 
Furthermore, those who are oppressed do not lack agency, but are able to resist the power relationships 
in which they find themselves. From this perspective, it is not possible to determine who is the most 
vulnerable.  
Nevertheless, the importance of power appears in Kjeldgaard Joergensen’s idea that 
exploitation is linked to vulnerability caused by oppressive socialization. Kjeldgaard Joergensen 
maintains that a vulnerable person is someone who has a disadvantaged motivational structure and 
therefore cannot be autonomous. He refers to a feminist understanding of oppressive socialization as a 
reason for the lack of autonomy.  In his view, an oppressive social order limits women’s options and 
forces them to adopt a motivational structure that is not self-imposed. In reference to surrogate 
motherhood, Kjeldgaard Joergensen claims that “women [who want to become surrogate mothers] 
cannot ‘control’ their own vulnerability – i.e. their motivational structure.”1002 He further proposes that 
paternalistic interference is justified when women want to participate in altruistic surrogate motherhood. 
This is to protect the women in question from engaging in an oppressive arrangement. From a feminist 
viewpoint, one has to ask whether paternalism is an ethical option for action. It seems dubious to remedy 
a possibly oppressive situation (surrogacy) with another way of using power (paternalistic interference). 
Furthermore, from a Foucaultian perspective on power, agency within different kinds of power 
relationships should be understood more diversely than Kjeldgaard Joergensen does.   
Note that Kjeldgaard Joergensen opposes only altruistic surrogacy. That is, he opposes 
arrangements in which surrogate mothers do not receive financial compensation for their labor. 
Kjeldgaard Joergensen’s ’ strong opposition to altruistic surrogacy is interesting, given that many ethicists 
maintain that, with the involvement of financial interests, a situation becomes unfairly exploitative. For 
example, by calling for a prohibition on the commerce in fetuses, embryos, and human eggs, stem cell 
reports at least seem to imply that any financial transaction makes the donation of fetuses, embryos, or 
eggs an unfairly exploitative process.  The claim is that financial incentives would seduce women and 
infertile couples to donate fetuses, embryos, or eggs for research. At a minimum, the incentives would 
make it harder for potential donors to say “no” to donation. The British Report by the Committee of Inquiry 
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into Human Fertilization and Embryology known as the Warnock Report also points out that financial 
interests and exploitation go together:  
That people should treat others as a means to their own ends, however desirable the 
consequences, must always be liable to moral objection. Such treatment of one person by another 
becomes positively exploitative when financial interests are involved.1003 
The Warnock Report does not, however, elaborate on exactly how financial interests make a situation 
exploitative. 
 The bioethicist John Harris argues that financial remuneration does not necessarily lead to 
unfair exploitation. The functions of Western societies are based on the remuneration for services, most 
of which are not deemed to be unfairly exploitative. Therefore, the argument that money automatically 
turns some actions, such as surrogacy or the donation of reproductive material, into unfair exploitation is 
implausible.1004  
Although remuneration for services does not automatically make a situation unfairly 
exploitative, the question of commercial exploitation should be examined.  Here the central issue is 
whether there is a disparity in the value of the exchange of goods or services and whether this disparity 
constitutes unfair exploitation.1005 However, this determination is difficult to ascertain, at least in relation 
to stem cell research. How do we determine the value of body parts, bodily products, or the labor related 
to their donation? Do we trust market forces to dictate the price of eggs, embryos, and fetuses, or the 
labor required to produce them? What constitutes a disparity in values is difficult to determine. Moreover, 
unequal benefits are not necessary or sufficient conditions for exploitation.1006 For the above- mentioned 
reasons, financial inducements alone cannot be used to explain what constitutes unfair exploitation. 
Both vulnerability and financial incentives seem at least partly problematic explanations of 
unfair exploitation. We need some other criteria to determine whether certain transactions, relationships, 
or practices are unfairly exploitative. I propose two such criteria: autonomy and (social) injustice. John 
Harris gives the following definition of unfair exploitation: 
Exploitation occurs when those exploited have not autonomously adopted their part in our projects 
as one of their own projects but have been coerced in some way into becoming instruments of 
ours.1007 
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Furthermore, he maintains that commercial exploitation becomes unfair if it is related to some 
background injustice. 
Disparity in value between one side of transaction and the other begins to look like exploitation 
when there is some background injustice or violation of rights, or the transaction is wrongful in 
some other way.1008 
As to the question of autonomy and stem cell research, the central question is thus 
whether women and infertile couples have autonomously consented to the donation of fetuses, embryos, 
and eggs for stem cell research. As seen in Kjeldgaard Joergensen’s view, a woman could simply not be 
engaged autonomously in altruistic surrogacy. Surrogacy and the donation of fetuses, embryos, and eggs 
for research are analogous cases to an extent. In both situations, there is seemingly nothing to be 
gained, either by the surrogates or by the donors. Yet there are women who decide to become surrogate 
mothers and women and infertile couples who decide to become donors. Both mainstream and feminist 
bioethicists have argued that both potential surrogates and donors could be vulnerable and thus likely to 
be unfairly exploited.1009 In regard to infertility and assisted reproduction, the motivational structure for 
women and infertile couples is said to be affected by social or societal factors. 
 Feminist bioethicists need to evaluate whether this leads to motivation that is not self-
selected “since it is the result of a non-ideal social or societal oppression that to some degree exerts a 
pressure on every woman”1010 and, hence, leads to a lack of autonomy. How does the idea of 
vulnerability fit into the idea of autonomy and the moral agency of women and infertile couples? Are 
women and infertile couples somehow ill-equipped to make autonomous decisions in these cases?  
Both mainstream and feminist bioethicists who argue that women and infertile couples 
cannot become donors autonomously seem to support substantive autonomy in which autonomous 
decisions are defined by their content and not by the process by which people reach these decisions. 
However, based on the analysis in chapter 3.3, it is only the procedural theories of autonomy that are 
sensitive to the feminist concerns of preserving diversity among a multiplicity of agents. Therefore, it is 
impossible to determine whether individual women and infertile couples are able to consent reliably to 
donating eggs, embryos, and fetuses for stem cell research. However, it is possible to say that not all 
donors are automatically non-autonomous and, hence, unable to give valid consent. The relationship 
between oppressive socialization on autonomy is not straightforward. Socialization does not inhibit 
autonomy altogether.  
The question of background injustice as a condition of exploitation prompts the further 
question of whether A is taking unfair advantage of B if A takes advantage of some prior unfairness to B. 
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Some bioethicists, such as Alan Wertheimer, claim that exploitation is always “transaction-specific;” 
therefore, background injustices are not relevant in the consideration of exploitation.1011 However, from a 
feminist point of view, it would seem odd to separate exploitation from background situations altogether. It 
could be argued, for instance, that research institutions and biotechnology companies add to the 
injustices that women experience in society. The point here is not so much that these institutions would 
exploit individual women unfairly as that the unfair exploitation is directed to women as a group. Here the 
focus is especially on the social consequences of using donated embryos, fetuses, and eggs in stem cell 
research.1012 
Feminist bioethicists in fact refer not only to the social origin, but also to the social 
consequences of current practice. These consequences are seen as exploitative. For example, Katz 
Rothman maintains that economically and socially disadvantaged women provide reproductive services 
to well-off women. The reproductive-infertility market reflects social and societal inequalities. Moreover, 
stem cell research and medicine as an institution rests on these inequalities. According to Katz Rothman, 
research and medicine intensify social practices that are unequal and exploitative to and between 
women. She calls for a broader ethical analysis of stem cell research and claims that embryos and eggs 
used for research are only at the micro level of ethics. Individual women “being exploited”1013 are at the 
middle level. At the macro level are the institution of medicine and biomedical research. Katz Rothman 
maintains that in order to be able to consider the “new ethical issues in human embryonic stem cell 
research,”1014 we have to consider the contexts in which the research takes place:  
I wish we had such a [decent] world: a world in which medicine as an institution was developing in 
the interests of people; a world in which we shared a genuine human morality which concerned 
itself with the needs of all people and not the sexual control of some and the economic interest of 
others.1015 
Feminists are not alone in their concern for the unregulated function of private infertility 
clinics and research institutes. Other bioethicists have also indicated problems with the privatization of 
research. There are signs that private infertility clinics, laboratories, and research companies invest more 
money in the clinical applications of embryo research than in basic science in the U.S. Private companies 
are unwilling to invest in research that does not lead to immediate higher success rates of infertility 
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treatments.1016 Bioethicists are further concerned about the quality of the research in private clinics. They 
claim that some of the research is “empirical” and conducted during the treatments instead of being 
properly prepared and based on other mammalian studies. Federal funding is seen as being necessary to 
stimulate the high-quality research needed to minimize health risks for women and children and to foster 
beneficial new medical research. Bioethicists agree that governmental support and equal treatment of 
public and private clinics are better guarantees of protecting women and their health and rights than a 
free market economy.1017 The idea is not, however, put into action in the U.S.1018 This becomes evident in 
the NBAC and the PCBE reports and the NIH guidelines.1019 Some bioethicists and medical experts 
believe that governmental payments of ovum donation increase the exploitation of the reproductive 
capacity of poor women.1020 According to Ronald Green, the NIH defends the ban on governmental 
payment for gametes on the following grounds: 
[F]ederal support for the creation of research embryos, coupled with payments to women providing 
eggs, would further exploit a population whose reproductive potential, from slavery onward, had 
already been much abused.1021  
The difference between the public and private sectors has created an unbearable 
situation, both ethically and scientifically. Under regulations in the United States most improvements in 
assisted reproduction and contraceptives are the result of research funded by the private sector. The 
research done in private clinics is not subject to federal oversight or research guidelines. The government 
has little means to direct or control research and development of assisted reproduction and 
contraceptives. Kenneth J. Ryan suggests that the U.S. government is not even interested in investing in 
reproductive science or in the interests of women: “women’s interests in advances in reproductive 
science have been hostage to a conservative agenda in government.”1022 Clear policies and institutional 
agreements are conditions for sustainable ethical prerequisites for stem cell research and use: “[N]ot to 
confront directly questions about how stem cell research will be organized, financed, and overseen is a 
kind of ethical failure.”1023 Even if the situation between private and public funding and research is not as 
dramatic elsewhere as it is in the U.S., the global effects of commercial interests should be taken into 
account. For example, NordForsk recognizes the worldwide consequences of commercialization: “If 
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women are paid for being egg donors, women, especially in the Third World countries, might feel 
economically constrained to become donors.”1024  
Europe is certainly not a safe haven for egg donors. In 2004 and 2005, the European 
Union faced the issue of trade in ova. Romanian women were asked to donate eggs for infertile women in 
Western Europe, especially in the U.K.1025 The European Parliament took a stand on the issue. In March 
2005, it announced that human body parts, including gametes, should not be a source for financial gain. 
The idea was that women were protected from financial pressure. Women should not be seduced to 
donate ova, which the European Parliament regards as a risky procedure.1026  
From a feminist viewpoint, the basis for the Parliament’s ruling to ban commerce on eggs 
was questionable. The ruling was based on the idea that donors were not considered autonomous, but 
vulnerable. From a feminist perspective (I want to stress), this seems paternalistic. However, the financial 
rewards are inappropriate because of the social consequences (not because of their origin). Parliament 
should have considered the following two issues.  
First, the infertility clinics profited from the donations. The Romanian women were paid 
between £150 and £300 for egg donation, while the infertility clinics made profits that were much 
higher.1027 Second, the incident could have triggered discussion about ovum donation and research on a 
larger scale. The Parliament could, for example, have discussed the effects of embryo donation for 
research purposes. However, it chose not to. The growing demand for human eggs in stem cell research 
should have been taken into account, because it is likely that the demand for both reproductive and 
research ova is increasing. “In Europe, the official position has been that the ova used should be ‘surplus’ 
from IVF, but that becomes less and less tenable: most clinics report shortages, not surpluses.”1028  
I maintain that both the recommendations in the U.S. and Europe are inadequate. The recommendations 
in the U.S. stem cell reports do not protect the rights of women sufficiently, because the work of private 
research facilities is not regulated. If private clinics are still allowed to pay for donated eggs, might this 
encourage women to seek cooperation with these institutes instead of governmental clinics and research 
laboratories? In Europe, the work of both private and public research and infertility laboratories is 
regulated. However, the regulations seem insufficient. As Nahman states, “consent is a slippery 
concept.”1029 Women do not always know what they are consenting to or to what their body parts will be 
used for in the future. This demonstrates the importance of making sure that the informed consent 
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processes satisfy the conditions of agent-based communication and interpersonal trust proposed in 
chapter 3.4. In other words, accurate information about stem cell research involves information about the 
procedures that precede research (such as assisted reproduction) and information about what the 
reproductive material will be used for (for reproductive or for research purposes). Furthermore, in 
bioethics the manner in which the information is communicated should be a central focus. 
 I am inclined to agree with Katz Rothman, who opposes the idea that women as a group 
truly benefit from selling their eggs. Although Katz Rothman recognizes that some women might gain 
financially and that women may choose to whom they sell their eggs, she maintains that women in 
general are disadvantaged by the practice, which repeats and affirms unequal positions between women 
of different ethnic backgrounds, and between women in Western countries and those in developing 
countries.1030 It is highly suspect that the financial reward would actually reduce the risk of violating the 
rights of women. On the contrary, the practice of buying ova might lead to undesirable results: “The 
measures … would not only fail to reduce the harm of coercion, but would add the harm of thoughtless 
commercial exploitation of women.”1031  
Others may argue that because egg donors – or sellers – are differently situated in terms 
of power, the global economy, and their relationship to ova recipients, no general guidelines can be 
given. The commerce on ova is made possible by the global market economy and capitalism. “It is not 
the capital itself which is the problem, but capitalism.”1032 I nevertheless maintain that within this 
economic system, there are ways of improving the general situation other than by simply paying donors 
directly.1033  
How to proceed in practice? Below I present two alternatives for decreasing the power 
inequalities inherent in the donation of reproductive tissue. First, Donna L. Dickenson who analyzed the 
commodification of reproductive tissue, including embryos, and asked, who owns embryonic and fetal 
tissue and who, thus, has the right to profit from their scientific and therapeutic use?1034 According to 
Dickenson, one answer may be that no one owns fetal and embryonic tissue. Thus, their commercial use 
does not count as financial exploitation, especially as there are positive outcomes. The second answer is 
that fetal and embryonic tissues indeed have a kind of extra value compared to other human tissue. The 
extra value is produced by biotechnology companies who transform the tissue into useful applications. 
Dickenson argues that the biotechnology companies do the actual work in stem cell research and thus 
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should get the profits.1035 She notes that the reluctance to view reproduction as production underlies the 
opinion that the commercial value in stem cells is produced by companies:  
Stem cell technologies highlight the “use-value” which women produce in the reproductive labours 
of superovulation, egg extraction, and the work of early pregnancy and abortion. It is abundantly 
clear that these pregnancy-derived tissues have value, and enormous value.1036 
According to Dickenson, reproduction is usually kept separate from production and 
therefore separate from financial value. Reproduction is consider something “natural” and non-productive 
and thus does not belong to the realm of production. Dickenson suggests that the reason for the 
separation is not that reproduction would not actually produce value. Rather the reasons are the cultural 
ethos, the social practices, and the gender roles in the Western world, which seem to undermine the 
value-producing element of reproduction.1037  
Dickenson challenges the traditional view of reproduction as non-productive. She employs 
a Lockean treatment of property. In her interpretation, the Lockean perspective rests on the conviction 
that people have a right to what they have worked to make. Since people have not labored to create their 
bodies, they do not have the right to dispose of their bodies, tissues, or body parts. Women’s 
reproductive labor is, however, an exception: intentionality, control, and hard work describe ovum 
donation. As such ovum donation is labor.1038 “[W]omen labour to produce these extracted ova, in the 
purposeful manner which characterises the sort of labour grounding property right in Locke.”1039 
Consequently, women have a right to their extracted ova. The right need not, however, mean the right to 
the capital value of the ova or the right to sell the ova. Dickenson maintains that the rights may mean that 
women have the right to physical possession of their ova, the right to the management of their egg cells, 
and the right to security against their ova being taken by others.1040  
 In order to protect the donors of reproductive tissue, Dickenson proposes a limited 
contract model based on the Lockean treatment of property and a Hegelian notion of contract as mutual 
recognition. According to Dickenson’s analysis of the Hegelian contract, rights are recognized by others – 
or rather both the rights bearer and others recognize the rights. This can be called mutual recognition. 
The Hegelian model of property indicates that “property is not merely about relations of possession and 
control, but rather about the broader dynamics of social recognition.”1041 The recognition is not only 
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mutual, but also ongoing and may be regarded as continuing, even after a physical object has changed 
owners. Donors have and should have interests in the use of their gifts, even after the donation.1042  
Dickenson suggests that a Hegelian model is useful in relation to stem cell research and 
stem cell banks:  
A Hegelian perspective on the purpose of contract as mutual recognition actually makes contract 
more attractive than informed consent as the model for setting up stem cell banks. Whereas in 
informed consent the patient or donor is too often the more passive partner, accepting or rejecting 
what the doctor or researcher proposes, in a Hegelian contract both partners are equals.1043 
In such a system, the donors should have the right to withdraw their consent at any time. The research 
institutes or biobanks would be obligated to contact donors for consent if the stem cell lines created from 
donated tissue were to be used for purposes other than those mentioned in the original informed consent 
form. Women and infertile couples would have a say in the purposes for which cell lines created from 
their tissues might be used.1044 Dickenson recognizes the possibility that investors would not want to put 
money on stem cell lines whose use might be later reversed by ovum donors. Policymakers should not, 
however, yield to economic pressure. Furthermore, biotechnology remains lucrative for investors despite 
the more restrictive guidelines.  
Since the commercial values stakes are immensely valuable, presumably researchers and 
biotechnology companies would still want to invest in stem cell research, even if the protections 
afforded to ovum donors were somewhat less minuscule they are at present.1045 
Another solution comes from Sheryl de Lacey, who has pointed out that the current 
donation guidelines protect scientific and economic interests, not voluntary and altruistic donors; 
consequently, the guidelines “trivialize the contribution of infertile embryo donors.”1046 She supports a 
form of monetary compensation, namely, a tissue tax. The indirect tissue tax could be used as a 
mechanism for sharing benefits: “a levy applied to commercial profit and redirected to subsidy of the 
clinical treatments from which donated IVF embryos are drawn.”1047 The tax would be an appropriate 
means of compensation, although “monetary exchange around biological donation is taboo because of 
assumptions about its power to coerce patients and to corrupt ethical consent processes.”1048 However, 
the presence of monetary transactions does not make a donation process coercive. Money is an 
important symbol of appreciation in Western societies. Moreover, the compensation need not be a 
payment for donated tissue, but rather a reimbursement for efforts, inconvenience, discomfort, and labor. 
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However, de Lacey does not argue for a direct payment to women and couples who donate embryos or 
egg cells remaining after IVF. Rather she proposes a model that acknowledges the economic burden of 
IVF, reproductive effort, the personal valuing of embryos, and economic growth.1049 The benefits of such 
a tax are democratic control, fair distribution, and preservation of scientific incentives. Donors would not 
benefit directly from the tax, but since there is evidence that infertile donors wish to help other infertile 
couples, the indirect nature of compensation would be appropriate.1050  
 In sum, the stem cell reports maintain that women should be prevented from seeking any 
profit from donating their embryos and fetuses. In addition, the stem cell reports emphasize that 
researchers must inform donors that the stem cells may be used for commercial purposes and that the 
researchers may profit financially. Financial incentives are believed to increase women’s decisions to 
terminate their pregnancies. The reports explicitly protect women from any financial pressure to donate 
embryos or go through abortion. I maintain, however, that the policy statements also reflect another, 
implicit concern – for the moral status of embryos and fetuses. This in turn is seen as compromising the 
moral status of the fetus. However, while masquerading as equals, the reports are unable to provide 
practical solutions to protect donors. If the problems related to commercialization are to be avoided, then 
new solutions and guidelines are needed, whether these be a tissue tax or the recognition of women’s 
right to control the stem cell lines resulting from their tissue. Guidelines should protect those who are the 
most vulnerable: “The problem lies not with erecting fences, but with whom they enclose: not those with 
power, but those without.”1051 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion of the Stem Cell Debate 
The reports on stem cell research and use are based on the assumption of an availability of surplus – or 
“extra” – ova and embryos. However, the assumption may prove false; there are already indications of a 
growing need for unfertilized eggs. There may not be “extra” ova for research purposes. Both the current 
practice and the future situation in which ova become scarce put a strain on women and infertile couples. 
Only a few stem cell reports recognize the pressure that stem cell research might exert on women. 
Feminist bioethicists claim that the negligence reflected in the reports reflects disinterest in women’s 
health in the current stem cell research and debate. Women are being separated from stem cell research, 
even though the research would not be possible without their contribution.1052  
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Feminist bioethicists claim that one of the reasons for the separation and negligence is 
that stem cell research has been separated from the contexts that precede the research. They point out 
that women undergo medical procedures before donating ova, fetuses or embryos for research and urge 
that “the decision of women to create embryos for infertility treatment and their decision to donate excess 
embryos for research are kept separate.”1053 The proponents of stem cell research defended the 
research on the grounds that it productively uses human tissue that would otherwise be wasted. Put 
another way, stem cell research uses only the “by-products” of reproductive technologies that would 
otherwise be discarded. This has led to separating women from stem cell research and thus to lack of 
interest in women’s health. The situation indicates that the procedures used to obtain human tissue for 
research belong to the realm of reproduction and not to the realm of science. Some bioethicists maintain 
that women are willing to accept the risks involved in infertility treatments. For this reason, they do not 
question the reproductive practices that enable stem cell research. It is worth noting, however, that the 
number of women providing gametes solely for research purposes is growing. Thus, the argument that 
the issues affecting women belong only to the realm of reproduction does not hold.1054   
Feminists maintain that the ethical discussion of stem cell research is inadequate if the 
procedures preceding research and donation, especially assisted reproduction, are not considered. From 
a feminist bioethical point of view, assisted reproduction per se need not be opposed. Both assisted 
reproduction technologies and reproduction reflect cultural, financial, and societal contexts and 
discourses, which are socially and culturally constructed. Reproduction especially is shaped by ideas, 
norms, and ideals of gender roles, children, and genetic progeny. Motherhood is perceived as a natural 
part of a woman’s life, and assisted reproduction is thought to provide the means to ensure and restore 
women their natural ability to conceive and bear a genetically related child.1055  
For example, according to Dion Farquhar’s analysis of assisted reproduction, “‘infertility’ … 
is a historically constructed, contested, and negotiated social condition and status that then takes on the 
aura of a ‘natural’ and eternal condition.”1056 Involuntary childlessness was not considered a medical 
condition before the invention of medical procedures that help overcome childlessness. The 
pathologization and classification of involuntary childlessness as infertility have functioned to relieve 
stigmatization that some involuntarily childless women and couples may experience.1057 According to 
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Farquhar, infertility has been normalized as a medical disease in the medical discourse. Consequently, 
the social and cultural dimensions of infertility have been obscured.1058 Medicalization reassures “people 
that they have done everything possible to have their ‘own’ baby.”1059  
Feminist bioethicists are concerned that both the cultural dimensions of childlessness and 
the medicalized account of infertility are directing women and infertile couples to take action to ensure 
pregnancy. If over-producing ova and embryos in IVF is thought to help ensure pregnancy and if 
pregnancy is the goal of reproductive medicine, then it is likely that women are directed to produce 
surplus ova and embryos regardless of the risks involved. The feminist bioethical literature indicates that 
the participants in the stem cell debate might be oblivious to the conditions under which supernumerary 
embryos are created.1060 Feminist bioethicists point out that reproduction is always about women’s 
bodies. Reproductive technologies, including egg derivation, IVF, and abortion, cannot be separated from 
corporeality and women’s bodies. Furthermore, “bodies are always inextricably intertwined with 
discourse, culture, and power.”1061 Therefore, technologies cannot be separated from the cultural and 
social representations, from which they derive their meanings.1062 It should be noted that there are indeed 
women who are aware of the risks and other issues in ovum donation, IVF, and abortion and who, 
despite the risks, are willing to take part in the research.  
I maintain that it is important to acknowledge to the larger or social effects of socialization. 
Even though it is important to pay attention to whether an individual woman or a couple has given “free 
and autonomous” consent, it is even more important to be attentive to the forces that place women – and 
men – in the position that they feel they have no choice but to engage in infertility technologies.1063 Novel 
stem cell technologies contribute partly to global inequalities in terms of economic status, race, and 
ethnicity. From a feminist bioethical perspective, it is not appropriate to declare that the Romany women 
who sold their eggs were not autonomous, but it is appropriate – and obligatory to – demand stronger 
regulations for research institutions. They should be called upon to take social responsibility.  
The feminist bioethical literature indicates that a more thorough analysis of the ethical 
assumptions behind stem cell policies is needed. For example, Suzanne Holland claims that in order for 
an ethical analysis of stem cell research and use to be adequate, bioethicists need to discuss the 
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theoretical issues that in turn would yield a sustainable stem cell policy. According to Holland, “an ethical 
commitment would entail social policy that reflects a fundamental trust in the moral agency of women and 
those in the margins.”1064 Such a policy would also have to honor human dignity and relationality.1065 
Holland’s requirements for a sustainable stem cell policy seem to suggest that the problems inherent in 
the current policy and debate will not be solved by adding women and infertile couples’ points of view to 
the debate. Rather the question concerns the deeper structures of bioethics, which in turn govern 
policymaking processes.  
The deeper structures of bioethics and medicine indeed direct the stem cell debate. As 
indicated by the analysis above, feminist bioethicists touch upon these issues. They maintain that the 
moral status of the human embryo is only the tip of the iceberg – or a micro-ethical issue. The focus on 
the embryo reflects a narrow view that should be broadened to larger social issues, such as benefit 
sharing and donor rights. How then should these macro issues be dealt with from a feminist bioethical 
perspective? In my view, feminist bioethicists concentrate especially on the following aspects of their 
analysis. First, sustainable stem cell ethics protect those without power. Thus, analysis of power 
structures is important for a feminist understanding of stem cell ethics. Second, a relational and 
contextual analysis of the issue is called for. For example, feminists maintain that the moral status of the 
embryo should be defined relationally. Like born human beings, embryos are related to the surrounding 
world from which they derive their moral status. Third, according to the feminist bioethicists, power 
structures, relations, and contexts affect autonomy and informed consent practices. Therefore, fourth, 
suggestions such as informed consent based on mutual recognition should be put into practice. Fifth, the 
endorsement of a tissue tax could help to allay any potential problems of commercial exploitation in the 
sense that it could help to overcome the possible disparity in the value of exchange of goods or services 
(the non-commercial donation of eggs, embryos, and fetuses and the commercial use of this “material”). 
Human stem cell research has been justified on the grounds of its potential for relieving 
human suffering. From a feminist ethical point of view, it is important to ask: whose suffering and at 
whose expense? Is stem cell research increasing the marginalization of the many on behalf of the 
few?1066 Currently, future stem cell therapies seem to be luxury treatments for the affluent and the well-
off. The problem is intensified as long as stem cell reports remain silent about the part women play in 
stem cell research and use.1067 
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[T]he continuing failure to “count women in” radically undermines current policy guidelines on new 
biotechnological developments, particularly stem cells, and how that failure threatens a new sort of 
poverty for women.1068  
The accurate ethical outcome of the questioning of stem cell research is not to deny women’s 
participation in the research per se. Rather the point is to make sure that all the relevant facts are 
presented correctly and openly. The point is to make women’s share in research visible. Stem cell 
research may be friend or foe – depending on what we do about it.  
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5 New Directions for Feminist Bioethics  
Feminist bioethicists rely on core feminism and on the imperative to reduce inequality in bioethical theory, 
health care practices, and medicine. These bioethicists are thus critical of biomedicine, biotechnologies, 
and bioethical theories, viewing them not as purely or necessarily repressive, but as facilitating, because 
they enhance certain cultural values. However, according to feminist bioethicists, technologies and 
relations of power are not simply bad. In order to determine what it means to have a healthy body, a 
careful analysis of both the social conditioning that affects all people and the meaning of experience is 
needed. Therefore, social values and standards that affect both experiences and scientific information 
should be examined.1069  
Feminist bioethicists maintain that women’s pre-existing social disadvantage has been 
reinforced both philosophically and medically. What is taken as a normal female body in the Western 
biomedical model is the result of a complicated normalization process. Although more often than not the 
process of normalization is directed at the bodies of women, it also affects the bodies of men.1070 Women 
are not solely objects in the interplay of normalization and technologies although women’s agency may 
be restricted in different societies.1071 
In order to go beyond the standard understanding of biomedicine, biotechnologies, and 
bioethics, feminist bioethicists call for contextual and relational transformation. As explained earlier, 
feminist bioethics is based on a contextual and relational interpretation of the world; according to 
feminists, human beings are shaped by relationships. Contexts affect the way people perceive and 
interpret the world, their surroundings, their environments, and their relationships, all of which give 
meaning to individual growth, to the development of autonomy skills, and to morality. Although feminist 
bioethicists are not always clear about how contextuality and relationality should be understood, they 
seem to make the following distinction: relations, more than contexts, define moral agency, whereas 
contexts seem to be more important in understanding moral knowledge.  
 This viewpoint can be seen throughout the present study. In chapter 2.1, I noted that 
contexts both construct and facilitate the choices that individuals make. These contexts are particular 
elements and relationships in particular cases, and also larger social networks of power relations. In 
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chapter 2.2, I maintained that persons are connected. This understanding of self as relational directs the 
feminist bioethicists’ account of moral agency. Because moral agents are connected to one another, their 
actions are situated in a web of different relations. In chapter 3.2, I provided a feminist account of 
autonomy in which pure, self-reliant subjects disappear and individuality is defined by relationality, 
through connection with the other.  
Feminists maintain that human beings make decisions and act on them in the world. 
However, they are unable to define how humans come to make these decisions – by free choice or by 
other processes? There seem to be certain factors (gender, religion, ethnicity, culture) that limit the 
opportunities individuals have. Feminists are faced with the problem of socialization. Therefore, as my 
analysis in chapter 3.3 indicates, feminist bioethicists need to explain whether and how autonomy is 
possible for women and other marginalized groups.  
 Chapter 4 provided insights into a specific bioethical problem, namely, stem cell research. 
The chapter showed that feminist bioethicists are not necessarily able to apply the above-mentioned 
paradigms (contextuality and relationality) to concrete situations in need of bioethical analysis. For 
example, chapter 4.4 demonstrated how feminist bioethicists are faced with the question of why women 
would want to donate eggs, embryos, or fetuses for research. Feminist bioethicists are ready to 
acknowledge that women indeed donate reproductive material for research. Hence, they are ready to 
acknowledge the agency of the women as donors. However, feminist bioethicists seem to believe that 
certain cultural and social factors, such as the pronatalism in Western societies, influence women’s 
choice to become donors, resulting in the fear that the autonomy of women donors may be compromised. 
In other words, feminist bioethicists have been unable to develop a bioethics that could combine 
theoretical insights and practical applications. I maintain that this is partly because of two serious 
deficiencies in feminist bioethics: the lack of analysis of empirical bioethics and a comprehensive 
definition of moral agency.  
The lack of analysis of empirical bioethics is surprising, given the interest among feminist 
bioethicists in grounding ethics on the real experiences of real women. In chapter 2.1, I criticized feminist 
bioethicists’ vague use of the meaning of experiences in bioethical analysis. Feminist bioethicists seem 
unable to clarify exactly how experiences should be applied to bioethical analysis. I maintain that the use 
of empirical bioethics could provide helpful insights into feminist bioethics and the use of women’s 
experiences in ethical analysis and moral decision-making. For example, Pfeffer and Parry’s empirical 
studies of stem cell ethics demonstrate how empirical methods can inform both abstract ethical analysis 
and also practical moral decision-making.  
 Moreover, throughout the course of my study the question of moral agency has been 
present, both implicitly and explicitly. On the one hand, feminist bioethicists acknowledge the need to 
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define moral agency and transform the traditional understanding of it. On the other hand, the goal of 
transformation seems to create a certain difficulty that feminist bioethicists are unable to resolve. Feminist 
bioethicists hold that agency is constructed socially: social relationships and contexts create 
subjectivities. At the same time, social relationships and contexts are often oppressive or unequal, a 
situation that affects the agency of individuals. Do women and other marginalized groups have the 
capacity for autonomous agency within this framework? If so, what are their realistic possibilities for 
action and authenticity? I discussed these issues in chapters 2.2 and 3.3. In chapter 3.4 I suggested that 
the respect for autonomy can be shown through informed consent processes, given that those processes 
are described as agency-based and communicative. In the communicative transaction of informed 
consent, the agency of both health care professionals and the patients is emphasized. Together with the 
feminist understanding of autonomy as relational, the agency-based model of informed consent as 
communication shows that, instead of individual autonomy, relational autonomy and agency should 
become central to bioethics.  
The question of agency also appeared in relation to stem cell research in chapters 4.4 and 
4.5, in which the questions formulated were how women can decide about becoming donors in stem cell 
research and how does the commercialization of research affect their rights as donors. However, no 
conclusive answers to these questions were offered. These considerations indicate that feminist 
bioethicists and ethicists have mainly concentrated on the definition of relational autonomy. The meaning 
of agency for feminist (bio)ethics has not been  fully discussed. In my view, feminist bioethicists should 
put their focus on defining a concept of agency that incorporates the ideas of relationality and 
interpersonal respect. This reformulation could be helpful in further attempts to answer ethical questions 
related to novel biotechnologies, such as stem cell research. 
 In this chapter I will discuss the themes of empirical bioethics and agency and suggest 
how these issues might be understood. My goal is not to provide a final analysis of either empirical 
bioethics or moral agency. Rather it is to clarify the areas that need conclusive analysis and provide 
insights for further research in the area of feminist bioethics. 
The first area of development in feminist bioethics is the use of empirical bioethics. In their 
evaluation of bioethics, autonomy, and stem cell research, feminist bioethicists call for attention to be 
devoted to contexts, relationships, and cultural aspects of morality. They emphasize the opinions and 
beliefs of patients, relatives of patients, physicians, and nurses. Moreover, feminist bioethicists consider 
philosophical bioethics to be too abstract, too general, and too insensitive to social realities and contexts. 
They seek ways to integrate the lived experience with moral theories. This characterization suggests that 
feminist bioethicists endorse – at least implicitly – empirical bioethics, a subfield in bioethics whose 
purpose is to meet the challenge posed by feminist bioethicists by “developing ways of contextualising 
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philosophical moral theorising, and locating it within a discourse that draws on empirical data (generally 
qualitative) and moral theory.”1072 In other words, “empirical ethics is a new development in ethical 
research with the goal to bring empirical and normative approaches closer to each other and to connect 
the empirical with the normative.”1073 
 It should be noted that feminist bioethicists do not explicitly suggest that empirical 
bioethics should be introduced to feminist bioethics. They do not define or discuss how attention to 
contexts or social realities should be integrated into bioethics. Nor do they define the methods 
appropriate for (feminist) empirical bioethics. The lack of definition is confusing because empirical 
bioethics can be understood in several ways, and some of the methods proposed may be more suitable 
than others. Below, I will describe different approaches to empirical bioethics and discuss their merits in 
relation to feminist bioethics. 
 In general, empirical research in bioethics is intended to generate reliable and valid 
information or data by either qualitative or quantitative research methods.1074 Several writers emphasize 
the need to integrate the data with some form of normative approach.1075  
[T]he concept of “empirical ethics” has five basic assumptions: firstly, empirical ethics states that 
the study of people’s actual moral beliefs, intuitions, behaviour, and reasoning yields information 
that is meaningful for ethics and should be the starting point of ethics; secondly, empirical ethics 
acknowledges that the methodology of the social sciences … is a way, and probably the best way, 
to map this reality; thirdly, empirical ethics states that the crucial distinction between descriptive 
and prescriptive aspects should be more flexible. … [F]ourthly, empirical ethics is a heuristic term 
which argues for an integration of empirical methodology or empirical research evidence in the 
process of ethical reflection. … [F]inally, empirical ethics cannot be considered to be an 
antitheorist approach, in which the context and only the context would dictate what is morally good 
or evil, because in that case it would cease to be ethics.1076 
This passage indicates that empirical bioethics is the integration of empirical research with ethical 
reflection. What is important is not only that empirical research informs ethical analysis, but that ethical 
analysis informs the way empirical research is designed and conducted. For this reason, the dissimilarity 
between empirical bioethics and evidence-based ethics should be noted.1077 Evidence-based ethics is 
incompatible with the normative aims of empirical bioethics and is closely connected to evidence-based 
medicine, which holds that clinical decisions should be based on the best available scientific evidence. 
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Evidence-based medicine is seen to be both ethically motivated and technologically advanced and thus 
believed to promote patient well-being and ethical decision-making.1078   
The critics of evidence-based medicine and ethics have pointed out that neither medicine 
nor ethics can be entirely free of value judgments.1079 Research arises in a certain social and historical 
context whose values and preferences are taken for granted, even while they affect the formation of 
research problems, settings, and data. The researcher acts both as the creator of and the reporter on the 
world.1080 Evidence-based medicine and ethics require a “positivistic reliance on ‘the evidence’ in its 
epistemological promise to ascertain truth or certainty by examination of the evidence.”1081 As pointed out 
by feminist epistemologists, the observational evidence is neither value-free nor self evident. Value 
neutrality of scientific facts is an illusion. 
Evidence-based practices maintain the distinct ability to sidestep value differences and political 
disputes by appealing to the evidence as the bottom line. This move is positivist in its elimination 
of culture, contexts and the subjects of knowledge production from consideration.1082  
The attraction of evidence-based ethics is its seeming ability to manage an “unruly social world.”1083 It 
appears to provide precise answers which guide actions and reduce errors. However, as stated above, it 
is questionable whether any evidence can provide such help in ethical decision-making. 
 Nevertheless, evidence can be employed in ethics. Rather than evidence-based ethics, 
the use of empirical bioethics is reasonable. Although surveys and in-depth interviews may be valued 
less than carefully controlled and quantified evidence, they do provide important information about the 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of patients, clinicians, and the general public regarding bioethical 
issues.1084 For example, Mairi Levitt emphasizes the importance of public consultations for bioethics.1085 
Levitt insists that only certain types of public consultations are meaningful: in-depth interviews, 
questionnaires with open-ended questions, focus groups and workshops, and the use of personal records 
and diaries, which allow the participants to voice their own concerns instead of simply responding to the 
concerns of a researcher. The aim of the public consultation is not to measure the public’s knowledge 
about bioethical or scientific facts and therefore to determine the need for public education, but to learn 
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about the participants’ culture and experiences. When understood in this manner, public consultation 
would make the “diversity of voices in modern world”1086 heard.  
Sometimes bioethics can be wrongly expected to provide information from which definite 
ethical decisions can be taken. The interest in evidence-based ethics may increase belief in the mistaken 
idea that bioethicists could and should provide incontestable answers and guidance in moral questions. 
For this reason, I am skeptical of the potential of evidence-based bioethics for feminist bioethics. Instead, 
I promote empirical bioethics, which takes seriously the nature of ethics: definite ethical truths do not 
exist. Ethical decisions are always provisional and open for further consideration. The role of empirical 
bioethics is not solely to provide numerical data related to an ethical problem. Empirical bioethics does 
not “involve simply documenting people’s experiences and describing beliefs.”1087 “Moral decisions are 
not determined solely by empirical facts.”1088 Empirical bioethics can provide insight into how to look at 
the world as it is as well as inform the debate on how the world should be. At its best the interaction of 
empirical data with normative evaluation can have an impact on practice and policy. This is not, however, 
to endorse “doing ethics by opinion poll.”1089 The data gathered must be evaluated and challenged.1090  
Feminist bioethicists need to address exactly how data should be evaluated and 
challenged. It is clear that core feminism provides a starting point for the evaluation indetermining how 
certain practices either support or oppose the oppression of women and other marginalized groups. It is 
important to develop feminist empirical bioethics further, use different methods of empirical research, and 
evaluate these methods in relation to core feminism. These are challenges to be met by feminist 
bioethics in the near future. Feminist bioethicists need to define feminist empirical bioethics and the 
appropriate methods for it. 
The second area of development in feminist bioethics is to understand agency. Feminist 
bioethicists discuss moral agency in relation to relationships and contexts. They maintain that the 
mainstream understanding of the ontology of persons should be challenged and seen relationally and 
contextually. The understanding of individuality in mainstream bioethics is accused of being devoid of all 
social relations. Instead of excluding social relations and the contexts of the construction of the self, 
bioethics should view people as being connected to each other and to their social environments. Feminist 
bioethics endorses the ontology of persons, which is rooted in relationships and social contexts. This 
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understanding of the ontology of persons has an effect on how feminist bioethicists understand agency 
generally and moral agency in particular.1091 
These considerations show that the need to transform the concept of agency is closely 
linked to the feminist discussion of autonomy. Feminist bioethicists maintain the desire to transform the 
central concept of autonomy to fit better with the idea of people as being connected. Feminists have 
abandoned the concept of individual autonomy and have reformulated autonomy in terms of relationality. 
The idea of relational autonomy is connected to the question of agency.  
In the feminist view of autonomy and agency, pure self-reliant subjects disappear and 
individuality is defined by relationality, through connection with the other. As seen in chapter 2.2 on moral 
agency, agency is construed in the networks of oppression, subordination, and power.  These conditions 
affect how individuals can act in the world. Feminist bioethicists maintain that social contexts construct 
and facilitate the choices that individuals make.1092 As indicated above, this creates the problem of 
socialization in feminist thinking: feminists are faced with the question of how oppressive socialization 
affects agency and what kind of agency is possible for women in oppressive socialization. Relations and 
contexts make agency possible. Obviously, they also impede agency. But what is important is that there 
is no other kind of agency available.1093  
Admittedly, this creates an uneasy situation for those feminist bioethicists who endorse 
core feminism. According to core feminism, the aim of feminism is to overturn oppression and challenge 
inequality especially for women and other marginalized groups. Part of the feminist project is to endorse 
women’s agency and promote their ways of acting in the world. Yet some feminists maintain that these 
ways of acting can be compromised by oppression. Therefore, the aim of feminism is to emancipate 
women and other marginalized groups from oppression. These feminists maintain that women’s agency 
is compromised if women are not liberated from oppression. For them, the concept of agency is best 
understood in relation to the endorsement of feminist values or resistance to the subordinating function of 
power. In this view, patriarchal ideologies objectify women’s bodies, for example, and subject them to 
masculine systems of representation. Women’s experiences of their own bodies and agency are thereby 
annulled and distorted. The feminist aim is to expose the negative valuation of women and their 
experiences in certain cultural and social practices. In addition the aim is to show alternative experiences 
and representations of the female body, which do not follow masculine social and cultural norms.1094  
                                                        
1091 “It [feminist theory] has […] provided grounds for rejecting ontology of persons conceived as isolated, fully developed 
individuals. Rather, it acknowledges the social roots of a person as a being who develops within a specific social context and 
who is, to a significant degree, a product of that context.” Sherwin 1992b, 23.  
1092 Donchin 2001b, 374; Sherwin 1992b, 23.  
1093 Mahmood 2005, 8, 15. 
1094 Mahmood 2005, 157-159. 
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For example, in discussion of why women would want to donate eggs, embryos or fetuses 
(chapter 4.4), it was pointed out that some feminists maintain that there are no reasons for women to 
show such altruism and assist research that does not benefit them directly or even indirectly. Yet there 
are in fact women who donate eggs, embryos, or fetuses for research instead of opposing a research 
environment that reflects patriarchal norms. Within this feminist framework their agency becomes 
compromised. However, as indicated by Pfeffer and Parry, women’s motives and thoughts on donation 
vary. Thus, agency cannot be analyzed solely through resistance to social and cultural norms. 
The problem with this model is that it questions the validity of women’s experiences that 
are in accordance with the cultural and social norms often defined as masculinist in feminist thinking. I 
maintain that it is questionable whether feminists should categorize women’s experiences normatively 
and the possibilities women have for acting in the world. For this reason, I question the understanding of 
core feminism and agency in terms of the liberatory politics advocated by some feminists. Not all 
feminists interpret core feminism in such a strict manner. However, these feminists must answer the 
question of how agency should be defined, if not in term of liberatory politics. Saba Mahmood frames this 
question as follows: 
If we recognize that the desire for freedom from, or subversion of, norms is not an innate desire 
that motivates all beings at all times, but is also profoundly mediated by cultural and historical 
conditions, then the question arises: how do we analyze operations of power that construct 
different kinds of bodies, knowledges, and subjectivities whose trajectories do not follow the 
entelechy of liberatory politics?1095 
Mahmood suggests that agency should not be seen as a “synonym for resistance to social norms,”1096 
but understood as a “modality of action”1097 instead.  
Within this framework, agency cannot be understood exclusively in relation to resistance, 
but must also be seen as habitation. According to Mahmood, an “agentival capacity is entailed not only in 
those acts that resist norms but also in the multiple ways in which one inhabits norms.”1098 Specific 
relations of subordination not only hinder subjects, but also create and enable capacity for action. There 
is no “undominated self” that exists outside the social order and thus reflects authentic desires of that 
subject. For this reason, agency should be understood as a capacity that is created in social relations and 
certain contexts. Power within those relationships and contexts molds agency.1099 People become agents 
                                                        
1095 Mahmood 2005, 14. 
1096 Mahmood 2005, 157. 
1097 Mahmood 2005, 157. 
1098 Mahmood 2005, 15. Emphasis in the original. 
1099 “The subject, argues Foucault, does not precede power relations, in the form of an individual consciousness, but is 
produced through these relations, which form the necessary conditions of its possibility. Central to this formulation is what 
Foucault calls the paradox of subjectivation: the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also 
the means by which she becomes self-conscious identity and agent.” Mahmood 2005, 17. 
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when they employ the different discourses presented to them.1100 Expressing subjectivity happens 
through negotiation between different discourses. 
We express moral agency as we decide what sort of subjects we are, how we will position 
ourselves in history, what social and political projects we commit ourselves to, what practices of 
power we will participate and on what terms, and where we will offer resistance to the discourses 
that would construct our subjectivity.1101  
What is central to this idea of self-creation is that it is not about finding an essential self, because such a 
self cannot be found.1102 
In this view, the relation between innate (authentic) desire and action is framed as follows: 
actions do not reaffirm innate desires and natural desires, but instead create them. Furthermore, this view 
allows seeing the various interpretations of cultural practices and social norms. For example, the feminist 
understanding of oppressive socialization described above is limited. It recognizes only the negative 
aspects of certain social and cultural norms and interprets them merely through masculinist power. 
However, actions that outwardly seem to be the result of oppressive socialization may very well indicate 
different agentival capacity for women.1103 The multifaceted nature of actions must therefore be the core 
of analysis in feminist bioethics. “Only through … specificities can we begin to grasp the different 
modalities of agency involved in enacting, transgressing, or inhabiting ethical norms and moral 
principles.”1104 
As shown in chapter 2.4 the Foucaultian model of power allows for a flexible 
understanding of agency. It locates agency outside the political and moral autonomy of the subject and 
questions agency as the capacity to realize one’s own interests versus the weight of custom, tradition, or 
other obstacles. Those who are marginalized are also able to resist the power relationships in which they 
are located.1105 It is important to move beyond the simple resistance/subordination framework and 
perceive agency as expressed in various ways, not only in the moments of resistance.1106 If feminists 
want to respect women’s agency in full, then they have to learn to live with the uneasy feeling that women 
may comply with masculine power. At the same time it is clear that power affects, restricts, and enables 
all people alike.  
  Some feminist bioethicists maintain that a more flexible understanding of agency and 
subject positions is helpful in the analysis of ovum donation, IVF, abortion, and stem cell research.1107 In 
                                                        
1100 Nagl 2005, 163-164.  
1101 Nagl 2005, 164. 
1102 Nagl 2005, 163-164. 
1103 Mahmood 2005, 158-159. 
1104 Mahmood 2005, 188. 
1105 Mahmood 2005, 14-15; Stone 2007, 58-60. 
1106 Mahmood 2005, 14, 20. 
1107 Farquhar 1996, 5-7; Shildrick 1997. 
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their view, power always operates productively. Predominant cultural and social attitudes toward 
reproduction mold the technologies and the discourse around and about them. “Contemporary 
reproductive technologies are practices that embody matrices of history, power, and knowledge.”1108 This 
account shows that “reproductive technologies can probe, regulate, and scan the body in coercive 
directions, but they can also stimulate, multiply, and extend the body’s functions in liberatory or 
hybridizing ones.”1109  
This understanding of agency might enlighten the recurring question of autonomous 
subjectivity of the donors. Even though autonomy may be compromised by oppressive socialization, 
agency rarely is. Agency does not have to refer to being active or passive in terms of resistance to social 
pressure, but rather is an expression of desires, intentions, or positions to relationships, for example. 
Recent feminist literature suggests that choice is not the only mode of understanding reproductive 
technologies. These can be understood as producing transnational networks of relationships in which 
individual desires are expressed. For example, the desires to donate eggs (for financial gain or for 
altruistic reasons) and the desire to receive eggs (in the hope of having a baby) produce relationships 
that may be temporary, yet are significant. Biological kinships are replaced by other ties. Both donors and 
recipients may attempt to gain a “sense of dignity”1110 within the system of reproductive technologies and 
market economy. By doing this, both donors and recipients perpetuate this system.  
Furthermore, I maintain that empirical bioethics as presented earlier in this chapter helps 
to understand how the donors themselves perceive agency and autonomy. Feminist bioethicists should 
be encouraged to take up the task of analyzing agency in relation to particular settings and situations. 
This would not require a comprehensive theory of agency, but rather a multiple understanding of the 
modalities of agency. This would also open up a view on the feminist question of how to reflect 
resistance.  
[I]t is best not to propose a theory of agency but to analyze agency in terms of the different 
modalities it takes and the grammar of concepts in which particular affect, meaning, and form 
resides. Insomuch as this kind of analysis suggests that different modalities of agency require 
different kinds of bodily capacities, it forces us to ask whether acts of resistance (to systems of 
gender hierarchy) also develop upon the ability of the body to behave in particular ways.1111  
Resistance is not only about effecting change in gender systems or social norms, but also about 
retraining desire, emotions, and emotional response. It would be important to develop bioethics in this 
direction. 
                                                        
1108 Farquhar 1996, 7. 
1109 Farquhar 1996, 5. 
1110 Nahman 2008, 76. 
1111 Mahmood 2005, 188. 
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The development of feminist bioethics should not rest only on the understanding of 
agency, but also on a new understanding of epistemology. Although it is not only women who express 
their agency through resistance of social norms, it is important that feminists examine those norms and 
identify the ones that are of particular relevance to women. The social structure must be analyzed in 
order to question it. Furthermore, feminists need to create new meanings for cultural and social norms. 
The creation will necessarily be embedded in cultural understandings and meanings. “Women who want 
to create new meanings work within an existing language, system of imagery, and myths.”1112 Therefore, 
both consenting to and resisting norms can help in creating new meanings. What is important is that 
multiple paths to truth can displace hegemonic discourses in moral theory and epistemology. These 
multiple paths can provide a new understanding of bioethics.  
In chapter 1.2, I proposed that feminists adopt three different transformation strategies, the 
third of which is the most suitable for feminist bioethics. In the third strategy, transformation is based on 
an epistemological analysis, which is committed to the following criteria. The object of knowledge is not 
only women, but also prevailing ways of knowing. Consequently, feminists should challenge and rebuild 
current epistemological theories in which universal knowledge of one “Truth”1113 is not possible, because 
knowledge is partial and affected by historical and philosophical issues.1114 Feminist bioethicists criticize 
the way bioethical knowledge is produced. In their view, moral knowledge and truth are partial and 
contextual. People as knowers are bound by their life-contexts. Therefore, knowledge is produced in 
particular situations and circumstances which, in turn, affect the nature of that knowledge. The contextual 
approach directs the transformation of bioethics. Newly transformed bioethics cannot claim a single truth. 
In addition to the criticism of standard bioethical knowledge, feminist bioethicists must remain critical of 
the ways in which feminist bioethics is produced. As indicated above, the feminist tendency to regard 
oppressive socialization as damaging to women’s agency is questionable. Therefore, the third 
transformation strategy requires that a definition of the subject that is based on differences demands a 
new conception of agency that does not presuppose universal human essence, but which nevertheless 
defines the identity of the subject without losing coherence. It should be noted that oppression does not 
negate women’s agency, because agency should be understood as a way both to inhabit and to resist 
oppressive norms and beliefs.  
This view advocates interpersonal responsibility. The boundary between the self and the 
other is never sharply defined. The self does not exist before it is differentiated from the other, but is built 
in the interaction of the self and the other. There is no defined line or boundary between subject and 
                                                        
1112 Hekman 1999, 140. 
1113 Hekman 1999, 26. 
1114 Grosz 1993, 206-209; Hekman 1999, 23-26. 
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object, because they do not radically diverge from each other. The subject derives its meaning and being 
from interacting with the object.1115 This renders the autonomous subject vulnerable. Its existence as “self-
as-individual”1116 is called into question, although this is not necessarily a negative development. When 
agency and autonomy are conceived as “closed”, our engagement with the other is limited.1117  Instead of 
independence, connectivity should be emphasized. “What this appears to suggest is that self-responsibility 
must entail a necessary responsibility to the trace of the other in myself.”1118 Hence, a new kind of ethical 
responsibility is possible.1119  
 
  
                                                        
1115 “[T]here is … no real distinction to be made between subject and object, for both the one who acts and the one who is 
acted upon are constituted by the same range of disciplinary forces directed at the individual body.” Shildrick 1997, 150. 
1116 Gibson 2006, 189. 
1117 Gibson 2006, 195. 
1118 Shildrick 1997, 112. 
1119 Shildrick 1997, 113. “[W]hat this [deconstructionist maneuver] would mean in terms of morality is that any frame of 
reference should always be acknowledged as specific, contextual, situated and fluid. … Far from reading that possibility as a 
dead end for its own project, postmodernist feminism sees in such scepticism the opportunity both of challenging male 
authorised certainties and of avoiding an equally damaging reliance on female alternatives.” Shildrick 1997, 104-105. 
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6 Conclusion 
In this study I have analyzed central feminist ways of thinking in relation to standard bioethics and its 
transformation. The goal was to identify how transformation defines feminist bioethics and what the 
feminist transformation of bioethics is like. The main aim of feminist bioethics is to bring new perspectives 
to the ongoing bioethical discussions. Feminist bioethicists both criticize and enrich the bioethical 
framework. Their work is characterized best by the idea of transformation. Behind the quest for 
transformation is core feminism and its political implications, namely, that women and other marginalized 
groups have been given unequal consideration in society and in the sciences, a situation that is 
unacceptable and needs to be remedied.  
Despite the general commitment to transformation, the depth and the form of the 
transformation are contested by feminist bioethicists. I have classified feminist approaches to 
transformation in three strategies according to their understanding of the reasons and remedies for the 
unequal power-relations. In both the first and second strategies, the male serves as the standard for 
human nature; the task of the feminists is to question the understanding of human nature as male. 
Whereas the first strategy emphasizes aspects of how women are like men, the second emphasizes the 
difference between the sexes. These strategies endeavor to highlight women and women’s activities and 
make women visible where they have been invisible.  
Unlike the first two strategies, the third strategy has a different approach to the 
transformation of feminist bioethics. Its adherents criticize the first two strategies of a dual understanding 
for having sexual difference in which male and female genders form two classes. The first two strategies 
interpret the differences between men and women to be monolithic and hierarchical. Feminists in favor of 
the third strategy maintain that the question of difference between men and women should be understood 
as a question of plural differences, meaning differences both between and among men and women. The 
advocates of the third strategy propose a distinctive tactic for transformation: calling attention to the 
transformation of the ideologies on which the standard epistemological stances are grounded.  
The goal of the dissertation was to determine how feminist bioethicists integrate the 
transformation into their respective fields and apply the potential of feminism to bioethical theories and 
practice. I suggested that the feminist transformation of bioethics is being used in certain theoretical 
themes and applied bioethics. I proposed that the transformation applies to profound theoretical, 
conceptual, and applied questions in bioethics.  
In chapter 2, I examined the theoretical premises of feminist bioethics. In chapter 2.1, I 
examined how feminist bioethicists challenge and rebuild current epistemological theories. I analyzed 
how feminist bioethicists contest and reconstruct the current ways of knowledge production in bioethics. 
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According to feminist bioethicists, social arrangements affect the production of knowledge. The power-
biased nature of bioethics is a result of the inequality that permeates these social arrangements. This 
creates a two-part task for feminists: the social arrangements need to be changed and current ways of 
knowing must be shown to be based on inequality. Bioethics cannot be transformed unless the biases in 
the field are acknowledged.   
According to feminist bioethicists, both moral knowledge and truth are partial and 
contextual. Knowledge is produced in particular situations and circumstances that, in turn affect the 
nature of knowledge. For that reason, the methods that feminist bioethicists propose – reflective 
equilibrium and practical dialogue – are based on contextuality. Both reflective equilibrium and practical 
dialogue suggest moral ideals that are not eternal, but tied to a certain time and place. Thus, the 
contextual approach directs the transformation of bioethics.  
This understanding of the nature of knowledge allows speculation on whether the 
transformation suggested by feminists entails moral relativism, namely, the idea that no single objective 
standard exists by which one can assess the truth of a moral proposition. Feminist bioethicists maintain 
that a certain form of relativism is in fact in accordance with feminist thinking. They bring up feminist 
relativism, in which there is nothing more primary or central than community standards in ethics. 
Feminists are called upon to pay attention to the communal and political contexts and to the power 
relations that each community endorses. The evaluation of a community’s moral standards must be 
based on an assessment of how a given community reaches moral decisions. The central element of 
feminist relativism is the analysis of the power used in decision-making. Practices based on the 
oppressive use of power come in for criticism. Moral decisions should be safeguarded against further 
oppression. Given this understanding of the nature of knowledge, I argued that in order to understand 
fully the concept of context, one must look at two issues to which contextuality is linked – relationships 
and power.  
In chapter 2.2, I examined what kind of effect relationships have on the social contexts 
that contribute to the construction of moral agency and knowledge. I maintained that the task of feminist 
bioethicists is to define agency, which is based on differences and does not presuppose universal human 
essence, but which nevertheless defines the identity of the subject without losing coherence. The feminist 
bioethicists’ account of moral agency is based on understanding the self as relational. Persons are 
viewed as connected to each other through a shared history and communities. However, people are not 
reducible to their community or to their roles therein. A critical stance toward relationships gives people 
the chance to define themselves. Their identities are not preordained according to their roles in the 
community. Because moral agents are connected to one another, their actions are situated in a web of 
different relationships. Thus, individualism and separateness do not define moral agency. 
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I maintained that feminists must answer the question of how agency can be understood in 
relation to power inequalities. In other words, what kind of agency is possible for those who are restricted 
by oppressive conditions? Feminist theorists suggest that oppressive conditions definitely affect agency, 
but they do not invalidate it. Agency should be understood as a capacity created in social relations and 
certain contexts. Within these contexts agency can be expressed not only by defying social norms, but 
also by inhabiting these norms. The question of how power relations and norms affect agency is not 
straightforward. For this reason, it cannot be claimed that social relations and contexts always hinder 
agency. The question of agency is versatile and complex. As such, agency is linked to autonomy and 
affected by different power relations. As I indicated in chapter 2.2, agency should be analyzed in relation 
to these themes.  
In chapter 2.3, I analyzed feminist bioethicists’ understanding of bioethics as relational. 
According to feminist bioethicists, the relational approach should direct actual decision-making in 
bioethics. Concrete relationships influence people’s moral decisions, and their moral decisions affect their 
relationships. Therefore, in bioethical decision making the fact that people consider how existing 
relationships affect their choices and how their actions affect those around them should be taken into 
account. According to my analysis, feminist bioethics describes how relationships influence and direct 
bioethics in specific settings and real decision-making situations. Relational ethics acknowledges 
people’s interpersonal bonds with others, and their influence on bioethics at different levels. A relational 
approach would question the use of the universal moral principles that have traditionally dominated the 
field of bioethics. Yet the relational approach would not wholly abandon the use of universal principles. 
For example, the requirement to pay heed to relationships and context might be considered a universal 
principle compatible with the feminist relational approach. 
Relational ethics is based on the idea that people are connected. The feminists’ account of 
relational ethics is based on a relational account of the self in which the interconnectedness of persons is 
important. For this reason, relational ethics is based on the idea of responsibility. If people want to adopt 
an ethical stance, then they must recognize the interconnectedness of moral agents. I maintained that the 
idea of relationality is reflected, for example, in the deconstuctionistic view of the boundary of the self and 
the other. Once the boundaries of the self and the other are deconstructed, they become unstable. There 
are traces of the other in the self and vice versa. Furthermore, if there are traces of the other in the self, 
then responsibility for the self is also responsibility for the other, namely, the other in the self. 
However, before the feminist bioethicists’ idea of relational ethics can be fully understood, 
the effect of power on relationships must be analyzed. Furthermore, feminist bioethicists consider 
relationships important for analyzing power inequalities and oppressive structures in a given society. The 
bioethicists use relationships to refer not only to personal relationships between individuals, but also to 
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larger scale, social relationships. This question was taken up in chapter 2.4 in which I discussed how 
feminist bioethicists define and analyze the power relations that are said to form the larger context for 
moral analysis in feminist bioethics. I argued that feminist bioethicists do not analyze the roots of gender 
oppression or the subordinate status of women very comprehensively. 
I examined how power appears in actual health care and medical settings and situations. 
Feminist bioethicists maintain that, from the practical point of view, bioethics has failed to empower 
patients, regardless of bioethicists’ outward concern for vulnerable patients. Ethics and especially 
formulating moral theories are ways for the powerful to extend their power and control those with less 
power. Medical practice does not encourage women to trust themselves or seek ways to maintain their 
own well-being, but directs them to trust male doctors and professionals. This is evident in different areas 
of medicine: medical research, occupational choices, and physician-patient relations reveal that women 
are affected by oppressive power relations. Feminist bioethicists are challenging the situation and 
providing alternative ways of seeing women’s roles in medicine.  
In order to accomplish this, feminist bioethicists are tracing the theoretical background of 
medicine and bioethics. Therefore, I discussed how bioethics, as a philosophical discourse, deals with 
issues of power and how bioethics reacts to power inequality. Not only medical practice, but also 
mainstream bioethics is oppressive to women and other marginalized groups. Feminist bioethicists 
maintain that power inequality is situated in the theoretical structures of bioethics. They identify two main 
theoretical reasons for the ignorance: individualism and abstraction. Bioethics’ appeal to universals and 
individual rights has erased the meaning of community contexts and cultural affiliations.  
I suggested that a more profound analysis of power may enrich feminist bioethics. I 
presented Deborah Lupton’s ways of understanding power: the functionalist, the political economy and 
the Foucaultian. According to the functionalist perspective, power is not coercive; it is a positive social 
resource that helps members of the society to achieve common goals. Power differences are not denied, 
but they are viewed as constructive and necessary to keep society functioning. Those with power are 
those with most skills. One problem with the functionalist perspective is that it does not take into account 
the larger social patterns in which individual relationships take place. The dominance of medicine and 
medical practice is not analyzed on a structural level. The political economy perspective is based on the 
idea that the patient-physician relationship is defined by a power struggle and a conflict of interest. 
Occupational control, not professional skills or expertise, is the basis for power. Medical practitioners 
have power because their status gives it to them. Although the political ecomony perspective studies the 
visible elements of power in a medical setting, it is unable to create a more comprehensive account of 
power in relation to the production of moral knowledge and agency. It does not, for example, state how 
those oppressed could reclaim agency. In the Foucaultian perspective, power produces knowledge and 
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agency. It is thus a social organization or a relation of force. Subjects do not precede power, but are 
created and enabled in the power relations. Power is everywhere and is thus pervasive. However, power 
is not about one-way domination, and patients are not obliged to be submissive. Power cannot be 
understood as a singular model of domination and subordination, but as a relation of a force.  
I suggested that the Foucaultian perspective on power can help clarify feminist 
bioethicists’ understanding of theoretical issues, such as agency and knowledge, related to their 
respective field. Within the Foucaultian model, agency is possible for those oppressed. Agency is located 
outside the political and moral autonomy of the subject, and, as the capacity to realize one’s own 
interests against the weight of custom, tradition, or other obstacles, agency is questioned. Those who are 
subjucated cannot fully lack agency. Therefore, they are also able to resist the power relationships in 
which they are situated. In relation to knowledge, power is based on knowledge, but also reproduces 
knowledge.  
 At the end of chapter 2.4, I suggested that feminism informed by a Foucaultian 
understanding of power and knowledge is linked to “social constructionism”, meaning that truth 
statements are grounded in social meanings (or language games or discourses). Accepting the social 
basis for truth statements does not imply that cultural forces could not be challenged. Social reform is 
possible, but it must be done slowly. The world is comprehensible through concepts. Therefore, changing 
the concepts means changing the world. Concepts can be used in new and different ways to construct a 
new social understanding. 
 I concluded that the third transformation strategy for feminist bioethics, presented in 
chapter 1.2, is both logical and possible. The question is not about finding a “true” grounding for feminist 
bioethics, for all meanings are “true” only in a social sense. Instead, feminist bioethicists must work with 
beliefs, concepts, and practices that give us our world and that can be worked with and directed changed 
toward feminist values.  
In order to understand fully the importance of concepts for the transformation of bioethics, 
I examined how feminist bioethicists have criticized and redefined one particular concept, namely, 
autonomy. Autonomy served as an example of how concepts can be revised to include feminist values. In 
chapter 3.1, I discussed and analyzed the feminist criticism of the standard understanding of autonomy. 
Feminist bioethicists criticize traditional bioethical theories for defining autonomous individuals as self-
sufficient, unconnected, and separate. Understood traditionally, autonomy refers to self-control and 
suggests that individuals can both restrain and surpass themselves. Contrary to the mainstream account, 
feminist bioethicists insist on the importance of an individual being a moral subject only within her or his 
social, cultural, and communal context. The bioethicists see morality as a social construct, which is 
always interpersonal. Even though feminist bioethicists sharply criticize the traditional concept of 
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autonomy, they note that it is built on sets of belief or ideologies that are not absolute, but arise within 
different discourses. For this reason, the transformation of beliefs and concepts is both possible and 
desirable.  
In chapter 3.2, I presented two feminist alternatives to the old concept of autonomy: 
conscientious autonomy and autokoenony. Both are relational in nature, since both emphasize human 
relationships, the social nature of moral knowledge, and the importance of contexts in value formation. 
Conscientious autonomy and autokoenony can be interpreted as belonging to the category of relational 
autonomy, which includes different perspectives and accounts of autonomy based on the conviction that 
social relationships shape moral identities and values. Feminist bioethicists emphasize that people 
become autonomous only through relationships and social contexts. Furthermore, they maintain that 
autonomy is pursued only in social contexts. A relational account of autonomy has left feminist 
bioethicists with the same question that arises in relation to agency, namely, the problem of socialization: 
how do (oppressive) societies influence and direct an agent and her or his decisions, actions and 
choices? Oppression may compromise an agent’s autonomy.  
In chapter 3.3, I discussed the consequences of the feminist understanding of autonomy 
as relational. How can individuals be autonomous if they are affected by oppressive socialization? I 
suggested that the problem of socialization and autonomy could be solved by using Diana Tietjens 
Meyers’ idea of intersectional identity. Intersectional identity is influenced by social systems of 
subordination and oppression. Most people belong to different groups with differing social values. Thus, 
the stark opposition between dominant and subordinate positions can be questioned. People seldom 
belong only to a subjugated group, but are members of privileged groups as well. For this reason, 
intersectional identity explains why it is wrong to assume that women are less autonomous than men. 
Both men and women have different affiliations with groups, some of which are dominant and some 
oppressed. Even though oppression may hinder the development of the skills required for autonomy 
competency, it may also provide elements that constitute autonomy. If one is not aware of one’s 
intersectional identity, one cannot be fully autonomous. I maintained that the problem with intersectional 
identity is that some people have wholly subordinated identities. Intersectional identity does not help to 
understand how these people could be autonomous. Thus, intersectional identity does not solve the 
central problem of the concept of autonomy. Instead, feminists need other theoretical tools to answer the 
question of how autonomy could be possible for those oppressed. 
I presented two alternative theories of autonomy, procedural and substantial, and how 
socialization is viewed through each theory. The procedural theories maintain that an agent must reflect 
critically her beliefs, desires, and values in order to act autonomously. These theories can easily be 
coupled with feminist insights about the multiplicity of agents and relationality. A central element in the 
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procedural theories of autonomy is the idea of “autonomy skills” as part of a larger notion of autonomy 
competency, the development of which depends on cultivating the necessary skills. Autonomy 
competency is achieved through frequent use in social environment and in relation to other individuals.  
Some feminist theorists maintain, however, that the theory of autonomy competency does 
not satisfactorily answer the question of whether desires that are influenced by oppressive socialization 
are autonomous. They maintain that the substantive theories of autonomy are better designed to answer 
this question. Whereas an agent’s motivation, actions, and the critical reflection on these actions are 
central to the procedural theories of autonomy, the substantive theories of autonomy entail some non-
neutral content. Substantive theories put restrictions on the desires, preferences, and values of an agent. 
In the case of feminism, the substantive theories would require a certain content in order to reflect 
“feminist intuition”. According to feminist intuition, only substantive theories can explain why certain 
restrictions should be made on the contents of agents’ preferences.  
I maintain that the substantive theories of autonomy are problematic for the following 
reasons. First, substantive theories of autonomy would require embracing the idea of feminist intuition, 
which is a challenging notion for feminist bioethics. Although it may describe a situation, intuition is 
unsuitable as a prescriptive tool in feminist bioethics. Furthermore, substantive autonomy lacks any claim 
to value neutrality and would open up the possibility of indefensible paternalism. Substantive theories of 
autonomy require people to be fully aware of all of their goals and desires and of the effect of 
socialization on those goals and desires. In other words, these theories would consider authenticity a 
prerequisite for autonomy. I claim, however, that the question should be put the other way around: 
Authenticity emerges when a person’s capacities for autonomy develop.  
Based on my analysis of the problems inherent in substantive theories of autonomy, these 
theories are not suitable for feminist bioethicists who are in favor of the third transformation strategy.  I 
wish to endorse agency that is varied and that preserves diversity among the actions and life-choices of 
individuals. While stating that only certain values are commendable, the substantive theories of autonomy 
might, for their part, restrict the options available to agents and, therefore, restrict the possibilities for the 
diversity of agency. 
The problems related to socialization and autonomy could be solved by abandoning the 
importance of autonomy altogether, as some feminists have suggested. However, this would be 
undesirable from a feminist bioethical perspective because feminist bioethicists committed to core 
feminism cannot abandon autonomy. I suggested that autonomy should be understood as a matter of 
degree instead of as a stable characteristic of a person. This solution to the problem of oppressive 
socialization and autonomy recognizes that oppressive socialization affects more people in a society than 
only those in the worst positions. Most individuals do not possess full autonomy which would require 
226 
 
them to have an array of autonomy skills and independent competencies. Autonomy competency can be 
developed, and agents’ environments have a great influence in the development processes. Autonomy is 
a matter of degree. Therefore, it is wrong to assume that individuals are either fully autonomous or not 
autonomous at all. 
This solution to the question of socialization is not exhaustive. However, although the 
theoretical uneasiness with the transformation of autonomy remains, the discussion of autonomy 
provides some suggestions for concrete actions in health care. Realizing the negative consequences of 
oppressive socialization leads to concrete actions directed to improving the autonomy of the oppressed. 
Therefore, it is important to determine how the feminist transformation of autonomy can be understood 
from the viewpoint of respect for autonomy.  
In chapter 3.4, I showed how autonomy can be applied in practical bioethics. I focused 
especially on the issue of respect for autonomy, which was discussed from three perspectives. First, 
personal autonomy involves individuals as self-determining moral agents who are positioned relationally 
to their families and health care professionals. Second, health care professionals have the responsibility 
to identify oppression and work for its elimination. Third, health care professionals should foster the 
development of autonomy competency in patients and clients.   
Feminist bioethicists, such as Anne Donchin, maintain that respecting autonomy does not 
mean paying attention only to the information given, but also to the manner in which the information is 
communicated. Donchin does not, however, develop her idea of this new kind of informed consent 
process any further. I suggested that feminist bioethics could benefit from developing an understanding of 
informed consent in the manner suggested by Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill. Manson and O’Neill 
suggest that informed consent should be understood as communication and not as mere choice. They 
maintain that informed consent as such cannot be based on individual autonomy. I suggested that, 
although Manson and O’Neill are correct in claiming that the communicative model of informed consent 
cannot be based on individual autonomy, it is worth exploring whether the model could be based on 
relational autonomy, as suggested by feminist bioethicists. 
The proposed model of informed consent as communicative transaction indicates a shift of 
focus from individual autonomy to relational autonomy and especially to the notion of agency. These 
realizations challenge feminists to determine more clearly how autonomy and agency should be 
understood and what their relationship is. 
In chapter 4, I analyzed stem cell research as a test case for feminist bioethics and 
feminist bioethics’ ability to employ its methodologies. I discussed both non-feminist and feminist 
accounts of stem cell ethics. The decision to use both standard and feminist bioethical analyses of stem 
cell research and use was based on my conviction that the stem cell debate is – still even after more than 
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a decade of research – a novel biotechnology that presents new ethical issues. Therefore, it is important 
to examine these issues from different perspectives. The analysis of these different perspectives allowed 
me first, to compare non-feminist and feminist accounts of stem cell ethics and, then to analyze feminist 
perspectives especially, on the novel biotechnology.  
In chapter 4.2, I described the debate over the moral status of embryos from three 
perspectives: the moral status of embryos, the debate about the status of pluripotent stem cells derived 
from human embryos (the derivation-versus-use distinction), and the creation of research embryos (the 
discarded-versus-created distinction). I noted that only a few feminist bioethicists discuss the moral status 
of human embryos. Bonnie Steinbock and Karen Lebacqz are among the feminist bioethicists who 
address this issue and who maintain that the human embryo should be respected. However, the respect 
owed to the human embryo does not mean that embryos cannot be used in research. Steinbock and 
Lebacqz seem to refer to a symbolic value argument in which embryos should be respected as symbols 
of human life. In this view, embryos may be used, but not in unimportant ways. Neither research nor 
assisted reproduction necessarily involves the thoughtless use of embryos. Therefore, neither practice 
threatens the respect owed the human embryo. According to my analysis of feminist bioethicists’ 
treatment of stem cell research, feminist bioethicists maintain that the moral status of the human embryo 
should be examined from a wider perspective than has been done thus far in mainstream bioethics.  
Feminist bioethicists maintain that the biological definitions of the human embryo alone 
should not direct the debate over the embryo’s moral status. Instead, the attitudes in the surrounding 
society and the embryo donors should be taken into account. I emphasized that the stem cell debate is 
inadequate if larger issues of social justice, such as financial issues and donor and recipient protection, 
are omitted. In addition, the socio-economic implications of the research and its possible application 
should be evaluated.  
In chapters 4.3 through 4.5, I explored these issues, beginning with a description of the 
discussion over the just use of resources. Two important perspectives especially were emphasized. One 
is that stem cell research and use cannot be used to strengthen existing or past power inequalities. 
Instead of an individualized approach to stem cell research and use, perspectives based on social justice 
and careful conceptual considerations are needed. The other is that on the conceptual level, discussion 
about stem cell technologies shape the understanding of normalcy and people’s desire for it. The power 
structures that affect the definition of normalcy should be examined.  
In chapter 4.4, I continued to analyze the implications of the fact that stem cell research is 
done on aborted fetuses, supernumerary embryos, and ova for stem cell research. Women and infertile 
couples donate this “material” for research. The analysis of stem cell reports revealed that informed 
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consent is a key issue in regard to donor rights and protection. However, feminists have pointed out that 
these procedures are inadequate for protecting autonomy.  
I concluded that the discussion of stem cell research and women’s role as donors show 
clearly how fragile a concept autonomy is. The chapter indicated the same questions that had surfaced in 
the previous chapters: are women and infertile couples autonomous and thus free to give informed 
consent if their motivational structure is not self-imposed, but affected by a social order? I argued that the 
feminist bioethics that criticizes embryo and ovum donation from this perspective misses the fact that 
everyone is “affected by the social order,” not just women and infertile couples. To suggest that in order 
to make informed choices a women has to be fully autonomous is to have a naïve understanding of 
autonomy. Autonomy becomes an ideal that cannot be attained. Instead, feminist bioethicists dealing with 
stem cell research should look at autonomy theories that emphasize the procedural nature of autonomy 
and that perceive autonomy as a process. The donation processes alone cannot be a threat to women’s 
self-respect, and thus autonomy, because autonomy can be expressed in degrees. 
In addition to a critical evaluation of the stem cell debate, urged by feminist bioethicists, 
sustainable stem cell policies should be grounded on empirical knowledge about how the donors 
perceive stem cell research and the donation process. What is needed is a survey in which women and 
infertile couples could express whether and how they could be empowered as donors of aborted fetuses 
and supernumerary embryos.  
I argued that tissue donation and transfers create threats to individual autonomy, not only 
of the donors but also the recipients. Bioethical attention should thus be directed to the networks and 
relationships created through tissue transfer in general and stem cell research in particular. I employed 
the concept of intercorporeality to explain the connections created between individuals through novel 
tissue technologies. Intercorporeality creates new power relations that are expressed, for example, 
through market forces. Market forces dictate the price of organs and other tissues and hence affect the 
power relations within biotechnologies and therapies. 
In chapter 4.5, I examined the effects of stem cell reports that maintain women should be 
prevented from seeking any profit from donating embryos and fetuses; the reports also emphasize that 
researchers must inform donors that stem cells may be used for commercial purposes and that 
researchers may profit financially. The reports explicitly protect women from the financial pressure to 
donate embryos or undergo abortions. I argued, however, that the policy statements also reflect another 
and often implicit concern – the moral status of embryos and fetuses. While masquerading as promoting 
equality, the reports are unable to provide practical solutions for protecting donors. If the problems related 
to commercialization are to be avoided, then new solutions and guidelines are needed. I presented two 
alternative ways to make women’s share in “stem cell economics” visible. First, a tissue tax would be a 
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monetary compensation paid by biotechnology companies and directed to research on infertility. Donors 
would not benefit directly from the tax, but since there is evidence that infertile donors wish to help other 
infertile couples, the indirect nature of compensation should be appropriate. Second, a woman’s right to 
control the stem cell lines resulting from her tissue should be recognized.   
The reports on stem cell research and use are based on the assumption of the availability 
of surplus – or “extra” – ova and embryos. For this reason, the ethical discussion on stem cell research is 
inadequate if the procedures preceding research and donation, especially assisted reproduction, are not 
considered. From a feminist bioethical viewpoint, assisted reproduction per se need not be opposed. 
Both assisted reproduction technologies and reproduction reflect cultural, financial, and societal contexts 
and discourses. Reproductive technologies cannot be separated from corporeality and women’s bodies, 
which in turn are intertwined with discourse, culture, and power. Therefore, technologies cannot be 
separated from their cultural and social representations. I argued that from the feminist bioethical 
perspective, the point is not in denying or questioning women’s participation in research. Rather it is to 
ensure that all the relevant facts are presented correctly and openly. The point is to acknowledge 
women’s share in stem cell research and therapies.  
In chapter 5, I discussed empirical bioethics and moral agency – two areas in feminist 
bioethics that need special attention and should be analyzed closely in future research. I argued that 
feminist bioethics should develop the use of empirical bioethics, a subfield in bioethics that develops 
ways to contextualize bioethical theorizing by employing empirical data. Its aim is to connect the empirical 
with the normative. What is important is not only that empirical research informs ethical analysis, but also 
that ethical analysis informs the way empirical research is designed and conducted.  
 I argued for empirical bioethics, in which the nature of ethics is taken seriously: ethical 
decisions are always provisional and open for further consideration. The role of empirical bioethics is not 
solely to provide numerical data related to an ethical problem. Empirical bioethics can provide insight into 
how we look at the world as it is and inform debate on how the world should be. At the best, the 
interaction of empirical data and normative evaluation can have an impact on practice and policy. 
Obviously, feminist bioethicists would need to address exactly how the empirical data should be 
evaluated and challenged. Core feminism provides a starting point for such an evaluation: in what ways 
do certain practices either support or oppose the oppression of women and other marginalized groups? It 
would be important to develop feminist empirical bioethics further, use different methods of empirical 
research and evaluate them in relation to core feminism.  
I argued that the second area of development in feminist bioethics is the understanding of 
agency. Feminist bioethicists discuss moral agency in relation to relationships and contexts. According to 
a feminist understanding of autonomy and moral agency, pure, self-reliant subjects disappear and 
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individuality is defined by relationality, through connection with the other. Even though autonomy may be 
compromised by oppressive socialization, agency rarely is. As seen in chapter 2.2, agency is construed 
in the networks of oppression, subordination, and power. These conditions affect how individuals act in 
the world.  
As indicated already in chapters 2.2, 3.3, 4.4, and 4.6, there is a problem of socialization 
in feminist thinking: feminists are faced with the question of how oppressive socialization affects agency 
and what kind of agency is possible for women under oppressive socialization. According to core 
feminism, the aim of feminism is to overturn oppression and challenge the inequality faced by women and 
other marginalized groups. Part of the feminist project is to endorse women’s agency and promote their 
ways of acting in the world. Yet some feminists maintain that these ways of acting in the world can be 
compromised by oppression. Therefore, the aim of feminism is to emancipate women and other 
marginalized groups from oppression. These feminists maintain that women’s agency is compromised if 
women are not liberated from oppression. For them, the concept of agency is best understood in relation 
to the endorsement of feminist values or resistance to the subordinating function of power. The feminist 
aim would be to expose the negative valuation of women and their experiences in certain cultural and 
social practices. In addition, goal would be to show alternative experiences and representations of the 
female body that do not follow the masculinist social and cultural norms. Agency cannot be analyzed 
solely through resistance to social and cultural norms. 
The problem with this model is that it questions the validity of women’s experiences that 
are in accordance with the cultural and social norms often defined as masculinist in feminist thinking. I 
maintain that it is questionable whether feminists should categorize women’s experiences and the 
possibilities women have for acting in the world. For this reason, I questioned the understanding of core 
feminism and agency in terms of liberatory politics.  
Drawing on Saba Mahmood, I argued that agency should be understood as a modality of 
action. In this view, actions do not reaffirm innate desires, and natural desires but rather actions create 
these desires. Actions that outwardly seem to be the result of oppressive socialization may very well 
indicate a different agentival capacity for women. The multifaceted nature of actions must therefore be 
the core of analysis in feminist bioethics. For example, I suggested that reproductive technologies should 
be understood as producing transnational networks of relationships in which individual desires are 
expressed.  
I emphasized that empirical bioethics as presented earlier in the chapter 5 helps to explain 
how the donors themselves perceive agency and autonomy. However, the development of feminist 
bioethics should not rest only on the understanding of agency, but also on a new understanding of 
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epistemology. Although it is not women who express their agency through resisting of social norms, it is 
important that feminists examine those norms identify the ones of particular relevance to women.  
In the Introduction, I suggested that feminists might adopt three different transformation 
strategies, of which the third is the most suitable for feminist bioethics. According to the third strategy, 
transformation is based on an epistemological analysis. The object of knowledge is not women only, but 
prevailing ways of knowing. Feminist bioethicists criticize the way bioethical knowledge is produced and 
maintain that knowledge is produced in a particular situation and particular circumstances, which in turn 
affect the nature of that knowledge. The contextual approach is driving the transformation of bioethics. A 
new, transformed bioethics cannot claim a single truth. In addition to the criticism of standard bioethical 
knowledge, feminist bioethicists must remain critical of the ways feminist bioethics is produced.  
In this view of feminist bioethics, interpersonal responsibility is advocated. The self does 
not exist before it is differentiated from the other, but is built in the interaction of the self and the other. 
There is no defined boundary between subject and object, because they do not radically diverge from 
one another. The subject derives its meaning and being from interaction with the object. In this view, self-
responsibility is responsibility for the other.  
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7 Abbreviations 
ART Assisted reproduction technologies 
EG cells Embryonic germ cells 
EGE European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies 
ES cells Embryonic stem cells 
ESF European Science Foundation 
FAB Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 
GMP Good manufacturing practice 
HFEA Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority 
IAB International Association of Bioethics 
iPS cells Induced pluripotent stem cells 
IVF In vitro fertilization 
IVM In vitro maturation 
NBAC National Bioethics Advisory Commission  
NCB Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
NIH National Institutes of Health 
PCBE President’s Council on Bioethics 
SCNT Somatic cell nuclear transfer 
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